A "JEW-COMMUNIST" STEREOTYPE IN LITHUANIA, 1940-1941

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An issue of a "Jew-Communist" stereotype is an important one if we look at the causes and motives that made the local population assist the Nazis during the Holocaust, and, first of all, having in mind the fact that within the Lithuanian society a "theory of two genocides" had prevailed for a long period of time. According to this theory, once the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania in the summer of 1941, the Jews extended their support to the Soviets. That is why Lithuanians behaved Jews without mercy. The Nazi Germany occupied Lithuania at the end of June 1941. Afterwards they found no difficulty recruiting accomplices in Lithuania who carried out the massacres. For some, the permanence of the stereotypes may seem extraordinary. However, this permanence of the stereotypes makes the understanding of such a tragedy as the Holocaust in Lithuania more difficult, delaying it. Thus, in this article the author reviews the historical roots of this stereotype that was present throughout the first Soviet period.

During the days of independence, especially during the parliamentary period (1920-1926), Lithuania's left-wing political forces (Social-democrats, Populists) expressed their opposition to the attacks radical Christian-democratic nationalists aimed at the Jews. Although this development departed from its original intentions, but the Jewish community, viewed at large, was to some extent pushed to the political left. At the same time, however, given the fact that Lithuania's State Security Department was the main supervisory institution in the country ruled by Smetona's authoritarian regime, the majority of leftwing Jews became regular "clients" of the State Security Department (further – SSD) and the police. Collected through a network of informants, the bulletins of the police and Lithuania's State Security Department contain extensive evidence on social and political activities of the Jews. Same bulletins presented reviews on the activities of the Bolsheviks-communists (the latter included lists of active communists with Jewish names and surnames) as well as on the activities of the Lithuanian political parties, their secret consultations. Besides, they accounted for the activities of other leftwing

political parties, the Jewish one – among them. It is interesting to note that in these records the Polish were identified as the second most dangerous ethnic group in Lithuania in terms of national security.

Activity of the Jewish political left was the main cause of concern for the police and the Security services. Speaking about Jewish organizations and Jewish cultural activities in general, one could declare that they provoked no concern as they abided by the law and could be considered loyal to Lithuania. No doubt, under the existing authoritarian regime in Lithuania the career of police and the security officers depended a lot on the results of the fight against the LCP (Lithuanian Communist Party). Considered as an anti-state organization, the activities of the LCP were banned, the organization and its members - prosecuted. LCP's ultimate goal was to overthrow the existing regime. Afterwards they hoped to unite Lithuania with the Soviet Union. The composition of the party, thus, had been constantly changing, first of all, given the numerous arrests and administrative fines that had been tabled.

Identification of the Jews with the Communists, 1933-1939

The Jews living in the cities comprised the majority of LCP members. What deserves special attention is the ruling of the LCP's Ukmergė subdistrict. This ruling defined that every communist of Ukmergė was obliged to recruit at least one person of Lithuanian origin – Jews-communists understood it clearly that one-nation-dominated organization would not have any major influence on and among the Lithuanians. Security reports attached huge importance to the activities of the Jews within the LCP. For instance, in their review on the LCP activities in Jonava, the reports came to the following conclusion: "In their preparations to celebrate the day of the unemployed (August 1st), the Jewish women are the most active; all the activities concentrate midst the Jews – they deliver and distribute literature on the occasion of E.Telman's imprisonment in Germany on their own. At the same time, if we divert our attention to the countryside (70 percent of Lithuanian population worked in the agricultural sector, and the majority of the Jews (160 thousand) lived in urban settlements (towns, small and large) – A.E.), there is no communist activity evident."[1] Activities of Jonava communists intensified in October, once Leiba Solomon and Gita Aronsonaitė had been released from prison.[2] In 1933, the SSD defined attempts of the communists to restore their activities in Jonava once the releases were completed in such a way: "Recently, a small group consisting of three Jews has intensified its activities in Jonava; this group has embarked on consistent investigation of the reasons that stand behind the (communist) arrests."[3]

In 1934, the security agencies maintained that the communists had reached the decision to intensify their activities with and inside the non-Jewish youth.[4]

The title of the LCP's proclamation, dated 1934, is quite elaborate in this respect. It said: "A new provocation of the Intelligence. Let's save Schochot, Komodaitė and Sokrataitytė."[5] Soon after the Anykščiai communists started to come around from the arrests, the SSD claimed that those communists who remained in freedom – mainly Jews – tried to restore their activities and planned to publish proclamations in Jewish, given that the majority of the Jewish proletariat working in the city, were unable to comprehend in Lithuanian. A similar case was evident in Utena. Residents of this city – most of them Jews – embarked on more vigorous activities. They had established the so-called IOSR (transcribed from the first letters in Russian – International Organization for the Support of the Revolutionaries) circle, which collected 65 litas to help the arrested communists and their families.[6]

Therefore, in the eyes of the local repressive structures and power institutions, the LCP was seen as a Jewish party. Accordingly, during the years of independence the police and the Security had become major prosecutors of the Jews. Not always did they make distinction between the Jews-communists and the majority of Jews-non-communists in their documents, let alone in their minds. Besides, the SSD documents reflect an additional tendency – namely that of a general negative attitude towards the Jews. Oftentimes they were described in pejorative terms, the tone the security servicemen use was also unfriendly, and the recommendations tabled – often negative in relation to the Jews as a national minority group.

High attention paid for the left of Lithuania's Jews did not mean they were undesirable as the Jews – the Jews had been a loyal national minority group, Lithuanian authorities knew it very well. The SSD documents, 1933-1940 on the activities of the Jewish organizations put it clear: Jews as a national minority group had caused no trouble, they were to a very large extent apolitical, they had not embarked on sabotaging the status quo, and the economic (business) affairs and cultural life was the only matter what they were concerned with. At the same time, concerned with the issue of moving to Palestine, they expressed dissatisfaction with the vigorous participation of the Jews in LCP organizations. The main problem here rested in the fact that the LCP was nothing more than a composite part of another state's – Russian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic – party (RCP(b). The latter was clearly an anti-state party that sought to undermine the legitimate Government and harbor Lithuania to the RFSSR (later SSSR). The party itself refused to accept Lithuania as a state. As a result, they drafted plans which envisaged that in the future Lithuania would become the 13th or 14th Soviet Socialist Republic. In the light of this Lithuania's police prosecuted the LCP as an anti-state, anti-Lithuanian power. Jews-communists, this logic saved, together with the Lithuanians-communists have put themselves onto the list of the enemies of the state of Lithuania. They only had to embark on the activities of the LCP to become part of it.

In some settlements citizens of Jewish nationality dominated in the communist movements. According to the SSD material, this was the case in Molėtai. In 1934 this area saw the dissemination of quite a huge volume of the communist literature; and it was in this area that the anniversary of the October revolution in Russia was commemorated. Because of this, the Security service searched out a number of houses that belonged to the well-known and suspected communist activists – Fruma Bernsteinatė, Naftal Melamed, Lipė, Peisach, Schmuil and Berel Lichts, Roch, Chan and Pesė Lichtaitė, Leib Schochot, Peisach Glot, Zelman Skurkovič, Leizer Segal. All of them, except for youngsters L.Segal and Ch.Lichtaitė, became imprisoned. Although they did not admit they had collaborated with the communists and on behalf of these, they were transferred to the detention of the Utena military commandant. "Activities of the Bolsheviks-communists in Molėtai got paralyzed once these arrests were carried out", - the SSD report claimed.[7]

On the word of the SSD, throughout the period from 1927 to 1936, the Security services instituted 3745 cases against the communist-activity suspects. All these cases were handed over to the court. All in all there were 2843 individuals accused of criminal activities. In addition to this, 1515 cases, and 2688 persons indicted, were transferred for administrative penalties.[8] All this notwithstanding, the overall number of communists grew consistently. Lithuanian CP, Young communists' movements and IOSR enlisted large numbers of people, Jewish by their origin, - the Security services noted:[9]

Year	LCP	LCYU	IOSR	Total of the Jews	Number of the Jews	Percent
1932				705	379	53,8
1933	651	214	173	1 038	514	50,1
1934	968	319	257	1 544	754	48,8
1935	1 345	484	680	2 509	1 109	44,2

The Security services noted, however, that the communists themselves held the belief that all these numbers were higher in reality, and there was no indication the domination of the Jews could have ended. They made no prognosis on whether the Jews would show less interest in the underground communist party, or not, first of all in the view of the immigration constraints all over the world they had to remain in Lithuania and look for the opportunities of settling down. They even had to disregard difficult economic situation they had to face in Lithuania. Pressure on the part of the Lithuanian businessmen would never diminish. Jews would suffer the assaults on their businesses and crafts, which would raise some kind of antagonism and opposition among the Jews vis-à-vis the Government. "It is too short a way for choosing communism afterwards", - the SSD review

concluded. Second – the wave of anti-Semitism that has been launched in the West drew more and more attention in Lithuania. Tauragė and Telšiai have been known for commiting excesses against the Jews. Increased hatred among the Kaunas' workforce for the Jews, - all these phenomena seem to have created favorable grounds for anti-Semitism. Aiming to offset this wave, the Jews are likely to look for the illegal means of fighting. That is why it can be expected that they will lean their backs against the communists, – the SSD concluded.[10]

Emigration, the SSD maintained, was the only chance the number of Jews in the Communist movement could be reduced. They suggested that the émigré encouraged the Jews of Lithuania to leave it for other countries, on the one hand, and, on the other, prevented Jews from entering Lithuania. This applied to the Jews from the Soviet Union, first of all, as they proposed total stopover of emigration from this country. Besides, the SSD stood by the offer to separate prisoners-Lithuanians and prisoners-Jews, so to avoid likely agitation while they were in detention, and keep them apart from each other.[11]

Active participation of some part of the Jews in the activities of LCP was exaggerated to a large extent. To begin with, this pertains to the perceptions of the society. Social, ideological and religious composition of the Jewish community itself was not analyzed in Lithuania, printed media including. Ordinary Lithuanians saw the Jewish community as an integral and compact community. Various layers of this community, however, mobilized themselves for the quest of a more just society, both in the social and in national sense. Henceforth, the socialist idea, which declared social and national equality, seemed to have been very attractive, if not to say infectious. Besides, the Soviet Union never ceased to vocalize its victories, LCP carried out its own propaganda campaigns. As a result, the Jews were active in joining, and, later, participating in the communist movement. In the 1930s, the number of Lithuanians – LCP members – increased. Even so, in 1939 the Jews made up to 31 percent of all the LCP members in Lithuania;[12] whereas in Kaunas, the provisional capital, almost 70 percent of the LCP members were Jews[13]. On the other hand, facing that kind of an era in Europe as it was, the Jews had no other way to follow – they had to choose between the emerging authoritarian, fascist tendencies, and socialism. Nazism promised no good to the Jews, and Socialism, which declared and which propagated the equality of rights between all the nations and all the races, was far more acceptable to them.

Much of ink has been spent in terms of the attempts to explain why had the Jews participated in the activities of the Communist parties, what stood behind this attraction, or, in the words of E.Mendelsohn, what stood behind this 'fatal' attraction for the political left.[14] Massive participation of the Jews in the Polish CP was no surprise to him, whereas, he was surprised by massive participation of the Jews in the Lithuanian CP, given that in this party the degree of acculturation

of the Jews was very low. However, even prior to that, the total domination of the "Hungarians of the Jewish origin" in the regime known since 1919 as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Hungary was obvious. This regime was lead by Bela Kun. In one of the German lands – Bavaria – the communist rebellion was headed by Kurt Eisner, and in Germany Rosa Luxembourg (who was later assassinated) was in charge of it. Success of the Jews in the revolution was most evident in Russia, even despite the fact that its architect, Lenin was not a Jew. The executive initiative, however, resided in the hands of Leon Trocki, Lev Bronštein – in his true name. Jews made up to 15-20 percent of all the delegates during the Bolshevik party Congress. They were "non-Jewish Jews", however. They have worked in the Special Commission – the ČK, Commissariats, the Tax police and the administration. They were active in nationalizing grain reserves from the peasants, - the activities everybody hated them for. The RCP (b) itself laid forward an anti-Jewish policy, annihilated Jewish culture, and Jewish cultural institutions. Non-Jewish Jews observed this annihilation closely. The party set up branches, subsidiaries of the Jewish party, the so-called "Jews'-section", which aimed at obliterating every sign of the "Jewish cultural sectarianism". In terms of the number of its members, the Jewish section – Jews'-section surpassed the Bolsheviks themselves, it had 1200 sub-branches and three hundred thousand members.[15] However, once J.Stalin became chief of the party anti-Semitism within the party. Jews made up a very big part of the victims of repressions. On the other hand, one should notice, the world knew very little about the kind of anti-Semitism that survived in the Soviet Russia. Little was known about the deconstruction of the Jewish institutions. For the most, outsiders held the belief that if the Jews had backed Bolshevism in the near past, they were the ones to take benefit from it. No one thought of the elements that made the non-Jewish Jews different from the religious, Zionist Jews. Many thought they have acted together.[16] In some sense, this has reinforced long-held myths about the Jewish conspiracy, their drive for domination over the world. Some still believed in a forge – namely, in the "Protocols of the Zionist Guru".

In the other countries, Lithuania – among them, the majority of the Jews recognized the fact that in the 1930s, at the time when radicalism was taking hold everywhere, it was natural for a Jew to identify himself as a Jew and socialist. Only few Jews departed from this rule in their community. It is difficult to imagine it could have turned the other way because every day these people faced confrontation and hatred, humiliation that was directed against them. This was the case both in the East and in the West European countries, and even in the United States of America. Either the blessed or the cursed ones, those who came out of the destitute, small craftsmen or the low middle class people's circle, considered the revolutionary changes their only chance to settle in somewhere. In the majority of countries the left could offer this change,

alone. Opposing Nazism, racism, fascism and other anti-Semitic movements was taken as a sign of bravery and self-confidence. All these "-isms" have inflicted losses upon the Jews. So it was natural for them to choose the side of the opposing. However, even by doing so they faced a well-known problem – the Communist parties had no wish to look particularly Jewish, trying to "dilute" themselves by means of recruiting the others.[17] One of the leaders of the LCP, Z.Aleksa-Angarietis, who lived and worked in Moscow, was among those who wanted a more-Lithuanian LCP as well. Angarietis was by no means against Jews; what he reacted to was the invasion of the Jewish majority of the LCP into the Lithuanian elite life – the latter could not exert any meaningful influence on the Lithuanian society – the fact Moscow demanded from the Communist parties it financed. The action launched among the military in 1928, did not offer any help. The Chiefs of the Comintern admitted this either. On March 12th, 1930 in a session of the Poland and the Baltic States' Secretariat Z.Angarietis explained it this way: the majority of Communists, first of all young Communists, are Jews; therefore, they have difficulty establishing and maintaining relations with the Baltic States' military officers.[18]

Still, the Jews felt someone needed them, they felt they were free. Nowhere else but in the Social-Democratic parties, and especially the Communist parties, did they enjoy equal rights. What is most important, however, is the fact that within this socialist and communist circle the "Non-Jewish Jews" did not feel the kind of anti-Semitism they have felt elsewhere. They could take advantage of a human-like comfort. As regards Lithuania, as well as other countries, the Communist movement was best established in urban areas overcrowded with the labor force, craftsmen and intellectuals. As a rule, the Jews lived there. They have been concentrating in the cities and urban settlements. Besides, in comparison to the farmers and the peasants, extremely distant in relation to Marxism, in Lithuania the Jews were better educated.

Furthermore – Marxism has offered the Jews an alternative: even under a constant prosecution and examination, saying no to their ancient religion, they were offered the chance to feel as a people the history itself, not the God, chose; they were offered the chance to feel themselves as a vanguard, as a people who got liberated from their ancestors' outstanding and chauvinistic prejudices, and who could teach the entire humankind, not only the Jews, what was the survival. That is not all. According to E. Mendelsohn, the modern Jew – that is, the one who identified himself with Marxism – eventually got rid of the closed national life of the Jews – the ghetto – their parents still lived in. This was a new situation. In this situation they were hated by their own relatives – Jews themselves, be they Zionists socialists, be they Communists or the representatives of Bund.[19]

Lithuanians and Jews made up the majority of the LCP elite. This fact

notwithstanding, the role national minorities played within the party depended on their role in the most important party organization – namely, that of Kaunas, the interim capital of Lithuania. Party organizers, publishers of the Communist press, agitators, - the Jews have occupied the majority of these positions. Thus, the influence of the Jews-Communists was most evident in the organizational and ideological realm of the LCP. Reading the bulletins of the Lithuania's State Security Department, getting acquainted to the reports of the security agents on the LCP's underground activities, brings one to numerous notes like this: "an instructor from Kaunas, tall, black haired Jew delivered a speech at the meeting"; "representative from Kaunas, a Jew, delivered a sound speech during the sub-district conference", etc. Here is a typical report – "On March 27, 1938 an organizer from the Central Committee of the Red Aid visited Lithuania; he met with the members of the local Bolshevik-Communist party. His characteristics: Jew, approximately 28-30 years of age, dressed in a black coat, wears a black hat, high boots, he is medium-height, beard is shaved constantly. Efforts have been to arrest the organizer"[20]

Security knew it very well (since 1940 this was known from the supporters themselves through the meetings and demonstrations), that LCP and IOSR received funds, among others, from very rich citizens of the Jewish origin – Jokūbas Slavinas from Kaunas, Attorney General of the Soviet machine company SAS to Lithuania, a wealthy businessman, known to have said he had been donating 15 thousand litas each year; timber tradesmen from Kaunas, brothers Bursteins; tradesmen Grodzenski, Mausha Raibshtein, Judelevičius (the latter has been donating twenty thousand litas annually), Samuel Bak, owner of the linen processing factory and a mill in Panevėžys, Chasen; a retailer from Ukmergė, F.Orvin; tradeswoman from Joniškėlis, Cipkė Todesaitė, and other prosperous businessmen.[21]

Social and economic situation in the country was getting increasingly complex, which made the tension in the society grow. Everyone was unhappy, and everyone looked for whom to blame fault on. As seen before, the Government of Lithuania received the same kind of information which identified Jews with the Communists, and vice versa. Using of anti-Jew assumptions was meant to intimidate Lithuanian society. S.Atamukas maintains that under the incitement of the State Security Department, Stasys Yla's book "Communism in Lithuania" saw the daylight in 1937. The author, who was a priest at the same time, published the book under the pseudonym J.Daulius. In the book he bore out evidence that, in his words, proved that a number of factors had made communism acceptable to the Jews; as indicated by him, every Jew had come close to communism; they forgot religion, and the capitalist Jews did not try to stand in the way of their children becoming communists. The book maintained that the Jews wanted to rule the world by means of

Communism; accordingly, the Jewish minority oriented itself towards Communism, which favored Jews in exchange. This book laid out an attitude that it was not only some specific Jewish group that had followed the Communist path. It said that the entire Jewish minority was in favor of Communism; even though the social composition of the Jews, the prevailing religious and Zionist standpoints among and characteristic to them provided no ground for such conclusions[22].

What is most important, however, is that these statements on the pro-Communist orientation of the Jews, spread in the 1930s, have demonstrated the mentality of some Lithuanian intellectuals, who believed that the Jewry cherished Communism not only in the Soviet Union but also in Lithuania. No secret was made of the fact that some rich Jews have extended huge financial donations to the LCP (they have supported the political prisoners). The efforts Lithuania exercised with regard to the launching of similar things were either unknown, or kept covert. Once the leftist public figures – Michalina Meškauskienė, Liudas Gira, Steponas Kairys, Professor Steponas Kolupaila – started visiting Ministers Kazys Musteikis, Antanas Tamošaitis, and started demanding that those convicted for the communist activities be amnestied altogether, the Prosecutor and the Commanders of the Army dismissed this option of general amnesty. The former and the latter motivated such a position by putting forth the fact that 70 percent of those arrested were Jews; among them only few were Russians, and very few – Lithuanians. Antanas Smetona – the President - endorsed this position. Therefore, the decision was made to amnesty on the basis of individual pleas, provided that the prisoners submitted their appeals for clemency.[23]

Speaking about the Lithuanian society, who were those who faced the Jews-Communists directly, who knew about their number and influence inside the LCP, and who had to spend most time on them? First of all, it was the middle and the lower personnel of the State Security Department (heads of the divisions, officials and spies, public police officials, the criminal police, and the personnel of the prisons and political prisoners' camps). There is no doubt that the majority of them felt no sympathy for the Jews-Communists. On the contrary – they have prosecuted the Jews. In due course, some kind of hatred for those who disturbed the peace of mind have been forming among them: they achieved that the underground Jewish communists were a dangerous group in terms of a threatening to the State of Lithuania.

During the period of time when these attitudes prevailed, Lithuania was stunned by extraordinary and unusual events: the 1938 Ultimatum of Poland demanding that Lithuania restored diplomatic relations, and, in essence, gave up its claims on Vilnius; it was followed a year later by the 1939 German Ultimatum, demanding that Lithuania transferred Klaipėda and the Klaipėda

region away to Germany. The society was called to mind. Various kinds of activist movements, critical positions of the changing Governments, emerged. As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (it was concluded on August 23rd, 1939) Lithuania was relocated to the zone of influence of the IIIrd Reich. Later Germany handed Lithuania over to the Soviet Union. By the terms of the Treaty the Soviet Union thrust on Lithuania the latter received Vilnius region and the capital Vilnius in exchange to the let-in of the Red Army garrisons (approximately twenty thousand of the military personnel). Some could see the Soviet occupation approaching gradually.

The society was overwhelmed by desperation – everyone understood that the war was imminent, that Lithuania faced at least the invasion of either Germany or the Soviet Union; perhaps the annexation, maybe the incorporation. Under such circumstances one could have ought of a composition of a small best case, or to be more precise – "less evil", outcome scenario: either the brown fascism, or the red communism, dictatorship one would have to live under in case of major perturbations. Independent Lithuania was a guarantee of peaceful life for Lithuanians and for the Jews. However, should the crisis have taken hold, the Lithuanians could have considered both alternatives, whereas for the Jews – there was the only one, because for them the German Nazi alternative meant nothing else but death. This was the main reason why the majority of Jews favored the Soviets, the Communist regime, which provided the Jewish community with the guarantees of physical survival, at least. Viewed at large, it explains the very geopolitical orientation of the Jewish community. It attached high esteem to the Soviets. The Nazis had not disclosed their plans with regard to the destiny of the Lithuanian nation. Although, the racism promised no good, the events that followed increased the number of Germany and, to some extent, the pro-Nazi oriented devotees among Lithuanians.

Lithuanians and the Jews: First Soviet Rule

The Soviet Union occupied Lithuania on June 14th, 1940. At that time the LCP consisted of approximately 1600 communists – the party was not large even on Lithuanian scale. Once the Red Army crossed the border, a new wave of all-social-groups' representatives flooded the LCP, Jews for the most part. As a result, the percentage of the Jews within the party rose to reach 36 percent, whereas in Kaunas' party organization the number of the Jews rose to 70-76 percent.[24]

Lithuanians caught sight of these developments from the very beginning – domination of the Jewish nationality members in the LCP's Kaunas organization, active participation of the communists in the sovietization of Lithuania, and the appearance of the communists in administration embracing

all those interested in politics. Although all the conversions had been introduced and controlled by the Soviet emissaries, Vladimir Dekanozov and Nikolai Pozdniakov, the majority of common Lithuanians had no idea such developments were taking place. Lithuanians, those who felt no sympathy towards the Jews, referred to the appearances of the ordinary agitators, listened to the speeches they had been delivering and made simple conclusions – Jews could be seen regularly on the political stage, therefore, they were behind everything.

In general, Lithuanians seemed to have overlooked, or they have done this deliberately, the fact that Lithuanians, their nationals, had collaborated with the Soviets in 1940. They tended to look for those responsible somewhere else, and the pro-Soviet oriented Jews were the most easy to notice. There were reasons to put everything this way. No doubt, the activities of the Nazi propaganda reaching Lithuania from Germany were directed at these groups. Since November 1940, LAF publications served the same purpose, that was, to bring the Jewish fault to the fore. Publications came from sophisticated German National-Socialist propaganda workshops.

According to Sergio Romano, people are neither very good, nor very bad and highly honorable. People getting very good or very bad depends on the circumstances, which instigate and provoke them.[25] It is important to judge what historical climate, what circumstances, and what historical conditions set and then intensified anti-Jewish irredenta. Human factors, political and social circumstances, dominated here. They have determined the appearance of the people aggressively oriented toward the Jewish in Lithuania.

One could have forecast of it quite easily that the Jews would sympathize the Red Army once it was appeared on the horizon. This happened in West Belarus in 1939, where the local Jews hailed the arrival of the Reds with major greetings – since Poland had fallen, everyone feared the upcoming invasion of the Germans. Thus, for instance, in Slonim the Jews threw flowers at the Russian militaries, they shook hands and kissed with them in a feast that lasted three days. Speeches had been delivered in favor of Communism, and the alcohol flew in the river-like amounts. The Jews shared the view that the Savior had come and that the Soviet Russians was their Messiah. The Goyas, in the meantime, kept on whispering that the "Now the Doors are open for the Jews to rule".[26] Situation in other areas and settlements seemed to be quite similar. In the West Ukraine, for example, the Jews managed to establish Soviet-governing institutions even prior to the influx of the Red Army. The Jews referred to several motives – ideological identification (delight of the Jews-communists), hopes of social transformation among the most destitute and among the most disappointed part of the population, - all this correlated with the ideological identification; plus they felt that some concrete strong defense,

which was going to take care of them, had appeared. The latter helped the Jews feel as if all the dangers had been postponed. Even the former members of the communist movement, once held in prison and now quite remote from it, soon afterwards became acceptable and important to the new regime.[27] The new regime looked much more pleasing, "less evil", than the German one even for those Jews who had feared and disliked the Soviets. The dominant sentiment, however, was identified by a deeply rooted fear of physical survival because the German defeat of the Poles stirred up massive depression among the Jews. German garrisons stood close by, and the fear of the ensuing terror, ghettos, and the possible constraints lingered all the way about.[28] Numerous memoirs, notes, diaries written by the Jews bear witness of the attitude spread among them: the Jews viewed the arrival of the Red Army as then liberation and salvation. Interesting to note, the Soviets adhered to a strategy of non-emphasizing of the Jews' hopes and their delight; the same applied to the Soviet Yiddish press – the Soviets sought to avoid being depicted by the German propaganda as "the lovers of the Jews". On the other hand, they wanted to preclude the strengthening of the local anti-Semitism, should the Jews be over-appreciated.[29]

Part of the Jews dived into great enthusiasm once the invading garrisons of the Red Army appeared in Lithuania the Government of the latter had to let in as a result of the June 15, 1940 Soviet-delivered ultimatum. Speaking about Lithuania's Jews who were the first to greet the Soviet armada crawling into the cities, they have shared the view that there was a few-hour gap between the Red Army and German Wermacht in their entry of Lithuania; given that the former outpaced the latter, they have constantly emphasized that Stalin was better than Hitler.[30] Historian Zenonas Ivinskis wrote in his diary: three tanks rested in the Laisvės avenue (Liberty avenue). "People, most of them Jews, gathered around the tanks and, it seems as if ingratiating and as if giving away any kind of self-respect, pretended to be the true henchmen of the Bolshevik militaries". In the Savanorių prospect "herds of Jewish girls and Jews, all below 18 years of age, greeted every passing car as if they were unchained. "Urra.Valio", they shouted, sung, swung their hands, and screamed… I got the impression that all kinds of sediments, checked by the former regime, now crawled into the streets. The young Jews notwithstanding, the elderly Jews did not share their joy. They had disapproved of what they saw. All they did - they watched and examined."[31] Many Lithuanians know it very well that the Jewish youth threw flowers at the Russian tanks. Lithuanians think there were no Lithuanians among them. Once again, this is the place the mentality finds its crossway.

One would find it easy to explain why the Jews sympathized the Soviets. When the Soviets occupied the part of Lithuania on the right bank of Nemunas river, and did not cross the river to reach the left bank, the fact itself caused

huge anxiety among the Jews in the Suduvite land. Chief editor of the LCP newspaper "Tiesa", Genrik Ziman in an interview with the American journalist Anna Louise Strong remembered that one Vilkaviškis' Jew had come to the editorial office crying. He said: "You are so happy you are here. If some Red Army officers cross the river, should I sell my house? What do you think?" In due course, however, the Red Army crossed Nemunas river, and the panics ended. This was the happiest meeting ever, - Strong wrote.[32]

The moment was a happy one for the Communist prisoners, put behind bars during the Antanas Smetona regime. On June 18, 1940 the Presidential decree of Justas Paleckis released them from detention. Important LCP guru left the top-security prison in Kaunas. All in all there were 104 communists; 45 percent of them – Jews. The same case, with non-determining deviations, applied to Vilnius, Šiauliai, Marijampolė, Panevėžys.[33]

Communists youth branch, Soviet sympathizers also made clear distinction whom to applause, and whom – not to. Garrisons of the Lithuanian Army, still dressed in authentic uniforms, attended the communists'-organized meetings and festivals. When the Lithuanian garrison marched by the public, one could hear the whistling. The militaries caught sight of those who whistled and remembered their dim faces[34].

Lithuanian writer Jokūbas Josadė, a Jew by descent, remembered the situation in such a way:

"I was to such a great extent overwhelmed by colorful mass demonstrations, speeches at the meetings, exclamations "Valio" and "Ura", that I have lost the sense of reality completely. I felt as if I had become totally insane: alien Army has occupied the country, it embarked on rapacious activities, and my hardened heart was jumping in joy. Innocent people got arrested and deported to Siberia, and I was bent to justify all this. Why? I was no communist, but I was … a Jew, the Jew who has been hated and insulted every day before today, and today… I remember coming to the LCP Central Committee as a journalist. Almost in every cabinet of this building I had spoken to the highest standing officials in my native Yiddish language. This has reinforced my sense of self-esteem. I used to triumph: the national question was finally settled."[35]

Such facts are mentioned repeatedly in the narrations and memoirs of that time witnesses-Lithuanians. These events have dramatically transformed the situation vis-à-vis the Jews in 1940. Mykolas Kuprevičius and other authors, who gathered the data in the DP camp, described this situation in a document "On the Issue of Lithuanian-Jewish Relations". In an essay dedicated to the Supreme Lithuanian Liberation Committee (SLLC) he tried to generalize the postures that characterized Lithuanians at that time.[36] The essay took a broader look at the views of Lithuanians towards the Jews during the first Soviet rule.[37] The major part of the text, commissioned to the SLLC, consists of the

M.Krupavičius article. It opens up with the text "Lithuanians-Jews relations during the Brown occupation" (according to Krupavičius the topic was touched upon by bishop Vincentas Brizgys, Liudas Šmuikštys[38]. Provided that Mykolas Krupavičius commissioned the major part of the text, we will further on consider him the main author of the document[39]).

Written in the aftermath of the war, Krupavičius' contribution, it is important to know and to compare, testified that Lithuanians held a very hostile opinion on the Soviets in addition to a very negative attitude towards the active part of Lithuanian Jews few moments prior to the German attack of the Soviet Union. Such kind of a stance was exploited by some during the period of the Nazi occupation. In the document Lithuanians drew in 1946, almost equal responsibility was blamed on the Jews communists, Jews identified with the communists, be they guilty or not, had they contributed to the establishment of the Soviet regime in Lithuania, or not. This is how the high-standing religious leaders of the Catholic Church perceived the situation. It seems, the laymen understood it the same way.

In 1940 Lithuanian society looked as if it were stunned, chaotic; it was catching out every rumor – economic and political crisis had followed the psychological one. On June 24, officers of the Šiauliai SSD office concluded that panics had taken hold among the farmers. Fearing that the Soviets were going to nationalize their farmlands and properties, they calmed down only after the new Minister of Agricultural spoke out in a radio show on June 22. Military officers felt disturbed either: they were unsure about their future; some of them thought that Lithuania's Army could be discharged. It included a chapter on the Jews. Its title was quite eloquent – "Jews Disregard Lithuanians". The chapter maintained:

"Once the Soviet Army entered Lithuania, the Jews set to express their arrogance. Sometimes it happens that irresponsible element of the Jewish society, youth for the most part, walk throughout the city streets in groups and make it difficult for Lithuanians to move freely on the sidewalk. Besides, one can hear complaints on the side of Lithuanians that the Jews threaten them with the expression like: "Now we are the masters".[40]

The situation looked similar in the Marijampolė region. At the meetings of Russians the Jewish youth was the most active again. Lithuanians could not stand the conclusion the State Security Department arrived at was quite cool, official, but eloquent at the same time: "Expression of the Jewish youth hampers the normal order of things". In Alytus, local Jews could not remain indifferent to the declaration of the new puppet Government of Lithuania which emphasized its opposition to any kind of chauvinism saying that everyone could work as rightful citizens. Nevertheless, in the suburbs of Seinai (Lazdijai) the Jews have split into two groups, - the Security Service wrote down, - the wealthy

would like that this Government remains in office, whereas the poor wanted the new Government to be formed of communists.[41]

It was not without due cause that Zenonas Ivinskis' notes as of June 30, 1940 were laid down thereafter:

"…Bolshevization proceeds. Jews are the most conspicuous. Of course, the wealthy Jews, whenever they have the opportunity to choose between Stalin and Hitler, they choose the former. The Majority of the people (at least those whom I know) want nothing else but the advent of the Germans. What begins afterwards is the formal massacre of the Jews. One could take sight of rage that flew into the air as a result of the impertinent benevolence of the Jews toward the Bolsheviks, as a result of their internationalism, intractability. Ign. Malinauskas and other decent people have addressed it the similar way. In Marijampolė the impudent Jews had beaten one Lithuanian military officer. Afterwards all the windows of the Jews up to the second floor were broken down"[42].

Indeed, this kind of event took place on June 19 when Moshe Krepko beat the lance corporal of the 3rd artillery regiment, Leonas Senkus. Enraged crowd started breaking the windows of the Jewish homes. The following day the military officers and civilians, electrified by the anti-Jewish rumors, broke the windows of Leizer Spender, the advocate. Windows of other Jews were broken either, and the crowd was pacified thanks of the efforts of the police.[43]

More were exceptions in terms of personal conflicts. On June 26 evening, on his way home the officer of the Office of the Commandant of Tauragė district, Januška was given a sharp scolding from a number of Jews who called him a pig; the whole story tells us that Januška's conduct against the Jews was several times inappropriate, equal to the burst of outrage against them. Januška submitted a complaint to the Head of the County; the public police investigated the incident.[44] The Jews-Soviet activists had to take active part in the Soviet reforms, nationalization of the private property, thus, laying grounds for general anti-Jewish sentiments within the society. Having nationalized the properties of the Jews, the authorities had installed supervisors-commissars from among the Jews, former subordinates. Thanks to these means the number of Jews-officials increased. They took the place of the owners of the companies and shops. These activists were those whom the people disliked most. In his diary Zenonas Ivinskis has presented the sequestering of his mother's farm and house (only two small rooms out of the entire house remained in her hands) in Kaušėnai, near Plungė:

"This is how the representative of the Communist party, Šeras behaved himself. You have to remember that several months beforehand he had been purchasing leather skins at the bazaar. Generally speaking the Jews have advantage of their new position almost every time they had one. On the other

hand, the negative attitude of the people, and especially the intelligentsia toward the Jews was getting increasingly stronger. Brother Paulius had a huge conflict with this Šeras. During this process of sequestering Šeras demanded that the fodder be moved out of the cattle-shed. Paulius used the chance to note:

- You cannot speak in such an indifferent manner. We do not have the place where to put this fodder. Last but not the least, we need more time.

- Don't You dare argue with me, or otherwise we will send You to sweep the manure, - the Jew shouted.

Then Paulius raised his voice and, showing the blebby hands, said the following:

- Look at my hands. I am not afraid of work. Show me yours?

The Jew replied nothing to this. In general, the communist Jews have tried to toady upon the Red Army as much as possible. Besides, they have tried to hurt the people deliberately. That is what they do as well."[45] The observers got this kind of impression from the clashes with the new Soviet officials, who had no basic knowledge in the majority of spheres the Soviets entitled them to conduct.

