Lithuania’s reaction to Russia’s war against Ukraine: support Ukraine, sanction autocrats, reinforce NATO’s defence capabilities

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The context:

• Support for reforms and integration of the Eastern partners to the EU and NATO has been a cornerstone of Lithuania’s foreign policy since 2004;

• Most of Lithuania’s foreign financial and technical assistance has been directed toward EaP countries;

• Lithuania’s foreign policy makers have been active in support for Ukraine’s Orange revolution in 2004, Georgia in war with Russia in 2008, promoting NATO membership perspective for Ukraine and Georgia (Bucharest 2008), brokering association agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova during Lithuania’s EU Council presidency in autumn 2013, advocating EU membership perspective to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova;

• Annexation of Crimea and war against Ukraine in 2014 acted as an important factor in domestic political mobilisation in Lithuania to increase military spending to 2% of GDP and more, reinforce cyber defence, diversify energy supplies from Russia;

• Lithuania has been among the pace-setters in the EU in responding to crisis in Belarus in 2020 by supporting its democratic activists, hosting them, advocating and applying sanctions to regime in Belarus, reinforcing border protection after illegal migration was weaponised by Minsk against Lithuania, Poland and Latvia.
Lithuania’s reaction to Russia’s war in 2022: supporting Ukraine

• Providing bilateral diplomatic and political support to Ukraine (visits of policy makers to Kiev, etc.), often coordinated with other Baltic States and Poland;

• Sending weapons to Ukraine (Stinger missile systems, machine guns, night vision equipment, anti-drone weapons, protective equipment, etc. for €29 million by mid-March), providing training and other services;

• Advocating for the financial support (a new Marshall plan) for Ukraine from the EU and other Western actors (among founding members of United4Ukraine Steering Committee within the European Parliament), providing in-kind humanitarian and financial aid estimated at €40 million;

• Advocating granting of EU membership perspective to Ukraine (Georgia and Moldova);

• Hosting refugees from Ukraine (around 52000 (1,86% of Lithuania’s population), mostly in March, 2022), integrating them into the labour market, providing education, social support;

• Active public support for Ukraine – private and NGO initiatives to raise funds, provide vehicles, medicines, etc. for Ukrainian fighters (i.e. BlueYellow which has been providing support to Ukraine since 2014, raising more than €25 million by April 15, 2022).
Bilateral support to Ukraine, commitments by type, € billion, Jan. 24-April 23, 2022 (Kiel Institute for World Economy, The Ukraine Support Tracker 2022)

Includes bilateral commitments to Ukraine. Does not include private donations, support for refugees outside of Ukraine, and aid by international organisations. EU commitments not included to avoid double counting (see Figure 4 and A1). Financial commitments that are made explicitly for military and weapons purchases are counted as military aid.
Bilateral support to Ukraine, commitments by type, % of donor country GDP, Jan. 24-April 23, 2022 (Kiel Institute for World Economy, The Ukraine Support Tracker 2022)
Bilateral military aid (including financial) to Ukraine, commitments by type, € billion, top 15 donor countries of 31, Jan. 24-April 23, 2022 (Kiel Institute for World Economy, The Ukraine Support Tracker 2022)
Lithuania’s reaction to Russia’s war in 2022: sanctioning autocrats

- Actively supporting EU wide sanctions against officials, businesses and other entities (sports, culture, etc.) in Russia (and Belarus) applied to the maximum extent (with an aim of ‘deputinization’ of Russia);
- The first among EU member states to announce termination of imports of oil and natural gas from Russia;
- Support for using seized Russian assets for the reconstruction and compensation of damage to Ukraine;
- Lithuania’s parliament (unanimously) was the third after Estonia and Canada to declare Russia’s war a genocide and Russia as a state sponsoring and conducting terrorism;
- Active support for bringing to justice those responsible for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity (i.e. on February 28, Lithuanian government decided to inquire the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court with respect to crimes committed by Russian Federation and Belarus in Ukraine, on March 15, Lithuania’s Minister of Justice send letters to the European Commission and counterparts in the EU member states with a proposal to establish a special tribunal within the EU to investigate aggression by Russia and Belarus).
Lithuania’s reaction to Russia’s war in 2022: reinforcing NATO’s defence capabilities

• Newly forged political consensus to accelerate increasing military spending, possibly to 3% of country’s GDP, other state and societal measures to increase territorial defence capabilities, upgrading and expanding facilities and infrastructure to host additional NATO forces;
• Advocating for stationing additional NATO military forces in the Baltic States and Poland, upgrading air and naval defence;
• Strong positive signalling with respect to the perspective of Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
Thank you!