Discontent with regard to the Jews was observed in the West Belarus as well – the Poles were angry at the Red color of the Jews, their domination in the administration, and their serving of the will of the "Moscovites". Belorussians liked the Jewish officials by no means either. Having acquired the role of the ruling, the majority of Jews did not identify themselves with the Soviet regime, its methods and its purposes. What they showed was the artificial loyalty to the regime, because, as they understood it, it was the only way to keep their job and the position they occupied. Although the Soviets recruited a number of local non-Jews into their governing institutions, all the local Jews were identified with the Soviet regime.[46]

In the majority of settlements, and especially in the countryside, the IOSR became almost the exclusive form of the social activities of the youth. Jewish youth made up almost half, or even more, of its members. This state of affairs determined the character of this organization's activities. Most of the cultural activities were held in Yiddish, the majority of the Jewish drama clubs functioned on behalf of IOSR, and the organization has established Jewish libraries in the major part of these settlements.[47] In five months since the beginning of the occupation, the number of the members of the organization increased from 6 to 25 thousand. In 1941 the total number of IOSR members reached 60 thousand individuals. The majority of Jews did not rush into the Communist organizations. Given that IOSR was not an official party organization, and there were less problems becoming a member of it than of the LCP or LLCYU, the IOSR attracted numerous wealthy Jews (who wanted to adapt to the new regime, or, in the words of M.Krupavičius, the utilitarian Jews). Part of these

Jews had extended support to the political prisoners Jews, and for that sake they had used the IOSR. Referring to this, the new Soviet regime showed respect to them, or at least did not snub them.[48] In the meantime, for some Lithuanians the IOSR was, beyond doubt, the communist organization, secret and covert during the period of independent Lithuania and now, given the Soviets ruled, the organization which has joined together a number of rich and poor Jews. Understanding the true causes behind the loyalty Jews demonstrated because of necessity not because of convictions to the Soviets A. Vienuolis-Žukauskas used sarcastic language to define this situation, precisely:

- "The Jews dressed themselves in the red stockings"[49]

Outrage towards the Red Jews, or the appointed individuals to administer former private property, grew, very little made them different from all the other Jews. In Lithuanian cities the Communists had organized public demonstrations gathering thousands of people. On July 3, 1940 an illegal meeting was held in Tauragė. The decision was reached to send the delegation to the Head of the County in order to obtain a permit to organize the anti-Jews demonstration. The organizers planned to speak against those Jews who strained to be in the Governmental and public institutions and who now exerted large influence on the present Government. Should the Head of the County have refused to grant such a permit, they had nevertheless committed themselves to organizing exactly the same demonstration.[50] Religious believers experienced the greatest anxiety because did not understand the new transformations. Having heard the radio report stating that the chaplains were being discharged from schools, prisons, hospitals and other institutions, the Catholics had started talking that, whatever the repercussions, should the religious lessons at Lithuanian schools be abolished and in the Jewish schools – maintained, a huge movement with huge consequences would be launched against them.[51]

It is important to note that M. Krupavičius in the document he wrote on behalf of VLIK on the politics of Sovietization the Soviet Union carried out in Lithuania, and on the limitations on the Church and the transformations it underwent, referred to this as an anti-Lithuanian, exceptionally Jewish policies, - as if no Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Soviet ultimatums, June 15th, 1940 Soviet occupation, Soviet and Kremlin designs to incorporate Lithuania, nationalize private and religious property had ever taken place. The Jews were not alone in their efforts to take over the Jewish property and religious institutions, and eradicate the Catholic religion. It is erroneous to think they were alone. We could refer to an attitude Lithuanian Catholic authors expressed in 1946; beyond doubt, that day propaganda had its influence on the author exerted:

"Jews disliked Catholic clergy very much. Once the Bolsheviks came in, they embarked on consistent measures aimed to prosecute, impede their pastoral work and cause difficulties everywhere they could. For example, even prior to

the consistent Russian Bolshevik crusade against religion and religious Catholic officials, the first Commissar of Health the Bolsheviks installed, Jew Kogan ordered that heads of the institutions subordinated to his – namely, the Catholics – be removed, and the Crosses from hospitals – confiscated. The Jews replaced the removed Catholic officials. Besides, they started dismissing the merciful sisters, nurses and Catholic nuns from hospitals. Jews administrators, aiming to make fun of the nuns, promised to retain them in service unless they comply with one condition, namely, if they pledge to… get married.

In the hospitals headed by the Jews or Russians, the late patient could not make a confession because the priest was disallowed to serve any spiritual care over the patients. In any case, heads of the hospitals – Lithuanians – still managed to find ways to let the priests into their hospitals where they could attend the late patients.

Following the shutting down of all the Catholic organizations, the Bolsheviks confiscated their property and reassigned them to the newly established Bolshevik organizations. Almost all the organizations of such a kind established were established and managed by the Jews. The Jews were among the first who attacked the Catholic property, and they received the major part of it. On behalf of the Commissar of Health, Kogan the Board of Kaunas' Jewish hospital demanded that the Religious seminary be handed over to the club of the hospital's personnel, the kindergarten, etc. Jews of the Kaunas city Committee without more ado have moved into the residence of Archbishop – the Curia and his personal apartment, new civil registrar's office and the residence department. All Lithuanian bishops without exception shared the same fate. Bishop of Vilkaviškis, then 90 years of age, was forced to settle in one small room inside the parsonage. The peace the latter could have enjoyed for some time, however, was not too long to last. First what the city Jews did with the parsonage, they have established a dispensary for the venereal diseases, later reformed into the dispensary for the consumptive diseases. Local municipalities, managed by the Jews, took over the control of the parsonages of the Catholic parishes. As regards the priests – they had been evicted from their apartments. So rarely, had the priests a chance given for them to hold on to the room. When they had one, they had to pay high rent."[52]

Provided that this was the way outstanding Lithuanian Christian-Democratic party representative, politician, Catholic priest, thought and evaluated the situation, there is no doubt that the ordinary Catholic viewed the situation with far greater resentment.

Thus in 1941, - full and fully true facts unavailable, - the Jews, regardless of the true, not that dramatic situation, were made responsible and guilty for everything that was happening at the time – sovietization, arrests of Lithuanians, destruction of the army, separation of the Catholic Church from the State,

deportations of the population to Siberia. Besides, the Jews were made guilty of the new social problems that emerged as a result of sovietization. Thus, it was the milieu the Nazi propaganda had used to disseminate the "Jew-Bolshevik" image it had constructed and now transferred. In such a difficult situation Lithuania faced during 1940-1941, this image, whatsoever contradictory, took hold in some part of Lithuanian society because the Jewish society itself was not monolithic and the communists had not prevailed in it. In fact they were in a minority position.

The stereotype had taken the root despite the fact that similar to the eclectic German national socialist construction in Lithuania the term "Jew-Bolshevik" did not fit into the logical framework. Jew – Bolshevik, or, in other words, non-Jewish, non-religious Jews, could be a Bolshevik because they did not believe in God. However, the absolute majority of Jews kept close to religion, thus they neither could nor were they Bolsheviks. They became sympathizers of the Soviets because of geopolitical considerations. What "made" them resemble the cohort of the Soviets was a rather obvious general attitude of the Jews who regarded the Soviet Union with favor because in terms of physical security they felt more or less secure under its rule. Second – the Jews were accused of exploiting Lithuanians on the basis that they were the wealthy ones, plus, capitalists; in that case, what Bolsheviks they were? Therefore, considering the anti-Jewish attitude characteristic to the part of Lithuanians, even the wealthy and affluent strata of the Jews, all the Zionists and other non-communists could not counter-balance the conviction that every Jew was a Bolshevik.

Effect of Lithuania's Incorporation into the USSR

What generated the myth that Jews betrayed Lithuania, it seems, was the visual impression demonstrations, - Jews were the most active there, - generated in the minds of Lithuanians watching how Lithuania evolved into the LSSR (Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic). On July 21st, 1940 Vilnius branch of the State Security Department, headed by a communist A. Mickevičius, generalized the information on two massive demonstrations. The first was held in Eišiškės. 200 people, majority of them – the Jews, took part in it. Speaking on behalf of the communists they expressed happiness the Red Army had liberated them, and that soon Lithuania would become the LSSR. On the same day, at one o'clock, a large meeting was organized in Vilnius, at the Lukiškių Square. Gathered together, a huge crowd held portraits and pictures of Stalin. The same way as before, the majority of them were Jews; one could have found only few Lithuanians and Poles there, - the Communists-controlled Security Department report stated. After the meeting, the participants of the meeting

walked down the streets of Vilnius, demonstrating. Vilnius residents stood on the streets watching the demonstration; couple of them shouted "Jews! Get Away!"[53]

The texts the people Lithuanians wrote on the electoral bulletins during the farce elections into the Soviet People's Seimas testify their increasingly anti-Jewish frame of mind: "My intuition and conscience tell me not to vote for those who are ready to sell their motherland, just give them a chance"[54]; one military officers wrote it this way: "Once and together again our battalion says yes – we want Hitler"; "I do not wat to be a slave of Jews' desires and I will never stand for the nations' future traitors"; "Jews away from Lithuania People's Government. Confiscate every cent of the Jewish Capitalists-Trotskyist property. Give the Jews-capitalists property to the enslaved Lithuanians – their "used to be" servants"; "Lithuania for Lithuanians, not for the venal creatures. Long live national socialism."[55] In Šiauliai county one could have run into a proclamation "Lithuania's sons and daughters", which urged resistance to the communist and Jewish influence, and which urged joint measures against the Jews and Godlessness. The text ends with a slogan "Long live Catholic Lithuania".[56] Following notes were found in the town of Kriukai: "Down you scoundrels Jews, down you venal creatures". Elsewhere there was a long note found instead of a bulletin, plentiful of anti-Jewish slogans calling them the greatest enemies of the Lithuania: "Viva independent, free and democratic Lithuania".[57] In Radviliškis Naoch Mackevičius, number five on the list, was sabotaged by the rural settlers. The majority of Jews put bulletins into the ballot-box with Nr. 5 marked on it, whereas the rural settlers torn that number out of their bulletins.[58] The same applied to the mixing-up of the Bolsheviks and Jews into one in the West Belarus. During the elections one could trace similar slogans as in Lithuania: "Death to Bolsheviks and Jews"; "Down the Soviet regime"; "Long live Hitler".[59] What showed to be different – the Poles, not the Lithuanians, wrote these slogans.

In Lithuanian literature the Jews have been frequently accused of propagating the Bolshevism. This was the case during the 1940-1941, as well. Liudas Truska[60], Nijolė Maslauskienė[61] and other historians referred to the facts to reveal that this treatment was a wrong one. Thus, in this case we have to address the image of Jews in Lithuanians' conscience, or, in other words, the problem of mentality of Lithuanians during that period.

At the same time, it seemed as if Jews-communists had launched competition with Lithuanians-communists, Russians-communists inside the LCP itself. What that brings about is that the organizations, which have officially declare national equality, set favorable ground for bipolar or even tripolar forms of nationalism to emerge. October 1940, after the LCP became part of VCP(b), saw the beginning of cleansing against the members of the party: in the end

half of its members – Lithuanians and Jews – were purged. The overall number of Lithuanians in the Communist party fell by 9 percent, whereas the number of Russians increased by 6 percent. As regards other nationalities, - their overall number increased three times. The percent of the Jews, however, remained stable. They have managed to retain their impressive domination in the Kaunas organization. As of the January 1st, 1941 Lithuanians made up 63.5 percent of the LCP members. The remaining part of the LCP consisted of the Jews and Russians (16 percent each), and the communists of other nationalities (4 percent). External and publicly declared internationalism notwithstanding, one could become aware of the friction that subsisted between ethnic-national groups within the LCP. All these national groups, of course, had nothing to do with the protection of the national interests of Lithuania, or the national interests of Lithuanians or Jews, - what they did – they have collaborated with the occupation forces and participated during the sovietization of Lithuania. Russians had the leading role in the party, although, the majority of them occupied "secondary" posts.

After the Jews communists had been absorbed by the Soviet administration, Lithuanian Commissars started competing with Chaim Aizen and to some extent – with Icik Meskupas-Adomas who would play the decisive role in the formation of the Soviet Lithuania administration. It was followed later by the competition of Lithuanian and Jewish communists groups. The goal was simple: who would take the most important posts. Antanas Sniečkus, as the chief of the LCP, expressed no formal support for any national communist group, tried to balance between them, and uphold the equilibrium.

I.Meskupas-Adomas, Ch.Aizenas and others took charge of the LCP cadres' policies. They have coordinated and put into practice the formation of the party and administrative apparatus on all levels. Likewise, they have administered its social political composition (carried out social political cleansing) and, as a result, recruited more and more Jews into the Soviet nomenclature, consolidating their positions. 15 percent of the officials were Jews communists. In comparison to the proportion of Jews to other nationalities in Lithuanian society, their representation in the Soviet institutions was twice as large. 80 percent of the Jews communists got employed as the public officials; Lithuanians communists managed to employ only 65 percent of their fellow-nationals, Russians – 67 percent. Concentration of the Jews in Kaunas, the heart of LSSR administration, cornering of the personnel policies in the hands of Meskupas-Adomas and Aizen helped Jews, members of LCP, retain solid standing within the party and the administration throughout 1941.[62] For instance, in August 1940 there were 94 staff members in the Ministry of Trade. Among them – 48 were Jews. The same applied to the Trusts, which appeared later. Almost half of the employees there used to be Jews.[63]

Therefore, rather small influx of Lithuanian communists into the administration confirmed the long-established impression that this administration rested in the hands of Russian settlers and local Jews. Soviet authorities and the Jews communists could not at that time have predicted what ace-card they had handed over to the nationalists and Lithuanian anti-Semites (later on, the Nazi propaganda including). It is understandable why no-one paid attention to the fact that prior to the Soviet occupation almost all the Jews worked in private enterprises. Once the Soviets nationalized them, the people could not find it anywhere else, the job. That is why a larger percent of Jews came to work in the administration.

Soviets used one hand to stifle national Jewish organizations and institutions. They used the remaining one to caress the Jews: by means of declaring the war on anti-Semitism, by means of declaring the equality and brotherhood of all nations. At the first sight, it seemed as if Lithuanians, who had not been used to public speeches and declarations, statements denouncing anti-Semitism could have got the impression that the authorities were Jewish-oriented, which meant that the new authorities promoted, and looked after the interests of the Jews first of all. Such talks had taken place regularly. For example, in Vilnius during the electoral campaign into the USSR Supreme Council, member of LCP Central Committee, Head of the Bureau of National Minorities Henrik Ziman announced that since the day the Red Army had entered Lithuania, anti-Semitism suffered a deadly blow. Every anti-Semite felt the consequences of that, and every anti-Semite who still remained untouched would get what he or she had deserved. Among the Governments of the world the Soviet Government is the only one free of anti-Semitism. Stalin said that anti-Semitism was worthy capital punishment. The Communist party would never let the anti-Semitism in because everyone knows that anti-Semitism is revolution.[64]

This was a misleading path for the enthusiastic and energetic Jewish youth. Their representatives were used to accentuating that the new Government was theirs and that Lithuanians were not longed-for in these organizations, that they had to be managed by, or at least dominated by the Jews. Communist youth organizations also saw the increase of the Jews, and "Yddish Štraln" was one of the communist youth's newspapers. From its pages it becomes clear that friction between the Jews and Lithuanians was evident in the primary communist youth organizations. On its pages one could become aware of the nationalism of both Lithuanians and Jews, which broke up such communist youth organizations that conveyed strong anti-Lithuanian sentiments. On July 17, 1940, Editor of the newspaper Aron Garon published an article "Fighting Chauvinism and all its Forms". He wrote that some fraction of young Jews tried no way to be friendly to Lithuanians because they seemed to have decided

that there could be no friends on the part of Lithuanians. Žasliai communist youngsters, claimed Garon, wanted no less than the communist youth organization consisting of members Jews because Lithuanians, in their opinion, were … hooligans. One communist youth member complained to Lithuania's Communist Youth Central Committee: " Why did you make that friend / Lithuanian/ a secretary and pay them 200 Litas per month? You could have given that job to a Jewish boy, instead?"[65]

Secretary of the Communist Youth Union recorded the following situation: a member of the Jewish Committee, surrounded by his friends Jews, resides in the Communist Youth club. They express themselves in Yiddish loudly. Meanwhile, on the opposite corner of the club one can find a member of the Committee who is Lithuanian and is surrounded by Lithuanian Communist youth. They speak in Lithuanian. Member of the Central Committee had an interpretation delivered to him by the Communist youngsters – Jews who told him it was impossible to make friends with Lithuanians.[66] It is difficult to say whether these cases were typical examples displaying the attitude within the Jewish-Lithuanian communist circle; however, one could say these kind of issues appeared frequently in the entire Lithuania.

Research carried out by Liudas Truska, a historian reveals quite huge a number of the Jews entering the ranks of the Soviet administration, the police and the security services. Except for a few institutions, nowhere else did they comprise the majority. According to Arvydas Anušauskas, 118 individuals out of 254 the State Security Department employed in 1940 were Lithuanians; 92 were Russian and 44 were Jews.[67] On the other hand the percentage share of the Jews – NKVD officers was considerably higher if compared to the percentage of Jews in the society. In May 1941, Russians made up 52.2 percent of those employed in the central apparatus of the Security Services, whereas there were only 31.2 percent of Lithuanians followed by 16.6 percent of Jews. It goes without saying, thus, that the Jews did not make up the majority.[68] Brought by the increasing number of Lithuanians entering the LCP, plus, given the influx of immigrants from the Soviet Union, the percentage of the local Jews in the LCP fell gradually. However, once the number of Jews has started to rise, Lithuanians noticed this immediately because for the majority of them this was unusual. They knew the not-written law, according to which the Jews were kept away from massive entrance into the Administration of the independent Lithuania, Chiefs of Staff, let alone the editorials of Lithuanian newspapers. Soviets, on their part, considered it necessary to attract the Jews because they knew the Russian language and could be useful as interpreters. In such historical circumstances a slogan saying that Jews ruled Lithuania had appeared.

Yet another moment existed, which had exerted negative impact on mutual relations. It was a traditional eastern affection of the Jews toward the Russian

culture, language, which became clear in various state institutions in 1940. And it was the reason why the group of the Jewish communists clashed with Lithuanian nationalists. Matured during the years of independence the young generation of Lithuanians, or at least the major part of it, did not speak the Russian language any longer. Geopolitically, it oriented itself toward the aid from the West. They thought the only country, which could have granted freedom to Lithuania, was its strong neighbor – Germany. Therefore, its attack on the Soviets was the only means of dropping the Soviet chains off Lithuania. What they believed in was that the activities of Germany on the eastern front would help restore either independent or dependent-on-Germany state of Lithuania.

The traditional, historically bound anti-Jewishness of some part of Lithuanians, reinforced by an active role the Jewish youth played in the Soviet politics, triggered the unprecedented wave of anti-Jewish sentiments. Manifest anti-Communism on the part of the Jews, oftentimes confused with anti-Semitism, could be observed even in the Soviet-controlled institutions. Some of these developments gained publicity, for instance in the Lithuanian Army the Soviets aimed to dissolve. Anti-Jewish sentiments, needless to say, soon reached the military units, military officers and the private ranks. Using the July 2nd meeting at the 9th Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytenis' regiment, the Communists organized a meeting in favor of adopting Stalinist constitution. Colonel Lieutenant of the General Staff and Commander of the regiment, Karolis Dabulevičius set off the meeting. Stasys Čepas, private of the first machine-guns company spoke at the meeting. According to him, the workers had to work hard in the past; they used to be exploited and offended; they had to live in the cellars, they had to work hard at the factories (up to 16 hours a day) they have receiving no extra payment for. Once the prompt soldier completed the speech, the communists gave him a storm of applause. To believe the words of the witness, the following words were the last the private uttered in his speech: "Who is to be blamed? Jews capitalists, of course (applause. Communists applaud, although, with far less fervor). – Whose hands hold these factories and companies the workers are exploited at? – Jews! (applause. Communists no longer applaud). – Who owns the largest shops and magazines downtown? – Jews! (applause). – Who is the owner of the capital? – Jews! (applause, accompanied by screams "Hurrah"). – Who is opulent in terms of luxury, who owns luxurious cars and houses? – Jews (applause, accompanied by screams "Hurrah"). – One of the Communist fellows interrupts the speech, - that is why one can hear exclamation from within the soldiers of the regiment: — Why don't you let him speak? Is it because he says the truth, isn't it?"[69] 31 men – officers and privates – were arrested as a result of this meeting and placed in the Kaunas high security prison.

Few Jews had occupied representative posts. As mentioned above, most of them operated in the executive. Contrary to what Lithuanians thought was a stone, Jews were not a dominant force among the political leaders, as well. In September 1940, at a time when Lithuanian army was in the process of liquidation, it included 47 political leaders (to be more precise, 29 in the territorial riflemen corps), among them – eleven Jews and Russians.[70] Even though there were no settlements the Jews prevailed in, even though, similar to Lithuanians – supporters of the Soviets, they carried out the politics of the Soviet authorities, not their own, Lithuanians appeared to have overlooked the majority of Jews who were not in favor of the Soviets. On the contrary – the majority now saw the Soviet regime, void of Jews in the past, as the "Jewish regime". What could have the Lithuanian peasants thought as long as they faced communists youngsters, most of them – Jews, pushing forward the pro-kolkhoz propaganda or teaching them how to manage a farm; or as long as they witnessed Jewish nationality Soviet activists confiscate the property of large farms.[71]

Anti-Jewish sentiments survived in the countryside, let alone in Kaunas. What remains unclear is to what extent they prevailed at that time. According to Aleksandras Pakalniškis, the behavior of Jews during the summer of 1940, perhaps, could have justified, provided that once the red wave overcame Lithuania, for Jews it had meant survival from death:

"They welcomed Russians with smiles on their faces. Most of them decorated themselves in red stars. What they managed to do – they became adjusted with the new situation. Once the larger shops were nationalized, former owners of these shops – Jews – became chiefs of the same shops; in comparison to less affluent farmers they were neither deported, nor imprisoned. Suffering from the nationalization, re-distribution of their land farmers had to face young Jews as executors. People flew into rage seeing this. They cursed Jews. That is how they thank Lithuania for giving shelter and food to them for a number of centuries. Jews! They are the perpetrators of all the evil!"[72].

Deportations to Siberia

Deportations to Siberia the Soviets launched on June 14, 1941 was the development that shocked and stunned the Lithuanian society – Jews and Lithuanian – to the utmost. The worst scenarios, the worst rumors turned into reality. Already on July 7, 1940 director of the State Security Department A.Sniečkus, the communist, - married to a Jewish woman, underground communist (the fact that will be used in the anti-Jewish campaign), - approved of the "Plan of preparatory workings and operational liquidation of the anti-state parties – the nationalists, the Voldemarininks, the populists, Christian-

democrats, the Trockyists, the Social-democrats, the Essers, the Riflemen and other leading organizations". This plan envisaged that the lists of the individuals to be arrested had to be prepared by July 10 (individuals responsible – Icik Dembo, L. Finkelstein, Judita Komodaitė, Danielius Todesas – all Jews by nationality, Fridas Krastinis – Latvian, and K. Macevičius – Lithuanian). Although the Jews did not prevail in the repressive structures, such a proportion that existed among the leaders of the repressive structures set favorable grounds for the rumors and convictions spreading among Lithuanians (later, once the existence of such document was traced down in the beginning of the war) putting it straightaway that the Jews made up the lists of the deported people. This fact was used widely as if it "exposed" the anti-Lithuanian activities the Jews carried out.[73]

The fact of deportations to Siberia had an effect on Lithuanians still remembering the deportations to Siberia the Czar had carried out. What's more, Grigorij Šuras, author of the "Vilnius gheto chronicle" pointed out to the impact of Soviet-carried deportations on Lithuanians who had seen no alternative but to look forward to help from the West: "The impression [of deportations] was awful […]. The majority thought that Germans are the true and possible saviors from the death inevitable"[74] W.Michell writes about the huge blow that rose as a result of deportations – they had triggered a unique excitement in Lithuanian society and brought up an exaggerated anti-Semitism.[75] Activity of the Jews communists made Lithuanians get impression as if the Jews ruled Lithuania, that they, the Jews, deported people to Siberia (in Anykščiai in June one could hear the following: "Jews take Lithuanians to Siberia"[76]). Deportations, participation in the deportation deepened the dramatic relationship that had developed between the young and elderly generations in the Jewish families. In Linkuva, the wealthiest family of Blechers, owners of the bank, iron-keeping warehouse and a shop, having packed their luggage waited in tremor for the departure, given that they knew of the latter thanks to their son, member of the communist youth, Jankel Blecher, who despite his farther outlawing him participation in the arrests and deportations of the people, became partaker in the deportations. This was a tragedy of the entire family, Jankel's sister later used to narrate to her classmates.[77]

We could add the following: in workplaces occupied by Lithuanians and Jews there were labor unions and Communist party leaders who claimed the creation of the decision-making Committees on a nationality-proportionate basis. This would help avoid accusations of Jews being discriminated.[78] Thus, even for Lithuanians the labor unions resembled the Jewish organizations. On account of that, the Communists had to make it clear that Lithuanians would at least be proportionately represented. Labor unions' activists were thrown into the nationalization of the companies; they had to help the communists

manage the elections campaign; they had to help the farmers collect the crops and participate in the implementation of the deportations to Siberia,[79] - Dov Levin wrote. Jews of various social strata entered the labor unions. In Vilnius, at a time of establishing actors' labor union, among others, the actors of the Jewish theater entered it. The affluent Jews, who, threatened by talks on the nationalization of the private property, decided to demonstrate their loyalty, followed them. They thought that demonstration of such kind of loyalty would help them recover their properties.[80] Access of the wealthy Jews into the labor unions and IOSR made Lithuanian nationalists believe that all the Jews supported the Soviet regime. To some extent it explains why Lithuanians could have thought that there were more Jews that carried out deportations in comparison to what the repressive structures actually contained.

This background provided, Lithuanian Jews were seen oft among those deporting to Siberia. One of the witnesses said once: "once they started deporting people, showdown of the Jews against Lithuanians reached the highest possible level. To say, when a truck loaded with Russian soldiers came regularly to the village to collect the people, there was a young Jewish man with a red star on his lap. Everyone could see that Russian soldiers are innocent of what was happening, that Ickė himself was the chief of the execution. He is the one who stands behind everything."[81]'When the feeling of the ensuing war between Russia and Germany intensified, one could note that the conviction saying that the Russians would stand not a single against the Germans became more and more widespread. And once the Germans come, among others they will extend their revenge on the Jews. "I see the Germans crossing the border. Once they do that the same day we will wade in the blood of the Jews in Plungė", - a farmer from Plungė said once."[82]

Thus, Jewish participation in the elite of the LCP, soviet reforms, destruction of the state of Lithuania, incorporation into the USSR, rapid growth of the communist youth, IOSR, and the labor unions engaged many Jews, especially young Jews, into all-ruling institutions of that time. Suffering from the loss of independence, it seems, Lithuanians directed too much of their energy onto the local Jews. This had huge negative impact on Lithuanian-Jewish relations throughout 1940-1941. In terms of the consciousness of the Lithuanian society, one could get impression that the Soviet occupying regime promoted the Jewish community, whereas those Jews who got employed in the Soviet institutions were identified with the occupying authorities which carried out Lithuania's Sovietization. Sentiments that became visible during the 1941 January elections into the Soviet Supreme Council denoted this. Agitating notes urged the voters to abstain from voting for the "Communist and Jewish regime"; in private meetings one could hear resentful people who emphasized that "Jews alone live well under this regime", that Jews stood behind the creation of the Soviet order, speaking against the "mastery of the Jews", "the Jewish rule".[83]

This was highly unfavorable for the Jewish community given that even the outside observers registered increased anti-Soviet sentiments the majority of Lithuanians, in their opinion, shared. Lithuania's neighbors Poles took notes of such a hatred on the part of Lithuanians - on February 19, 1941 head of the region's Army Krajowa general Stefan Rowecki in the notation he addressed to London wrote: "Lithuanians' hatred of Bolsheviks is universal".[84] It is not clear what part of this hatred could be attributed to the Jews identified with the Bolsheviks, but, it seemed, there was quite a lot of it. An impression of the "Jewish regime" became very solid, persuasive and hardly disputable inasmuch as it was manifest. Lithuanians were neither alone in observing that, nor did they use the term "Jewish regime" first. Outside observers, in this case – more objective than Lithuanians, reached this conclusion as well. Employee of the US Embassy in Moscow, John Mazioni traveled throughout Lithuania in March 1941. Afterwards he wrote that the reds had confidence in the Jews, appointing them to the most important posts. Every shop in Kaunas has its own Jewish commissars – the fact that ignited anti-Semitic antipathy in the entire country. US diplomat Mačionis seems to be the first foreigner who in rapport called the Lithuanian authorities "the Jewish Government".[85]

In their memoirs, the Jewish authors emphasize that Lithuanians blamed partial fault for the emergence of Bolshevism on Jews making the anti-Jewish sentiments intensify. The core of the problem rested in the fact that 1940-1941 saw the first appearance of the Jews in the ranks of the national Government and local administration. For the majority of Lithuanians this was, put simply, unusual. If the Jews were more numerous in the administration of independent Lithuania, their influx into the Soviet administration would have been defined more precisely – that is here come the communists, or here come the Jewish communists youth. Thus, a large part of Lithuanian society considered it obvious that the Jews had occupied the authority, conclusion that close to the entire community accomplishing this.

The "Jewish Jews" the Lithuanians never saw

Authors Lithuanians, documents of that day provide the perspective the society shared at that time with regard to the responsibility of the Jews (some part of the population accepted this as a truth), ignoring the participation of Lithuanians in the Sovietization of Lithuania, carrying out the deportations to Siberia, - the activities Soviet the affiliates (Jews, Russians, and Lithuanians), had carried out, beyond doubt. In the middle of June 1941 an the deportations embraced an additional group of population – the soviet-party nomenclature, many Jews who helped organize the deportations, among them.

However, the alarming news arriving from the West Ukraine and West Belarus (policies of the Soviet authorities in a little while had disappointed the Jewish masses) made the majority of Jews inhibit pro-Soviet enthusiasm. Dov Levin referred to the words spelled by his gymnasium teacher on the Soviet perfidy: "You saved the bodies before loosing the souls". Lithuanians disregarded the fact that the absolute majority of Jews maintained a reserved attitude towards the new authorities, the fact that they feared nationalization, Soviet unification, constraints on the cultural institutions, and ideologization. Anti-Soviet Lithuanian groups, who paid close attention to the developments in the society, overlooked the Jews who disapproved the activities of their fellow nationals. Here is an example. Yet, even the religious leaders of the Jews felt the impact of the spread of the rumors that the Soviets had planning the occupation of Lithuania.

On June 12, 1940 the State Security Department observed that according to the rumors Lithuania was occupied on June 15. There were fears on the results of the departure of the Prime Ministers A.Merkys to Moscow. It was said he was summoned to discuss all the terms the Soviets had submitted to make Lithuania surrender to them.[86] Vilnius started to believe and react to these rumors, as did the rabbis. On June 6, 1940 the rabbis from the city of Vilnius and its suburbs came to Vilnius, and, gathering in the synagogue in the Vokiečių street, prayed the salvage of Lithuania from the Soviet occupation. Common Jews were not allowed to enter this service.[87] Having in mind that the rabbis were the leaders of the Jewish community, who exerted influence on the religious, and sometimes – general, orientation of the members of the Jewish community, it is obvious that non-communist Jews feared the Soviet occupation as well.

Soviet arrests brought damage to the leading ranks of both the Lithuanian national and the Jewish national institutions. However, even the most objective observers became aware of the fact that the NKVD extended arrests not only on Lithuanians. Jews were involved either. A teacher from Marijampolė Dzivakas, Kaunas' Jews: social activist Garfunkel, student Gabronski, lawyer Goldberg, rabbi Dovid Icikovič, accountant Jokūbas Jankelevičius, lawyer Južbalovski, tradesmen Kahal, Kagan, Kamber, Muškat, editors Rozenberg and Rubinshtein, journalist Serebrovič, tradesman Golum from Vilnius, Dovid, Samuel and Girš Gordons, Abraham and Checler Viniks from Šiauliai, Marijampolė tradesmen Jakobson, Neoch Malovicki, Ben Šachov, Utena's Simanovič and others, - all of them were put to the Soviet prisons.[88]

The people swept away goods at the shops; one could witness the queues extending there. The Jews were blamed for all the difficulties and social inequality the people faced. This was the case both in the Lithuanian SSR, and the sometimes even in the independent Lithuania during the Bolshevik period.

The fact that Lithuania's Jews suffered most from the Soviet Law on the Nationalization of Trade Companies (majority of them were owned by the Jews) could do little to change such a predisposition of the population. Having nationalized the private property, even the apartments (14.000 houses were nationalized in Lithuania)[89] and private businesses, the Jews had been subjected to the economic collapse. Many owners of small private shops lost their stores and jobs. For the reason that they oriented themselves toward the Zionism, the Soviets had closed down Jewish organizations and student corporations, and arrested leaders of the Jews. The same applied to the majority of synagogues, which were shut down. In his memoirs W.Mishell summarized: Bank system was also nationalized – one could see an end put to all gains and progress Jews made during the last twenty years.[90] Approximately 83 percent of all the Soviet-nationalized companies once belonged to the Jews (on the whole there were 1.593 trade companies functioning; and the Jews owned 1320 companies); the ownership of 7 percent was mixed (65 Jewish-Lithuanian, or other nationalities' companies); 147 trade companies belonged to Lithuanians.[91] It may seem feasible that these developments made no particular impression on Lithuanians because the Jews occupied the majority of the commissar posts during the period of nationalization. During the first period of nationalization (July-August, 1940), 153 Lithuanians (45 percent) and 107 Jews (32 percent) were commissars in 337 out of 460 companies nationalized. The remaining posts of the commissars attributed to the Poles or Russians. On the basis of these figures, we may conclude that Jews preferred being commissars to being ordinary workers or the lower-rank officials.[92]

There is little evidence in the texts of Lithuanians of the fact that Jews were deported to Siberia alongside Lithuanians, though, on June 14, 1941 the wealthy, Zionist Jews were deported along with the Soviets-disliked Lithuanians (some author say 2000 Jews were deported, Izraeli historian prof. Dov Levin, on the other hand, says there were 7000 Jews).

As maintained by the Lithuanian Jews, - Jonas Rimašauskas wrote, - in June 1940, about 4000 people of Jewish nationality were deported into the hub of the Soviet Union, large tradesman Mauša Abramavičius from Šakiai, tradesman Binders' family from Zarasai, editor of the "Voice of the Jews" Aron Rubinštein from Kaunas, leader of Lithuanian Zionists Benjamin Berger, owner of "Bitukas" factory S.Gudinskas from Kaunas, engineer contractor D.Ilgovskis from Kaunas, owner of the manufacture trade Perelman with his family (from Jurbarkas), lawyer Michelis Bergsonas from Kaunas, merchant from Plungė Gamza, owner of the mill in Plungė Zakas, landlord Aron Grinberg from Žalioji, chemist from Skuodas Dovydas Mirke, owner of the parquet (floor)-producing factory in Jurbarkas Volfovič, merchants and tradesmen: Blokas from Mažeikiai, Dembas from Panevėžys, Finas from Jurbarkas, Josel Grinberg from Jurbarkas,

Leibas Kacas from Utena, Vulf Kleckas and Perelstein from Kaunas, Dovydas Lapinskas and Margolis from Jurbarkas, brothers Millers from Rokiškis and many others, who made an important contribution to the growth of welfare of Lithuania.[93]

Soon afterwards the Jews felt that their largest achievement in Lithuania had been ruined – the schools, and this was what the new Soviet regime did. G. Ziman, member of the Communist leadership announced that schools in Hebrew were no longer acceptable because this was not the question of language, - Hebrew was a social matter, orienting deliberately towards the Zionism and emigration into the Palestine. In July and August, following the noisy meetings, the gymnasiums were transformed from teaching in Hebrew into teaching in Yiddish. In Kaunas only two Jewish schools remained working out of six; in Panevėžys Javne gymnasium became the Secondary school Nr.3; in other cities primary or progymnasiums replaced the Jewish gymnasiums, - all in all 170 schools with 19500 schoolchildren.[94] What changed the most were the contents of the teaching instructions. Huge attention was paid toward the publishing of the wall-newspapers supervised by the Communist youth. May feasts, Lenin and Stalin's days, woman's day, the day of the Red Army, the day of the Stalin's Constitution and other novelties replaced the traditional festivals.

Schools witnessed the appearance of pioneer and Communist youth organizations. Jewish cultural institute YIVO, which had voluminous archive in Vilnius (200 thousand exponents, 40 thousand volumes' library), had been nationalized in January 1941. Subsequent to the establishment of the Academy of Science of Lithuania's SSR, the latter became part of it, an Institute of Jewish culture. The same happened to the institutes of the Polish culture and Lithuanian language, institutes of history and ethnography that became integral part of the Academy. By January 1941, "Der Emes" was the only newspaper that had been published in Yiddish.

Part of Lithuanians understood the "Jew-Bolshevik" concept as an obvious matter, especially bearing in mind the growing anti-communist sentiments: the Soviet Union took everything that once used to be theirs – the independent state, social order they were used to, the Soviet Union nationalized their property and, as if it were still Czarist times, deported the population to Siberia. Some kind of an explanation had to be delivered, especially due to the crisis the society experienced as a result of the destruction of the state of Lithuania, the Soviet occupation, and the change of the system. The people questioned why did such a poor nation of Lithuania had to suffer all these disasters. Traditional social, economic and religious anti-Semitism and Judo-phobia characteristic to Lithuanians gave the puzzled minds the most logical answer – Bolshevism and the Jews are the guilty ones because almost all the Jews were Bolsheviks at the same time. This conviction was reinforced by a traditional, security instinct

bred tendency of the Jews to choose the side of the stronger. Shouldered by it they could feel safe enough. Given that the stronger (USSR) had come, and it was able of saving Jewish lives from death, one could have noticed their favorable attitude towards the Soviet Union. In the minds of the society this attitude was exaggerated and radicalized.

It seemed as if Lithuanians overlooked the statements made by the Jews experts, representatives of the wealthy strata who saw no future for them under the Soviet regime, and who understood it well indeed what disastrous situation their people faced. This is evident from Jonas Matulionis' notes on the discussion between him and his colleague – a Jew on the impression this intellectual obtained from Soviet-carried deportations:

"Did the Jews determine the arrival of the Soviets in Lithuania? Can the Jews do anything to change today's situation?" [...] I see no life for myself. Ruled by the Bolsheviks, there is no hope that my future will be bright. What is left for me is a constant degradation. But what can we expect for ourselves and me myself should the Germans come? Concentration camp at best. [...] Jews have no hopes. It is the same here and there.[95]

Conclusions

Soviets-carried June 14, 1940 occupation of Lithuania, playing of social and national groups one against the other during the nationalization of the private property, limitation of personal freedoms, arrests of the political opponents and especially the deportations into Siberia, - all these factors created favorable conditions for the stereotype on the Communism of the Jews to form. Active participation of the Jewish left, and especially the youth, in the Comsomol, IOSR and in labor unions, participation in the Soviet administration developed an image of all the Jews supporting the Soviet regime, general geopolitical orientation in favor of the Soviet Union on the part of the Jews, activities of the LCP and Soviet activists including.

On the eve of the war, one could have noticed the total split between the politically active Lithuanian and Lithuania's Jews' groups – ideological and geopolitical orientation of the young (young people, indeed; 20-30 years of age, with exceptions, of course; most active part of the society at the time), even despite the fact that many Jews were arrested, the Zionist organizations – shut down, part of the Jews, together with Lithuanians - deported (approximately 4000) to Siberia.

In due course, the history showed that the "Jews-Bolsheviks" stereotype, together with the idea of the Jewish guilt in Lithuania losing its independence and its sovietization was very popular among the Lithuanians. In 1976, while

answering to the question Tomas Venclova posed Soviet-times resistant A.Žuvintas (pseudonym) stuck to old, stereotypical provisions and accusations toward or against the Jews, which were so characteristic to 1941.[96] In this place it is important to note that demonization of the role Jews played during 1940-1941 had lived in the minds of some part of Lithuanians through 1946, to 1976, and even up until the present times.

Front of Lithuania's Activists (LAF), headquartered in Berlin referred to the participation of Jews Communists inside the LSSR administration as their main argument to defend the case of constraining or even expelling of the Jews from Lithuania because in Europe, which is going to be ruled by the Nazis, Lithuania – among them, there was no place for Communist Jews. However, documents of neither LAF, nor any other organization revealed there were any plans of physical eradication of the Jews. These circumstances allowed the Nazis to ground a thesis that Jewish pogroms in Kaunas were initiated and organized inside Lithuania and later carried out by special task units. This helped the Nazis cherish wide anti-Jewish hysteria, and justify means of brutal isolation and annihilation of the Jews. Nazi treatment of the Jews as the enemies of Germany, statements by Lithuania's patriotic groups, oriented toward Germany that the Jews were the enemies of Lithuania made the rescue of the Jews in Lithuania during the first months of the Nazi occupation extremely difficult. On the other hands, in the face of the rebellion of Lithuanians against the Soviets it was easier to direct their anger at the Jews, to use the "Jew-Communist" stereotype to justify restrictions on the Jews and their isolation.

Having broken the social constraints, the Soviet invasion strengthened anti-Semitic sentiments a lot. It unveiled the old wounds of the society as well. The Soviet administration personified the image of the Jew-Bolshevik, the Nazis were so intensively forcing into the minds of the population. Stanford University Professor, Norman Naimark claimed that the Jews, the future victims, did not care at all if there were less Jews among those Russians and Lithuanians who established the Soviet rule than the majority believed. What is most important, however, is that so many Lithuanians relied upon these rumors the Nazis fortified by means of propaganda during the period of their occupation of Lithuania.[97]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] SSD Review of the activities of the political organizations in Jonava region, August 1933 // Lithuania's Central State Archive – further CVA. F. 378. Ap. 3. B. 2825. L.384.

[2] Ibid. L. 452

[3] SSD Review of Kaunas apygarda, November 1933 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 3. B. 2825. L. 496.

[4] Review of the political parties and organizations by the Head of the Agency division, September 1934 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 3. B. 2960. L. 21

[5] Ibid. L. 12.

[6] SSD Summary of events in Utena region, January 31, 1934 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 3. B. 2962. L. 7.

[7] SSD and Criminal police's summary of news, December 4, 1934 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 3. B. 2962. L.184-185.

[8] SSD Bulletin No. 242 on the activities of the LCP, datd October 12, 1936 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 10. B. 88a. T. 2. L.310.

[9] Ibid.

[10] SSD Bulletin No. 242 // Ibid., L.300

[11] Ibid. L. 301-302.

[12] Nijolės Maslauskienės pranešimas // Lietuvių-žydų santykiai. Istoriniai, teisiniai ir politiniai aspektai. Praktinis seminaras-diskusija.Stenograma. - Vilnius: LR Seimas, P. 10.

[13] Nijolė Maslauskienė. Lietuvos komunistų tautinė ir socialinė sudėtis 1939 m. pabaigoje – 1940 m. rugsėjo mėnesį // Genocidas ir rezistencija (Vilnius), 1999, Nr. 1(5), P. 84, 87-88.

[14] Ezra Mendelsohn. On Modern Jewish politics. - New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 94-95.

[15] Paul Johnson. Žydų istorija. - Vilnius: Aidai, 1999, p. 658-659.

[16] Ibid, P. 662.

[17] Ibid., P. 96.

[18] Zenonas Butkus. SSRS intrigos Baltijos šalyse 1920-1940. A seal from "Darbai ir Dienos" No. 7 (16). - Kaunas: VDU leidykla, 1998, P.4.

[19] Paul Johnson. Žydų istorija, P. 98.

[20] SSD Bulletin of Šiaulių apygarda, March 29, 1938 // CVA. F. 378. Ap.5. B. 4421. T. 2.L.794.

[21] /Jonas Rimašauskas/ Jews in Independent Lithuania, p. 6-8 (Authors' archive).

[22] Solomonas Atamukas. Lietuvos žydų kelias. Nuo XIV amžiaus iki XX a. pabaigos. - Vilnius: Alna litera, p. 195. Once the Soviets entered Lithuania, bishop V. Brizgys suggested that the priest S. Yla left for Germany because Yla could have been killed. Being an active Lithuanian he was detested by every occupant. Even after he ran away to Germany, S. Yla was prosecuted by other Security Services. During the years of the Hitler Germany's occupation he was arrested by the Nazis and deported to the concentration camp in Stuthof. See: Vincentas Brizgys. Gyvenimo keliai. - Vilnius: Rašytojų sąjungos leidykla, 1993, P. 100.

[23] Kazys Musteikis. Prisiminimų fragmentai. - London: Nida, 1970, p. 41-42.

[24] Nijolės Maslauskienės pranešimas // Lietuvių-žydų santykiai. Istoriniai, teisiniai ir politiniai aspektai. Praktinis seminaras-diskusija. Stenograma.Vilnius: LR Seimas, p. 10-11.

[25] Sergio Romano. Laiškas bičiuliui žydui. - Vilnius: Aidai, 1999, P. 30.

[26] Shalom Cholawsky. The Jews of Belorussia during World War II. - Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publischers,1998, P. 3

[27] Ibid., p. 4-5.

[28] Ben-Cion Pinchuk. Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule. Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust. - Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Lui, 1990, P. 20.

[29] Ibid., P. 23.

[30] Dov Levin. The Lesser of two Evils. Eastern European Jewry under Soviet Rule, 1939-1941. - Philadelphia-Jerusalem: The Jewish Publication Society, 1995, P.36.

[31] National Martynas Mažvydas Library of Lithuania. Department of manuscripts. (taliau-LNMBRS). F. 29. B. 14.02. l. 511, P. 540.

[32] A.L. Strong. Novyj putj Litvy. - M.: Izd. Polit. Literatury, 1990, s. 26-27.

[33] / Jonas Rimašauskas/ Jews in the Independent Lithuania (typescrpt, written around 1952. USA, author's archive), P.33. Besides, in this 1952 essay J.Rimašauskas presents the following statements afterwards: " I want to remind to everyone that I do not identify such expressions as "anti-Lithuanian activities of the Jews" or "Jewish efforts" with the activities and efforts of the entire Jewish community. In addition individual representatives of the Jewish community or their groups, mentioned in the given cases, could not be representative and did not represent every members of the Jewish community". Ibid., p. 33-34.

[34] This is the way Liūtas Mockūnas narrated the impression of his parents, who watched the turmoil in Kaunas, to the author of these lines.

[35] Jokūbas Josadė. Laiškai dukrai į Izraelį // Lietuvos rytas.(Vilnius) 1993 11 03 Nr. 213

[36] Typescript, 22 pages, dated May 28, 1946, unsigned. Published in "Kultūros barai"(Vilnius) 2000 m. Nr. 8/9, p. 87-104.

[37] It is possible that technically the final document was made of the facts Jonas Rimašauskas, former prisoner of Stuthof concentration camp, collected on the basis of M.Krupavičius' references to the other authors. Likely editor of the document is identified on the basis of Juozas Brazaitis' sentence that "immediately after the war, thanks to VLIK's efforts lots of facts on the Jewish-Lithuanian relations were collected in Germany (perhaps by J. Rimašauskas) ..." See: Juozas Brazaitis. Vienų vieni. Vilnius: Į Laisvę fondas, 1990, P. 144. However, this only an assumption. J.Brazaitis could have referred to another document assembled by Jonas Rimašauskas, which had to do with the Lithuanian-Jewish relations, written in accordance to the factual data collected in the DP camps in Germany.

[38] Juozas Šalna /Liudas Šmulkštys/ Lietuviai kovoje dėl žydų laisvės // Išgelbėję pasaulį. Žydų gelbėjimas Lietuvoje (1941-1944). - Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2001, p. 69-99.

[39] M. Krupavičius published his part of the essay in "Europos lietuvis" 1956 m. Nr. 27-30. This text was reprinted in the collection of his works: Mykolas Krupavičius. Visuomeniniai klausimai. Straipsnių rinkinys iš jo palikimo. - Chicago: Popiežiaus Leono XIII Fondas, 1983, p. 100-123; recently this publication was reprinted in Lithuania as well: Vygintas Bronius Pšibilskis. ...Dulkes nužėrus. Mykolas Krupavičius apie Lietuvos žydų tragediją ir lietuvius // Lietuvos istorijos studijos. Vilniaus universiteto mokslo darbai. 1997. T. 5, p.181-206.

[40] SSD and Criminal Police's Bulletin on Šiauliai apygarda, 1940.VI.24 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 12.B. 296. L.46-47.

[41] SSD and Criminal Police's news on Marijampolė apygarda // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 12. B. 296. L. 197-200.

[42] Z. Ivinskis Memoirs, June 30 record // National Martynas Mažvydas Library of Lithuania. Department of Manuscripts. F. 29. B. 14.02. l. 530, p. 558. I am grateful to Gediminas Rudys for this reference.

[43] SSD and Criminal Police's news on Marijampolė apygarda 1940.VI.25 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 12. B. 296. L. 190.

[44] SSD and Criminal Police's bulletin on Šiauliai apygarda 1940.VI.28 // CVA. F. 378. Ap12.B. 296. L. 35.

[45] Z. Ivinskis Memoirs // LNBRS Saug.vienetas 29. B. 14.02, P. 339.

[46] Shalom Cholawsky. The Jews of Belorussia during Word War II, P. 13.

[47] Dov Levin. The Jews in the Soviet Lithuanian Establishment, 1940-1941 // The Jewish Journal of Sociology (London). Vol. XXI, 2, December 1979, p.34.

[48] Ibid., P. 35.

[49] Rimantas Vanagas. Nenusigręžk nuo savęs. Gyvieji tiltai. - Vilnius: Vyturys, P. 101 (V. Žemaitytės' testimony).

[50] SSD and Criminal Police's Bulletin on Šiauliai apygarda 1940.VII.3 // CVA. F. 378. Ap. 12. B. 296. L. 27.

[51] SSD and Criminal Police's Bulletin of Šiauliai apygarda, signed by Head of the apygarda B. Baranauskas 1940.VII.4 // CVA. F. 378. Ap.12. b. 296. L. 24.

[52] Document publication prepared by Alfonsas Eidintas // Kultūros barai. 2000 Nr. 8/9, P. 90.

[53] CVA. F. 378. Ap. 10. B. 699. 4 dalis. L. 661, 648-650.

[54] Bulletins // LVOA. F. 3377. Ap.1. B. 593. L.17.

[55] Ibid. L. 28,43,51,53,55. One could refer to more similar protests prior to the elections and Jewish positioning in the Government.

[56] CVA. F. 378. Ap. 12. B. 296. L. 38.

[57] SSD and Criminal Police's Bulletin of Šiauliai apygarda, signed by Head of the apygarda B. Baranauskas July 18, 1940 // Ibid. L. 13-14.

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THE CONTEXT OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2000: THE EXPERIENCE AND PERSPECTIVES OF COALITION POLITICS IN LITHUANIA

Alvidas Lukošaitis

INTRODUCTION

Coalition politics as if embodies the essence of democracy - the settlement of disagreements, the search of affinity, the seek for a compromise. The success of it is determined by a variety of reasons, however, in any case the basic one in decision-making is the ability of political leaders to engage in a discussion.

More than a couple of decades ago, A. Lijphart set criteria for a consensus democracy, where compromises and negotiations were considered the chief means for achieving political change. [1]

Coalition politics is just one of the criterion according to which a *consensus democracy* can be recognized, it is just a small pattern representing it. Generally *consensus democracy* is a universal dialogue between those in power and civil community, which is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties and institutional rights altogether. The final rather than mediating point of democracy is reached when everyone engages in the process of political decision formulation, discussion, decision making, and its implementation: a citizen, elite of the society, political parties, interest groups, and so on. Thus, the scope of subjects to rule is enlarged, and decisions become an expression of the universal will.

It is quite possible that the year 2000 in Lithuania will be remembered as "coalition year". For the first time the efforts of political forces, the results of the Local elections as well as the Seimas set a great precedent for the practice of *coalition politics*. It was possible to detect the latter trend not only on the level of elections but also on the structural, i.e. organizational level of parties.

Political parties and party system in Lithuania are probably very dinamic. Otherwise, how would it be possible to explain the fact that the boom of coalition approach of political parties was almost simultaneously followed by

the phenomena of split of the parties, and the disintegration of the party system? For instance, in year 1999-2000 five parties were established. All of them were the outcome of the split of *former parties.* [2]

The events of political life this year give reasons to believe that parties being strictly pseudoideologically engaged, are slowly changing their attitude towards negotiations and finding consensus.

1. THE RESULTS OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND PARTY SYSTEM

Neither sociologists, nor political scientists succeeded in predicting the degree of active participation in elections. It was believed that 60 - 65 percent of electors would participate due to the level of dissatisfaction with the current policy of the government, more active and expensive electoral campaign. In reality the percentage was a little bit smaller than expected but bigger comparing to that of 4 years ago.

Table 1. **Participation in parliamentary elections (1990 – 2000)**

Electors / date	**1990**	**1992**	**1996**	**2000**
Registered number of electors	2.581.359	2.549.952	2.597.530	2.626.321
Participated in elections	1.851.313 (71,71 %)	1.919.073 (75,25 %)	1.374.673 (52,92 %)	1.539.667 (58,62 %)

The results of parliamentary elections give a premise to speak of vivid changes in the image of the party system throughout the decade (1990-2000): changes of the preferences among voters, as well as changes of relevant parties and their numbers, the `nature of interactions between parties from confrontational to compromise, and typical curricullar and pragmatic features in party competition are becoming more and more vivid too.

The results of the recent elections to the Seimas have shown that not all political parties had managed to adapt to the radical changes within the party system (static is changed by dynamics, polarization by consolidation and so on.). The tactics of the coalition had proven itself to be the most effective instrument of *adaptation* to the changes: the political parties that had coordinated their tactics of elections and raised common goals (for instance, *the Coalition of Social democrats, the Block of "New Politics"*) achieved the best results.

Table 2. **The results of three parliamentary elections (multi-member constituency)**

Political party	Date of Elections to the Seimas					
	1992		1996		2000	
	Votes	Total % of all the votes of the electorate	Votes	Total % of all the votes of the electorate	Votes	Total % of all the votes of the electorate
LDLP[1]/ The coalition of Social-Democrats	817.331	42,58	130.837	9,51	***457.294***	***31,08***
The coalition of LS /TU/LK[2]	393.500	20,5	409.585	29,79	**126.850**	**8,62**
LCDP coalition / LCDP[3]	234.368	12,2	136.259	9,91	**45.227**	**3,07**
LSDP/ The coalition of Social-Democrats[4]	112.410	5,48	90.757	6,60	***457.294***	***31,08***
LCM/LCU[5]	46.908	2,44	113.333	8,24	**42.030**	**2,86**
LLU[6]	28.091	1,46	25.279	1,83	**253.823**	**17,25**
New Union/Social Liberals					**288.895**	**19,64**

The second round of parliamentary elections in single-member constituencies was abolished during those elections. The latter amendment is the most radical one since the adoption of the Law on Elections to the Seimas.[9] The outcomes of such a decision were observed shortly after the elections: firstly, the scope of representation of the interests of the society narrowed tremendously as well as the quantative decrease of the mandate of national representative. Also the vivid attempts to clean up the party system instrumentally by eliminating small political parties were observed. As a result the representative effectiveness of multi party system is artificially decreased. For instance, the winner in 27 constituencies gained fewer than 5000 votes, whereas four years ago winner who had gained fewer than 7000 votes won only in 7 constituencies. [10] During the recent elections winner gained 30 percent of the total number of votes, whereas four years ago, he gained 50 percent averagely. Moreover, the winner in six constituencies gained less than 20 percent of total number of votes. [11]

The level of fragmentation within the Seimas in 2000- 2004 has increased comparing with the results of previous parliamentary elections, since there will be 18 political parties and organizations represented. [12]

Table 3. **Representation of political parties in the Parliament 2000**
(the distribution of mandates in the single and multi-member constituency)

No.	Political party	Multi Constituency		Single Constituency	Total number of seats in Seimas
		Votes (%)	Number of mandates	Number of mandates	
1.	*Coalition of Social-democrats*	*31,08*	*LDDP – 13, LSDP – 11, LRS – 3, NDP – 1* *Total: 28*	*LDDP –14, LSDP – 7 NDP – 2, LRS – 0* *Total: 23*	*51*
2.	LLU	17,25	LLS – 15 MKDS – 1	18	34
3.	NU/SL	19,64	NS/SL – 16 MKDS – 1 TPP – 1	11	29
4.	LDLP	-	13	14	27
5.	LSDP	-	11	7	18
6.	HU/LC[1]	8,62	TS/LK – 7 LPKTS – 1	1	9
7.	LPP[2]	4,08	0	4	4
8.	NDP[3]	-	1	2	3
9.	MCDU[4]	-	2	1	3
10.	RUL[5]	-	3	0	3
11.	*Independent candidates **	-	-	*3*	*3*
12.	LCU	2,86	0	2	2
13.	LCDP	3,07	0	2	2
14.	LPEA[6]	1,95	0	2	2
15.	CDU[7]	4,19	0	1	1
16.	"Young Lithuania"	1,15	0	1	1
17.	The Liberty League	1,27	0	1	1
18.	MCU[8]	2,01	0	1	1
19.	LUPPD[9]	-	1	0	1
20.	NPP[10]	-	1	0	1

** Independent candidates: K.Glaveckas, J.Veselka, V.Uspaskich.*

The results of recent parliamentary elections as well as the change within the party system were determined by three highly important events during the past year: firstly, signing up the treaty with "Williams" on 29 October 1999; secondly, local elections on 19 March 2000; finally, the return of President A. Brazauskas into politics and his support to the Social-democratic political forces.

The grown popularity of LLU can be viewed as an outcome of the first event: the ratings of the political party grew up exactly in October-November 1999, and reached the peak at the beginning of the year 2000. Afterwards they transcended gradually while fluctuating within the interval from 10 to 12 percent [23]; the growth of popularity of NU/SL is related to the results of local government elections. During these elections the electorate for the first time recognized the latter party as an important source of opposition; LDDP as well as LSDP lost their popularity in the year of 2000. However, they managed to regain their popularity when President of Lithuania A. Brazauskas had officially

demonstrated his support for the two parties in the middle of the year. [24] As it became clear after the recent parliamentary elections all those events had an influence on the electorate of other political parties, and primarily on the electorate of Conservative and Center parties. [25]

Previous elections to the Seimas demonstrated that party system in Lithuania can be described as a fragmentized and polarized one, and the political preferences in every single election were changing. This was proven by the large number of political parties that participated in elections, as well as by the fact that the votes tend to concentrate at the edges of party system, and that people tend to vote *negative* or according to the method of *pendulum.*

1 graph. **Results of the elections to the Seimas in 1992, 1996 and 2000 (%)**



The results of the elections show that due to searches for the alternatives for political parties LDLP and HU/LC- old components within party system,- redistribution of the votes, is observed greater and competitiveness among political parties fostered political consolidation, and that party system has shifted from a bipolar (left – right) to the three–polar (left – center – right).

The party system has entered a qualitatively new era after the recent parliamentary elections. The process of elections, relations among political parties, and the perception of the status of the ruling party and opposition have shown that not all political parties were capable of meeting the challenges of today's world: internal challenges (internal democratization of the political party, the change and renovation of party elite, influence and control over decision-making process) as well as external (competition within political parties, the search for a compromise and cooperation). The latter phenomenon is related to the essential shift within the electorate: the stable electorate is changed by the newly formed one that is difficult to define, as the boundaries of expansion and shrinkage are not clear.

Table 4. **The identification of orientation of the electors** (support for the parties)

No	Political Party/ Coalition	Parliamentary and local governments elections					
		1996	1997	2000 (Local elections)	2000 (Seimas elections)	Support of electorate (+; -)	The average of the electorate
1.	**LDLP** **LSDP** **The coalition of Social Democrats**	130.837 90.756	122.000 85.000	120.622 99.250	 457.294	+332.808 +365.626	207.688 183.075
2.	**LCU** **LLU** **NU/SL**	113.333 25.279	92.000 43.000	132.020 176.615 224.925	42.030 253.823 288.895	-70.421 +172.192 +63.970	94.845 124.679 256.910
3.	**LCDP** **HU/LC**	136.259 409.585	102.000 331.000	68.996 159.163	45.227 126.850	-57.191 -173.066	88.120 256.649

Explanation: *1) the "support of electorate" is derived from (a) calculating the average number of votes given to a political party during the last three parliamentary elections (in 1996, 1997 and elections to the local governments in 2000) that is b) compared to the number of votes gained during the recent elections to the Seimas (in 2000); 2) "the average of electorate" is calculated by using the results of last four last parliamentary elections.*

The data presented in the table proves the efforts of LDLP and LSDP coalition politics to be fruitful. The achieved results not only have revived stagnated electorate, but also exceeded twice the average of the statistic electorate. There is no doubt that coalition would have succeeded to gain absolute majority in the parliament if it had not been for NU/SL, which had decreased the number of supporters of social democrats. Moreover, NU/SL and LLU can be blamed for the failure of LCU in the recent parliamentary elections. The right wing of political parties, HU/LC and LCDP in particular, received the worst results ever.

The change of the party system appeared within the previously defined context: the traditional set of five greatest political parties (LDLP, LSDP, LCU, LCDP, and HU/LC) gave way to a new set of "big four" (LDLP+LSDP, NU/SL, HU/LC, and LLU). It is possible to state that a change in the programme values of political parties corresponds to ta new evaluation of the leaders of political parties and party system in general.

2. THE TYPOLOGY OF GOVERNMENTS AND MODELS OF COALITION

There are various models of government and coalition that are suitable for parliamentary democracy. According to the proportions of parties and parliamentary support usually the following models are distinguished:

a) Single party government – model of government formed by one political party that has a majority of seats in the parliament.

b) Minority government is a model of government that is formed by one or several political parties that do not have a majority in the parliament. To be more exact, the party that forms the government does not have more than 50% plus 1 of all the seats in the parliament. There can be a *single party minority government* or *a coalition minority government.* It is important to notice that a *single party minority government* holds in power until new elections twice more often than a *coalition minority government.* [26]

The phenomenon of a *minority government* is determined by the following five reasons: 1) minority parties form a government when the results of the parliamentary elections guarantee the support for a single party, but a *single party government* is not formed; 2) the immobilist situations appear in which structural reasons within party system prevent from the formation of a coalition of majority; 3) the ideological–political differences of various parties are forgotten and *caretaker governments* for a certain period of time are created; 4) the tradition of cooperation under certain conditions is disrupted, and one or several political parties remain in the government until the former coalition is either reorganized, or involves a new member; 5) *minority government* is formed when there is a *fragile majority.* [27]

Minority governments are quite often viewed as manifestations of the fact that political forces lack a will to form a majority government. Due to the lack of consensus of political forces minority governments (including coalitions of minority) are formed when:

a) a fundamental oppositions exists in the polarized multi–party system (for instance, Italy, the Weimer Republic of Germany); b) within systems that can be characterized by a clear asymmetry of the "left " and the "right" sides. For instance, the domination of a strong Social Democratic party is accompanied by the existence of equally strong opposition parties in the "right"(this phenomenon can be observed in Scandinavian countries, especially in Denmark and Norway); c) within a multiparty system that has a tendency to become a biparty system, and reject an idea of coalition rather early (Canada can serve as a good example to illustrate this case); d) the formation of the government is a painful and complicated process that requires lots of time to form a majority government. Due to the cost of time and unfavorable conditions, caretaker

governments are formed in order to overcome the periods of crises and remain stable until the next parliamentary elections. [28]

Once the vitality of minority governments is being analyzed, it is important to notice that the most favorable conditions for the survival of minority governments are within consensual democratic political systems. For instance, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and so on. A high level of coorporativism, due to which the rules of cooperation between the government and interest groups are highly institutionalized, characterizes the these systems. Corporative systems encode *extra parliamentary* mechanisms that help to influence the political decision-making process. In other words, within corporative systems, it is possible to influence the political decision-making process from the outside of the parliament, thus way including interest groups into a political process; [29]

c) Minimal winning coalition is formed when all political parties that constitute a coalition government are necessary conditions to form a government and guarantee its support within a parliament.

Such coalitions are also referred to as ***bare coalitions***. The reason of its "bareness" is the micro parliamentary majority within the parliament that overcomes coalition by only one or two seats. For instance, a case of a minimal ***winning coalition*** in Lithuania would be the situation in which coalition of political parties would have slightly more than 71 seats. The phenomenon of ***minimal winning coalition*** is a troublesome one in terms of effectiveness: an effective government is supported by vivid majority of the parliament.

d) Surplus coalition is a coalition government when the number of political parties within a coalition is larger than it is set by the criterion of the minimal winning coalition. To be more exact, surplus coalition is a phenomenon when the amount of political parties within a coalition overexceeds the minimally required number.

As it was already mentioned, in parliamentary democracy, the political parties that seek political control must have the support of the parliamentary majority. Eventhough it is a rigid law of a parliamentary democracy, there is an interesting tendency: political parties having majority within the parliament tend to get a certain surplus votes that is not necessary for them in order to form a government.

The benefit of *surplus coalition* lies within the fact that it is easier to solve problems related with greater quotes of votes. For instance, in the case of *surplus coalition* it is easier to pass a draft that requires a qualified majority vote. Moreover, *surplus votes* are useful in solving the issues of discipline of a political party in the cases when the members of political parties chose to become dissidents and vote against the will of their own faction. In the latter case, *surplus votes* serve as an "insurance company" that helps to avoid unpredictable results of voting.

The phenomenon of the surplus coalition may also appear in the semi-presidential political systems if the president has certain influence in the government formation process. Quite often the president requests that coalition were wider than it is necessary for the government to work effectively. The president in such cases seeks greater guarantees of stability of the government.[30]

Extreme cases of surplus coalitions are the so-called oversize *coalitions.*[31] Such a coalition may have a support of more than 75 percent of members of the parliament. [32] *Oversize coalitions* are also common in *consensual democratic* political systems that encode a way of compromise in resolving conflicts (for instance, Switzerland). [33]

e) Caretaker government – it is a cabinet of ministers that does not commit itself to long term goals, that is to program promises, and is created for a transitional period only, until the new government is formed.

3. THE EXPERIENCE OF COALITION POLITICS IN LITHUANIA

The Lithuanian experience in coalition cooperation is not rich.[34] Negotiations on possible relations, union or cooperation have been rarely fruitful in terms of formal decisions or real political actions.

Lithuanian experience of coalition is mainly gained on the level of elections. However, the assumption that coalitions formed during the process of elections are potential proto-coalitions after the elections has not proved to be valid in the case of Lithuania. The main reason might lie within the attitude towards coalitions in general. They are often viewed as a strategic move in the process of elections. Moreover, political parties that pursue minimal goals just to overcome the elections "barrier" foreseen in the law of Elections of Lithuania make such coalitions most often.[35] Due to the latter amendments, the number of coalitions has been reduced. This statement was proved by the results of the parliamentary elections in 1996 as well as by the results of the elections to the Local Governments in 1997. [36]

Previous elections have proved that for great number of political parties in Lithuania a coalition cooperation is just inevitable. Until now only several political parties, such as HU/LC, LDLP, LCDP, LSDP and LCU, were able to overstep the election "barrier" in the elections to the Seimas 1992- 1996. High degree of fragmentation within the party system fostered the disparity of electorate votes. Meanwhile, the current development of the party system does not promise any positive changes yet. On the contrary, the division in the "right" and "left" wings can be observed. Due to the latter phenomenon, it is possible that the party system will polarize, as the new political forces will occupy the front positions.

The efforts of single and uncompetitive political parties to participate in the parliamentary elections were often fruitless. During the parliamentary elections in 1992, 17 political parties participated, however only 4 of them managed to pass the barrier of 4 percent of all the votes of electorate, and 13.44 percent of all the votes of electorate were burnt. The same tendency can be observed dealing with the results of the parliamentary elections in 1996: only 5 political parties out of 24 managed to pass the barrier, and the number of burnt votes had increased by 35.95 percent of all the votes of the electorate.

Having all this in mind, it is possible to state that the tendency observed in the parliamentary elections in 1992 was proved by the results of the parliamentary elections in 1996: the same five political parties were successfully competing for the votes of the electorate. They managed to get 64.05 percent of all the votes. The other group of political parties was constituted of the ones that got from 2 to 4 percent of all the votes. Such parties as "Young Lithuania", LWP[37], CDU, LPEA, NUL+LDP belong to the latter group. They managed to get 18.04 percent of all the votes of the electorate. The remaining political parties (LLU, LPP, LUPPD, LFL[38], etc.) got only 12.86 percent of all the votes. Thus, the "great five" received 64.05 percent of all the votes of the electorate, meanwhile the remaining 35.96 percent of votes were distributed among the political parties according to the law of parliamentary elections. However, this failed to reflect the will expressed by the electorate.

The political parties that passed the barrier of elections in the parliamentary elections in 2000 (such as a Coalition of Social Democrats, LLU, NU/SL, HU/LC) received 73.18 percent of all the votes of the electorate (only 26.82 % of all the votes were burnt). Thus, the reorganization within the party system that is determined by the tactics of coalition provides the electorate with a clearer set of options for their choice.

There are not many examples of coalition cooperation among political parties on the structural level rather than on the level of elections. Unused chances for cooperation among political parties in Lithuania show the weaknesses of the party system. For instance, a considerable ideological distance among political parties as well as their politically engaged behavior can still be observed.

The attempts of LCU and LLU to unite can serve as a good example of the failure of coalition cooperation. The chances for these two political parties to cooperate increased after their unsuccessful participation in the parliamentary elections in 1992. The chances for cooperation especially increased because of the similarity of the doctrine of liberalism up on which both political parties had based their programs. First, the political parties had agreed on the coordination of their actions on the level of municipalities, and only later their leaders signed up an agreement postulating the ideological similarity and perspectives for the unification of these political parties in the future.[39] LLU

was more active in seeking for a closer cooperation between the political parties, and during the LLU congress held on 14May, 1996 a resolution was adopted stating that there should be negotiations with LCU on unification. Since there was no response from LCU, in its congress held on 20 January, 1996 LLU decided to remain an independent political party.

Another example of missed chance for coalition cooperation is the interaction between the left wing political parties- LDLP and LSDP. Both political parties base their programs on the principles of social democratic values. Moreover, both political parties coordinated their political actions as well as spoke on a possible closer cooperation before. However, there are certain barriers for the coalition cooperation between the latter political parties. Firstly, LSDP had institutionalized in their resolution a negative attitude towards LDLP. [40] Secondly, a severe competition (that is partially and ideological one) within the left wing creates one more obstacle for their closer cooperation. The latter phenomenon is also observed in the opposition of LSDP to LDLP membership in the Socialist International. [41]

The best and the only so far (de *jure* as well as *de facto*) example of coalition cooperation between political parties is the coalition agreement signed between HU/LC and LCDP.[42] That was a rather logical outcome of the previous coordination of actions and cooperation between those two right wing political parties. The coalition agreement provided for the coordination of actions of those two political parties within the parliament and government based on the following principles: equal partnership, proportionality, respect for the values pursued by the partner of the coalition as well as transparency. Thus, the coalition agreement provided for coordination of actions on the parliamentary as well as on the executive government level. The latter notice was important since it implied that coalition agreement was a guarantee of support for the parliamentary majority on the policy lead by the government. However, one of the coalition partners initiated a breach of that agreement due to the misperception of the implementation of the policy as well as due to disagreements between the political parties. [43]

Meanwhile, there are not many examples of cooperation among other political parties. However it is possible to distinguish the political parties that have a positive attitude to the coalition cooperation or the coordination of actions among political parties similar to theirs. Such parties as CDU, NUL, LDP, LUPPD, "Young Lithuania", LFL (right wing political parties), as well as LPP, NU/SL, ND/WP, LSP (left wing political parties) can be assigned to the latter group. [44]

The elections to the Local Self–Governments held this spring gave a new impulse to the regrouping of the political forces. After the redistribution of the votes of the electorate, political parties were convinced in the perspectives

provided by the coalition politics in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Right after the elections to the Local Self–Governments, it was possible to observe the first signs of mutual efforts to coordinate actions among political parties in the process of negotiations over the support in the forthcoming elections of mayors. It is important to notice that the absolute majority of a single political party won the elections in only eight municipalities. In the rest of the municipalities there were negotiations on the coalition cooperation with other parties in order to gain more support. As a result, 20 coalitions of the left wing political parties, 9 coalitions of the right, 10 ideologically based boosted coalitions, and 11 oversize coalitions were formed.

Since the political party NU/SL had won the elections it attracted lots of attention. There was a dialogue between two parties- NU/SL and LCU on possible cooperation and "strategic guidelines for the cooperation". As an outcome of the latter, the idea of a coalition of central forces was born.[45] A. Paulauskas, the leader of the political party NU/SL, during his meeting with President of Lithuania V. Adamkus, on 26 April, mentioned a possible coalition of NU/SLwith LCU and other political parties. [46] However, liberals were not in any rush to make their final decision on their coalition tactics in the forthcoming elections to the Seimas. The final decision had to be made at the congress held on 13 May.

The political party LLU was also in search of relations with other political parties. On 13 April the board of the latter political party called the right wing as well as center political forces for unification against the populist rise of the left wing political forces. LLU called upon a constructive work of the right wing political forces together with the center political forces to coordinate their positions and bring to life principles encoded in their programs and those common to them all.

The political parties evaluated the latter statement quite skeptically. The conservatives named it as a "sensless and belated joke of all Fool's day". According to J.Razma, "liberals now assign themselves to the right wing political parties though they are still in the center, and the ones that see themselves in the center tend to become left wing political parties. So far we are the only ones who strongly believe in our ideology". The evaluation made by R. Ozolas, the leader of LCU political party, of the previously discussed statement was not positive either. He referred the latter as "a sign of recently observed syndrome of being the first". In his words, the statement is " of a declaratative nature and totally unnecessary, and it is quite probable that liberals do not feel like ones being within the sphere of the direct influence of the conservatives…"

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the prehistory of new ideas in politics comprises the efforts of NU/SL and LCU negotiations on coordination of their actions, as well as one- sided efforts of the political party LLU to search for partners in the party life market by creating some undefined coalition at

least, a single united liberal "front" had not been observed until April.

However, the negotations that were carried earlier among party leaders of LCU, NU/SL, and LLU were not that fruitless. By the beginning of May, it was possible to observe some rudiments of creating a coalition. One of the factors that fostered the process of unification among liberals was V. Adamkus, the President of Lithuania. The leader of political party LLS, at the congress held on 3 May spoke on the cooperation between the right wing and center political parties, naming the potential partners- NU/SL, LCU and LLU. The mutual conference of the latter the "*New Politics"* that being held in June was also announced during the congress. One of the goals of the conference was to provide an explanation on the content of the "*New Politics"* that was mentioned by V. Adamkus, President of Lithuania, in the annual report. [47] It was also mentioned that the conference was organized on President's initiative, and three political parties (that are liberal, popular and perspective) were only the organizers of that event as well as presenters in the conference.

It is possible to state that by the time liberal parties began to work on their tactics of parliamentary elections the same was simultaneously done by other political parties, to be more precise Social Democrats. At that time an idea to create a wide Social Democratic coalition to include such political parties as LDLP, LSDP, ND, NU/SL, and may be some other political parties, was born. In April and May, political parties LDLP and LSDP adopted important agreements that made the coalition cooperation and even the unification of those political parties possible (agreements on " Strategic partnership", " Coalition of LDLP and LSDP", " The establishment of coalition among opposition factions of Cocial Democrats"). The former President of Lithuania A. Brazauskas, who according to the formalized agreement on coalition between LDLP – LSDP signed on 13 May 2000, became an official protector of the coalition, supported the latter ideas.

However, NU/SL refused to participate in the Social Democratic coalition based on the fact that NU/SL remained " a center political party which strongly holds on the idea of a trinomial political system of the country". The efforts of the political party NDP also failed in reaching the goal of coalition coordination of actions with NU/SL. It became clear in the middle of May that NDP had expected much more from the coalition than benefited to either NU/SL or LCU. Another deciding factor was equal partnership. [48] Some details of negotiation skills were observed at that time as well. A. Paulauskas, the leader of NU/SL political party, confessed, " There were complicated turns. I am new in politics, and it is difficult for me to understand what it means to be the first or second." The latter statement can be understood as a hint that other colleagues, in order to achieve better positions in negotiations over the establishment of the coalition, had used some shadowy methods.

Thus, two centers – Social Democratic (LDLP+LSDP) and center forces (NU/SL +LCU+LLU)- within the political party system before parliamentary elections became evident by April and May. The final constitution of the Block of "New Politics" become clear after 16-18 June, when WCDU (the "Pact of Bebrusas" (according to the name of a lake) had joined the coalition. It seems it was also the time when other essential questions on the forthcoming parliamentary elections were discussed. To be more exact, it was agreed to participate in the parliamentary elections independently after coordination of just a few candidates in single constituencies. It was also agreed that the members of the political party WCDU would begin the second tens of the election lists of NU/SL, LCU and LLU.

The Social Democratic coalition supervised by the former President of Lithuania A.Brazauskas, was established in July: on 3 July political parties LDLP and LSDP signed with NDP a communiqué on cooperation in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, on the 13th of July Social Democratic coalition sighed an agreement on cooperation with URL. The common election platforma of LDLP, LSDP, NDP, and URL was signed in the middle of August.[49]

Meanwhile, the remaining political parties during the whole summer limited their activities to observing the shifts within the political party system, i.e. how political parties had regrouped, and how their interactions had changed. Therefore, it was impossible to state that the latter political parties had adopted the tactics of waiting. As it became clear later, the registration with the Central Electoral Committe of election lists which consisted of members of several parties under the name of one political party became the most popular practice. For instance, the election list of the Nationalist political party "Front of the Nation" was made of the members of the following political parties: LTU, LFL, and LNDP.[50] However the latter was registered under the name of the political party LTU. A similar trend could be observed on the election list of the political party HU/LC. It included the names of the candidates nominated by the political party HU/LC as well as the names of the members of LUPPD, yet it was registered under the name of HU/LC. [51] The results of the parliamentary elections proved the fragmentary efforts made by certain political parties to coordinate actions to be ineffective. For instance, the agreements on cooperation on the level of single–member constituencies [52] between HU/LC and LCDP failed, as well as the efforts of LCDP and SD2000 to cooperate on the questions of social politics.

Having in mind the results of parliamentary elections2000 today, it is possible to conclude that unsuccessful maneuvers of pre-election negotiations of coalition, as well as the private ambitions of the leaders of the political parties, had severe consequences on the political parties, primarily for the LPP, CDU, and LCDP.

5 table. **The tactics of party coalition politics in the elections to the Seimas**

No	Political Party	Agreed/Not agreed	Remarks
I.	LDLP, LSDP, **NDP, LRS**, LPP, **LLRA**, NU/SL	The **Social demokrats** *de* facto and *de jure* **coalition** among political parties LDDP – LSDP – NDP – LRS had been formed before the parliamentary elections.	The coalition agreement between **LDLP** and LSDP had been sighed before the parliamentary elections. To be more exact it was signed on 13May 2000. The latter political parties signed the communiqué with NDP on 3 July 2000.
II.	NU/SL, LLU, LCU, **MCDU**, LPP, NDP	The **Liberal** *de facto* **coalition** among political parties **NU/SL – LCU – LLU – MCDU** had been formed before the elections. However, the **Liberal** *de iure* coalition had been established after the elections.	The agreement among **NU/SL, LCU, LLU** and **MCDU**on the cooperation was made before the parliamentary elections. The latter agreement was formalized on 12 October 2000, i.e. after the elections.
III.	NUL, LFL, NDPL, CDU, "Young Lithuania", LDP, RP[1]	The Nationalistic *de* facto and *de iure* coalition "The Front of the Nation" (LTU, **LFL, NDPL**) had been created before the elections.	The agreement among **NUL, LFL** and **NDPL** on the establishment of the coalition, and creation of the common election list as well as common agenda of elections were signed on 10 June 2000.
IV.	**HU/LC, LUPPD, LCDP**	Political parties **HU/LC** and **LUPPD** had agreed before the parliamentary elections on common election list of candidates as well as on the principle of non- competitiveness with each other in single constituencies.	The agreement between **HU/LC** and **LUPPD** on the common election list under the name of **HU/LC**, and non-competitiveness in single constituencies was signed on 17 August 2000.
V.	LCDP , SD2000[2]	The political parties LCDP together with SD2000 had coordinated their actions on the questions of social politics, and agreed not to compete in some of the single constituencies before the parliamentary elections.	The declaration " On cooperation on implementing social programs" between the political parties LCDP and SD2000 was sighed on 18 August 2000.

4. PERSPECTIVES FOR COALITION POLITICS

"The bases for the agenda of the Government lie within the election platform of the political parties that had won the elections. On the other hand, it is only through the program of the Government that the principles encoded in the election platform achieve legal status …"

"Thus, the President of the state is empowerd to assign the Prime Minister, and to approve of the Government whose program is supported by the majority within the parliament …"

"Therefore, based on the principles of parliamentary democracy that are institutionalized within the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, it is possible to make an assumption that the President is not free in his choice of canditates for the post of the Prime Minister or Ministers, since the appointment of the above mentioned officialls depends on whether the Seimas majority has confidence in them or not. However the implications of the fact that the President is a part of the executive branch, and therefore has tools to influence the process of forming the Government should be taken into consideration."

The latter quote was taken from a long, yet very important decision of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania made on 10 January 1998. The decision can be questioned yet not completely ignored.

In this decision it is possible to find at least two answers to the questions on 1) what are the constitutional as well as political boundaries within which the President can choose a candidate for the post of Prime Minister; 2) to what extent are the differences of the political parties that constitute the majority within the Parliament compatible in approving the agenda of the Government.

Besides, not only politicians questioned the decision (as soon as it was announced) of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (CCL) on limitation of President's rights and liberties in choosing a candidate for the post of Prime Minister. The analysis of the President's behavior after the parliamentary elections proved what the specialists of constitutional law had whispered mildly, and the political scientists had declared aloud. The realities of the politics essentially transform the powers of the President in the semi-Presidential political system in Lithuania (as it had been acknowledged by the CCL). To be more exact, the Presidential power to chose Prime Minister is essentially shifted by the ratio of power distribution in the parliament.

It happened more than once. The most vivid example is the formation of the reorganized 8th Government in 1998. V. Adamkus, the President of Lithuania, confronted the Seimas, and was forced to choose the Prime Minister who was a conservative. A very similar scenario can be observed after the recently held parliamentary elections. The coalition majority was well disposed towards the President giving him an important role in the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers.

One can only guess what situation would have been like if the parliamentary elections had been won by the coalition of Social Democrats. However, one thing is clear, that in the case of the President ignoring the configuration of political forces within parliament, as well as the logic of "*easy disposition regime*", the political tension between the institutes of the President and Seimas would be guaranteed. Certain problems for the President, as a base for the interaction between the Constitution and governmental institutions would occur in the latter case.

A new element in the political situation after the parliamentary elections is the phenomenon of coalition, when the parliamentary majority is not based on a domination of a single party but is rather composed of several political parties. It is known how President chose the Prime Minister, yet the question whether the President had a different choice requires some analysis.

According to some specialists of the constitutional law, the President could have made another choice. However, a lack of constitutional conventions, political traditions and precedents became a barrier for that. The latter should

fill certain gaps in the constitutional (formal) rules of interaction of governmental institutions.

The coalition of Social Democrat led by A. Brazauskas won the greatest number of mandates however that did not guarantee them a majority within the parliament. The President discovered that political parties such as LLU, NU/SL could more easily guarantee the majority within the parliament.

It is difficult to evaluate unilaterally such behavior of the President. Firstly, it is important to notice that more or less favorable President's gesture to one or another political party should be seen as a concession for their initiative. The question of what would have been the reaction of other political parties, for instance LPP, if the President had invited members of other political parties for negotiations, remains of high importance. Also it is important to notice, that the President showed his support for the leaders of LLU and NU/SL in the following morning after the parliamentary elections, when the final results were not even known.[55] The former President A. Brazauskas, on the contrary, invited the leaders of the political parties only when the official results of the parliamentary elections in 1996 were announced. V.Landsbergis, however, called the invitation as a waste of time. Therefore, the "traditions" change as the presidents change.

A characteristic tradition that is still in the process of formation is the simplistic way in which the public perceives an invitation of the President sent to certain political parties to the President's Residence right after the elections. The public believes that the only goal of such invitation is a suggestion for a political party to raise their candidates for the post of the Prime Minister. However, such a gesture made by the President could also be interpreted as the beginning of a cycle of meetings with political parties first, and only after the configuration of political forces is clear within the Seimas, the President could call for another meeting with the primary concern to discuss possible candidates for the post of Prime Minister. Lithuania is a parliamentary republic that has some " features of the government mode (semi- presidential features) ".

In other words, the President's concept of the political ethics could be questioned, yet not the constitutional bases of his actions (even though some tried to prove the opposite).

In any case, President V. Adamkus was as active as never before in the process of Government formation. I disagree with the statement that he was active before, since his "activeness" had been limited to the debates over the governmental structure (how many ministries there should be) or potential candidates for Ministers. This time, the President was active in respect of all questions related with the new Government, i.e. he was concerned about every candidate for each post of Minister.

The above mentioned long quote from the decision of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania answers the question on whether the differences of the platforms of different political parties is a barrier for the adoption of the Governmental agenda – the basis for lawful Governmental activities and prerogatives – in the Seimas.

The efforts to escalate the differences between LLU and NU/SL election agendas were observed in the argumentation that the latter prevents the adoption of the government program. However it was forgotten that election agendas are constructed to serve the purpose of elections, and only later they form the basis for the governmental program. The election agenda as well as the governmental one are far from being totally compatible documents though, a too far distance between them is not seen as a positive phenomenon either since it manifest the inability of the government to coordinate the election principles of the political parties.

Contradictions are not possible within the Governmental programme, and if there are some left, the problem of agreement in the parliamentary majority (coalition) arises. The impacts of the latter situation are well explained in Article 58 of the Constitution of Lithuania that forsees premature elections. The political parties that are responsible for forming a government do not desire this. In other words, the project of the governmental program is proposed before the parliament by the ones who guarantee a bigger support in the Seimas.

The question of parliamentary support and confidence is an essential one within the democratic parliamentary political system. The government can work efficiently no matter if it has the support from the President or not, however it cannot work efficiently if the Seimas has no confidence in it. [56] The compatibility of the ideology of the coalition partners becomes as important factor in a coalition government as the previously mentioned ones. It is proved that ideologically compatable coalition gives the basis for its partners to find common grounds for further discussions and coordination of the disparities. Besides, it fosters the unanimity of the policies carried out, as well as decreases the number of disagreements on decision-making process or on the programs to be implemented.

The ideological factor plays an essential role in coalition stability especially in the case of Lithuania. The premise that ideological engagement creates a barrier for closer cooperation among political parties should be taken into consideration. The possibility to negotiate decreases as the ideological gap among political parties increases. The so-called "*core*" theory is useful in determining whether the political parties are ideologically compatible, and if a compromise among them could be achieved. According to the theory, the ideological similarities among coalition partners overlap and form a coherent core of the program. Meanwhile the differences between the programs are outside the boundaries of the *core*, and they do not result in cohesion of the coalition.

The influence on the stability of specific events is taken into consideration as well. The latter ones are primarily events within the political life that tend to create various crises. The impacts of such events may result in the disruption of the support for the government as well as in the loss of its decision-making power. The coalition government is very sensitive to crises that mostly appear due to economic recession, social unrest, and so forth.

The results of the parliamentary elections determined the environment in which coalition partners had to negotiate. It was not a bipolar but rather a multipolar environment, i.e. the interests of more than two coalition partners had to be matched. However, the negotiations were neither too sensitive, conflictual nor lasting longer than they were expected to. [57] The negotiations over the formation of a coalition government were limited to the participation of the two political parties – LLU and NU/SL – that had been involved in this process for the first time in their practice.

As it was expected, a wider range of distribution of the electorate votes caused certain problems of the compatibility of the coalition. As the victory of the winning political parties was not significant, and the total number of electorate votes they managed to get was not enough to make a coalition; as the situation was not improved by the use of the essentially reformed principle of coalition variant "2+1", the question on the stability of the coalition was raised. Due to the lack of parliamentary support for the coalition government and the "overload" of the expected number of partners within the coalition, the problems appeared at the initial stage of the formation of the government, i.e. at the stage of adopting the Governmental agenda.[58] The questions whether there would be a sufficient parliamentary support for the coalition government, and whether the government would be long lasting became the central issues.

How should the 11th Government of Lithuania be evaluated? It is necessary to remember the three types of coalition government mentioned earlier: (a) minority government that is not supported by the parliamentary majority, (b) minimal winning coalition that has a minimal parliamentary support, and (c) surplus coalition that has a significant support of the parliamentary majority (p. 11).

The first criterion for the evaluation is the composition of the parliament and the structure of the coalition. The signed agreement of coalition (12 October 2000) united the following four political parties: LLU, NU/SL, LCU and MCDU. 68 members represent the latter in unifying factions (there are 62 members in the Seimas factions of Liberals and Social Liberals, plus 3 representatives of the Center political forces, as well as 3 Modern democrats from the United faction). The chosen tactics of negotiations ("posts for support") by the coalition partners resulted in extended boundaries of parliamentary support within the Seimas by 74 votes (+4 votes from LPP, and +2 votes from

LPEA). The signing of the *Declaration on the implementation of the principles of the foreign and domestic policy* by several political parties together with some individual members of parliament manifested the efforts to formalize the latter growth of the parliamentary support before the elections to the chairperson of the Seimas [59]. Not only LLU, NU/SL, LCU and MCDU had signed the Declaration, but did the leaders of LPP and LPEA, the members of the parliament outside the faction – K. Bobelis and S. Buškevičius.

The question arises if a minority government (68) transforms into a majority government that has the support of 76 votes within the Seimas. The answer is definitely not. First, the "posts for the support" are usually used and justify themselves among the coalition partners that have signed a coalition agreement. Meanwhile, the promised (and some of them already assigned) posts for the political parties LPP and LPEA guaranteed favorable outcomes of some random voting rather than a long-term support for the policies of the coalition government. The conflict is endemic within the artificially widened coalition. The agreements of such kind lasts until the emergence first serious critical events or crises.

Second, it is quite obvious that the commitments made before the parliamentary elections among LLU, NU/SL, LCU and MCDU created a barrier to form an effectively functioning government based on the principles of the logic of politics. The efforts to improve the situation by signing up the Declaration were fruitless since it was not an equivalent document to the coalition agreement signed by the "big four". The initiative of the Liberals and Social Liberals for the " act of support of Governmental program", i.e. efforts to sign an agreement of *Partnership* among different fractions were not fruitful in terms of a long lasting effect, as it was a *posteriori* tactics of the coalition.

The phenomenon of the " 68 votes minority" government has more arguments in favor than the government of the "76 majority votes". Even if it were not the case, the coalition of the 76 votes would remain a boosted and contradictory creation composed out of or supported by 6 political parties. Such coalition government would not guarantee stability, it would not last long, and it would not work efficiently.[60] At last, it reveals the support for the idea of an oversized coalition that was mentioned by the coalition of the Social Democrats right after the elections. Thus it was believed that the latter idea of the coalition will be escalated more than once (51 mandates belong to the coalition of Social Democrats, and +26 mandates for the Social Liberals) and not only on the academic level.

Thus formally, from the political science perspective, the 11th coalition Government is a coalition minority government.

So what are the chances for a long life of the 11th coalition Government? The first criterion, the composition of political forces as well as the structure of the governing coalition has been already discussed.

The second criterion – the index of Laaks/Taagepara. It reflects the influence of the parties within a parliament (it is measured by the percent of the seats in the parliament the parties have). The number of effective political parties (others refer to them as "the number of equivalent political parties") is a hypothetical number of political parties with the same degree of influence that is derived from the number of political parties with non equivalent influence. This index shows the degree of fragmentation within a party system.63 After the Parliamentary elections 2000 this index has increased. Therefore, the bigger the number, the more difficult it is to form a stable and an effective government

The third criterion is the problem of parliamentary support for the Governments. The Seimas and the President did not have greater difficulties in establishing the governments so far. The process of constructing the government (from the day the Seimas agreed on the candidate for the Prime Minister till the day the composition of the Government was approved) averagely took only 16.28 days [61], to say nothing of the complicated process of investiture[62]. However, political experience of Lithuania proves that there has never been solid parliamentary support in the process of approving the constitution of a government. There are very few exceptions from this rule. These are the governments lead by K. Prunskienė, G. Vagnorius (2nd government) and R. Paksas. In the remaining cases the support was not determined by an "overlap" of support of the political parties but rather by a political motivation (mostly by the " difficult and complicated situation in the country").

Earlier the lack of parliamentary support for the government (including the lack of the political party support) did not end up in a shift of the status of the government (a single part majority government transforming into a minority government) but rather in the resigning of the government.

The behavior of the party factions in the Lithuanian Seimas does not deviate a lot from European standards, as it is difficult for the political party that gained the latter status to keep it. Migration of parliament members starts as soon as some time since the elections has passed. Party dissidents appear as well as the general party discipline goes down, and so forth. This implies that parliamentary support for the government decreases in the environment of poor political party discipline.

The political party LDLP in its faction had 74 votes (equivalent to 52.8 percent of al the seats in the Seimas) after the parliamentary elections in 1992. A very similar situation was observed after the parliamentary elections in 1996 when the political party TU/LC had a faction of 70 members of the parliament (equivalent to 51.09 percent of all the seats in the Seimas) plus it had 16 votes derived from its coalition partner LCDP (in total 62.7 percent from all the seats in the Seimas. Both examples meet the criteria for a surplus coalition,

even though not all party members had won the elections in all the constituencies.

When the Seimas reaches the second half of its term of office, the parliamentary majority tends to split and the support for the government diminishes. For instance, after a year from parliamentary elections 1992–1996 had passed, by the differences of opinions within the faction of LDLP might be observed. The "LDLP program group" (it included 21 members of parliament) was created on 27 September 1993. Later a group of "LSP support group" (included 3 members of the parliament) was created, as well as some members of the faction left (or were expelled) the party itself. Due to the latter events the LDLP faction in a year's time was reduced to include 70 members, and at the end of the term of the Seimas- only 60 members (equivalent of 45.1percent of the total number of seats in the Seimas).

The same scenario is suitable to describe the situation after the parliamentary elections in 1996–2000. In the second half of the term of the Seimas, the faction started to split as the disagreements between the supporters of Landsbergis and Vagnorius had strengthened. After three years had passed (on the 1st of December 1999) 64 members of parliament belonged to the HU/LC faction, and at the end of term of the Seimas – only 49 members of the political party HU/LC and 12 members of LCDP (equivalent of 43.8 percent of total number of all the seats in the Seimas). [63]

Thus, it is usual that by the end of the term of the Seimas, the parliamentary majority loses from 20 to 30 percent of its members.

CONCLUSIONS

The disadvantages of the coalition government are great in terms of stability and vitality: the Seimas is very fragmentized, and the problem of the long-term support for the Government can be observed today; the coalition itself is a very complicated and mixed structure. It is not worthwhile to talk on the programme compatibility of coalition partners as well as various mobilizing opportunities for the support of the governmental policy implementation.

There are few however present guarantees of the vitality and stability of the coalition Government. First, it is important to notice an active involvement of the President into the process of establishing a coalition Government. This implies the greater responsibility the President has taken for the actions of the Government. The public support for the work of the Government and the Seimas can be achieved not without the efforts of the President, Chairman of the Seimas and the Prime Minister.

Second, no matter what a paradox it may seem, the forthcoming presidential elections should serve as consolidation forces of the coalition government, and

might bring the latter one to the " intermediate point".[64] The results of the presidential elections will not only determine the composition of the government but also are likely to revise the governmental program that has been adopted.

However, it will not be easy to reach the "intermediate point". It might be possible that the efforts of the coalition politics will make the above mentioned process easier. Meanwhile, the statistics in Lithuania states that the average "life" of a government lasts for 382 days. The "European statistics" is more benevolent. It says that in the parliamentary- semi presidential political systems, such as Lithuania, the average life-cycle of the government is slightly more than a year and a half.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Lijpart A. Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. – New Haven and London: Yale University Press. – 1984.

[2] Lithuanian National Democratic party was established on 30th January, 1999, Homeland People's Party – 18th December, 1999, Lithuanian Party "Social Democracy' 2000" – 18th December, 1999, Modern Christian Democratic Union on 29th March, 2000, Moderate Conservative Union was established on 2nd July, 2000 (Lithuanian National Socialist Party was established on 14th May, 2000, however it was not institutionalized).

[3] LDLP stands for Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party

[4] LS stands for Lithuanian Sąjūdis; HU/LC stands for Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives

[5] LCDP stands for Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party

[6] LSDP stands for Lithuanian Social Democratic Party

[7] LCM stands for Lithuanian Centre Movement; LCU stands for Lithuanian Center Union

[8] LLU stands for Lithuanian Liberal Union

[9] R. Survila, a member of the Nation Union conservative faction, initiated the abolition of the second round of parliamentary elections in single-member constituencies. S. Kaktys, a member of the parliament registered the amendment on 23 of May 2000. These amendments were taken into consideration and approved by the Seimas. The revised Law on Elections to the Seimas was adopted on 4 of July 2000. President of Lithuania V.Adamkus overruled the amendment and returned the law to the parliament with some remarks for further revision by his decree 12 of July 2000. In other words, the President of Lithuania has used his power of veto. The Seimas did not take into consideration the Lithuanian President's comments on the revised law, and voted in favor of the amendment on 18 of July 2000 (72 voted in favor, 32- against, 10- abstained from voting). In order to overrule the Presidential veto, no fewer than 72 votes are needed.

[10] The following politicians gained the most votes in their constituencies (the first five politicians are mentioned): V.Uspaskich – 67.20 percent, A.Butkevičius - 61.22 percent, K.Bobelis – 57.96 percent, V.Tomaševski – 51.17 percent, R.Paksas – 49.35 percent, R.Karbauskis – 49.12 percent.

In the first round of elections in 1996 two candidates won by absolute majority – V.Landsbergis (Kaunas district constituency No.66) and G.Vagnorius (Telšiai district constituecny No. 40), who gained 59.1 and 53.9 percent of total number of votes respectively. During the second round of elections (**repeated vote**) the following candidates gained most of the votes: R.Smetona – 67.67 percent, P.Papovas – 66 percent, A.Kašėta – 64.71 percent, V.Aleknaitė – Abramikienė – 64.19 percent, M.Laurinkus and J.Matekonienė equally got 62.23 percent of votes.

[11] G.Šileikis, who became a member of the parliament Western conctituency No. 27) gained only 15.65 percent of the total number of votes. It comes up only to 9.45 percent of voters within that particular constituency who supported the above mentioned candidate. These are not single case examples that question the notion of a *representative of the nation.*

[12] In the previous parliamentary elections there was less variety among political parties (political organizations in general): in the year of 1990 – 1992 there were 7 parties; in the year 1992 – 1996, as well as in the year 1996 – 2000 there were 14 parties. The number of politically active/ capable parties has tremendously increased during the recent elections.

[13] HU/LC stands for Homeland Union/ Lithuanian Conservatives

[14] LPP stands for Lithuanian Peasants Party

[15] NDP stands for New Democracy Party

[16] MCDU stands for Modern Christian Democratic Union

[17] URL stands for Union of the Russians of Lithuania

[18] LPEA stands for Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action

[19] CDU stands for Christian Democratic Union

[20] MCU stands for Moderate Conservative Union

[21] LUPPD stands for Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees

[22] PNP stands for Party of National Progress

[23] Besides, the ratings of LLU after the scandal of the debt of Vilnius municipality that was revealed by the tax inspection at the beginning of June recovered pretty fast.

[24] The first meeting of the council of LDLP- LSDP coalition was held on 13 of May 2000. During this meeting the coalition agreement was adoptedunanimously, and the President of Lithuania A. Brazauskas was announced the chairperson of honor of the coalition.

[25] The information on the change of the ratings of the major political parties can be obtained on the following webpage://www.5ci.lt/ratings2/lit

[26] Budge I., Keman H. Parties and Democracy. – Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 1993. - P. 166.

[27] Laver M., Schofield N. Multiparty Government. – Oxford: Oxford University Press. – 1990. - P. 72 – 73.

[28] Beyme K. Political Parties in Western Democracies. – Gover House: Redwood Burn Ltd. – 1985. – P. 327.

[29] Laver M. Op.cit. - P. 77 – 78.

[30] A good example can be seen in the political attitude of the President of Finland Kekkonen in forming the governments.

[31] *Oversize coalitions* are formed when the democratic regime is at threat, internally as well as externally. A good example of that is an *oversize coalition* that was formed in Germany in 1966-1969 as a response to a more active Neonazist movements (anti-Semitist movements).

[32] Lane E-J. Politics and Society in Western Europe. – 1994. – P.240.

[33] There is a four–party coalition government formed in Switzerland since 1959: National Party (SVP), Social Democrat Party (SPS), Christian Democrat National Party (CVP), and Free Democrat National Party (FDP).

[34] The coalition politics experience in Estonia and Latvia is much richer to compare with the one in Lithuania. There were lots of cases when a coalition government was formed out of three or more political parties. In Estonia, for instance, such a government was formed more than once; the 4th government in Latvia lead by Prime Minister A. Skele consisted of the representatives from 6 political parties, and the 5th government – of the representatives from 8 political parties. There were total number of 7 governments formed in Estonia and 8 governments in Latvia since 1990.

[35] Amendments to the law on Elections to the Seimas (Article 88) were made on 27 June 1996, and amendments to the law on Elections to the Local Self–Governments (Article 85) were made on 23 December, 1996.

Valstybės žinios. – 1996.07.02. – Nr.62; 1996.12.31. – Nr.126.

[36] During the parliamentary elections in 1992, five coalitions participated in elections, whereas in the parliamentary elecions in 1996 there was only one coalition (Lithuanians' Union (or National Union of Lithuania?)+ Lithuanian Democratic Party) registered. The same situation can be observed in the elections to the Local Self–Governments: in the elections in 1995, 34 coalitions were registered, whereas in the elections in 1997, only 5.

[37] LWP stands for Lithuanian Women's Party

[38] LFL stands for Lithuanian Freedom League

[39] The agreement on the coordination of actions on the level of municipalities was signed on 26 May 1994; the agreement on ideological similarities between the political parties and perspectives of their unification in the future was sighed on 19 October 1994.

[40] These resolutions were made in the following congresses: LSDP 14th congress on 5 May 1991, and in the 17th congress held on 23 May 1993.

[41] The membership of LSDP in the Socialist International was reestablished on 8 October 1990.

[42] The coalition between political parties HU/LC and LCDP can be regarded as bipolar with considerable reservation since for more than two years (to be more exact since 4 December, 1996 when the 8th government was formed) a third political party, LCU, until 1 June, 1999(by then the coalition agreement was breached by the initiative of LCDP) extended it. The political party LCU was represented in the coalition government (A. Čaplikas, I. Lazdinis, G. Balčiūnas) as well as in the authorities of the parliament (R. Ozolas) until 6 November 1999 when it was declared to be in opposition. Thus, formally (until 1 June, 1999) the latter coalition can be referred to as a surplus coalition since the third political party- LCU supported the coalition between HU/LC and LCDP. That guaranteed for coalition government the support of more than 72percent of parliamentary votes (65+ 16+ 18 = 99).

[43] According to the experts of politics, there are three main reasons that determined the split of the coalition between LCDP and HU/LC. Firstly, the initiative of LCDP to breach the coalition agreement was a manifestation of the protest orientated towards the attitude of HU/LC on the government lead by Prime Minister R. Paksas (the Trust Government of President and Seimas). Secondly, the fate of the coalition was also determined by the fact that HU/LCand LCDP did not agree on the policy implemented by the government lead by G. Vagnorius. Thirdly, the split of the coalition could have been influenced by the disagreements (as well as misunderstandings) that occurred during the process of assigning the posts in the newly reorganized government (25 August, 1998- 3 May, 1999) lead by the earlier mentioned Prime Minister G. Vagnorius. Besides a great emphasis in the coalition agreement was put on the process of assigning the posts.

[44] The coalitions of political parties, as a rule, tend to be short term ones, as political parties bear neither considerable similarities within their programs nor ideological identities. However there are political party groups that to a certain extent exercise some common political interests. For instance, Coalition of **"Sandora"** (established in year 1995) consisted of the following political parties: LDP, LUPPD, NUL, PI (Party of Independence) (; the Coalition of Central Right Forces (established in year 1997) was constituted of these political parties: LCU, LDP, LTU; Coalition for the Righteous Lithuania (established in 1998) – "Elections' 96", LPP (Lithuanian Peoples' Party, LRP (Lithunian Reforms Party, URL (Union Russians' of Lithuania), LSP; the Union of Nation (established in year 1999) consisted of these political parties: NUL, LDP, CDS, LFL, "Young Lithuania", PI; the Union of the Country and the City of Lithuania (established in 1999) – CDS, LPP, "Young Lithuania"; the Block of the Middle Left Wing Forces (established in 1999) consisted of these political parties: LDLP, ND/WP, NU/SL.

[45] It is said that on the night of elections to the Local Self–Governments Social Democrats were aware of the unwillingness of the political party NU/SL to negotiate with them over the possible cooperation (the latter happened not without the interference of the leader of the LCU R. Ozolas). By then, there was a plan on behalf of LCS to cooperate with LDLP, LSDP and NU/SL and outweigh the influence of liberals in Vilnius.

[46] The President of the Republic of Lithuania V. Adamkus after the meeting evaluated NU/SL as a political party that can produce constructive decisions. On the other hand it is quite possible that Liberals during that meeting were remembered as perspective partners for the coalition of the center, despite the incidents that appeared during the process of appointing the mayor of Vilnius.

[47] Due to the scandal of the debt of Vilnius municipality, the conference on the "*New Politics*" was held on the 3rd of July instead of the 30th of June. Meanwhile, the "great four" (political parties that were organizing the conference) established work groups (there were 8 groups) to coordinate the party programmes.

[48] Besides, the leader of NDP, K. Prunskiene, had favored the coalition among LCU, NU/SL and NDP and had made statements on possible unified participation in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. However, R.Ozolas, the leader of LCU, was categorically against.

[49] It is said that coalition platform of elections was revised 12 times.

[50] NDPL stands for National Democratic Party of Lithuania

[51]LTS, LFL and NDPL agreed to prepare a common election list for the forthcoming parliamentary elections on 10 June 2000, and HU/LC and LUPPD made a similar agreement on 17 August 2000.

[52] HU/LC and LCDP agreed not to compete with each other in almost 50 single-member constituencies.

[53] RP stands for Respublicans' Party

[54] SD2000 stands for Social Democracy 2000

[55] By the time the leaders of the political parties LLU and NU/SL R. Paksas and A. Paulauskas had met the President V. Adamkus, the mandates of 9 single-member constituencies were not distributed.

[56] The so-called conservative " construction" of 1999, i.e. the 9th Government led by R. Paksas, should be remembered as a good constitutional lesson. That government was the President's Trust Government. It is a good example of the politisation of the principles of the constitution.

[57] The only incident noticed by the mass media was the early of signing of the coalition agreement due to the position of the political party LCU.

[58] According to Article 58 in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Seimas is obliged to adopt Governmental agenda within 30 days after the draft is submitted for consideration. If the Seimas fails to make a decision on the Governmental agenda or if it votes it negatively twice within 60 days, the President has a constitutional right to call for premature elections.

[59] The declaration was signed on 18 October 2000, and the Chairperson of the Seimas was assigned the day after: 76 members of parliament voted in favor of A. Paulauskas, 53 in favor of Č.Juršėnas, and 10 ballots were announced as non valid.

[60] The coalition government discussed above would include LLU, NU/SL, LCU, MCDU, LPP, **LPEA**, except for the political party **CDU** and "the Young Lithuania".

[61] The calculations are made starting from the 5th Government led by B. Lubys, as only then the President got involved into the process of approving the composition of the Government.

[62] Investiture (lot. investitura, investio – I dress) – "it is a procedure (an act) of giving away the juridical title and it involves symbolic rituals. In this case, it is a process of forming a new government, or in other words, it is a change of the governments".

[63] Besides the coalition agreement between HU/LC and LCDP had been breached earlier so only informal ties of responsibility connected them.

[64] The third factor of high importance is an attempt to supplement (re-write) the coalition agreement with additional (protocal) agreements that formalize the rights and responsibilities of the political parties that support the coalition. The best moment for that is the process of adopting a Governmental agenda in the Seimas. Generally, when the Government is formed, political parties should relate their consequences of actions with the adoption of the Governmental agenda rather than with other " intermediate agreements".

STASYS ŠALKAUSKIS AND ANTANAS MACEINA AS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS

Alvydas Jokubaitis

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the attitude Šalkauskis and Maceina held towards the political philosophy. Later writings of Maceina notwithstanding, in this article we find the analysis of the perspectives that characterized these authors during the Interwar period. The article is based on the assumption that the failure to take account of Šalkauskis and Maceina's attitude held toward the political philosophy makes the overall discussion on their political outlook non-valid. Neither of these authors can be dealt with as political philosophers in the strict sense of this word. They touched upon the issues this discipline embraced in the context of the works they had devoted to an entirely different purpose. Thus, before proceeding toward the examination of their political outlooks, it is necessary to identify their relationship with the problems this discipline is set to answer.

There is a certain degree of paradox in the way Šalkauskis and Maceina treat politics. While taking a wide interest in the problems of political life both of them avoid any analysis of political philosophy. These authors found it interesting to touch upon the political themes. However, if we look at their philosophical output, we can trace the determination to avoid wider discussion of the issues pertaining to this discipline. Šalkauskis inaugurated the Interwar period with two semi-theoretical, semi-publicist works. Both of them substantiate his talents of a political philosopher – *Krikščioniškoji politika ir gyvenamoji valanda (Christian Politics and the Living Hour)* and *Momento reikalai ir principų reikalavimai (The Matters of Moment and Demands of the Principles)*. Nevertheless, following the 1926 Šalkauskis' interest in the political philosophy went through an obvious recession. His famous 1935 letter to the President and his fourth-decade works on the *Ateitininkai* ideology belong to a completely different genre. Besides, the majority of his fourth-decade political works replicate the basic ideas of the previous period.

Maceina's view of political philosophy is even more complicated. This author liked it very much to discuss political matters; however, he found it very

difficult to obtain the theoretical language fit enough to examine issues characteristic to political philosophy. What he uttered on a level of principle appeared to be different from what he used to say during the so-called "practical advice". *Individas-asmuo ir valstybė (Individual-Person and the State)* is the best proof of this. On the level of principle one may find the ideas highly familiar to the liberal ones: "a person is an objective by himself, thus, he cannot serve anybody's needs as a means"[1]. At the same time, having analyzed his "practical advises" deep enough, we may see things contrary to the latter. In his opinion, the state may pose a demand that individual's "body life serve her [state's] interests and her security"; "can regulate the size of the family"; "has rights to command and ration individual property, control its sources, constrict and even put an end to them. She may even apply a right to forfeit this property for the sake of the common good".[2]

The way Maceina dubbed the titles of the articles may create misleading impression: the titles refer to political matters, however, in reality they speak about the issues of the philosophy of culture, religion, and history. Since the very beginning of his career as a philosopher this author had committed himself to analyzing public issues. His negative attitude toward any contact more serious with the political philosophy, however, is the main paradox of his oeuvre. His major works, despite numerous political references, are dedicated to analyzing historiosophical, not political, issues. Even his famous *Socialinis teisingumas (Social Justice),* a masterpiece that according to the modern canons can be attributed to the sphere of political philosophy, demonstrates an obvious will to get away from politics. In the introduction of this work the author writes: "This book is still an outline. In its constructive part (Chapter III) the book presents the very principles and talks about their implementation in the life of a Catholic, alone. Thus, in the meantime we must avoid speaking about concrete ways and concrete measures how to implement the principles referred to because we still disagree on the very principles".[3] What draws the attention is that the author of these lines wants to talk about the principles of social justice that are relevant to none but the Catholic community. It means he leaves the society at large aside. Furthemore, in this work we come across a few references about the state as a tool of implementing the principles of social justice.

Šalkauskis' love for the philosophy of culture is what makes his interest in political philosophy secondary. In his essays on the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis shuns making any major allusion on politics. He prefers speaking about arts - "the brightest illustration of the essence of culture"[4] to all the discussions on politics. Even the ethics – closest neighbour of the political philosophy – is no match to the aesthetics. In the *Enciklopedinė filosofijos dalis (Encyclopedic Part of the Introduction on Philosophy)* eight pages are devoted to aesthetics, whereas the ethics occupy only one and a half pages.[5] Writing his

works on the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis evades a more thorough analysis of political issues. Whenever he touches upon a certain political topic he immediately skips from that subject to another. *Geopolitinė Lietuvos padėtis ir lietuvių kultūros problema (Geopolitical Situation of Lithuania and the Problem of the Culture of Lithuanians)* is the best proof of cultural philosophy pushing political philosophy away from its established positions.

What is most surprising, however, is the fact that in the essays devoted to the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis does not identify politics as a separate cultural phenomenon. Philosophy of law is the only discipline author designates as kindred to the philosophy of culture. One may get an impression that he deliberately evades wider debates on the issues of the philosophy of law and the political philosophy. In the *Kultūros filosofijos metmenys (Parameters of the Philosophy of Culture)* he becomes embroiled in the discussion of the issues that characterize the philosophy of economy. At the same time he voices not a single word on the political matters.

In addition to the already mentioned *Social Justice,* the following articles – *Individual-Person and the State* and *Tauta ir valstybė (The Nation and the State)* – could be referred to as the essays that illustrate Maceina's political philosophy best. Extensive debates on the ideas of the latter articles might be our first alternative choice; at the same time, however, we must acknowledge that this is Maceina's one of the most consistent political treatises, devoid of appeals for matters alien to politics – ethnology, eschatology, and dichotomy of spirits or Prometheism. Alternatively, in the article *Individual-person and the State* one could observe an excellent demonstration of all the weak sides of Maceina as political philosopher. In this article author's inability to deal with the theoretical language appropriate to the analysis of political phenomena becomes extremely evident. Any substance familiar to the reader disappears under the philosophical terms and concepts the author employs. Principal thesis of the article is nothing but shocking: "the State cannot be moved into the soul-related category".[6] The impression one might generate as a result is that applying such theses logically follows his wish to push politics away from the sphere of culture.

Individual-Person and the State, an article, was written as a commentary to the well-known 1936 declaration *To the Institution of an Organic State.* In this article Maceina backed the general intention of the declaration and disapproved its individual statements. The declaration put it clear: "the future of the State is the future of the Nation"[7], whereas Maceina aimed to establish the contrary position: "The State does not count as part of the spiritual community"[8]. What follows such a comment is a much more conservative impression of the declaration we get, different to what we may think once we have completed reading the text.

Comparison of Šalkauskis and Maceina comments indicates that the former

favors democracy whereas the latter is inclined to overestimate the role of the state. This conclusion is underpinned by the analysis of the concepts of corporatism. Šalkauskis is used to accentuating the decentralizing role of corporations: "What the spirit of democracy demands is the decentralization of the state duties in all spheres where more or less intensive participation of the interested people in dealing with their own affairs ensures the security of individual rights that the latter require and the former provide"[9]. Maceina's attitude on corporations, instead, refers to the interests of the state: "corporation is an instrument of the state"[10].

The attitude Maceina holds toward philosophy is not the right one in order to explore political issues. "*An act of philosophic knowledge*, - in his opinion, - *is an essentially personal matter. The truth is personal (italics – A.M.)* The truth may not be given from above. It must be lived over inside"[11]. This attitude better applies to artists than to the political philosophers ("Aesthetic choice is always individual, whereas the aesthetic experience – a private one"). No doubt, the political philosophy entails more attention to be drawn to the idea of common good. Maceina's philosophic temperament, meanwhile, brings him into an entirely opposite direction, that of romantic individualism. The way he viewed and treated philosophic schools reflects this very well: "Philosophy lays down the requirement to move away from one's teachers because it insists on exposing person's unique, original nature"[12]. Such an attitude is hardly compatible with the political philosophy which is barely imaginable without different kinds of "-isms".

Maceina is well known for his inclination to aestheticize political phenomena[13]. In his works contemplative aesthetic answers prevail over the political analysis. His poetical imagination regularly destroys the conventions of political life. In this regard his attitude towards the Bolshevism is of special interest: "In the Bolshevist world the new type of culture has been developing, completely different both Marxist or Liberal culture. Marks of Prometheus make it different from the tradesmen and the bankers' culture. Hereby, this type of culture approximates a theistic type of culture, and via its ideal – like character almost merges[14]. The author held a miserable understanding of the political build-up of the Soviet Union.

Ever since the middle of the 1930s, Maceina had begun to show more and more resemblance with the XIXth century poets romanticists. It is not without due cause that his *Prometėjizmo dvasia (Spirit of Prometheus)* begins with the Aeschylus Tragedy and Adam Mickiewicz' *All Soul's Day* interpretations. The ending of this masterpiece is also literary: "The tide is coming in; it catches us and takes us togetherwith into the mysterious eternity"[15]. Another Interwar masterpiece Maceina is the author of – namely, *Buržuazijos žlugimas (Collapse of the Bourgeoisie)* - also bears similar poetic tones. In this essay the historiosophic

prophecy dominates over the political and economic analysis of capitalism: "the Bourgeoisie inevitably comes to an end both as a historic guise and as a style of public life"[16]. Thanks to the so-called analysis of "three souls" Maceina hopes to get to the bottom of all the theoretical problems – he hopes to explain the science, religion, arts and politics.

Maceina adheres to pushing everything to the radical, mystical verge. His philosophical deliberations time and again reflect his walking on a tightrope near to prophecies: "Knowledge of the future presented in the most general characteristics is necessary for the philosophy of history and culture; in this area each and every philosopher becomes a prophet"[17]. Maceina writes as if he were the poet inspired, the poet who fears no reference to the Apocalypse: "The Revelations in their essence manifest the depth of life; the depth of life contains more than just external-occurrences; it contains occurrences inside the human soul. External-occurrences derive from the inside occurrences, alone. Prior to the revolution taking place inside the state, it had already come to pass through the soul".[18]

Maceina used to pose one of his favorite questions: "Is there a lot of time left until the clock of the world strikes twelve?"[19] As long as the author writes about the political matters, he is overwhelmed with mystical, not theoretical disposition. A person for him is first of all a religious, and not the political, concept. What he strives for is not some kind of political reforms, he strives for the mystical transformation of the entire mankind: "The vision of the world that is presented by the Revelations is not the one that leads to the collapse, to the happiness of this reality; it is the vision that leads to the *universal transfiguration through the universal and sudden catastrophe (Italics – A.M.)*. This is the main idea of the Apocalypse, which becomes an irreplaceable guideline for the whole philosophy of culture"[20].

Maceina is not concerned with the history designed by historians; he is not much interested in the details of the everyday political life. For him the essence of the political events resides beyond the historical time limits: "These are not the laws, not the natural or acquired citizenship, still not the language or the customs that bind together a Christian and the society. It is the unity of the mankind redeemed, which in the bottom of life of the Church is set to found the perfect community"[21]. The language of his political considerations is permeated with religious symbols and allegories.

Early works of Maceina promised a completely opposite development of his philosophical career. In his *Pirminės kultūros pagrindai (Basics of the Primary Culture)* Maceina presented himself as an author showing great respect for the specialized sciences (ethnology, in particular). True to say, this was a completely new development the philosophy of culture faced in Lithuania. It was, alas, a short one. In a couple of years Maceina evolved into a radical critic of any

philosophers' claims over the specialized sciences: "Nowhere else does the positivism flourish except for in the mindless, motionless, bourgeois souls"[22]. In terms of reputation, his love for ethnology turned into controversial statements. Suffice to mention the fact that he employed the totemic culture to explain democracy: "History of the mankind undergoes the period of time when the totemic male element comes into the light and takes over the rule of the human mind, his activities and his creative works. As a result the theoretical sphere sees the appearance of a mechanist worldview, whereas in the practical sphere it is the sense of democracy that takes ground"[23]. His understanding of totalitarianism was similar: "...all the totalistic attempts in human history – from Plato to modern theoreticians of state – are but a never-ending manifestations of a matriarchatic principle"[24].

Šalkauskis held somewhat more positive attitude toward the empirical sciences. In his review of Kazys Pakštas' book, he admitted the following: "the first romantic period of Lithuanian national renaissance, when the nation of Lithuanians and the land known as Lithuania were treated for the most on the basis of what he or she felt or saw, has ended, it cannot be retrieved. Nowadays we have become aware of the attempts to lay more objective scientific knowledge basis for the folk studies and for the country's studies; it implies changing of the romantic beliefs of the national and country matters into a more realistic standpoint..."[25]. In one of his *Matters of the Moment and the Demands of the Principle* Šalkauskis has even embarked on the examination of the issues of public administration.

Such a development is very unlikely in the case of Maceina. This author's philosophical considerations have always remained detached from the matters of the daily political life. The ideas he propagated could not exert any more expressive effect on real politics. Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes and Thomas Aquinas were also metaphysicians. However, they never tried to conceal the peculiarities of political phenomena. On the contrary, they exposed them. Whereas Maceina tries to evade a more specific analyses of political events. One may get an impression that Maceina treats metaphysics as a means in his fight against politics.

The political philosophy of both Šalkauskis and Maceina had been influenced by the essentialist metaphysical beliefs each of them possessed. These authors believed in the primary elements of the being and had no doubts as to whether the eternal philosophy, based on the Christ. The main difference rests in the fact that Šalkauskis is able to reason beyond the Apocalypse: in addition to that, he is able to consider the division of the powers of the Government, the democracy and human freedom. Maceina, on the hand, evades any more concrete analysis of the political events. He is lured by other, more poetic themes – "juvenile relationship between a man and the nature", "capitalism as a collapse

of life", "division of spirits in the present" and "the beginning of the night period in the history". He treats politics from the standpoint of an artist, and such a view corresponds to all the main canons characteristic to the romantic philosophical cogitation.

Šalkauskis has offered a very wide description of culture: "The *material* subjectmatter of the philosophy of culture is culture at large or cultural activity of a human-being. Whereas formal subject matter is to investigate fundamentals considering primary and universal reasons"[26]. Such a wide concept of culture enabled one to expect that politics would be included into the scope of its phenomena. However, in his works on the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis does not identify politics as a separate cultural phenomenon. What he talks about is knowledge, morality and art[27]. Later on, Maceina introduced language, education and technique into that list; though, he uttered not a single word about politics. There is something like a tacit agreement existing – the politics must remain outside the confines of the philosophy of culture.

Indeed, it is very interesting to observe how both philosophers search for a place in the family of other sciences the philosophy of culture could be landed into. The most difficult task for them is to identify the relationship between the philosophy of culture and its two most important neighbours – the philosophies of history and society. Šalkauskis is convinced that the disciplines of history and society must be subjected to the philosophy of culture. Maceina, meanwhile, disagrees with such a point of view. In his opinion, the philosophy of culture is the composite part of the philosophy of history.

Among the disciplines familiar to the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis points out to the philosophy of law, the discipline which could be treated as one of the closest neighbors of the political philosophy. What may seem surprising, however, is that this person, – he had graduated from the faculty of Law, - seemed to evade from any more thorough analysis of the philosophy of law. Maceina is consistent in this respect – he completes the extrusion of the political sciences from the confines of the philosophy of culture. He no longer mentions the philosophy of law as a discipline close to the philosophy of culture. More to say, he resists including the philosophy of society into the realm of this discipline.[28]

To find the middle way between the ideologies that oppose each other is the main objective of Šalkauskis and Maceina. They try reconciling the variety of elements – liberalism and socialism, individualism and collectivism, East and West civilizations, nomadic and matriarchatic origins of culture. Šalkauskis titled this policy "the tactics of Christian balance"[29]. The concept of an organic and corporate state, based on a balance between three different elements, he devised is the most manifest example of the use of this tactics: "*political sphere*: individual – political party – state's central authority; *economic social sphere*:

individual – professional organization – state's economic chamber; *cultural spiritual sphere*: individual – culturally autonomous community – supreme cultural council; *territorial sphere*: individual – provincial municipality – state's central authority"[30]. The aforementioned could be treated as the shortest resume of Šalkauskis' entire political philosophy.

Maceina endorsed his teacher's "Christian balance" idea, although, he often admitted he did not know practical means how to carry it out. In one of his articles Maceina wrote: "Of course, given that Catholics are well disposed, even this would not cause much difficulty. However, its legal and national assertion is a very complicated matter"[31]. Such a belief is evident in his *Social Justice*, the only masterpiece he offers the doctrine appropriate for the Catholic community in. The aforementioned is a very typical characteristic of this author's philosophic thinking: he deals with politics on the basis of non-political concepts.

Šalkauskis and Maceina's political stance is determined by the pedagogical orientation of their philosophy of culture. These authors maintain that the philosophy of culture must serve the educational needs of the Lithuanian nation. They treat politics as a composite part of the Lithuanian nation's educational purpose. Even in his geopolitical works Šalkauskis is overwhelmed with the cultural mission of the Lithuanian nation, not so much the politics: "Under such circumstances cultural understanding becomes the main objective; it must first of all deal with the concept of the national culture, later followed by the cultural mission of the Lithuanian nation"[32]. Such a geopolitical treatment destroys the established concept of international politics, based on the analysis of legal, military, economic and political factors.

Šalkauskis and Maceina make no secret of their understanding that Lithuania must "boost the cultural progress of the society". Identifying of the guidelines for the future cultural development of the country can be seen as the purpose they have designated as the political philosophers. One may get an impression that even living in the independent Lithuania does not help, - these authors are obsessed over the possible loss of political independence. Šalkauskis' thoughts at the end of the Interwar period prove this very well: "revision of the state territories and even independence itself from outside is eventually likely. It follows that the cultural immunity of the nation and its cultural significance may act as the determining factors"[33]. The main objective of Šalkauskis as a political philosopher is the preparation of the nation for the life following the loss of the political independence. He is most concerned with the matters of establishing the House of Culture, the Cultural Foundation and the Cultural Institute. In his assessment of a-two-decade independence period he claims: "We have to regret very much the fact that up until now we have lacked clear and well shaped cultural policy, and that up until now we have not established

the House of Culture. There are numbers of different kinds of Houses established; however, what we fail to see in this system of houses is the most important houses, which ought to take care of our recreation from the ill-fated historical heritage and which would arm us culturally"[34].

Šalkauskis and Maceina can be referred to as the disciples of the conservative tradition of political thinking. What makes them part of this tradition of political thinking is their attitude toward religion, patriotism and the national elements. However, presenting them as conservatives brings about one difficulty – their own critical statements on conservatism. Šalkauskis was used to emphasizing the need to look for a middle way between conservatism and radicalism: "Christian worldview urges the Catholics to be part of the progress: neither conservatism, nor slight progressiveness is good enough for us. In our social psychology we are obliged to combine the spirit of positive traditions with a lively initiative of our enduring self-improvement"[35]. Maceina, one of the most radical critics of the conservative wing of the Catholic community during the Interwar, held similar beliefs.

However, despite all of these circumstances, it is not difficult to prove that Šalkauskis and Maceina adhered to an orientation that characterizes the tradition of the conservative political thinking. Šalkauskis' philosophy of culture corresponds to the main intention of Edmund Burke – "to preserve and to reform". Save we view it more closely, we may note that his declarations aim at conservatism's most radical forms, not the conservatism itself. Šalkauskis is sincere in his wish that Lithuania's cultural life becomes modern; however, at the same time he wants to preserve Christian forms of cultural life. What may seem problematic is Maceina's conservatism alone. This author had a weakness for radical statements. He may be characterized as a conservative only with some reservations, if we draw attention to his attitude toward the family, religion and patriotism.

In Lithuanian philosophic literature there are very few discussions on the difference between Šalkauskis and Maceina's political outlooks. The former can be described as a disciple of political liberalism, whereas Maceina represents the group of thinkers who are in favor of totalitarianism. At the end of the Interwar period he openly talked about the totalitarian nature of the national state[36].

Classification of Šalkauskis as a member of the liberal camp is quite surprising. It is driven by the fact that Šalkauskis himself was a famous critic of liberalism. We should not, however, yield to the suggestion of his statements. What he called liberalism was in fact this doctrine's ethical, not political, version. The modern concept of liberalism we find in the works of John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Michael Oakeshott and John Gray may explain the interpretation of him as a political liberal[37]. All these authors do not identify liberalism with the

doctrine of ethic individualism.

Likewise, Maceina must be described using the concepts he would not have applied in relation to himself. Leonidas Donskis provided for a very strict assessment of his outlook: "Maceina openly sympathized to all the fascistic elements and even the fascist regimes he knew of, all the fascistic ideologies he was aware of, and the most reactive, the darkest and the most irrational ideas of his epoch he could have come across"[38]. No doubt, this is an exaggerated critique of this author. First of all, because Maceina had from time to time been directing the spears of criticism toward fascism himself. Besides, even his *Nation and the State* is not a-fascist-propaganda-minded piece of work. Other two designations, namely, that of the "totalitarianist" and "nationalist", describe him better.

The best description of Šalkauskis is that of "a liberal conservative". This term split into two parts, we obtain a double characteristic of this author's outlook – "the political liberal" and "the cultural conservative". As a follower of cultural conservatism, he adheres to an idea of the natural Christian order: "we live in the limits of the natural order"[39]. His political outlook, at the same time, corresponds to all the requirements of a widely understood liberalism: "the democratic society serves the interests of freedom; from the other hand, the freedom is limited to an extent that is required in order to maintain order and avoid chaos"[40]. Šalkauskis endorses the rule of law as well as the natural human rights, moral pluralism and the significance of the representative democracy. Such a dual interpretation of this author's works – "cultural conservative" and "political liberal" – is reinforced by the critical outgivings of Vytautas Kavolis. Kavolis is obsessed mainly with the critics of Šalkauskis' "conservative moral imagination"; however, he always shows honor to his "conscientious engagement with democracy"[41].

Šalkauskis was against any idealistic treatment of politics: "When we count on uncultivated predilections of the real life alone, we arrive at unilateral social naturalism. When, on the other hand, we count on a pure enchantment of the ideals, we come across the baseless idealism. Meanwhile, neither the former, nor the latter imply the true Christian orientation in our social life and activities"[42]. Maceina in the meantime, pursued an opposite point of view. Vivid idealism marks his political considerations. In cases when the ideal collided with reality, he always picked the former element out of two.

Until now, there was little evidence on Šalkauskis as a consistent supporter of methodological individualism. It is manifest in his critique directed against the organistic treatment of social phenomena: "A scientist, akin to keep a strict analogy between the society and an organism, would be unable to catch the specific nature of social phenomena"[43]. He reiterated this methodological point of view in the discussions on patriotism: "It is the fact that the nation's real and lively stronghold is the living human personality. This applies to any other

form of the common life either. What reveals itself to us as an organism of common life is the relationship between different people"[44]. Moved to the political realm, this methodological principle sounds a bit different: "I have no doubt that the democratic republic is the most complete form of the state system. At the same time, I am just as sure that in reality this complete form is worth of the people who are mastered by it"[45].

Pondering on Šalkauskis' concept of social rights is exactly what may seem as the most difficult task. There is no doubt over his sincere engagement to protect these rights: "Equal rights of all the people is a milk-and-water talk in the so-called democratic society where the individual human rights find no specific guaranty that they will be socially protected"[46]. It is very difficult to understand what concrete social rights he protects. His concept of political rights is far more clear. In a situation of collision between the demands of citizenship and nationality he is always take the side of an individual: "moral trespass on national obligations, for instance, given away of ones nationality, is not punishable by means of juridical repressions because personal rights which add up to individual freedoms outweigh the moral right of the nation to demand patriotism of its members"[47]. In contrast to Maceina, Šalkauskis had never submitted a demand that the limits of the state and the limits of the nation coincide. Respect for the rights of the national minorities is a composite part of his political philosophy.

In spite of a huge passion for the idea of an organic state, Šalkauskis remained a consistent devotee of the open society. His corporate state theory bore in itself no totalitarian claims. The latter is avoided thanks to a firm and coherent human rights protection policy. Each self-conscious Catholic, in his opinion, must be "a consistent democrat, provided that democracy speaks out the determination to norm out social relations so that the principles of equality, freedom and solidarity, the principles that find the best metaphysic substantiation nowhere but in the Christian worldview are complied with"[48]. These statements are not present in the works of young Maceina.

In the beginning of his career this author became known for his expertise in the areas of nationalism and patriotism. For a long time he was a consistent critic of nationalism: "Nationalism is the largest threat to the civilized world"[49]. However, such statements were always followed by a very cautious approach towards democracy. Whenever Šalkauskis was criticizing "liberal atomism", Maceina necessarily added to this a remark that he was criticizing "democratic atomism"[50]. Such a negative view of democracy was the main reason driving for the evolution of his outlook in the direction of totalitarianism. Starting from 1936 Maceina's political sympathies had been resting on the side of collectivism and political nationalism.

Individual-Person and the State, his article, can be treated as the first step in that direction. This article is surprising in many respects – inconsistency of

philosophical considerations, mismatch of statements on the level of principle and practice, and statements on the natural origin of the state. Having acknowledged that "the personality is superior to the individual and the state", Maceina points to the forms of human life which are unable to get along with any respect for human rights. In his opinion, the state has the right to claim that individual's "body life would serve its goals and its protection", that the state is entitled to "regulate the size of the family", "to ban illegal reproduction", "to arrange and to regulate individual's property, control its sources"[51].

The 1939 article *The Nation and the State* in a logical manner completes this author's evolution in the direction of totalitarianism. No doubt, this is the work propagating extreme political nationalism. This article might make any discussion about organic state frightening. Šalkauskis managed to keep away from the threats of political nationalism and totalitarianism. His disciple infused perspicuous totalitarian touch into the organic state idea. Maceina disregards human rights, including the national minority rights. He is indifferent to the principles of democracy and moral pluralism. It is safe to say that he is the first who coupled together a tendency to accentuate national culture, which was characteristic to the entire interwar philosophy of culture, with the radical forms of political nationalism.

Maceina's idea of the national state is a logical continuation of his philosophy of culture. So far little attention has been focused on the fact that this idea of this leads to the total disappearance of politics. Maceina is fond of the cultural nature of the nation-state, and talks openly and extensively on the end of politics: "As a matter of fact, the internal politics have been losing their primacy in the nation-state, and its place has been taken by the cultural questions. Thus, the answer of ours – to politicize on the internal issues – is a significant matter"[52]. Having read these lines one may get an impression that the author of theirs is an anarchist. The case is exactly the opposite, however. What Maceina does by means of destroying politics – he expands the rights of the state. He attributes to the political institutions the right to control the education, nurturing, health care, human reproduction, emigration and immigration.

Removing of the state objectives helps Maceina realize his long-bred dream – to move politics out of the cultural sphere. Attention should be paid to the fact that the nation-state he propagates is based solely on the realization of the cultural objectives. Indifference to the political rights of the citizens, in this case, is not only desirable – it is also a necessary element of the social life. This is the moment when the philosophy of culture triumphs over the political philosophy. The state disappears completely in the milieu of the society's cultural life. It makes any discussions about the political philosophy senseless.

The entire tradition of the philosophy of culture of the Interwar Lithuania stands behind Maceina's considerations. Main characteristics of the nation-

state he propagates correspond to the pedagogic orientation of this philosophy. Šalkauskis managed to combine the idea of the nation-state with the respect for human rights and democracy. His disciple, in the meantime, durst include the totalitarian state into the list of pedagogic measures. Maceina demands that national minorities be assimilated by violent means; he openly delivers racist slogans. As far as the foreigners are concerned, in his opinion, they can be behaved with in three ways: "either to subdue them to the extent of denationalizing them; or to relocate them into their own country, or leave them alone, as if they were guests taking benefit of being sheltered"[53].

Maceina oftentimes reminds of a Hegelian without Hegel himself. His philosophy of culture is based on the Hegelian idea of culture as an objectivization of the spirit. However, in comparison to Hegel, in amidst these forms of the objectivization of the spirit, he found no place for the state. His philosophical thoughts try to destroy every substance of political life. He looks for such a form of cultural life of the society, which would have the least possible number of political elements.

Two diverse traditions of moral philosophy stand behind Šalkauskis and Maceina's political outlooks. Šalkauskis is more close to Aristotle, whereas Maceina – to Plato's philosophical tradition. Political philosophy of the former is based on the accentuation of the significance of the virtues of behavior. Understanding the importance of the principles of procedural justice very well, Šalkauskis consistently emphasizes the role education of individual's moral character plays: "the most perfect form of the state system, in principle, is better than aristocratic republic or even the monarchy, save its members are well educated and developed at the same time. In other words, the most perfect and complete form of the state system demands that its citizens be educated and developed as good as possible"[54]. No doubt, this is the motive of the Aristotelian political philosophy. Thus, it is no surprise that in cases when Maceina comes to declare the emergence of a new total state, Šalkauskis persists further on and talks about "the development of a person as a prerequisite of any progress". The personality development ideas essentially reveal no indications that would remind of a flight from politics. On the contrary, he is used to accentuating that "the development, life, activities, and constant progress of an individual, among other factors, depends on the environment, on the social and cultural status of life"[55].

Critique of Aristotelism is one of the favorite subjects of Maceina. Both the *Social Justice* and the *Collapse of the Bourgeoisie* cannot be understood without this critique. Practical orientation of Aristotelism is what Maceina criticizes it for: "ethica naturalis", created under the influence of Aristotle, no longer bears that extreme idealism St. Augustine was talking about"[56]. Maceina is not interested in practical consequences following the implementation of the political

principles. Political reforms are not what he strives for. He wants a mystical rebirth of the entire humankind. One may get an impression that time and again this author appears incapable of finding the link that binds together the moral principles and the ever changing conditions of political life.

The character of Šalkauskis and Maceina's philosophical thought reflects some of the requirements laid down by postmodernist author Richard Rorty. The American philosopher makes a demand that those authors who contemplate on the political matters be artist-like.[57] True, it is not difficult to prove that the motives of the worldview, as contrasted to the scientific, analysis dominate in Šalkauskis and Maceina's philosophical works. If these authors' works had been dominated by strict scientific calculations, they would have never ever started talking about the world soul, about the "division of souls", or "the night period of history". In this respect Maceina, who talks as if were a true artist, is an outstanding example.

Both Šalkauskis and Maceina indifference towards the philosophy of politics is not related to their excessive infatuation with metaphysics. For sure they don't belong to the people whose interest in metaphysical problems overshadow practical affairs of daily life. Reasons why these authors remained indifferent to political philosophy must be looked for elsewhere - in their enchantment over the network of problems the philosophy of culture faces. These authors thought that the philosophy of culture is capable of finding answers to all the most important issues social and political sciences pose. They treated this discipline as if it were a master's-key, fit to open every door of humanitarian and social sciences.

Charles Taylor's idea of splitting the discussion of political philosophy into two levels is very helpful in the understanding of the outlook of Šalkauskis and Maceina. On the first – political philosophy – level we find arguments on the so-called ontological matters: "The ontological questions concern what you recognize as the factors you will invoke to account for social life. Or, put in the formal mode, they concern the terms you accept as ultimate in the order of explanation. The big debate in this area, which has been raging now for more than three centuries, divide "atomists" from "holists"[58]. Argument over the concrete moral and political principles comprises the second level of discussions of political philosophy. On this level we find a discussion concerning the attitude towards the set-up of the political authorities, individual freedom, equality and other political principles. Holding to such a concept, we may prove that the first-level philosophic discussions were dominant in the works of Šalkauskis and Maceina. This rule applies first of all to Maceina's works. This author shuns any larger polemics over political issues. He evades concrete discussion of the political issues, trying to replace them with the discussions on ontological issues, instead. Šalkauskis feel comfortably on the second level of discussions

on political philosophy. However, since 1926 he had revealed a tendency toward the first level of discussions on political philosophy.

Šalkauskis and Maceina were lucky to avoid what Ronald Dworkin nowadays calls as "external skepticism"[59]. These authors had no intention of getting rid of substantial issues of morality as well as they found no need look for a value-free phenomena treatment perspective. They understood philosophy as a worldview science: "Cultural beliefs is not the same as extraordinary attitudes; it makes one part of an organic general worldview"[60]. They treated politics through the lenses of a specific moral, religious and philosophical position. Although, the latter does not imply they did not understand the meaning of the principles of impartiality. Maceina alone can be blamed for the non-understanding of this matter. During the Interwar period he earned his reputation as a true opponent of political impartiality and moral pluralism. Šalkauskis remained a consistent champion of state's neutrality with respect to moral, religious and philosophical tenets throughout this entire period.

Robert Nozick's notion of political philosophy may be used to defend the perspective of the authors analyzed here.[61] Nozick maintains that any attempts to explain political phenomena by means of the concepts characteristic to this sphere launch the weakest possible version of theoretical explanation. According to him, the version of theoretical explanation, which defines political phenomena on the basis of non-political concepts, is the most superior one. Having applied such a perspective to Šalkauskis and Maceina, we could try proving that they had also put forth similar efforts - they explained politics on the basis of the non-political concepts of the philosophy of culture.

However, such a defense strategy is not suitable in order to assert our authors' view of political philosophy. First of all, this ensues because the philosophy of culture is unable to play the role the moral philosophy has usually played as a matter of rule. Šalkauskis, for example, says that the philosophy of culture is not a normative discipline[62]. Such a view of his is nothing but an impediment to any possibility that the strategy offered by Nozick will be applied. Political philosophy needs a partner serious who bears in it serious normative claims. Maceina acknowledges the normative nature of the philosophy of culture[63]; yet it does not exceed the level of methodological declaration, however. Even his concept of morality, which is ascetic (not ethic) in nature, will not do for this objective's implementation purpose[64].

We must acknowledge that the indifference Šalkauskis and Maceina bestow on the moral philosophy make their way into the political philosophy more difficult. Since the Middle Ages, political philosophy has been perceived as a discipline of "political ethics". This means that without more attention being drawn on the issues of the philosophy of morality it would be very difficult to carry out a more thorough analysis of the issues of political philosophy. In

meantime, neither Šalkauskis, nor Maceina show any more substantial interest in the issues of the moral philosophy. The former would have preferred analyzing aesthetic, the latter - historiosophic issues. The philosophy of culture these authors provide for is not linked by any more intensive bonds to the analysis of issues the moral philosophy deals with.

Šalkauskis' geopolitical arguments resemble Samuel Huntington's current considerations[65]. In both cases we see the attention being paid on cultural and civilization factors. However, concepts of the "East" and the "West" that are employed by Huntington do not have that strong metaphysical background that is evident in Šalkauskis' works. Our author is more concerned with the philosophical facade of his geopolitical considerations. Huntington would never agree with his idea of a cultural synthesis between the East and the West. He is more familiar with the perspective held by Felix Koneczny, professor of the Vilnius University. In 1938 Koneczny ideas were presented by "Židinys"[66]. Both Huntington and Koneczny believe that some kind of synthesis of cultures, which belong to different civilizations, is hardly possible. There has been little evidence that in the aftermath of the Koneczny ideas' presentation in "Židinys" in 1938 Maceina would have had doubts about his teacher's ideas on the cultural synthesis: "Indeed, if the cultural synthesis is impossible, if all the efforts to create such a synthesis lead to the mixture of cultures - it all brings chaos and leads to the cultural collapse - in that case prof. Šalkauskis' concept becomes unreal. In addition to this, it becomes, to some extent, even dangerous because the cultural recession is what grows out of a true synthesis"[67].

It is impossible to explain why the philosophy of culture prospered in the Interwar Lithuania on the basis of a single theory. There is no doubt about one thing: that this philosophy turned out to be the continuation of the national revival days of the XIXth century. Even if the national movements of the other countries did not end up with the boom of the philosophy of culture, Lithuania's interwar philosophy of culture was a clear illustration of coincidence between the former and the intentions of the national revival movement. Leaders of the national revival and the interwar philosophers of culture, - both of them worked for the same - they wanted to preserve and further cherish Lithuania's national culture. Nations that are fighting for independence accentuate very much the interests of the community, not individual interests. Isaiah Berlin took note of this aspect: "What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither simply unhampered liberty of action for their members, nor, above everything, equality of social or economic opportunity, still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, organic state devised by the rational lawgiver. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition..."[68].

For lithuanian philosophers the pursuit for national recognition was often superior to the matters of defending individual rights and freedoms. This was

influenced, among other things, by a long period of lost political independence: "Demise of statehood in our national individuality has developed disrespect and ambivalence in public life in terms of its relationship with the institutions of this life. This is well pronounced even today when the public life has become familiar. Even nowadays a Lithuanian is indifferent toward the state public institutions, he distrusts the latter, tries to get rid of the duties imposed by public life or deceive the managers of this life"[69]. It may seem to some extent paradoxical but even the author of this note acted in the opposite way – in the way of suppressing civil initiative instead of instigating it. There is no need to prove that the national state, as propagated by Maceina, was one of the many sources of the erosion of the civil society.

On the other hand, we may disagree with Berlin who maintains that the struggle for national recognition is in a constant conflict with the idea of the civil rights' defending. Šalkauskis' works show that this struggle can be reconciled with the respect for human rights. The major contribution of the above mentioned author into the Lithuanian philosophy of culture is his talent to introduce respect for human rights and freedom. What Berlin says can be applied to Maceina; however, there is no way it can be appropriate to Šalkauskis.

Interwar Lithuania's philosophers of culture often bear a resemblance to the enlighteners devoid of the ideas of Enlightenment. There is no chance modern Western civilization could be thought of as their major enemy, except for the possible original impression. One could deliver numerous quotations that display their conviction that modernization of the country's culture is a necessary one. Šalkauskis and Maceina used to be paradoxical enlighteners: disapproving the ideas of the XVIII century Enlightenment, they sought after the same goals their predecessors from the French camp of enlighteners did – to overcome cultural prejudices, misfit traditions of the economical and political life of the country, over-exaggerated conservatism and isolation in the local forms of life. To modernize the cultural life of the country and, at the same time, preclude negative repercussions of this modernization, - this was a dual objective Šalkauskis and Maceina tried to implement. First of all, this is driven by their desire to withhold and resist religious recession, well-entrenched instrumental intelligence, atomization of social life and decadence of family values.

It is not easy to explain why politics remained on the outskirts of Šalkauskis and Maceina's philosophical interests. There are several arguments we could designate as possible answers to this question. One might try to prove that they were affected by general termination of the political life traditions, which had begun at the end of the XVIII century. In addition to this, we may point to the situation of the interwar Lithuania's political life. Considerations on the features of their character, which had determined their interest in one or another

philosophical discipline, seem as important as the former. In this case one may want to suffice with one conclusion – Šalkauskis and Maceina treated political philosophy as a secondary discipline.

It would seem silly if one chose to reprehend the philosophers on non-endorsing of the analysis of one or another type of issue. And, indeed, this was not the very purpose of this article. The author aimed to draw attention to another realm – the Soviet period left after itself an awry understanding of Šalkauskis and Maceina's oeuvre. Negative stance of the Soviet authorities against the outlooks of these authors set a biased reputation of them as political philosophers. Šalkauskis and Maceina were interested in political issues, indeed, most often remaining outside the confines of political philosophy as an independent discipline.

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KALININGRAD OBLAST IN THE CONTEXT OF EU ENLARGEMENT

Inga Stanytė-Toločkienė

The starting point of the present article is an assumption that the process of the EU eastward expansion is inevitably related with side effects on the third countries (including Russia and its integral part – the Kaliningrad oblast), and apart from significant positive implications, it likewise requires a certain price to be paid. In the light of membership of Poland and the Baltic States (predominantly Lithuania), the threat of Kaliningrad's social and economic underdevelopment and deterioration into "a double periphery" (with regard to both the EU and the Russian Federation) becomes especially relevant. The purpose of the present work is to discuss the possible impact of the Lithuanian and Polish membership in the EU on the Kaliningrad oblast, to identify the interests, positions and tools of the key actors in the region – Russia, the European Union, Poland and Lithuania – and to determine whether they are conducive to a successful resolution of the problem of Kaliningrad in the context of the EU enlargement. The resolution of the Kaliningrad problem in the context of the (future) EU enlargement is examined as a case of crisis prevention, using the definition of the concept of crisis, lately prevailing in the studies on crisis management: a crisis, emerging in a "normal" decision-making process, is the situation which arises due to the changes in the external or internal environment, and is defined as threatening important values, necessitating immediate decision-making and creating the perception of the atmosphere of uncertainty between the persons who take decisions. The definition is based on a subjective interpretation of the situation by the decision makers: in view of institutional-cognitive analysis, there are three necessary and sufficient circumstances – threat to important values, limit of time, and the perception of the uncertainty of situation – to allow the situation to be considered critical.

INTRODUCTION

The focus of attention of the international community was turned to the geo-strategic situation of Kaliningrad in early 1990s, when, with the constituent

parts of the former USSR turning into independent states, and the Russian Federation taking over the rights and obligations of the SSSR, the Kaliningrad oblast turned into a Russian exclave, surrounded by the territories of foreign states. The discussions at that time prevailingly concentrated on two aspects of the problem of Kaliningrad. On the one side, it was attempted to analyse the possible threat presented by the level of its militarisation to the national security of the neighbouring states – first of all Lithuania and Poland. On the other side, there was a search for alternative scenarios for the development of the oblast, the majority of which, in one aspect or another, were related with the demilitarisation of the region or even change of its legal status[1].

A fundamental change of the geopolitical situation in Europe, and the necessity to ensure economic welfare of the region in the context of the altered status of its relationship with Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus, determined two main tendencies: geographical isolation of the Kaliningrad oblast from Russia, and its opening for direct contacts with the external world, first of all, with the neighbouring states (before the collapse of the USSR, the Kaliningrad oblast, a strategic military outpost, was a completely closed zone). In the middle of the decade, the visions of independence or internationalisation for Kaliningrad were essentially rejected, while the discussion acquired a new dimension (basically among the Russian political elite) – it gradually became obvious that, with the creation of a favourable legal environment, the geographical location of the oblast could enable it to turn into an attractive region for investments. In other words, the "Kaliningrad problem" of the beginning of the decade was gradually transformed into the "Kaliningrad issue", in the framework of which the geopolitical changes in Europe were started to be regarded as a challenge, opening new prospects for a qualitatively new development scenario of the oblast.

On the other hand, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the Baltic States and other Central and Eastern European countries, there also increased the relative Kaliningrad's geostrategic importance for Moscow[2]. The neighbourhood with the oblast served as an extra incentive for Poland and the Baltic States to seek for "hard" security guaranties by means of NATO membership, while, at the same time, it was an additional Russian argument for blocking the NATO expansion eastwards, as potentially able to destroy the Russian front-line defence potential, thus strongly damaging the country's national security. The prospects for the development of Kaliningrad were started to be considered as a dilemma between the military outpost of strategic importance (especially in the context of the direct NATO advancement) and an economic bridge between the Western Europe and Russia.

At the end of the 1990s, with the start of accession negotiations between Poland, and later between Lithuania and the European Union, which confirmed the irreversibility of the processes of integration of these countries into Western

international structures, the issue of the Kaliningrad oblast – a potential Russian exclave surrounded by the EU member states – became the focus of attention of the international community. Contrary to NATO, the EU enlargement eastwards, according to the official position of Moscow, poses no threat to the national interests of Russia. In fact, some researchers acknowledge that in Russia the positive, or "positively neutral" image of the EU and its enlargement is essentially based on the belief that a united and strong Europe is capable of forming one of the world pillars for creating a balance against hegemonic ambitions of the US, as well as on the conviction that the EU is a civilian-economic block of wealthy and liberal European states (military-political factors are still, by inertia, dominating the spectrum of threats to the Russian statehood[3]).

On the other hand, the EU enlargement is inevitably related with side effects on the third countries, including Russia and its integral part, the Kaliningrad oblast. In the perspective of the future EU membership of Poland and the Baltic States (and first of all Lithuania) the threat of social-economic lag behind the neighbouring states acquires particular significance. Two scenarios for the development of the oblast are usually mentioned as the most likely [4]: Kaliningrad may become a "double periphery" (both in regard to the EU and the Russian Federation) – with Poland and the Baltic States enjoying the benefits from the elimination of restrictions on internal trade and the freedom of movement, Kaliningrad would find itself isolated from its neighbours, as Common Market and Schengen countries, and subsequently – Economic and Monetary Union members. However, if Russia and the EU managed to cooperate effectively in order to minimise possible negative effects of the EU enlargement to Kaliningrad, the oblast might even turn into a bridge between the EU and Russia.

In the present work, the resolution of the "problem" of Kaliningrad in the context of the EU enlargement is analysed as a case of crisis prevention. Pursuant to the theoretical model used in the studies of political leadership in crisis management, effective crisis management (including prevention) requires two types of conditions[5]: adequate political will of the decision makers and adequate powers of the decision makers. In case of crisis prevention (with a limited, though more extensive than in the case of crisis escalation, time limit) political will is an essential prerequisite both for the agreement on the aims and means of their achievement, and the creation of effective instruments. Therefore, with a favourable assortment of interests of the regional actors, the Kaliningrad oblast may *de facto* become a pilot region, an incentive for the creation of new forms of cooperation between Russia and the EU (including Lithuania and Poland as future members).

1. THEORETICAL MODEL, BASIC CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Development prospects for the Kaliningrad oblast, surrounded by the expanding EU, have been analysed in a whole range of articles, research works, impact studies. The most frequently asked questions are about the direct impact of the EU enlargement on the Kaliningrad oblast, the possible scenarios of the oblast's development and the possible effect of one or another scenario on the EU-Russian relationship, as well as on the security of the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. The standpoint of this work is the assumption that the process of the EU eastward enlargement is inevitably related to side effects on the third parties (including Russia and its integral part, the Kaliningrad oblast) and, alongside with significant positive implications, also condition certain costs. Thus the factors/conditions which could enable the maximum reduction of the costs and maximum utilisation of the emerging opportunities become a fundamental issue.

As the emergence of the "Kaliningrad problem" is conditioned by the side effect of the EU enlargement, its successful unilateral resolution is not possible and calls for a constructive cooperation between the key regional actors. The analysis is based on the premise that there exists a link between the importance of the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue for the interests of the key actors and the realisation of the successful development scenario of the oblast in the expanding Europe. Thus the principal assumption of the present work: if the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue fails to become a significant interest/value of priority importance, it is hardly possible that the oblast will manage to escape the crisis – turning into a "double periphery", separated from the neighbouring regions by socio-economic backwardness.

1.1. The Concept of Crisis and Crisis Management: Modern Tendencies

It is often stated that the concept of crisis is one of the terms that has undergone the most dynamic and dramatic changes in the course of the last several decades[6]. The modern society, despite impressive technologic achievement, is increasingly becoming more vulnerable in the aspect of crises. This is influenced by several factors: on the one hand, alongside with the "traditional" crises, characterised by strictly defined boundaries in time and space – like natural disasters or industrial catastrophes, public tumult or international military conflicts – new "post-industrial" threats are emerging, related with the global mobility of persons, goods and capital, as well as ultramodernisation (refugees, epidemics, arising as a side effect of human activity,

environmental disasters, financial crisis)[7]. Alongside with objective elements, there also act psychological (increased expectations) factors: the state is expected to perform not only traditional functions (national security, guarantee of public order or elimination of the consequences of natural disasters), but likewise an effective combat against the new-type threats to people's health and welfare[8]. With the notion of security becoming wider, the functions of the State in ensuring it have also expanded. In other words, under the influence of the complex of objective and subjective factors, there is a functional increase of the scope of events and situations which can be identified as crisis[9]. New type challenges emerge both in national and international environment, defined by a progressively increasing interrelation, complexity, and, quite often, jurisdictional overlap.

Both tendencies affect the notion of crisis and crisis management. P.'t Hart distinguishes several features of the modern crisis[10]: firstly, crises cease to be the phenomena with clearly defined boundaries in space. Modern crises disregard state borders and require co-ordination between states; by their ability of fast and extensive spread, they only reveal the defects of the current institutional crisis management infrastructure, defined by powerful states and weak transnational structures. Secondly, modern crises is a relative phenomenon. Different individuals, groups, organisations, even states may present a different assessment of the same phenomenon: some of the actors may become aware of the crises only after it has actually ended for the others; a situation regarded by some of the actors as critical, for the others may be viewed as a perfect opportunity. Thirdly, the boundaries of a crisis in time become relative: modern crises seldom have the effect of "unexpectedness" or great concentration in time. Contrary to traditional crises, which were mainly the consequence of external (in regard to state authorities) activity, modern crises often emerge as a result of political errors or inability to control the speedy processes of the modern world. Therefore, modern crises are often characterised by the complexity of values, threatened by a critical situation[11]. In choosing the alternatives, there arise dilemmas between values which, in their turn, enhance the atmosphere of uncertainty typical to crises.

One of the fundamental features of modern crises is their indefiniteness in space, thus the modern crisis management requires concerted action of several states concerned, which inevitably changes the level of analysis. According to C.F.Hermann, there exist three possible approaches, which differ in the level of analysis: systematic (examination of the threatened stability of the international system), confrontational/actor (examination of conflicting relations and negotiations between two or more states/other actors) and decision-making (examination of decision-making processes within a state or

any other actor)[12]. The first two approaches are applied in the case of international military crises, the third examines the processes of crisis (any type) management within a state.

Effective management of modern crises requires interstate decision-making, or at least co-ordination. This enables to split into two the second – actor's– level: confrontational level and level of common (inter-state) crisis management. In examining the decision-making process between several states or their groups, this also allows to employ the dominating definition of the concept of crisis, presented by advocates of the cognitive institutional approach, not only in the third but likewise in the second level (examining common crisis management): a crisis which emerges in the "normal" decision-making process is the situation created by the changes in the external or internal environment and characterised by the perception of threat to the main values, the urgency of decision-making and the atmosphere of uncertainty perceived by the persons who make decisions[13]. The definition is based on a subjective interpretation of the situation by the decision-makers: threat to principal values, shortage of time and the indefiniteness of the situation – three necessary and sufficient conditions for a situation to be regarded as critical.

It should be noted that, by interrupting the inertial flow of social, political and organisational processes, a critical situation reveals the *status quo* problems and creates prerequisites for alternative policies. During the time of crisis, existing political goals, norms, procedures and institutional mechanisms are submitted to pressure and lose the seemingly obvious legitimacy possessed at the time of "normal" decision making. In crisis situations decision-making is "de-institutionalised" thus creating a potential ("window of opportunity") for unconventional decisions and fundamental reforms[14]. The initial definition of the problem affects the decision-making process: depending on the initial assessment of the situation, some political options may be given priority, while others – instantly rejected. The determination of a situation as critical and demanding immediate response, may spontaneously change the rules of the institutional game and justify the application of alternative decision-making procedures and resources[15].

In summarising, it could be stated that the de-escalation of a crisis and the reduction or elimination of its consequences is minimum objective of the actors that participate in crisis management, nevertheless, successful crisis management may also possess "added value": firstly, a precedent for effective resolution of a crisis situation is created, which will serve for "lessons to be drawn in future"[16], secondly, the crisis paves the way for a replacement of the existing norms, procedures and practices. In this context, the focus is on the conditions for successful crisis management.

1.2. Conditions for Successful Crisis Management. Time Factor

For the purposes of analysis, such a process is considered to be a case of successful crisis management which enables to achieve de-escalation of the crisis and elimination of its consequences, while a case of successful crisis prevention is the preclusion of the escalation of crisis. According to the model formed on the basis of P.t'Hart's assumptions, two types of conditions are necessary for a successful crisis management (including prevention) [17]: sufficient political will and power possessed by the decision-making actors. Sufficient political will includes the adequate definition of the problem and the concord of the decision-making group on the objectives and means for resolving the problem which has caused the crisis. As crisis situations are characterised by the complexity of values, political will depends on how central are the values, directly or indirectly threatened by the crisis, to the actors participating in the decision-making process. Sufficient power includes authorisation to take the relevant decisions and the disposal of effective instruments for their realisation.

In the case of crisis prevention (with the existence of limited, though longer than in case of crisis escalation, time period) political will is an essential pre-condition for the agreement both on the aims and the measures for their achievement, as well as on the creation of effective instruments. When the perceived importance of values is peripheral, it is possible to expect a failure in crisis prevention with the subsequent escalation of the crisis.

Political will is not a static notion – the interests of the actors, their motivation and the information possessed undergo change in the course of time. The longer the time period before the start of the expected crisis, the lower the level of information possessed by the actors on the potential damage likely to be caused by the crisis to the important values, and a weaker determination to become involved in crisis prevention, especially if crisis prevention is related with the costs in respect to other equally important values. Contrary to the case of crisis response, where investments are inevitable, in the case of crisis prevention, the necessity to take active action, due to the lack of information about the "reality" and consequences of crisis, is often questioned.

On the basis of this part, the present article analyses the situation of the Kaliningrad oblast in regard with the EU enlargement, including the discussion of expected consequences of the Lithuanian and Polish membership in the EU[18], identification of key values of the regional actors, which might be threatened, the indication of the time limit, and the definition of the factors which enhance the atmosphere of uncertainty. The article also presents conclusions on the fulfilment of conditions for successful crisis prevention in the case of Kaliningrad, and possible future tendencies.

2. EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE KALININGRAD OBLAST: EMERGENCE OF CRISIS POTENTIAL

2.1. Requirements for the EU Membership and Kaliningrad: Problem Areas

The 1993 Copenhagen European Council determined three quite general requirements to be met by countries of Central and Eastern Europe which aspire for the EU membership: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities; 2) the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 3) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. In other words, the EU enlargement principle, which states that the Union may not expand at the expense of deepening, determines the fundamental condition for the EU membership requiring the aspiring countries, even before they become actual members, to fully adopt the EU *acquis communautaire,* which regulate *inter alia* free movement of goods, people and services within the internal market, as well as between the EU and the third countries.

Pursuant to Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community[19], the provisions of the *acquis* may not affect the rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded between a member state and any third countries before the membership of the state concerned. In practice this is implemented by negotiating for amendments in the agreements with the third countries, or withdrawing from such agreements[20]. Consequently, the agreements, which come under the exclusive competence of the Communities, are denounced or their administration is transferred to the European Commission.

In this particular case of Kaliningrad, the adoption of the *acquis* would mean that the present visa and trade regimes, introduced on the basis of bilateral agreements to ensure the link between the oblast and the remaining part of Russia, and its openness for relationship with the neighbouring states, will be denounced or modified on Lithuania and Poland becoming EU members. Precisely due to its exclave situation, the Kaliningrad oblast may be to a greater extent affected by the consequences of the EU enlargement than the remaining regions of Russia which are situated on the border with the expanding EU[21]. In other words, the specifics and importance of the "Kaliningrad issue", in the context of the EU enlargement, is determined by two interrelated factors: exterritorial status of the Kaliningrad oblast and its location on the "crossroads" between Russia and the European Union[22]. The application of the *acquis* may

significantly impede the relations not only between Kaliningrad and the neighbouring states – future EU members – but with Russia as well[23]. Bearing in mind the unique geographical location and exceptionally high level of dependence on the import of products, as well as close private contacts with the neighbours, to retain the unimpeded movement of persons and goods, including energy supply, between the Kaliningrad oblast and the remaining part of Russia ought to be regarded as the interest of vital importance for Kaliningrad after Lithuania and Poland become EU members.

With the Amsterdam Treaty coming into force in 1999, the visa policies and border control was transferred to the competence of the Communities, and the Schengen System (which provides for the removal of barriers for free movement within the Schengen area and a more stringent control of external borders) became a part of the EU *acquis*. Due to this reason, every new country, including both Lithuania and Poland, will sooner or later have to become Schengen members with all the ensuing consequences. The Schengen membership is mandatory, though conditioned by the requirement of conformity to additional criteria and subsequent conclusion of separate agreement. Russia is included into the list of countries the citizens of which will require visas to cross the EU border. For this reason, Lithuania and Poland, in their aspiration for the EU membership, will have to cancel the visa-free regime for the citizens of the Russian Federation, including the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad oblast.

After becoming EU members, Lithuania and Poland will have to join the EU Common Trade policy. It means mandatory adoption of customs tariffs, trade protection instruments and agreements with the third countries. Trade relations between Russia and the EU are regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1994. From the day of their membership in the EU, Lithuania and Poland will have to accept this Agreement as an integral part of the *acquis,* and will have to apply in respect to Russia a higher common external tariff than is currently applied in Lithuania. In addition, it is often stated that, having in mind the low competitive ability of Kaliningrad-produced goods, the proximity of the EU market will in itself not only fail to improve the situation in the oblast but is even likely to make it worse: the possibilities of Russian export (including that from the Kaliningrad oblast) will be negatively affected by non-tariff barriers – the EU technical norms and standards.

The fact of Lithuania and Poland joining the Community Customs Code and the common transit system is not expected to affect the existing bilateral agreements with Russia, as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provides for transit through the EU territory exempt from customs or any other transit duties (except transportation and administration charges). On the other hand, it is feared that, due to the currently existing problem of the low operational

capacity of the border crossing points[24] as well as the inability of Russia to finance the development of its part of transport corridors[25], transit flows a quite likely to by-pass the Kaliningrad oblast.

Another problem is the supply of Kalingrad with the electric energy. At present about 90 per cent of the electric energy consumed in Kaliningrad is supplied by transit through Lithuania. With Lithuania seeking to join through Poland the Central European electric energy grid, which, in its turn is connected to the main European power grid, there emerges the problem of electric energy supply to the Kaliningrad oblast. Possible technical solutions include the development of capacities for autonomous electric energy production; preservation of the connection with the Russian power grid; or joining the Central European power grid.

Apart from these problem areas, which are the main issue of the current EU-RF negotiations, the augmenting threat of Kaliningrad's socio-economic backwardness in comparison to its neighbouring states drawing benefit from the EU membership, is increasingly becoming evident in the context of the EU enlargement. This threat is only indirectly related to the EU membership requirements, therefore, it is not subject to elimination by technical or procedural international agreements. The tightening of customs procedures or border control may undermine the shadow economy, which is estimated as accounting for over 60 per cent of the region's gross domestic product, and will inevitably reduce the citizens' income[26]. The situation is complicated by the fact that Kaliningrad fails to possess any relative advantage which is necessary for the socio-economic adaptation to the new conditions – being encircled by Europe – while Russia does not have the necessary resources for the economic modernisation of the region[27].

2.2. EU Enlargement as a Crisis Factor

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Iron Curtain made it possible to believe that, in the long run, the geopolitical and psychological dividing lines in Europe may be eliminated, while the EU, as a civil power uniting wealthy and liberal Western states, will be capable of assuming the role of the leader in the transformed European environment and *de facto* implement the unification of Europe[28]. The 1995 Madrid European Council stated that the enlargement of the EU is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for Europe to ensure security and stability in the continent. The new President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, in his inaugural speech to the European Parliament in September 1999, stated, - "All of us – the European Union, the applicant countries, and our neighbours in the wider Europe – must work together towards our common destiny: a wider European area

offering peace, stability and prosperity to all. A "new European order"[29].

Despite the more or less positive attitude of Russia towards the European Union, the start of membership negotiations by Poland and Lithuania, which confirmed the irreversible character of the processes of these countries' integration in the EU, forced Moscow, and subsequently Brussels, to become concerned about the fate of the Kaliningrad oblast, as future Russian exclave encircled by the EU member states. It became obvious that the EU enlargement was inevitably related to a strong negative effect on Kaliningrad (primarily due to its distinctive geographical location) and might stipulate the appearance of a new – "paper curtain" to separate the Kaliningrad oblast from the neighbouring states, as members of the Common Market and the Schengen System, and subsequently – Economic and Monetary Union members. With Poland and the Baltic States drawing benefit from the elimination of restrictions on internal trade and the freedom of movement, the threat of Kaliningrad's socio-economic backwardness in comparison with its neighbouring states, acquires particular importance.

2.2.1. The "Issue of Kaliningrad" in the Context of EU Enlargement: Time Limits for Decision Making

At the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, the EU Heads of State and Government decided that the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, having signed the Association Agreements and aspiring for the EU membership, would be able to become members of the EU after they assumed membership commitments and implemented economic and political conditions. Nevertheless, alongside with the membership criteria applied in respect to the candidate countries, the European Council indicated one more prerequisite for enlargement– the preparedness of the EU for the accession of new members. In other words, there were two fundamental enlargement requirements established which affected the time of possible EU enlargement: the capability of the candidate countries to comply with the Copenhagen criteria; and the EU reforms in preparing for the expected increase in the number of members.

At the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, the European Commission adopted a recommendation obligating the EU to be prepared for accepting new members by the year 2002. The December 2000 European Council in Nice approved the enlargement strategy developed by the European Commission as well as passed important decisions on the institutional reform, which indicated that the EU institutional structure would be ready to start accepting new members starting with late 2002. The European Council also mentioned the possibility for the most advanced candidate countries to participate in the 2004 elections to the European Parliament. Pursuant to the enlargement strategy, negotiations with the best prepared candidate countries

under the chapter on Justice and Home Affairs, regulating the issue of visas, which is of particular concern for the Kaliningrad oblast, is expected to be completed within the Belgian presidency (second half of 2001).

Both Poland, which started accession negotiations in 1998, and Lithuania, which started the negotiations two years later, are expecting to complete it by the end of 2002. The National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis* of Lithuania and the negotiating positions are based on the declared date of membership: Lithuania expects to prepare to assume membership obligations by the year 2004.

Even though in the framework of EU accession negotiations, Lithuania and Poland do not raise the issue of Kaliningrad, or request for any related transitional periods or derogations, completion of the negotiations, which determines the date of the start of membership (following the ratification of the Accession Treaty by all member states), has a direct effect on Kaliningrad. In order to prevent negative impact of the EU enlargement, it is necessary to decide on a special status for the oblast before the date of the expected Lithuanian and Polish EU membership, though the need for decisions to be taken in separate areas my emerge even earlier (e.g. Poland announced its decision to introduce a visa regime for the citizens of the Russian Federation as from the second half of 2001[30]; Lithuania informed Russia about its plans to cancel visa privileges for the RF nationals from 1 January 2003, and for the Kaliningrad inhabitants from 1 June 2003). In other words, bearing in mind the continuously increasing financial support rendered to the candidates, the process of law approximation in candidate countries, which is already progressively affecting the Kaliningrad oblast, as well as the existence of the informal EU requirement for the candidate countries to have at least one year experience in the application of the *acquis* provisions and procedures, the Kaliningrad issue ought to be resolved much earlier – in 2002 or even by the end of the year 2001 – as some authors maintain[31].

2.2.2. EU Enlargement Impact on the Kaliningrad Oblast as Source of Threat to the Actor's Interests

In Russia the issue of Kaliningrad is viewed as a part of the general problem related with the negative economic consequences caused to Russia by the EU enlargement. Moscow realises that, in the case of the EU maintaining inflexible attitude towards trade and visa regimes for Kaliningrad, the oblast may find itself in complete isolation or "double [in respect to both the EU and Russia] periphery"[32] and turn into chronically backward region. However, if the EU were convinced to apply flexible policy towards the oblast, it would create perfect conditions for Kaliningrad, thanks to its favourable geographical location,

to become an advanced region – "economic bridge" between the East and the West. In other words, the EU enlargement effect on Kaliningrad is first of all regarded as a source of threat to the economic prosperity of the oblast[33].

The second, but not less important, interest of Russia is to avoid Kaliningrad's isolation from the "Main Russia". In this context, particular importance for Russia acquires the issue of retaining the simplified communication procedures with the Kaliningrad oblast, including visa-free transit communication by direct trains and the connection of the Kaliningrad electric energy system to the Russian power complex. Having in mind that even now Kaliningrad's inhabitants visit Klaipeda, Vilnius or Warsaw more often than Moscow, statements, that the requirement for Kaliningrad people to have visas for their travel to the remaining territory of Russia is a violation of human rights, resemble attempts to avoid further gravitation of the oblast from the rest of Russia, to which Moscow responds very sensitively. In this context, the efforts of Moscow to recognise the issue of Kaliningrad as a separate problem among other possible EU enlargement effects, as well as to share the responsibility for the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue with the EU, seems quite natural: avoidance of Kaliningrad's isolation is, first of all, prevailingly a Russian interest.

The declared fundamental imperative for the EU enlargement is to expand the "area of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe". Since 1989, one of the major aims of the EC policy towards the Central and Eastern Europe has become the stabilisation of the region by improving bilateral relations between individual states and promoting regional integration. Successful application of the Western European integration pattern for the stabilisation of relations between candidate countries and their neighbouring sates, has become a principle of the EU security policy[34]. However, the application of the Schengen *acquis* for the border of Lithuania and Poland with the Kaliningrad oblast may seriously damage the bilateral relations and initiatives of sub-regional economic cooperation, which, in its turn will affect the external security of the EU. A scenario with the emergence of a centre of persisting instability, created by the oblast having deteriorated into the "double periphery", would, undoubtedly produce an even greater threat to the EU security.

Besides, the EU aims "to expand eastwards without creating any new iron curtains"[35] and contribute to the processes of consolidating democratic institutions and market economy in Russia. In early 1999s, namely the EC was expected to take an active role in the integration of Russia into Europe. Soon, however, the principle of differentiation between the countries of the region – potential associate members – and other countries, for which Community membership was not planned within short or medium term, was established in the EC policy towards the Central and Easter Europe. The policy towards the first group of countries eventually turned into the policy of

enlargement ("internal" in respect of the EU) with the major tools – PHARE and structural funds, while the policy towards the second group of countries remained "external", with the only enlargement support tool – TACIS programme.[36] Criticism of such a rigid principle of differentiation, by means of which the EU border is simply pushed further eastwards without eliminating the dividing line between the East and the West as such, alongside with the start of membership negotiations, have encouraged the European Union to adopt a more "inclusive" policy towards Russia. The isolation of Kaliningrad, which may become evident as a result of the EU enlargement, is clearly inconsistent with the moral imperative of the EU to overcome the division of Europe.

The realisation of the scenario with the oblast in the situation of a "double periphery" creating a centre of chronic instability and, as it could be expected in such eventuality, the strengthening military dimension in the Kaliningrad oblast, would pose a particularly serious threat to the security of its direct neighbours – Lithuania and Poland – as future EU members. The preservation of Kaliningrad's openness for the contacts with its neighbouring states is an particularly important guarantee for the stability in the Baltic Sea region, while the "paper curtain"[37], which is likely to emerge as a result of the introduction of the new visa regime and additional border control measures, will, undoubtedly, have a restrictive effect on the economic integration and political cooperation between the Kaliningrad oblast and the neighbouring regions.

On the other hand, even though, in the wake of the Russian crisis, the Kaliningrad market has to some extent lost its importance for Lithuania and Poland, the decline in sub-regional economic cooperation caused by the closure of borders, will inevitably mean definite economic costs to the candidate countries, in particular to the regions bordering with Kaliningrad.

The closure of borders may damage the atmosphere of mutual trust, created by Lithuanian and Polish efforts, thus reducing the effectiveness of "stability export"[38] policy towards the Kaliningrad oblast. The application of the EU border policy and visa regimes for the border with Kaliningrad, may effect the whole range of "vulnerable" spheres of cooperation, including development of local economy infrastructure, advancement of democratic institutions and the development of civil society. In other words, the application of the Schengen *acquis* for the bilateral Lithuanian and Polish borders with the Kaliningrad oblast of the Russian Federation, may undermine the foreign policy pursued by the candidate countries. In this context, it is also worth remembering that a successful relationship between Poland – and, especially, Lithuania – and the Kaliningrad oblast pays considerable political dividends in the relations with Moscow.[39] Furthermore, promotion of cooperation between the candidate countries and Kaliningrad has been repeatedly met with approval in Brussels.

2.2.3. *Factor of Uncertainty*

One of the factors to create uncertainty in dealing with the issue of Kaliningrad is a limited experience of cooperation between Russia and the European Union – as actors with the greatest freedom of action and choice of tools in the definition of the special status for the oblast. It could be stated that, until the end of the last decade, relationship between Russia and the EU was not high on the agenda and even had a certain inadequacy.[40] The process of European integration was considered by Moscow to be of secondary importance, and Russia was, by tradition, oriented to bilateral relations with European states, in particular Germany, France, Great Britain, which were deemed to be "worthy" partners of dialogue. Lately, however, the situation has been undergoing change, with Russia having realised that definite and structural relations with the EU is an essential prerequisite for the dialogue with (Western) Europe. With the evident Moscow's disappointment in the failure of partnership with the US (especially having in mind the strict relativity of the latter's financial aid as well as disagreement over Washington's dominance in the international politics), Moscow is seeking a closer cooperation with the EU. The attractiveness of the partnership is determined *inter alia* by already existing commercial dependency of Russia, and the need for direct foreign investment. Invigoration of the relationship with the EU reflects the search for geopolitical partners in Russia and the hope that the unified and strong Europe will be capable to form one of the world pillars, which will help to create balance against the hegemonic aims of the US.[41]

The EU is also criticised over its "Eastern policy", in particular over the inadequacy of its relations with Russia. The collapse of the Iron Curtain, which created a new vision of the EC mission, turned into the greatest challenge in the sense of novel and adequate response to the developments in the Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Russia, which in the period of the Cold War was "grey area" in the EC perception, suddenly turned into a source of greatest expectations and concerns.[42] The expectations are primarily related with the extensive human and natural resources as well as vast and unsaturated market. Furthermore, a stable Russia might provide with the cheapest, fastest and safest transport corridor to the dynamic markets of the South-eastern Asia. Thirdly, the urge towards closer relations with Moscow reflects the realisation that a secure and unified Europe is impossible with an isolated, unstable and hostile Russia. In addition, support to Russia is also based on geopolitical considerations: it is Russia which is shielding the expanding EU against the threats from the South.[43] However, the socio-economic backwardness, problems of structural character, crime, environmental pollution and similar problems of Russia forced Brussels, especially bearing in mind the "overloaded" agenda of the EU with the issues related to the implementation

of Economic and Monetary Union and its eastward expansion, to establish a balance between challenges and opportunities in favour of a less vigorous cooperation with Moscow.

The second factor of uncertainty, directly related with the resolution of the Kaliningrad problem, is determined by the complexity of related actors' interests/values, which inevitably complicates a clear definition of the actors' positions. As it was already mentioned, Russia interprets the impact of the EU enlargement essentially in terms of economic prosperity. Besides, the attitude in Moscow towards the scenario of the development of Kaliningrad as an "economic bridge" between the East and the West is not homogeneous. Usually it is declared that the realisation of such scenario may turn to be a too costly project. Firstly, the idea of "economic bridge" is incompatible with the role of a military outpost. Despite the significant decrease in the oblast's militarisation level during the beginning of the 1990s, the military dimension still remains an important card of Russia to block the further NATO expansion into the Baltic Sea region. In this respect, the changes in the priority of different Russian interests towards Kaliningrad are significantly influenced by the dominating fundamental attitudes of Russia in regard to the relationship with the West (economic pragmatism *versus* geopolitical realism). Secondly, having in mind the existing tension between the Centre (Moscow) and regional centres, the question of whether economic development of the Kaliningrad oblast and strong relationship with foreign counties is not likely to weaken Moscow's influence in the region, seems fairly logic.[44] In addition, a "special resolution" of the Kaliningrad issue will also inevitably lead to a "special status" and a greater autonomy for the oblast.

The EU likewise is clearly faced with the inevitability of political choice. On the one hand, there exists a definite EU imperative for enlargement without creating any new dividing lines in Europe. On the other hand, all the previous enlargement stages were based on the principle that the expansion may not interfere with the deepening of the integration or hinder integration as such. Therefore, prior to membership, candidate countries have to adopt the whole EU law. Common external customs tariffs, visa regimes compatible with the Schengen *acquis*, and control of external borders are the prerequisites for free movement of goods and persons within the territory of the EU.

The oblast, conveyed to isolation and "double periphery", separated from contacts with neighbouring states also contradicts the EU external security interests. On the other hand, the aim of the border control measures, introduced by the Schengen *acquis,* is to protect the EU territory against the new type of "private" threats (illegal migration and crime)[45], emanating from unstable neighbouring territories. In other words, the EU is faced with the necessity to choose between the internal and external security interests.

The dynamism of the EU in resolving the Kaliningrad issue (despite the pragmatic interest to involve the oblast into the process of regional integration: the increasing volume of the energy imports from Russia force to consider Kaliningrad's inclusion into the European infrastructure and transport networks) is significantly restrained by equally cautious position of the EU in its relations with Russia: the EU, recognising the sovereignty of Russia in Kaliningrad, avoids emphasising the necessity to pursue towards Kaliningrad a different policy from that applied in respect to Russia as a whole. The urge for a more robust cooperation with Russia, preventing political and economic break of Russian exclave from other states of the region, as well as the desire to avoid the isolation of the Kaliningrad oblast, calls for "special" regional decisions – to be guided by the logic of "transparent borders"[46].

Lithuania and Poland, as future EU members with direct borders with the Kaliningrad oblast, are most interested in promoting cooperation with Kaliningrad and preserving its openness. On the other hand, expeditious EU membership is perceived as a foreign policy aim of priority importance, capable of ensuring economic prosperity and stability[47]. Being in the position of states the borders of which will in future become external EU borders, Lithuania and Poland are subject to the tensions arising between the EU outer (macro) and inner (micro) security aims.

The complexity of values and interests, which determine the obscure preferences of the actors, increase the uncertainty about the possible impact of the EU enlargement on the oblast. There is still no comprehensive study, which would embrace the whole range of EU enlargement effects on the oblast of Kaliningrad, to assess the consequences. On the other hand, there is a problem of quantitative measure for certain values, the threats thereto, and the effectiveness of combat tools (e. g. some of the soft threats cannot, in essence, be measured, equally difficult is to verify the effectiveness of the tools of combat against them[48]).

In sum, it is possible to conclude that, with Kaliningrad gradually turning into a Russian exclave in the EU, the potential threat to the regional actors' important interests/values, the atmosphere of uncertainty about the likely consequences and best political alternatives, as well as time limits for decisions, make it possible to view the EU enlargement as a change of Kaliningrad's external environment – a trigger for creating critical situation. It should be noted that the actors perceive the emerging crisis potential as not being confined only to the Kaliningrad oblast, but threatening different values, devoid of the effect of unexpectedness, thus capable of "realising itself" in a case of political failure (inability to control the ongoing processes in the region and accomplish successful crisis prevention). In other words, the Kaliningrad crisis potential embraces the essential features of the modern crises, including the necessity of inter-state prevention.

3. POSITIONS AND TOOLS OF REGIONAL ACTORS: PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL CRISIS PREVENTION

In analysing the resolution of the "Kaliningrad issue" in the context of EU enlargement as a crisis prevention case, it is important to take regard of several significant circumstances. The EU enlargement is changing the main parameters of the political and economic environment of the Kaliningrad oblast. These changes create enormous pressure and a need for quite speedy and effective (i.e. not based on cosmetic measures, but in-depth reforms) adaptation. Neither the Kaliningrad oblast nor Moscow dispose of adequate resources or are capable of adaptation of this scope. Therefore, the blame for the emergence of critical situation is put on the EU, the enlargement policy of which, based on the requirement for implementation of the *acquis* as well as on the financial support of candidate countries in their preparation process, allegedly creates "unequal conditions" for the Kaliningrad oblast in the competition for foreign investments[49] as well as destroys the oblast's shadow economy, which mainly relies on cross-border trading. However, the EU enlargement in itself does not give rise to the crisis potential in the Kaliningrad oblast: the integration of Lithuania and Poland in the EU highlights the fundamental structural problems which exist in the oblast. The EU enlargement is a factor of creating crisis potential: it produces an enormous pressure for an expeditious in-depth modernisation of the oblast. In the background of the EU enlargement, there are two alternatives available to the Kaliningrad oblast: modernisation or turning into a double periphery, while the third alternative, i.e. preservation of the *status quo* becomes impossible.

Due to the complexity of the EU enlargement impact on the Kaliningrad oblast, crisis prevention ought to be oriented not only towards the direct softening of the negative EU enlargement effects by means of technical or procedural agreements (e.g. simplification of border crossing procedures), or, as Russia calls it, the protection of the interests of Kaliningrad oblast in the context of the EU enlargement. In the focus of attention there ought to be a creation of favourable conditions for overcoming the socio-economic lag from the neighbouring countries[50].The natural and reasonable wish of the EU to protect against the soft threats coming from unstable neighbouring territories, makes it possible to assume that some of the direct procedural consequences of the EU enlargement to Kaliningrad could be eliminated without even evoking much resistance from Brussels, providing an adequately high level of prosperity and stability has been reached in the oblast.

The transformation of the oblast into a double periphery includes a threat of the spillover effect: isolation of Kaliningrad entails costs in the sense of values not only for Russia but likewise for the EU and the candidate countries. For

this reason, the success of the crisis prevention ought to be an interest of importance for all regional actors: the community of the problem enables/ requires to share the responsibility for its resolution. Thus, it looks like the prospects for the development of the Kaliniongrad oblast to the greatest extent depend on the ability of the key regional actors to concertedly and adequately assess the evolving situation and agree on the aims and necessary measures. On the other hand, there undoubtedly is a link between the possibilities to realise the scenario of successful development of the oblast in the expanding Europe and the importance of the Kaliningrad issue on the agenda of the decision-makers.

3.1. Issue of Kaliningrad within the Context of Relationship between Russia and the European Union

At the Russian Federation-European Union Summit in October 1999, both parties underlined that the Kaliningrad oblast is potentially capable of turning into a model of successful cooperation between Russia and the EU to be emulated by other Russian regions, in other words – "pilot region". The analysis of the development of relations between Russia and the EU reveals two tendencies, one of which is the intensification of the dialogue. It is not yet clear if, in resorting to the term "strategic partnership", Russia demonstrates its constructive and sustaining attitude towards the EU, or it is simply an expression of Moscow's desire to realise the vision of a multipolar world and pursue active diplomacy in several directions (thus at the same time trying to find response to the US domination)[51]. On the other hand, the attractiveness of the partnership with the EU and other member countries is determined by already existing commercial dependency and the need for investments. Since 1997 the EU has become the main trading and investment partner of Russia. The EU-Russian trade relations are asymmetric: EU accounts for 40 per cent of the Russian foreign trade, while the part of Russia in the EU external trade constitutes only 3.5 percent. The asymmetric character of the relationship is softened by the fact that Russia supplies to the countries of the European Union about 36 percent of their total gas import and 10 percent of oil import[52]. The EU dependency on Russian energy sources may be expected to further increase in the future. Nevertheless, it is important to note that energy supply is not an effective tool for pressure on the EU: it is quite difficult for Russia to find an alternative to the European market for its gas supply.

On the other hand, both Moscow and Brussels emphasise the necessity of resolving the issue of Kaliningrad (first of all) within the framework of bilateral mechanisms provided by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The pilot region idea creates a bilateral Brussels-Moscow format. The position of

Moscow on this issue seems quite natural (Kaliningrad is an integral part of the Russian Federation; on the other hand, Russia fully realises the limited freedom for manoeuvre on the part of the candidate countries within the context of membership negotiations: rules of the game are set by the EU). The suggestion of President V.Putin to discuss the issue of Kaliningrad within the trilateral format, expressed during the visit of President V.Adamkus, was, in practice, limited to consultations and resolutions of technical issues: the dictum of Brussels: "the EU will continue discussions with Lithuania and Poland on the issue of Kaliningrad on the basis of Association Agreement"[53], clearly reflects the fully understandable wish of the EU to avoid the Kaliningrad issue in the context of the EU accession negotiations[54].

The existing asymmetry in the relations between Lithuania and Poland on the one side, and the European Union on the other, makes it possible to conclude that framework agreements on the issue of Kaliningrad will predominantly be the object of bilateral EU-RF negotiations; in this respect (and to this extent) the prospect for a successful development of the oblast within the expanding Europe will depend on the ability of both Moscow and Brussels to adequately assess the situation and agree on the agenda (goals) and tools.

3.1.1. Position of the European Union

The EU views the issue of Kaliningrad as part of its foreign policy in respect to Russia. Both the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which came into force in 1997, and the 1999 EU Common Strategy on Russia[55] are based on the concept of Russia as a non-differentiable territory. These instruments do not recognise the specifics of the Kaliningrad oblast, and there is likewise no special policy envisaged in regard to the oblast, thus ignoring the fact that the development of the region is affected not only by bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the European Union, but also by the processes in Poland and Lithuania related to the preparation for the EU membership and the accession negotiations with the EU (in other words, these instruments fail to recognise the side effects of the EU enlargement, which are mostly experienced in Kaliningrad).

True, the Common Strategy indicates that a "particular attention is paid by the EU to the regional and local administrations within the sphere of their competence"; there is also a reference to "special initiatives", including the approximation of law, creation of free trade zones, etc.; regard is taken of Russia's "concern over problems of access to the EU market", however the Kaliningrad problem is not examined in this context. In the Chapter on regional cooperation and the cross-border cooperation, the focus is on enhancing effective

collaboration with Russia in the sphere of regional cooperation and developing cross-border cooperation with the neighbouring Russian regions, Kaliningrad included, in particular within the context of the EU enlargement and within the framework of the Northern Dimension[56].

Contrary to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia or the Common Strategy, the initiative launched by Finland in 1997, approved by the 1998 Vienna Summit Meeting of the European leaders, has become a classical example of the EU response to the enlargement of 1995, and is based on the recognition of the uniqueness and importance of the Northwestern Russia (including Kaliningrad) for regional cooperation. Based on the formula, suggested by the Finnish Government, the Northern Dimension involves the re-definition and development of the interests and policies of the European Union towards the Northern area (from Iceland, the Northwest of Russia to the Southern coast of the Baltic Sea). The Northern Dimension initiative is built on the assumption that a coherent and single EU policy towards the region will create conditions for the development of the area of security, stability and economic prosperity in Europe[57]. The Northern Dimension seeks to utilise the effect of "positive interdependence" by concentrating on regional development projects (primarily, in the sphere of energy, raw materials, environment protection, nuclear security, cross-border cooperation, trade, transport, social issues, science and education).

However, the EU has repeatedly emphasised that the Northern Dimension initiative does not aim at creating a new regional policy. The Northern Dimension is expected to be implemented by means of the already existing EU policy tools and assistance programmes[58], in other words, by a better re-distribution of the available resources (without additional support). Besides, even though in the Northern Dimension Action Plan[59], approved by the 2000 European Summit in Feira, Kaliningrad is regarded as a separate region, the document is limited to stating that, as a part of the ongoing dialogue between the EU and the Russian Federation within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Kaliningrad presents a challenge to the development of the regional cooperation. The responsibility for the development of the Kaliningrad oblast is left in the remit of the oblast itself by indicating that Kaliningrad's ability to take advantage of the possibilities presented by the EU enlargement will depend upon the quality and speed of the internal adaptation of the oblast (especially in the sphere of customs and border control, combat against organised crime and corruption, structural reforms and public administration)[60]. There is no reference in the plan to any possible negative enlargement effects on the oblast or ways of reducing thereof. Thus, the Northern Dimension Action Plan views the problem of the Kaliningrad oblast as an issue of adaptation not negotiation.

The turning point in the EU political attitude towards the Kaliningrad oblast was the Enlargement Strategy Paper issued alongside the Regular Reports on the progress of the candidate countries, which indicated that Kaliningrad would experience a particular impact of the EU enlargement by turning into a Russian enclave within the EU. The document also provided for the development – in cooperation with Russia, Poland and Lithuania – of a strategy to ensure better prospects for Kaliningrad's prosperity within the context of Lithuania and Poland joining the EU.

Based on the recommendations in the EU Enlargement Strategy Paper, and in response to the Russian Letter of concern of 2000 on the possible direct effects of the EU expansion, the European Commission adopted a communication on "EU and Kaliningrad". The communication makes a distinction between the issues of the EU enlargement impact on all Russian regions (and all third countries) and the specific issues related to the consequences of the future Lithuanian and Polish membership in the EU on the Kaliningrad oblast (first of all in the sphere of the movement of goods and persons, and electric energy supply).

In addition, there also is an examination of the possible ways of cooperation between the EU and Russia in resolving the issues not directly related with the EU enlargement: environment protection, combat against crime, health care and economic development. According to the Commission, both Russia and the oblast itself are responsible for the future of Kaliningrad, nevertheless, the EU and its future members are willing to facilitate a smooth introduction of the changes, conditioned by the membership requirements, by fostering cooperation with the Kaliningrad oblast in resolving a range of regional problems.

The Commission, while recognising that Kaliningrad, due to its exceptional geographical location, may experience greater effects of the EU enlargement than other Russian regions or other third countries, nevertheless emphasised that no exemptions of the *acquis* application might be applicable to Kaliningrad. The same visa and border control regime will apply in respect of Kaliningrad as that applicable to Russia as a whole. The Commission suggested that the problems related with the movement of persons were resolved by means of technical measures both provided for by the *acquis* and those within the national competence of member states: by issuing long-term multiple visas, determining low prices thereof, by establishing new consular representations, improving the operating capacity of border-crossing points. Secondly, a certain flexibility in regard to the small border traffic and transit *acquis* is indicated. Thirdly, an essential issue is the determination of the dividing line between the activities which the aspirant countries will have to complete before their actual membership in the EU, and those which might be postponed until the new members accede to the Schengen Agreement.

In the sphere of the free movement of goods, the European Commission underlines the positive effect of the EU expansion: geographical proximity of the oblast will create particularly favourable opportunities for the access to the EU (including that of the future members – Lithuania and Poland) market. Nevertheless, it is also emphasised there, that the oblast, in order to derive the maximum benefit from the opening prospects, ought to be interested in the adoption of the EU norms and standards.

The Commission did not foresee any possible or enduring negative consequences for the Kaliningrad oblast in the sphere of the movement of goods or electric energy supply. However, Brussels is indicating its readiness to implement a number of practical measures intended to improve the border control efficiency, expedite the border crossing procedures, ensure transport communication and electric energy supply. The introduction of any special trade regime for Kaliningrad is questionable, first of all due to the indefinite position of Moscow.

In the opinion of the European Commission, the EU-Russian Cooperation Council, established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, produces an appropriate and adequate forum for the further "discussion" on the issue of Kaliningrad, though the prospect for convening a meeting of all interested parties, in order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and resolution of related practical issues, is not rejected either.

By way of summary, it could be stated that the Commission focuses exclusively on the issues of direct impact of the EU enlargement on the Kaliningrad oblast by indicating in separate areas a different level (depending on the scale such decisions would mean a deviation from the common practice) of preparedness to deal with problems of technico-procedural aspect. The awareness of the Kaliningrad threat determines the "general [of EU and Russia] interest" in the issues not directly related with the EU expansion: ecology (including the storage of nuclear waste), health care, combat against crime, economic development. However, the role of the EU in these areas is limited to its readiness to share expertise and give financial assistance through the existing TACIS, as well as bilateral programmes of the member states on technical assistance.

Despite the recognition of the Kaliningrad uniqueness and the Kaliningrad issue in the context of the EU enlargement (proved by the very fact of the issuing of the Communication) as well as the obvious readiness of Brussels to pay more attention to the resolution of some problems, within the level of the suggested decisions, the oblast remains within the sphere of function of the principles and mechanisms regulating the general relations between the EU and Russia[61], in addition, the responsibility of Russia for the oblast's adaptation to the changing environment is emphasised.

3.1.2. Position of Russia

In the initial stage, between 1998 and 1999, the attitude of Russia towards Kaliningrad, as its eventual exclave in the territory of the EU, mostly held a responsive character: in 1998 Russia had nothing against the Kaliningrad oblast being involved in the Northern Dimension initiative. In 1999 it even put forward a suggestion (together with Lithuania) to discuss the issue of Kaliningrad at the meeting of European foreign ministers on the Northern Dimension[62]. The break-through came in October 1999, when the Russian delegation, headed by then the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation V.Putin submitted the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union and its Position on the Northern Dimension.

The Russian position in principle expressed approval of the Initiative and even called for a closer cooperation than the EU was prepared to offer[63]. Russia expressed request for the application of the conditions for regional cooperation (including the experience of Euroregions), valid on the Russian-Finnish border, in respect to regions bordering with Poland and the Baltic States (even before they become EU members). The countries participating in the Northern Dimension Initiative were invited to apply a less stringent Schengen regime towards Russia. The focus of the Medium-term EU-Russian Relationship Development Strategy was on ensuring Russian interests within the expanding EU, including Kaliningrad's interests: "within the framework of the contacts with the EU to concentrate on guaranteeing the interests of the Kaliningrad oblast, as an entity and integral part of the Russian Federation, and an active participant in the regional cooperation process, by creating the necessary external conditions for the functioning and development of the oblast."(64). In the sphere of trade, the emphasis was even laid on the Russian interest in concluding a separate agreement to safeguard the interests of Kaliningrad in the context of the EU enlargement, and transform it into a pilot region.

In October 2000, Russia submitted to the European Union a Letter of concern over the impact of the EU enlargement on the Kaliningrad oblast. The spheres of the greatest concern for Russia, as related to the prospective EU membership of the neighbouring states, included, first of all, the vital necessity of ensuring free movement of persons, goods and services between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia by air, land and sea through the territories of the "neighbouring EU states". Russia expressed hope that, for the sake of ensuring such transit, the following measures could be introduced: simplification of the customs and border crossing procedures, opening of the Gołdup-Grodno route for cargo transport; modernisation of the infrastructure of border crossing points; as well as the reconstruction of Via Hanseatica motorway. In addition, it is

necessary to ensure free transit of oil, gas, fuel and electric energy by pipelines which cross the territories of the "neighbouring EU states". It is equally essential to guarantee the tele-communication with the Kaliningrad oblast. According to the Russian position, the visa-free regime must be retained for the movement of Kaliningrad inhabitants to Lithuania, Poland (or Northern Poland), Latvia (and possibly also to the territories of other "neighbouring EU states"); on candidate countries joining the EU, the interests of Kaliningrad's fishing fleet must be safeguarded; etc.

The Letter also underlines the "objectively existing" need for financial aid (*inter alia*, by means of the instruments previously applied exclusively in respect of candidate countries – i.e. PHARE and structural funds) to the region in order to avoid a social-economic gap between Kaliningrad and its neighbouring states, as well as compensate the negative consequences of the EU expansion to the Baltic Sea region.[65] The outcomes of the EU-Russian dialogue on the Kaliningrad oblast ought to be implemented by a special document, binding on both parties.[66]

At the time of the meeting of the Sub-committee for Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in Moscow on 6 March 2001, Russia submitted to the EU its response the Communication of the European Commission in the form of a revised position paper entitled "Possible Solutions for the Problems of the Kaliningrad Oblast, Related with the EU Enlargement"[67]. The Russian suggestions embraced four key areas: transport and transit (the focus in this area being on ensuring the unrestricted transit between the Kaliningrad oblast and the remaining territory of Russia, thus creating conditions for Kaliningrad to remain a part of the Russian internal market); principle measures – air traffic corridor over the territory of Lithuania, cargo transportation by rail without submitting it to customs procedures on the EU border, visa-free transit regime for the Russian nationals, non-residents of the Kaliningrad oblast, travelling by trains, buses or private cars through the territories of Lithuania, Poland and Latvia along previously agreed routes, visa regime (in place of its previous position concerning visa-free regime, Russia asked that Schengen visas for the duration of one year were issued free of charge for the Kaliningrad inhabitants to enter the territories of Lithuania, Poland and Latvia), electric energy supply: Russia expects to be allowed to build pipelines for the supply of oil, gas and electric energy to the Kaliningrad oblast through the territories of Lithuania and Poland; performance of agreements: all business agreements between the Kaliningrad inhabitants and the candidate countries, as well as agreements concluded between the Kaliningrad administration and the representatives of local authorities of the candidate countries, are expected to be valid until the time of their expiry, even if some of their provisions may not be in line with the *acquis*.

On 19 March 2001, the Russian Foreign Minister I.Ivanov submitted to the European Commission the "Comprehensive Analysis of the Communication" as Russia's official reaction to the EU proposals on Kaliningrad.[68] In this new document, the EU is invited to concentrate not only on the resolution of the potential problems arising in the context of the EU enlargement process, but likewise on the realisation of opportunities created by this process (if adequately managed). Though the main partner in resolving the Kaliningrad issue is the EU, Moscow does not reject a possibility of establishing contacts with the neighbouring candidate countries, e.g. concluding bilateral agreements beyond the remit of the *acquis*. Russia likewise supports a "more homogeneous accession regime for Lithuania, Latvia and Poland", which would enable Russia to better accommodate Kaliningrad's interests. The Document reiterates the suggestions of 6 March concerning the visa regime, and underlines Moscow's concern over the border crossing regime not only for the inhabitants of Kaliningrad, but likewise in respect of other Russian citizens in their movement to and from Kaliningrad, because the Kaliningrad oblast, as an integral part of the Russian Federation, may not be separated. In the area of electric energy supply, Russian plans envisage the construction of an electric power station in the town of Kaliningrad; in the sphere of fishery, the EU is invited to conclude a new EU-Russian agreement on fishery. As concerns the future consultation format, Russia expressed its preference to discuss the issue of Kaliningrad within a separate single forum, not in individual subcommittees of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

In summarising the evolution of the Russian position on the issue of Kaliningrad, several conclusions may be drawn. First, the demands of Moscow have a one-sided character: the EU enlargement in respect of the Kaliningrad oblast is an external development, therefore it is the responsibility of the EU to cover the costs of adjustment and the ensuring of "normal" communication between the oblast and the remaining part of the Russian territory. Second, Russia seems to have easily abandoned its request for the provision of visa-free travels for Kaliningrad inhabitants to Lithuania and Poland: the priority of Moscow has clearly shifted from the emphasis on avoiding the oblast's isolation from the neighbouring region to preventing Kaliningrad's isolation from the rest of Russia. Thus, the most persistent negotiations may be expected over the visa-free transit communication by railways. Third, despite the attempts in the new Position to shift the focus from the elimination of the negative effects of the EU enlargement to the best realisation of the positive opportunities, Russia's response to the EU suggestion to discuss, within the framework of a relevant sub-committee, the impact of the change in the trade regime to Kaliningrad was surprising: Russia has no specific concerns related with the enlargement impact on economic relations of Kaliningrad, and is inclined to start consultations

concerning the enlargement impact on the level of Russia as a whole. This indicates that Moscow is not planning to provide the oblast with any special status in its relations with the EU. A similar conclusion might also be drawn after the 22 March 2001 meeting of the Government of the Russian Federation, where a common liberal Moscow's, as the federation centre, policy towards Kaliningrad was charted. However, instead of determining a clear pilot region development perspective, supported by a relevant strategy, essential decisions were postponed for another half a year[69]. In other words, the interests of Moscow in the negotiations lie in unrestricted transit between the Kaliningrad oblast and the main Russia, as well as in the compensation of the negative impact of the EU enlargement. Being clearly reluctant to award any special status to the oblast, Moscow concentrates on the resolution of problems related to the direct procedural consequences of the EU enlargement (e.g. in the area of the border-crossing regime), often by means which are unacceptable for candidate countries and the EU (e.g. extraterritorial corridors), without giving any attention to the need of in-depth modernisation of the oblast.

3.2. Interests of the Candidate Countries and Potentiality of Influence

During the last decade, the active policy of Poland and, especially, of Lithuania, directed at maintaining close cooperation with the Kaliningrad oblast and preventing its isolation, became an integral part of the foreign policy aimed at ensuring security and stability in the region.[70] In the foreign policy of Lithuania, the Kaliningrad oblast has undergone transformation from the main threat to security into an advantage – an opportunity to play an independent role of a leader in the Southeast of the Baltic Sea region, truly contributing to promoting stability in the region[71]. The active and positive Lithuanian policy towards Kaliningrad has become one of the fundamental elements in the relations between Lithuania and Russia. In the foreign policy of Poland and in the Warsaw-Moscow relations, the Kaliningrad oblast takes an important but not an outstanding place. The efforts of Poland, as a "stability exporter" are primarily directed towards Ukraine, and to some extent to Belarus.[72]

In any case, active policy towards Kaliningrad, aimed at involving the oblast into the closest possible regional cooperation, is regarded by both countries as one of the main elements of insuring security in the Baltic Sea region, though there are insignificant differences in the cooperation strategies: Lithuania is more oriented towards cooperation in the social-economic sphere, thus diverting attention from the "military dimension", while Poland is developing cooperation in the military sphere as a prerequisite for creating the atmosphere of mutual trust in the region.

The asymmetric and conditional character of the relations between the EU and candidate countries, within the framework of their accession to this Union, limits the possibilities of Lithuania and Poland to participate in the resolution of the "Kaliningrad issue": firstly, the candidate countries have to adopt the Schengen *acquis*; secondly, the desire of the EU to avoid the Kaliningrad issue in the bilateral accession negotiations (in other words – trilateral negotiations, with the Russian participation) reduces Lithuanian and Polish prospects for direct participation in the on-going discussion between Moscow and Brussels. It is obvious that the situation where Russia could play the "Kaliningrad card" in the membership negotiations of Lithuania and Poland with the EU would also be the least favourable to the candidate countries themselves.

The fundamental interest of Lithuania and Poland in the context of the EU enlargement, would be to avoid the isolation of the oblast and its turning into a "double periphery" (a zone of instability at the Baltic Sea with a distinctly expressed military dimension). Both countries emphasise not only the direct impact of the *acquis* application, but likewise the social-economic development gap between the oblast and its neighbouring regions.[73] Nevertheless, the implementation of the EU membership requirements clearly limits the choice and effectiveness of the existing tools (economic and sub-regional cooperation, transborder cooperation, etc.). Centralisation tendencies in Russia take the same course: possibilities for the Kaliningrad political elite to build economic foreign contacts are often limited by the position of Moscow.[74]

In their preparation process for the EU membership, Lithuania and Poland inevitably become "consumers" of the EU policies, norms and procedures, without being able to influence their development processes.[75] In this situation, Lithuania and Poland, taking regard of the EU position which excludes any transitional periods and provisos that could prejudice internal market principles, (reinforced control of external borders and the common visa regime is a prerequisite for the free movement of persons), Lithuania and Poland refrained from raising the issue of Kaliningrad within the format of accession negotiations with the EU. The focus was on the expeditious accession to the EU, with the ensuing right to vote in the process of shaping the EU policy.[76]

Both Poland and Lithuania, alongside with their announcement about the plans to introduce a visa regime in regard to Kaliningrad, emphasise their intention to take measures aimed at the maximum increase of the border crossing capacity, thus reducing the barrier effect on the free movement: to expand the network of consulates, develop the infrastructure of the border crossing points, to issue cheap visas.

In order to avoid a transformation of the new paper/procedural borders into political ones, measures aimed at mutual confidence building are being

introduced at various levels (local, regional, administrative, and private).[77] It is planned to continue on an enhanced level the existing cooperation initiatives, including participation and active involvement within the framework of the Northern Dimension and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (for instance, at the April 2001 Conference in Luxembourg, Lithuania and Russia together submitted 5 revised and updated projects – the Second Nida Initiative); in the "Baltija" and "Saule" Euroregions; by implementing the existing projects in the area of civil society development; promoting cooperation between non-governmental organisations and research institutions, etc.

Lithuania and Poland are closely following the EU-Russian dialogue on the issue of Kaliningrad. Poland has declared its position in regard to the Commission Communication where it emphasised that Poland was determined, in cooperation with its partners, to foster the development of processes in Russia aimed at creating conditions for a "open" attitude of Russia towards the European integration.

In other words, the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue in Lithuania and Poland seems to have taken two directions[78]: in the short term: to further maintain active sub-regional cooperation aimed at preventing the isolation of the oblast; to search for procedural/technical decisions, provided for by the *acquis* or left within the national competence, which could soften the impact of the EU membership requirements on the relations with the Kaliningrad oblast; to support the enhanced dialogue between the expanding EU and Russia on the issue of Kaliningrad and the development of a EU-RF relationship model in the Kaliningrad oblast. In the long term: to follow a successful Finnish example and try to "communitarise" (transfer to the European Union level) their policy in respect to the oblast, thus achieving long-term political interests and aims within the framework of the dialogue between the enlarged European Union and the Russian Federation.

3.3. Prospects for Successful Crisis Prevention

The EU enlargement, by changing the essential parameters of Kaliningrad's political and economic environment, thus creating the pressing need for expeditious in-depth modernisation of the oblast, for the implementation of which Russia is not ready and lacks capacity, becomes a trigger for creating crisis potential. The danger of the spillover effect (in the sense of the infringement of essential values) is experienced not only by Russia, but also by the EU and candidate countries. Therefore, successful crisis prevention should be an important interest for all regional actors. Nevertheless, a review of their position reveals several tendencies.

Because of the need for fundamental reforms in the Kaliningrad oblast, and the asymmetry of the EU accession process, the EU and Russia "monopolise" the process for the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue. The scope and effectiveness of the initiatives offered by the candidate countries – Lithuania and Poland – to a great extent become dependent on the framework conditions determined by the decisions of Moscow and Brussels. In other words, the EU and Russia possess adequate power for crisis prevention, while the capacity of Lithuania and Poland is limited to sub-regional initiatives, which are though important but inadequate condition for successful crisis prevention.

The assessment of the evolving situation by both Moscow and Brussels does not seem to be adequate: Brussels comparatively recently acknowledged the uniqueness and importance of the Kaliningrad issue, likewise the possible negative impact of the enlargement on the oblast. Moscow is defining the consequences of the EU enlargement on Kaliningrad in terms of economic costs and the notion of the oblast's separation from the "Great Russia", though, a certain conflict between the values of prosperity and territorial integrity seems likely to be resolved in favour of the latter. This determines concentration on the technical/procedural aspects of the *acquis* application without raising the question about the development of the necessary prerequisites for the oblast's adaptation to the transformed economic environment.

Both Russia and the EU, even though they have monopolised the decision-making process, clearly decline from taking responsibility for the development of the oblast, surrounded by the enlarged European Union. Consequently, there is a disagreement about the agenda, aims and tools. The fact that, despite the expected costs in relation to the increased vulnerability of certain EU and Russian values, there is a lack of strong political determination to decide the Kaliningrad issue *in essence* (by resorting to unconventional tools for breaking the *status quo*), calls for an assumption that the problem of successful adaptation of the oblast (together with the relevant values) is not placed high on the Moscow agenda. It is evident that Brussels seems likely to start discussing the application of a special regime in respect to Kaliningrad only after a firm resolution to award a certain special status to the oblast in its relations with the EU has been demonstrated by Moscow.[79]

The circumstances where both Russia and the EU possess an adequate political power, but fail to possess political will to change the existing situation, while Lithuania and Poland, even though they more or less adequately assess the situation and agree on the definition of the problem, as well as its resolution aims, do not have the power to take the necessary decisions, make it possible to conclude that (at the present time) the requirement for the successful prevention of the crisis in the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue is not satisfied.

In the long run (with the EU-membership of Lithuania and Poland approaching) positions of players are likely to change (it seems that Moscow itself does not believe that its demands related with various "corridors" will be satisfied, which makes it possible to presume that real negotiations have not yet actually started). The real threat, posed by the inability of the oblast to adapt to the changing environment, has not yet been perceived by all actors. With the approach of the Lithuanian and Polish membership, the evidence of the costs and the necessity for "real negotiations" will increase. Without the agreement in principle on the Kaliningrad oblast being reached before the EU enlargement, the positive attention of Brussels towards the region might be expected to grow: the enlargement will "shift" the EU gravity centre eastwards; after the enlargement, the EU agenda will be less "busy", while the membership will provide for Lithuania and Poland access to new levers and instruments for transferring their policy towards the oblast to the European Union level. However, meanwhile the prospects for the development of the Russian federalism and Moscow's policy in respect to Kaliningrad remain quite obscure. In addition, there exist factors which limit the possibility of applying, in respect to Kaliningrad, (e.g. the presidency of the EU southern states, NATO expansion, which will inevitably increase the oblast's military dimension and strategic importance) the assumption that with the time period until the crisis getting shorter, the preparedness of the decision-makers for the crisis prevention increases.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In late 1990, upon the start of negotiations of Poland and Lithuania for membership in the EU, the international community focussed on the problem related to the Kaliningrad region as a potential Russian exclave in the envelopment of the EU member states. The EU enlargement is inevitably related with side effect on third countries, including Russia and its integral part – the Kaliningrad oblast. Within the perspective of the future EU membership of Poland and the Baltic States (first of all Lithuania), the threat of Kaliningrad lagging behind its neighbouring states in socio-economical aspect and becoming "double periphery" (in respect both to the EU and the Russian Federation) becomes especially important. The analysis of the prerequisites for a successful crisis prevention, enables several conclusions to be drawn:

1.The EU enlargement changes the essential parameters of the political and economic environment of the Kaliningrad oblast. This determines the necessity for quite a rapid adaptation of the oblast to the changing external circumstances. The EU enlargement as such is not the cause for creating a crisis potential in the oblast, as it only highlights the existing basic structural problems.

Nevertheless, the EU enlargement is a factor of creating crisis potential as it produces a tremendous pressure for the expeditious in-depth modernisation of the oblast, for which Russia is neither prepared nor capable.

2. The EU expansion into the Baltic Sea region turns into a development which interrupts the flow of customary, inertial policy (in the oblast and in respect thereof) and challenges into making qualitatively new decisions. In the context of the EU enlargement, the Kaliningrad oblast can either resort to modernisation or turn into a double periphery, with the third alternative – the continuation of the *status quo* – being impossible or too expensive (a further "conservation" of the problem in the presence of the EU enlargement will undoubtedly lead to the deterioration of the oblast's economic situation). Thus the EU enlargement may create objective conditions/stimulus for a major qualitative change (i.e. it forces the implementation of policies oriented to ensuring the socio-economic development of the oblast).

3. Deterioration of the oblast into "a double periphery" entails the threat of the spillover effect. Therefore, the necessity to avoid the scenario of Kaliningrad as a "double periphery" urges for contacts between regional actors: an isolation of Kaliningrad would mean costs for both Russia and the candidate-countries. The further development of the issue of Kaliningrad will inevitably have one or another effect on the regional actors, their security, relations with the Kaliningrad oblast and mutual interrelations. As the crisis potential in the Kaliningrad oblast is emerging as a side effect of the EU enlargement, and a unilateral resolution of the Kaliningrad problem is not possible, the prospects for the oblast's development will mainly depend on the will and capacity of the key regional actors to adequately assess the evolving situation and agree both on the agenda and necessary measures.

4. The analysis of the attitudes of the regional actors, participating in the discussion on the "Kaliningrad problem", enables to state that at the moment preconditions for successful crisis prevention are not sufficient: Russia and the EU have adequate political power, but no political will to change the prevailing practice, whereas Lithuania and Poland do not have any power to make necessary decisions although they agree on the definition of the problem and objectives of its solution.

5. In the long run (the EU-membership of Lithuania and Poland approaching) positions of players are likely to change: there will be increased amounts of relevant information about the actual impact of the EU enlargement on the Kaliningrad oblast and the consequences of the oblast's deterioration into a "double periphery" on the regional actors, and with the approach of the decisive moment, the motivation to take real decisions will be stronger. Furthermore, in case of a failure to reach a principal decision before the EU enlargement, the attention of Brussels towards the region may be expected to

grow, though the real prospects for the implementation of the pilot region idea will further depend on Russia's readiness to accept the increasing regional variety and decentralisation: the EU will not take the initiative without an expressed urge on the part of Russia for a clear and sustained constructive dialogue.

In its attempt to implement the "pilot region" idea, Russia ought to demonstrate a clear and unambiguous political will to acknowledge the uniqueness of Kaliningrad, to grant the oblast a greater degree of autonomy and share with the EU the responsibility in resolving the problem of in-depth modernisation of the Kaliningrad oblast. With the existence of a constructive initiative on the part of Russia, based not on one-sided demands but on mutual commitments, Brussels would be more flexible in respect to the issue of granting a special status to the Kaliningrad oblast. So far, Russia does not seem to have a clear vision of Kaliningrad's development. Nevertheless, it is also equally obvious that the "conservation" of the issue, fearing the increased contacts of the oblast with the expanding EU and a further gravitation of Kaliningrad out of Moscow's sphere of influence, may condition a contrary effect (in the sense of increased separatist tendencies in the oblast). The possible impact of the "double periphery" scenario on the relationships between Moscow and Kaliningrad political elite might turn to be an interesting theme for a further research.

THE IMAGE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN LITHUANIA: THE SALIENCE OF NATIONALITY AS A CRITERION OF MEMBERSHIP

Inga Vinogradnaitė

INTRODUCTION

In the early beginning of democratisation processes, the three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - had to made a choice about the kind of democracy: "an inclusionary liberal democracy based on citizenship for almost all permanent residents or an exclusionary "ethnic democracy" only for 1940 descendants". If the choice in Latvia and Estonia was in favour of an exclusionary ethnic democracy, Lithuania has adopted an inclusionary politics towards citizenship.[1] In some countries nationality indeed plays an important role as a criterion of inclusion/exclusion from political community. If one bases upon the analysis of Citizenship laws, one can legitimately argue that this is not the case in Lithuania. Such an argument today has become a stereotype, which this paper aims to challenge.

The underlying assumption, which motivates such challenge, is that it is necessary to distinguish between "formal" political communities and the "real" or "actual" ones. Many employ the term "political community" as if both its theoretical content and empirical referent were self-evident. Though rarely explicitly defined, "political community" is a term for a corpus of citizens where a citizen is a person formally entitled with political rights. In this paper I argue that the "formal" understanding of political community is not sufficient if we are to understand the nature of actually undergoing political processes. Political community can be more properly understood as an imagined community of those whose interests should be concerned when making decision on the affairs of political community. In this sense, the actual political community can be either broader or narrower than the formal political community. It is narrower if political decisions are deliberated and made without taking into account the interests of all citizens (or without acknowledging the specificity of interests of some groups). It is the argument of this paper that the actual inclusion into

political community always requires the acknowledgement of difference – different identities and different interests.

Conversely, the broadening of formal political community would appear if, for example, decisions were made by taking into account the interests of future generations. The more different interests are acknowledged, the broader political community is.

This paper focuses on the membership aspect of political community in Lithuania. The main question here is about nationality: whether nationality count as a criterion of inclusion or exclusion from political community. To answer this question, I start with the conception of political community. The first part of the paper develops the argument that political community cannot be accounted in terms of formal citizenship only. Political community is a social construct, where the sense of community should be constructed and the difference should be overcome. The problem of contemporary politics is, as many political theoreticians have emphasised, that community often is constructed by eliminating, not recognising, the difference. Next, the main guidelines for the discourse analysis of political community construction are provided. Finally, the analysis of some texts from Lithuanian political discourse is conducted. The purpose of this analysis is to answer what image of political community is constructed in Lithuania. The main conclusion is that nationality (Lithuanianness) plays an important role as a criterion of inclusion into political community, and, what is even more important, that nationality is a criterion of exclusion as well. To put it in other words, the difference of interests of different national identities is not recognised.

1. CONCEPTION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The main purpose of this part of the paper is to provide arguments why it is not sufficient to define political community in terms of formal membership, as well as to provide the conception of political community as it is understood in this paper.

The existence of political community presupposes, as the very term of "community" indicates, the existence of commonality and solidarity. In other words, if there is a political community, there necessarily should exist a feeling of commonness which overcomes all the existing differences. Ch.Mouffe distinguishes between three different accounts of commonness that make political community.[2]

In the liberal vision of political community, the political community is composed of free and equal persons, capable to form, revise and rationally pursue their own definitions of "good". What is common to these persons is

that they should agree on the same principles of justice, which govern and constrain their actions, as they all need the same primary goods, all-purpose means and social bases of self-respect. The communitarian vision of political community puts a strong emphasis on the notion of a public or common good. The existence of a public good, which is independent of individual desires, makes a political community.

Both liberal and communitarian visions of political community suffer from their shortcomings. Ch. Mouffe proposes that "we need to conceive of a mode of political association, which, although it does not postulate the existence of a substantive common good, nevertheless implies the idea of commonality, of an ethico-political bond that creates a linkage among the participants in the association".[3] Drawing on M.Oakeshott's distinction between *universitas* as a purposive association, and *societas* where the association means the acknowledgement of authority of the rules constraining the action, Ch.Mouffe defines political association under modern conditions of democracy as *societas*. "This modern form of political community is held together not by a substantive idea of common good but by a common bond, a public concern".[4]

Whatever are the backgrounds of commonness, the political community then implies a collective identity, that is, the conditions under which a group of persons (citizens) can refer to themselves as "us". Solidarity in the case of political community does not arise out of direct interactions; political community exists as a community as long as there is an imagination that certain people are connected together.[5]

Still, to understand "political community" only in its "community" aspect is not sufficient. The "political" should be accounted for as well. There have been plenty of efforts in political science literature to provide the definitions of what is politics and what is political. I do not intend to argue for a particular conception of politics. Rather, I selectively discuss the argument against liberal conception of politics, and relate this argument to the idea that formal membership does not grasp the essence of political community.

The main argument against liberal conception of politics is that it omits the difference and antagonism. In their efforts to reason for the neutrality, liberals de-politicise politics, as neutrality refers to the ignorance of controversial views of the good life.[6] On the other hand, such a de-politicisation involves the consolidation of the domination of particular interests and particular identities. Consider, for example, the Rawlsian justification of principles of justice, which should govern any social arrangement or practice. Justification of these principles is achieved by reference to the decisions, which everyone would make under the "veil of ignorance", that is, under condition of ignorance of one's future status, identities and interests. In such a condition all individuals are essentially the same, reducible to each other. In essence, liberalism proposes to treat people

as if all were identical, and in such way it fails to recognise the divergent interests. Neutrality alone can grant neither pluralism nor personal autonomy; the latter are achieved only in the conditions of tolerance.[7] The conclusion can be drawn that formal membership is far from the way to ensure the recognition of particular interests. If we are to understand political community as a community (solidarity) of those who come together to articulate and to defend their different interests and identities, then it is certain that the definition of political community in terms of formal membership is not sufficient. The latter fails to account for two essential elements of political community: (1) commonality, and (2) difference.

Political community is not merely a normative ideal, it is also an empirical reality. As I have argued above, political community refers to the existence of common identity, of political "we". This political "we" is never stable and given, it is constantly negotiated in political discourse.[8]

"In political discourse's problem of "what shall we do?" the "we" is always called into question. Part of the issue becomes, if we pursue this or that course of action open to us, who could affirm it, who could regard it as done in his name? Who will still be with "us" if "we" take this course of action?"

If we agree that the constitution of political community is closely related to the content of binding decisions and politics of recognition, we should carefully re-examine the criteria of granting membership in political community. It is exactly the process of inclusion, understood in terms of recognition of difference, which I intend to analyse in detail. There are many different interests and identities, which may be silenced, or in other words, denied the membership, in negotiating the image of political community – gender, sexual orientation, black, ecological etc. This paper is concerned with nationality as a criterion of inclusion or exclusion from political community.

The salience of national identity in the constitution of a political community is widely acknowledged. This salience is grounded by the logic of popular sovereignty doctrine which is closely related to the ways political community (the people) is understood today.[9] According to B.Yack, "the people, it seems, is imagined *both* as existing prior to the state and as defined by the borders of an already constituted state, or if you prefer, as both a prepolitical and postpolitical community".[10] The boundaries of postpolitical community are derived from the boundaries of the state, to which it is subject and whose authority it is to control. The question of boundaries of prepolitical community is much more difficult to answer. It is for that reason that national and political communities tend to overlap, and that nationality becomes an important criterion in the constitution of political community.

But does this logical necessity to nationalise political community affects the actual political discourse and the actual processes of discursive construction of political community. This question will be addressed further in this paper, but before the main guidelines for an empirical analysis of political community construction should be drawn.

2. THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION

Political community is a discursive construct in terms of both solidarity and boundaries (or membership). This does not mean that discursive practices are the only sort of practices involved in the construction or challenge of bonds of solidarity with each other, but they definitely are the most important ones.[11] In this paper, I focus upon discursive practices in particular, and the ways the image of political community is constructed in Lithuanian political discourse.

The main data for an empirical analysis was gathered from the telecast debates organised in September-October 2000. The TV debates were organised as a forum for all parties and electoral coalitions participating in parliamentary elections.[12] Bellow I outline the main methodological guidelines for the discourse analysis of political community construction.

The construction of membership and bonds of solidarity involves the usage of the indexical pronoun "we". The employment of the pronoun "we" neutralises the opposition between "I" and "You", and this is the way in which solidarity is built.[13] But the indexicality of the pronoun "we" means that its meaning is not stable and depends on the context of discursive act. Both the context and the "traces" which every text contains help to disclose the meaning of any indexical term. Consider the following excerpt:

"It is a party whose purpose is to finally dissociate Lithuania from the influence of Eastern states. *We* are for a good business with Russia, but *we* are for European models, upon which European, Central and Eastern European countries base themselves. *We* are with those who have made at least one mistake in their life (...)"[14]

Who is "we" in this text? The first sentence already provides the answer – it is a party (as this is an excerpt from A.Vidžiūnas discourse, we can also know that "we" refers to the Homeland Union party). But it is not always the case that there is an explicit statement, which would help to find out the meaning of an indexical term "we":

"Lithuanians were provided by destiny with an extremely good place to live in the world. It is common to say that *we* are at crossroads, that *we* are

trampled down, and so on. Of course, there is no and never will be other place. But *we think* that *we* do not have to lament, but *we* have to use this situation with a maximum convenience and utility".

This is an excerpt from the presentation of the position of electoral coalition (Lithuanian Nationalist Union) by R.Smetona. The first two "we" in this excerpt refer to Lithuanians, as defined in the first sentence. Still, even if there are no traces we can firmly state that the third "we" (we think that) refers to Lithuanian Nationalist Union, not to Lithuanians in general. Such an interpretation is due to the fact that we have some habitus to accept which practical activities are relevant for what social groups. As P. Achard has put it, "there is a possible definition of social groups as discourse processes, in the sense that a range of practical activities are related to a discourse field in which there is a relatively stable "we" position presupposed".[15]

The context (the place, the time, the purpose of discourse) likewise plays an important role in defining the meaning of "we". In this paper, I analyse the material from TV debates organised as electoral campaign. The very logic of electoral campaign is to attract as many electors as possible, where the strategy of building solidarity is extremely important. Those with whom solidarity is striven for are those who are entitled to the right of election, and for that reason those who formally are the members of political community. If there is an address to "us", but not to "us" as a party, or as participants in the debates, then this address is to the citizens, the members of political community.

I have argued above in this article that political community should be accounted both in terms of solidarity and in terms of difference. The commonality does not necessarily overwrite the difference, but the very logic of any identity as relational (capable to exist only via opposition) means that some difference (or "enemy") is necessary in order to articulate a common identity. The existence of difference ("enemy") implies drawing a boundary between those who are included and those who are excluded. To summarise the argument of P. Achard, the use of an indexical pronoun "we" creates an open "we-space" without boundaries or with empty boundaries. The boundary is drawn only when there is an explicit reference to the "stranger" or "enemy".[16]

3. THE IMAGE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN LITHUANIA

Who is "we" in the political discourse in Lithuania? It is not an easy enterprise to summarise the image of political community, because such a summary would require provision of a logically consistent image of political community what is not necessarily the case in the actual articulation of political "we" in Lithuania.

The most articulated background of commonality is the state, its

institutions, laws and policies which are often described in terms of relationship of (common) property. Such terms as state, Lithuania, laws, decisions, production etc. in the discourse go together with a possessive pronoun "our".

The things which people own in common provide for the solidarity in a deeper sense. The subjection to the same state, its policies and laws, the living and producing together creates a common experience. The common and direct experience allows "sharing without explanation", because it shapes the meanings and provides with the assumption that everyone wish the same experience will understand in the same way. Just recall the word "Williams" or the expression "Who could deny", bringing with themselves the whole story, which may be unknown for a foreigner but definitely should be known for a compatriot. The political discourse is full of references to the fact that experience should be the same, as well as to the very experiences:

"We saw the rule by the Left and the Right, we saw what was the end of this rule …"

"The current elite, we see, made the independence of Lithuania their private business. And we invite to vote for us all those who feel that Lithuania in ten years has been made into a half-slave country."

"And when an enterprise in on the edge of bankruptcy, then it is attempted to be privatised, and is sold to different groups, often without any competition, as we see now."

"And not like now, so to say, as we run, destroy, hurry and loose everything".

The common experience upon which solidarity is built most often is related with the experience of the last ten years. The references to the Soviet occupation period or "older" times are rare, and even if they are made, they are still involved in the construction of political not national community.

The commonality is constructed by construction of common responsibility, as can be seen in the way critique on current situation and governmental decisions, is provided. In many situations the criticism of governmental decisions is done in the form: "Look, what *we* have done", not "Look, what *they* have done". This can be interpreted as a construction of solidarity via the construction of shared responsibility.

"*We thrust ourselves* into the West, but there are traditions, technologies, advertisement etc. *We refuse ourselves* eastern markets in fighting *as idiots* with Russia till now".

"First, how *we waste* money – for various pomp etc."

"If *we do not know* where we go, what we want, *how can we administer* budget and the things like that".

The ways European integration experience is conceptualised can provide more "information" about the bonds which keep political community together. Anti-Europeanism in Lithuania rests mainly on the idea that the affairs of the community should be managed by itself. "Anti-Europeans" articulate the image of "us" where "we" should have the final say on our own affairs. This image could be inferred from the ways European integration experience is constructed. "Anti-Europeans" claim that "we abase ourselves", "we look to the West with a bowed head", "we capitulate unconditionally", "it is not for Europe to dictate Lithuania what to do" etc. They often construct the imperative not to "abase ourselves". If we look at the ways the metaphor used to describe European integration of Lithuania - "to go to Europe" - is used by "anti-Europeans", we find the same picture. A real disapproval sounds in expressions "these parties lead, pull us to the West or Europe". The words "lead", "pull" refer to something, which goes on against our will.

Such an argumentation of "anti-Europeans" sets a context for "pro-Europeans". The latter try to reply in terms of the advantage in being a member of the EU. In general their reply does not differ substantially from the "anti-Europeans" positions as they all agree that Lithuania should become a member due to economic and security reasons, to appear so to say on "the other side of the fence" where the money, the support, etc. is. The "pro-Europeans" neither challenge nor support the image of a nation where "we" are the deciding ones on our affairs. Their underlying assumption is that membership in the EU is justified in purely economic terms. If something is useful for "us", so this something is what "we" want. The picture changes if we start to analyse the speeches by pro-Europeans in the situations when there are no opponents to the EU integration. (When participants in a TV debate are those who all agree with the need to integrate). The European community, whose institutional expression is the EU, is a community of equals, according to the image of pro-Europeans. Lithuanian national community should strive to become a member of this community of equals, to put in the expressions used so widely not only in the debates under analysis, but in many other contexts "Lithuania should become a part of Europe in full value", "equal in rights member of Europe". Otherwise Lithuania will become even "more provincial", "even further than Romania or Africa". Pride is an important element in a person's relationship with his community, and this element is employed in the construction of the image of national community in the context of European integration. We should become members of EU in order to be respected, not the other way round: we should not try so hard to become members of EU because in this way we loose the self-respect. Whatever is the position towards the EU, it finally is motivated by the need to be independent in terms of deciding and managing one's own affairs (which in some sense is to be responsible for what is going on).

As long as the solidarity of political community is constructed by reference to the state, the commonness of experience and purposes as well as to the shared responsibility, it may seem that nationality does not play any role in assigning membership. Political community is confined within the boundaries of the state, and Lithuanianness alone is not a sufficient basis to be included into a political community. This can be illustrated by the negotiation of the membership in the political community between K.Bobelis and the rest of the audience in TV debates:

Participant in TV debates: "Maybe it is necessary to turn to the West, maybe it would be better for Lithuania if *Lithuanians from abroad* headed not only the President Office, but the Seimas and the Government as well?

{…}

R.Musnickas: "Should *we import more American Lithuanians*?"

K.Bobelis: "Every Lithuanian is a Lithuanian, it does not matter where he lives. And if *a Lithuanian who lives in Australia, America, Canada* can contribute to a better life of Lithuania, he has to be accepted, honoured, and he *could participate here, in order to pass his experience in the West to us*. And I think it is very useful. We should not categorise a Lithuanian according to the place where he lives. We all are Lithuanians, we all are brothers, we all fight for a free Lithuania, and now we all have to make efforts to improve Lithuania's life".

This passage is illustrative as it provides an example of the fact that to be a member of national community is not a sufficient ground to be included into a political community. "Other" Lithuanians are denied the right to decide and to share responsibility and their attempts to do this are refused with disdain ("Because the advises of EU and these our good Americans, I do not mean mister Bobelis, showed how good is our life."). What matters is the place of living, not nationality. The attempts by K.Bobelis to challenge such an image of the political community and to negotiate for the inclusion of all Lithuanians into it, in result is just another maintenance of the dominating image. Though himself an American Lithuanian, K.Bobelis speaks of "here" and "us" in a way which excludes the Lithuanians from abroad from the membership in the political community. An American Lithuanian "has to be accepted" but under definite conditions (if he can contribute to a better life), not because he is a Lithuanian.

On the other hand, the fact of silence about nationality as a criterion of inclusion does not mean that it is not an important basis for membership in political community. An actual inclusion into a political community requires the acknowledgement of difference in interests and identities, in this case, of different national identities. Social practices which go unreflected may be the most powerful way of exclusion. Their power may be conceived when reflection appears and

when the reflection becomes a basis for challenge of these practices, as in the case where the Polish challenged the practice of one official language.

It is not an easy enterprise to evaluate the impact of official language in the construction of the image of political community. A single "linguistic community" is necessarily the product of political domination, and the dominance of an official language rests on the denial of other languages and dialects.[17] Any language policy raise the problem of public recognition, where the public recognition of a language means that it is possible to access public service and conduct public business in that language. The recognition of minorities language is necessary if we are to promote different identities, but on the other hand, there are strong arguments against the public recognition of a minorities language as well. These arguments can be summarised under the label of language rationalisation, necessary if efficient communication has to be ensured.[18]

The TV debates, where representatives of political parties and electoral coalitions addressed the audience in order to elicit their political positions, were conducted in Lithuanian language. In such context, the "we" inescapably excludes those who can not communicate in Lithuanian, and limits the membership in political community to those only who speak Lithuanian. It can be argued that the representatives of the Polish Electoral Action intended to challenge this image of political community when addressing (greeting) the audience not only in Lithuanian, but in Polish as well. To start a speech by greeting in two languages could mean the affirmation of the existence of at least two national groups within one political community as well as it could mean the challenge of the image of political community confined to one national group. Of course, such interpretation may seem superficial but it can be supported by a reference to other practices, as will be shown bellow.

The exclusion of national minorities from political community appears not only at the level of unreflected social practices, but on the level of discursive practices as well. There is a general trend to address the Polish as outsiders of Lithuanian political community, the trend challenged by the Polish in their efforts to negotiate the membership in the political community.

A.Siaurusevičius: "What has determined your decision? Is it finally a decision which is made by you, Lithuanian Polish, yourselves and springing from inside, or is it that Poland has an influence on it?

T.Filipovič: "We all know, we read the press, listen to television, radio, who is our strategic partner, who is one of the main supporters for Lithuania's membership in NATO. (…) In the USA the Polish society is also very important, they also support these our purposes here in Lithuania. (…) well, I live in Lithuania, but we read the press, television, listen to discussions. There are (in

Poland) certain problems related with the membership in the EU, as we all know".

The words of A.Siaurusevičius repeat the general mood of addressing the Polish – it is the mood of suspicion in non-loyalty towards Lithuanian political community ("what actions have Polish prepared for Lithuania?"). The Polish representatives reply with efforts to construct and maintain the feeling of solidarity by using of the indexical term "we" of which the meaning is clearly articulated – we, who live in Lithuania, we here, we all know, "we should be patient", "… our privatisation looks like this – we hurry and make many mistakes, which sometimes are even very harmful".

Though political community in Lithuania is bounded together by the experience of the subjection to the same authority, and national identity does not play an important role in creating the feeling of solidarity, national identity is still important in making boundaries of political community. There exist practices of non-recognition of different national identities, as can be seen from the ways Polish are addressed in the political discourse in the construction of the political community in Lithuania.

CONCLUSIONS

The main argument in this paper was that the formal entitlement with the rights of citizenship is not a sufficient basis for the membership in political community. Political community is a term to designate the commonality which overcomes the particular interests and identities without denying them. An actual membership in political community involves the acknowledgement of difference of those aspiring for membership. To acknowledge the difference between the interests of the country and the city is to include both those who live in countryside and those who live in the towns.

Political community is a collective identity constructed and negotiated in political discourse. The discourse analysis provides for the possibilities to find out the criteria which play an important role in ascribing or denying the membership in political community. Based on the analysis of political discourse in Lithuania, this paper aimed to evaluate the salience of nationality as a criterion of membership in Lithuanian political community. As this analysis has revealed, the political community is based on the commonality of experience of living under the authority of the same state and on the commonality of responsibility for the decisions and policies of the same state.

Nationality plays an ambiguous role in the construction of the image of political community. On the one hand, it is definitely an unimportant criterion of membership, as it is in the case of American Lithuanians. Not Lithuanianness, but living together, which creates common experience and shared responsibility, is

what makes a person a member in political community. On the other hand, nationality seems to be a salient factor in determining the membership. The Polish are treated as "outsiders" just because, or as far as, they try to articulate their different national identity. The complaints about low support for Polish secondary schools, for example, may sound different then if interpreted as a result of exclusion from political community, which is also a result of non-recognition politics.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] See J.Linz, A.Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 408-424.

[2] See Ch.Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community", in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, ed. by Ch.Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 225-239.

[3] Ch.Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship", p. 231.

[4] Ch.Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship", p. 233.

[5] See B.Yack, "Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism", *Political Theory*, 29(4) (2001), pp. 520-521.

[6] See Ch.Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 135-144.

[7] See J.Raz, "Liberalizmas, autonomija ir neutralaus rūpinimosi politika", in *Šiuolaikinė politinė filosofija. Antologija*, ed. by J.Kis (Vilnius: Pradai, 1998), pp. 381-246.

[8] H.Pitkin, quoted in M.Passerin d'Entreves, "Hannah Arendt and the Idea of Citizenship", in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, ed. by Ch.Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), p. 158.

[9] This argument is developed in B.Yack, "Popular sovereignty".

[10] B.Yack, "Popular sovereignty", p. 523.

[11] See P.McIlveny, "Popular public discourse at Speakers' Corner: negotiating cultural identities in interaction", *Discourse & Society*, 7(1) (1996), p. 18.

[12] The video-records of the TV debates is accessible on the Internet, address: http://www.lrs.lt/n/rinkimai/20001008/rec_ltv.htm

[13] See P.Achard, "Discourse and Social Praxis in the construction of nation and state", *Discourse & Society*, 4(1) (1993), p. 77.

[14] All the excerpts, quoted in this paper, are from the video record of pre-electoral TV debates, internet address: http://www.lrs.lt/n/rinkimai/20001008/rec_ltv.htm

[15] P.Achard, "Discourse and social praxis", p. 77.

[16] See P.Achard, "Discourse and social praxis", p. 78-80.

[17] See P.Bourdieu, "The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language", in P.Bourdieu, *Language & Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 43-65.

[18] See A.Patten, "Political Theory and Language Policy", *Political Theory*, 29(5) (2001), p. 692.

ELECTIONS TO THE SEIMAS 2000: PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION OR ITS TRANSFORMATION?

Jūratė Novagrockienė

There is an express difference between the elections to the councils of local self-governments and to the Seimas of the year 2000, and the previously held elections, which is expressed both in their results and the situation in regard to the party system and the society. Two years heretofore, the former leader of the Centre Union Romualdas Ozolas already spoke about a breakdown of the party system. Political scientists and sociologists also discussed and forecast possible changes in the party alignment, in particular related with the abolition of the second round of elections in single-member constituencies. In other words, premonitions of evolving prerequisites for change on the Lithuanian political map were already felt quite a while ago. Nevertheless, the assessment of the election outcome per se is far from unanimous. Some political scientists argue that the latest parliamentary election did not introduce any radical changes, however, there also exists another attitude towards this election which terms it as being critical, or at least possessing features of this category.

This article does not attempt to present an exhaustive answer to the question of whether the results of the elections to the Seimas 2000 indicate a turning point in the development of the Lithuanian party system, as that would be a premature conclusion. The purpose of this work is to analyse the reasons for the new realignment of the political forces, and, at least to some extent, assess the ensuing situation from the perspective of the party system development. I would, therefore, start with the analysis of such categories as party system evolution and transformation, as well as the notion of critical election.

In trying to determine whether a party system is undergoing evolution or transformation, i.e. radical change, it is necessary to remember that for over forty years Western political scientists have been involved in the discussion of this issue in analysing party system dynamics in the Western Europe. The hypothesis of Seymur Lipset and Stein Rokkan that Western party systems remained stable – "frozen" – in the period between the beginning of the 20th

century and the sixties due to the strong allegiance of groups of voters to the relevant political parties, started to be questioned in the sixties and seventies. Their principal conclusion was that the traditional parties of that time were sufficiently autonomous and capable of governing the party supply market by limiting the entrance of new parties to the party system.[1] However, the impact of significant economic, social, demographic change and the increasing geographic mobility conditioned new political problems, the emergence of new parties (e.g. ecological), and the increase of voting volatility. "Parties found themselves faced with the necessity to make strategic choices between older and newer social cleavages. They engage in rival attempts to politicize those that are most favourable to them, and in this context they are neither passive agents nor free actors."[2] In other words, with the change of the society and the generations of voters in the Western democracies, the parties and party systems became subjected to other forces which reduced the social-ideological allegiance of voters to relevant parties, while the party supply-demand market became less manageable.

Nevertheless, a long-term comparative analysis of party systems revealed that the party systems did not experience equally radical change in all countries, they underwent a gradual transformation. Moreover, a conclusion was reached that, in order to evaluate the range and depth of party system change, a greater number of elections and relevant indicators of change were necessary.

According to P. Mair, one of appropriate measures of party system change is M.Pedersen's index of volatility, which enables to determine the number of critical elections.[3] For example, the elections in Italy (1976), Denmark (1973) and Norway (1975) were considered to be critical, as there occurred a sudden party system change. The changes of the party system, however, are not of equal significance and the transformation is not always immediately evident, therefore, it is important to determine the levels and types of change.[4]

Gordon Smith distinguishes for categories in party system change: temporary fluctuations, restricted change, general change and transformation.[5]

Temporary fluctuations are characterised by the emergence of a certain, one or another new feature in the party system, which is short-lived and may soon disappear. G. Smith states that it is very difficult to determine which feature may be considered temporary. As an example, he indicates a possible emergence of a new party and its fast decline without materially altering the party system itself. Polarisation can likewise be a transient feature if there is an express difference in the attitudes of the parties towards some political issue. Temporary fluctuations may also predict a permanent change, though more time is necessary for their assessment.

A restricted change may extend over a long period, though without altering the format of the party system itself. A change of this type is a formation of

new parties that are able to supersede old traditional parties. Voting volatility or polarisation may also increase, though if such changes act autonomously, they do not alter the party system itself.

A general change occurs at the moment when several of the above-mentioned changes take place at the same time or follow on quickly, thus creating unstable situation, since before a new equilibrium is established in the alignment of party powers in the system. In this situation, it is most difficult to determine which factors are independent in some circumstances, i.e. restricted, and which, in different situations, are interrelated, i.e. have a systemic impact. For example, an increase in the number of parties may have a potential for general change, but it may also remain latent.[6]

A general change does not necessarily mean an essential change in the party system itself, though it may be instrumental for the system transformation. Party system transformation is possible under extreme conditions, i.e. following the collapse of one or another regime, and the party system from the multiparty turning into a one-party system, or vice versa. Another possible alternative is when one central feature of the party system undergoes a radical change with the ensuing actual change of the whole party system. The emergence of catch-all parties, which has practically changed the character of the West European inter-party competition, may be considered as an example of such a system-affecting factor.

According to A. Smith, for the determination of the level of change, it is necessary to build a working model which would include the following:

"(a) a rating or assessment of the party system in respect of its main defining features: number/relative size, polarisation, volatility, government/opposition, concentration/deconcentration;

(b) a specification of the key "regulatory" factors affecting the functioning of the system (of an institutional nature, but possibly referring also to aspects of political culture);

(c) the identification of what may be termed as "core element" of the party system, that is, the feature or parts of the system which are most immune to change and which provide a significant continuity."[7]

A fundamental question is to what extent and how adequately this model can be applied for measuring the party system development in Lithuania. The essential tendencies of the party system, typical to the period between 1992 and 1996, was a decrease in the party system polarisation and an increase in its fragmentation. First of all, the fragmentation encouraged voting volatility, i.e. fluctuation of the electorate. On the other hand, it did not affect the fragmentation of the Parliament (Seimas). However, the interrelation of voting volatility and party fragmentation caused a continuous increase in the percentage

of unrepresented votes. In 1996 almost 36 per cent of the votes were cast for the parties which failed to overcome the 5 per cent threshold. The calculation of this index according to the results of the 2000 election has revealed that now this ratio has fallen to 23.6 per cent. A continuos increase in the party supply in this election managed to some extent satisfy the demand of the undecided voters.

Voting volatility, closely related with other features of the party system, is in general characteristic to all post-communist party systems. It was not possible for the party support to acquire stability within a decade of the restored independence primarily due to the characteristics of the transitional regime, fragility of the new political institutions, rapidly changing values and unstable socio-economic situation. Nevertheless, it is possible to state that voting volatility is one of the most prominent features of the Seimas elections 2000, the outcome of which makes it possible to determine this election as critical.

Critical elections mean that there is a change in the alignment of political parties, brought about by the realignment of voter support extended to the parties. According to James Sundquist, one of the initiators of the support realignment analysis, certain voting variations are typical to all elections, as the voter is influenced by such transient factors as the attractiveness of the candidate, topicality of the problem, or the voter does not like a particular candidate of the party for which he used to vote. Where the choice of the voter crosses the party line on account of the current moment, it means only a temporary deviation. When the number of such deviations is so significant that the whole election seems to have departed from the norm, they are critical.[8]

The elections are considered to be critical where the redistribution of support results in a change of the party system format, and the new path of party interaction is lasting. "The format of the electoral party system can be described in terms of the number of parties contesting the elections, and the distribution of electoral strength among these parties."[9]

The main traditional parties in the context of Lithuania – Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives (HU/LC), Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) and Lithuanian Centre Union (CU) – lost respectively 20.18, 6.84 and 5.38 per cent of voter support in comparison with the 1996 election results (Table 1). The two latter parties failed to overcome the 5 per cent electoral threshold.

On the other hand, there emerged two new attractive parties which took over the voter support mainly from the centre and right parties. They are the New Union (Social Liberals) (NU) and the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU), which received 19.64 and 17.25 per cent of votes, and 29 and 34 mandates respectively (Table 3).

Table 1. **Voting volatility, 1996–2000**

Party	2000		1996		Received more/ fewer votes	Electoral volatility*
A. Brazauskas Socialdemocratic Coalition New Democratic Party (NDP)/former Women's Party (WP)	Number of votes	%	Number of votes	%	+235701	+16.12
	457294	31.08	LDLP/130837 LSDP/90756 LRU/22395 WP/50494	9.52 6.60 1.63 3.67		
NU (Social Liberals)	288895	19.64	-	-	288895	+19.64
LLU	253823	17.25	25279	1.84	+228544	+15.41
HU/LC	126850	8.62	409585	29.8	-386900	-20.18
LCU	42030	2.86	113333	8.24	-71303	-5.38
Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	61583	4.19	42346	3.08	+19237	-1.11
Lithuanian Peasants' Party (LPP)	60040	4.08	22826	1.66	+37214	+2.4
LCDP	45227	3.07	136259	9.91	-91032	-6.84
Moderate Conservative Union (MCU)	29615	2.01			-	+2.01
Lithuanian Poles Electoral Action (LPEA)	28641	1.95	40941	2.98	-12300	-1.03
Freedom Union (FU)	18622	1.27	20511	1.49	-1889	0.22
"Young Lithuania" (YL)	16941	1.15	52423	3.81	-35482	-2.66
Aggregated volatility**						46.5

* Voting volatility is determined according to the formula $\Delta p_{i,t} = p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}$

** Aggregated volatility is determined according to the formula $V_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |\Delta p_{i,t}| / 2$

Source: Central Electoral Committee data

In fact, all the parties were affected by the electorate realignment. The results of the opinion survey[10] carried out after the election permit to state that in this election there occurred general electorate realignment. (Table 2). Some of the former electorate of the rightwing parties, together with the fluctuating part of the electorate, transferred their support practically to all their rivals. The former Central Union (CU) voters were now more favourably disposed to the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU) and the New Union (NU), and the Lithuanian Liberal Union was now preferred by the former Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party voters and some of the citizens who formerly failed to turn up at the elections in general. It is evident that the Lithuanian Liberal Union now enjoys the support of the former voters of the Central Union and the Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives (HU/LC) (10% and 17%), while the New Union is supported by the former voters of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) (18 %). The electorate of the HU/LC traditionally remained the most stable: 88 per cent of those who voted for this party in 1996 cast their ballot for the same party in 2000 as well. The Lithuanian Democratic

Labour Party (LDLP) retained 41 per cent of its electorate. An interesting fact is that Algirdas Brazauskas Socialdemocratic Coalition took away 4 per cent of voters from the HU/LC.

The aggregate volatility of the 2000 elections reaches 46,5 per cent, while the analysis of thirteen Western party systems, carried out in the period between 1948 and 1977, established that the highest volatility, which was registered in France, amounted only to 16.8 percent[11], and the highest aggregate volatility, determined in the countries of Central Europe in 1991-1993, was in Poland – 35.52 per cent.[12] It could be stated that the high electoral volatility in Lithuanian has directly affected the party system format. Out of the five parties that managed to overcome the electoral threshold in 1996, in the latest Seimas election there remained only three, where the LDLP and Lithuanian Socialdemocratic Party (LSDP) formed a single Socialdemocratic Party with 31.91 seats in the Seimas, while the HU/LC retained only 6.4 per cent of seats at the Seimas instead of almost 50 per cent of those held previously. The number of mandates received by the New Union (Social Liberals) and the Lithuanian Liberal Union, which for the first time managed to climb over the electoral barrier, taken together account for 44.68 per cent of the total number of seats at the Seimas. In other words, in the current Lithuanian parliament there act three mainstream parties. As concerns the HU/LC, it can hardly be considered a mainstream party due to its insignificant number of mandates.

P.Mair, however, notes the differences between the aggregated and inter-area volatility, which indicates the fluctuation of support given to the main blocks of the parties in opposition to one another. In all the analysed party systems, the aggregated volatility exceeds the inter-area volatility, though, in his opinion, "the contrast between the two types of volatility does not afford us the opportunity to measure the extent to which political continuity may exist despite substantial aggregate electoral change"[13].

Table 2. Votes received by parties in the Seimas elections of 1996 and 2000

Votes received by parties in 2000	Votes received by parties in 1996 (%)						
	HU/LC	LDLP	LSDP	LCU	LCDP	Did not vote	Do not remember
HU/LC	88	0	0	12	0	0	0
NU (Social Liberals)	15	18	4	6	0	14	39
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU)	17	7	8	10	3	10	19
Socialdemocratic Coalition	4	41	14	6	3	13	17

If the main opposition parties in Lithuania are the left (LDLP and LSDP) and the right (HU/LC and LCDP) parties, then their electoral volatility amounts to (20.18+6.84+14.96) 21 percent, i.e., it is twice lower than the aggregated volatility. These volatility differences, in P.Mair's opinion, may help to determine the location and the extent of change. Inter-area change may involve the very dynamics of the party system itself and a within-area change – a displacement of one party by another.[14]

Table 3. Self-identification on the left-right scale in June 1999

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.7	1.7	6.1	5.3	27.6	3.8	5.4	3.2	3.1
14.8					15.5			

42.3% fail to identify themselves on the left-right scale. Mean: 5.13.

It is evident, in respect of the localisation of party system changes, that the greatest shifts occurred in the centre of the left-right scale. The calculation of the volatility of the centre block shows it to be 40.43 percent. The defeat of the Centre Union is directly related with the victory of the NU and the LLU. These two parties represent a qualitatively new centre, the first – on the left, and the second – on the right, and consistently correspond to the data of the citizens' self-identification on the left-right scale.

In the 1999 analysis of political culture, the respondents were asked to identify themselves on the 1to 9 point scale, where 1 indicated "extreme left", and 9 – "extreme right" (Table 3). 42.3 per cent of the citizens were not able to identify themselves; 27.6 per cent identified with the centre (5 points); 11.4 per cent with the centre left; 9.2 per cent with the centre right; 1.7 per cent – with the marginal left; and 3.1 per cent –with the marginal right. On the other hand, there can be observed an interesting assessment of the New Union (NU). The NU is considered to be more left than the Lithuanian Socialdemocratic Party (LSDP), while the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU) is assessed as a centre right party. The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) is considered to be the most extreme left, while the Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives (HU/LC) – the most extreme right. In comparison with the 1996 survey, the number of people who considered themselves right-winged, decreased from 39.1 to 15.5 percent, while the numbers of those who saw themselves as the left increased from 8.7 to 14.8 percent. In other words, the distribution of votes in the election reflects the changes in the orientation of people (Table 4 and Graph 1).

Table 4. **Public assessment of parties as left-right on the –10 +10 scale in 1994, 1996, and in 1999 (1–9 scale)**

Party	LDLP	NU (Soclib.)	LSDP	CU	Lib.Union	LCDP	HU/LC
1994	-6.05	-	-1.47	1.13	0.82	5.5	6.61
1996	-7.17	-	-0.99	1.92	2.91	6.91	8.06
1999*	3.07	4.27	4.47	5.01	4.99	6.62	7.16

Source: Report of the Survey on Lithuanian Political Culture, V., 1994, P.34; Data of the December 1996 opinion survey: Seimas Elections'96. Analysis of Electoral Behaviour. Report. V., Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University (IIRPS VU), 1997. P.11.

Analysis of Political Culture carried out by the Social Information Centre (SIC) and IIRPS VU in June 1999.

** "Left" and "right" is assessed on 1 to 9 scale.*

However, contrary to the assessment presented in the media and at the time of the electoral campaign, the content analysis of the Lithuanian Liberal Union and the New Union programmes, performed by Algis Krupavičius[15] indicates that the attitudes both in the NU and the LLU political programmes coincide in a number of parameters (attitudes towards freedom, justice and equality), and are considerably closer than, for instance, the programmes of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) and the New Union (NU). The ideology of social liberalism, pursued by the New Union, already in itself attracts a certain degree of favouritism towards the political niche of this party.

It is necessary to note that a great impact on the outcome of the election was produced by one of the institutional factors – the elimination of the second election round in single-member constituencies. It turned to be a case of miscalculation on the part of the conservatives who initiated the relevant amendment in the Law on Elections to the Seimas. The consequence of this amendment was an increase of party fragmentation in the Parliament. Multiplication of political parties outside the Parliament, or emergence of new parties before the elections, was limited by a considerably high threshold of 5 per cent for parties and 7 per cent for coalitions in accordance with the proportional representation system in the Seimas elections. In this election, the limiting capability of the mixed electoral system decreased. In the current Seimas there work from 1 to 4 representatives of twenty parties. There were 11 parties represented in the Seimas of the 1996 election.

On the other hand, there were lists of 10 parties and coalitions participating in the 2000 Seimas elections, while in 1996 the number was 24. The Modern Christian Democratic Party (MCDP), that split off before the election, the Union of ex-Political Prisoners and Deportees, the National Progress Party, the New Democracy Party, the Russians Union, participated in the election within the lists of other parties or nominated their candidates only in the single-member

constituencies. Nevertheless, the index of parliamentary fragmentation, as calculated by Alvydas Lukošaitis, increased from 3.2 up to 6.2, i.e. – it doubled. The fragmentation and electoral volatility tendencies determined the establishment of a qualitatively new feature in the party politics of Lithuania – coalition politics, which, in essence, leads to instability and the increase of influence of small parties. The formation of the ruling coalition and the work in the Seimas coalition show that the political blackmailing potential of the small parties is increasing. Under these circumstances, the small parties may, in one way or another, exert influence over the decisions of the ruling coalition, or paralyse the decision-making process in general, though the facility of this process basically depends on the ability of the key coalition partners to ensure accord and find compromises.

Graph 1. **Distribution of votes in the Seimas elections**



The ability of the older parties to adapt to the changing party environment also reflects the changes in the party system development, though not all of them are believed to be lasting.

Firstly, the right parties mainly became victims of their inner disagreements, ambitions of their leaders and split-ups, which entirely weakened the traditional right wing of the party system – Christian Democrats and Lithuanian Conservatives. Consequently, that directly affected the right-oriented electorate and increased their volatility.

Secondly, the election results in general indicate the decrease in the support for the marginal parties (Table 5). Even the Freedom Union (FU) received fewer votes in the 2000 Seimas elections than it did in 1996 (true, only by 0.25 per cent), despite its successful participation in the March 2000 local election. These seemingly insignificant indications, together with the landslide defeat of the CU, suggest that in general those parties which were established it the period of Sąjūdis – national revival movement – are loosing electoral support. It could be believed that the main cause is disappointment in the leaders of these parties, as well as the inability of these leaders to adequately evaluate the changed circumstances, though the success of the A. Brazauskas Socialdemocratic Coalition seams to challenge this attitude.

It is possible to maintain that these parties had some advantage primarily because they were in opposition, as well as due to their

communicative abilities and the popularity of Algirdas Brazauskas. An objective factor, which determined their electoral success, was the aggravation of the economic situation facilitating to the increase of the Socialdemocratic party electoral potential.

Table 5. **Distribution of votes and mandates in the Seimas elections of 1996 and 2000**

Party/coalition		1996		2000	
		Per cent of votes (multi-mandate district)	Number of mandates	Per cent of votes (multi-mandate district)	Number of mandates (total)
A. Brazauskas Socialdemocratic Coalition*	LDLP	9.51	10/2=12	31.08	27
	LSDP	9.52	7/5=12		18
New Union (Social Liberals)				19.64	29
Lithuanian Liberal Union		1.86	0/1	17.25	34
HU/LC		29.79	33/37=70	8.26	9
LCDP		9.91	11/5=16	3.07	2
Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action (LPEA)		3.01	0/1	1.95	2
Lithuanian Freedom Union		1.50	0	1.27	1
Lithuanian Centre Union		8.13	9/4=13	2.86	
Christian Democratic Party		3.08	0/1	4.19	1
"Young Lithuania",		3.82	0/1	1.15	1
Party of National Progress		0.90	0	0.29	0
New Democracy/ (Women Party)		3.68	0/1	1.03	3
Lithuanian Peasants' Party		1.68	0/1	4.08	4
Russians Union		1.64	0	-	3

* The list of A. Brazauskas Coalition includes LDLP, LSDP, National Democratic Party (NDP) and Lithuanian Russians Union, which respectively received 13, 11, 1 and 3 seats in the Seimas.

The most difficult task is to evaluate those features of a party system which ensure its continuity. It could be believed that to some extent such features are the ability of the united LSDP and the HU/LC to maintain their positions in the Parliament, and to consistently preserve their mutual balance: in every second elections the HU/LC gains fewer seats while the former LDLP wins more, and vice versa. The relevant defeat of the conservatives in the current elections does not necessarily mean that this party has withered away.

On the other hand, the character of competition between these parties has changed. There has been a transition from the rivalry between two dominating party blocks to the emergence of third parties and the formation of coalition relationship. Nevertheless, in order to determine whether it is a transient or a permanent feature, it is necessary to have more data.

The characteristics of the incumbent parties, the New Union (NU) and the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU), are different irrespective of their equal status – participation in the coalition government. The NU fully conforms to and was organised according to A. Downs's model of a rational party aimed at winning an election. It has successfully achieved its goal. However, the NU came to power as a group of very different people who are more concerned about their personal interests and are not much knowledgeable about party discipline or joint action in normal circumstances, i.e. not during the electoral battle. In other words, the New Union is not a party prepared to govern. Besides, the foundation of its attractiveness lies not in ideology but in its leader Artūras Paulauskas, therefore, its future prospects are obscure.

It is obvious that A.Paulauskas will seek the post of the President. For the party, it would be more advantageous if he failed to win the coming presidential election, as it does not have any alternative to the present leader. In this case, the party may be expected to gradually loose its political potential. Equally disadvantageous for the NU is its identification with the centre left, as most of its attitudes appeal to, and therefore compete for, the electorate of the unified Lithuanian Socialdemocratic Party (LSDP). The participation of the NU in the coalition with the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU) to some extent even facilitates to the consolidation of the leftist electorate for the benefit of the LSDP, while encouraging the more moderate voters to look for more attractive parties on the right from the centre, as the NU will in essence fail to fulfil its electoral promises. It has found itself in a political stalemate, as it is not able to control its faction members or to agree with the coalition partner the LLU in decision-making. Therefore, a political crisis is evolving and its consequences will be painful both for the Liberal Union and the New Union.

If A.Paulauskas fails to win the presidential election, the NU will have more prospects to survive longer, though it is hardly likely to win as many votes in the nearest election as it did in the 2000 Seimas elections. Having lost their leader, the Socialdemocrats may stumble over the 5 per cent barrier. Moreover, it is obvious that the political orientation of the NU members is extremely diverse. Therefore, its members may be expected to defect both to the right and the left parties, which would undermine the party position even further.

The Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU) could be attributed to the family of traditional parties, with clear ideology being their distinguishing feature. It possesses a more substantial organisational achievement, a greater number of prominent leaders, and is better prepared to work in office. Still, it lacks experience and the will power to embark on resolute reforms. Therefore, its fate is also obscure. It has more prospects for overcoming the 5 per cent barrier in the forthcoming Seimas elections, as it has taken the centre-right niche on

the Lithuanian left-right scale, i.e. it may target both at the moderate right-oriented electorate and the former Central Union partisans. Furthermore, the right-wing parties are at present factional and not eager to employ any new tactics, while the CU needs much effort to regain its lost position.

On the other hand, the Liberals may experience the fate of a number of other parties with two equal leaders. The dissent between the two leaders Eugenijus Gentvilas and Rolandas Paksas enhances the risk of inner conflict in the LLU. The friction between the leaders within the party encourages inner party fragmentation which, as illustrated by the experience of the Conservative and the Christian Democratic Parties, leads to party cleavage. Therefore, the future of the Lithuanian Liberal Union will depend on its ability to resolve the internal problems.

Conclusions

The previously observed tendencies in the party system development were fully revealed in the 2000 Seimas election. The continuously increasing party fragmentation outside the Parliament, which, prior to the 2000 elections, failed to produce any major impact on the Parliament fragmentation, has gradually become the most prominent feature of the Lithuanian party system development.

The increasing voting volatility, in connection with the party fragmentation, determined the change of the party system format in the aftermath of the 2000 elections. The New Union (NU) and the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU), the modern left centre and centre right parties, replaced the traditional parties of the Lithuanian context – the Centre Union (CU) and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LCDP). It is a qualitatively new change, as the coalitional politics is expected to survive after the forthcoming elections as well. Therefore, much will depend on the ability of the parties to adapt to the new situation and their capability to successfully employ the factors that determine the choice of voters.

The further course in the political system development will basically depend on the conduct of the right parties and the CU, as their principal goal is to regain the lost voters and to attract those undecided. In this respect, undoubtedly, the decisive factor will be their participation in the presidential election and its outcome. In this case the salience of the New Union and the Lithuanian Liberal Union could be viewed as a temporary phenomenon.

Nevertheless, it is also possible to expect a victory of the Socialdemocratic Party in the next Seimas elections, in the eventuality of neither a centre nor any right party individually or in a coalition, being able to form a political counterbalance to it.

The essential questions are still to be answered – whether the elections in question were really critical, and whether the shift in the party balance is a transient feature. Is the outcome of the 2000 elections just a feature of the inadequately institutionalised party system, or is it a new stage in the Lithuanian party system development? The next parliamentary elections will undoubtedly help to answer these questions.

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RUSSIA'S MILITARY REFORM: POLITICAL TRAJECTORIES

Raimundas Lopata, Česlovas Laurinavičius

INTRODUCTION

Russia's state and identity crisis that commenced with the end of the Cold War has inevitably touched the military of the country.

Military reform has been discussed over the last decade in Russia with decidedly mixed results. In practice, reform has primarily meant further cuts in the size of the armed forces (from 5.1 million to 1.2) with some moderate organizational changes. Reform under Pavel Grachev (1992-1996) basically amounted to a gradual hollowing out of the military structure inherited from the Soviet Union. The army was cut but not reformed. Igor Rodionov's tenure (1996-1997) was marked mainly by his increasingly strident complaints of the meagre finances availably to the army and advocated preparations for theatre-wide conventional war with NATO. The most significant steps toward not just a smaller but also restructured military have taken place under Igor Sergeyev (1997-2001). Further cuts were enacted in a more logical fashion - assembling of a small number of "permanent readiness" divisions was started, it was tried to integrate all components of strategic deterrence under one command and to reduce the number of military districts[1].

However, several factors were major in the trajectory of the military development: the Kosovo crisis, the second Chechnya War and *the Kursk* catastrophe.

Russia in response to NATO operation in Kosovo laid a new emphasis on nuclear deterrence, which should compensate for the weakness of conventional forces. At the meeting of Russia's Security Council on 29 April 1999, there were prepared three secret decrees. One of them allegedly prescribed development of new tactical weapons. Neither the content of those decrees nor their implementation has become known[2]. Nevertheless, the military manoeuvres in Kaliningrad that imitated the scenarios of "de-escalation" mission spoke for themselves (Russia's military doctrine signed in April 2000 confirmed this)[3].

In 1999 reactivated use of the Armed Forces in Chechnya determined preconditions for the authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin and for the emergence of a hypertrophied status of the military. In every public speech in early 2000, acting President Vladimir Putin reiterated the key message: "The Army has regained trust in itself and society believes in and trusts its Army"[4]. At this juncture the situation could end up with the formation of the military authoritarianism.

However, in 2000 *the Kursk* catastrophe brought the public attention to the disastrous deterioration of the military. Without any doubts the accident had a huge impact on Putin's authority as well as on a presumable model of the military authoritarianism. The urgent need to restructure and reorganise the whole military system was confirmed during a series of the meetings of the Security Council during autumn 2000[5]. Thereby Putin faced the dilemma: how to reform (modernise) the military by keeping up political leverage that assisted in the forming the authority of Putin? Therefore Kremlin's trajectory with regard to the military reform reflects certain contradiction. The military issue implicates two scopes reflecting the above- mentioned ambivalence.

Reshuffle in the top of the military and security establishment

At the end of March 2001 in appointing a retired KGB Lieutenant General Sergey Ivanov to head the Defence Ministry and making a senior woman official Lyubov Kudelina from the Finance Ministry one of his deputies, Putin claimed to have begun demilitarising Russia and justified his decision by saying that as Security Council secretary, it was Ivanov who oversaw the interministerial working group that drew up a military reform program. Now he will have to implement this program[6]. The fact that Putin has appointed a close ally to the defense minister's job suggests he really does consider military reform a top priority and resigned the principle that the military reform was given to the military "to preoccupy themselves with".

The new Deputy Defense Minister responsible for the financial and economic issues is well-known specialist Lyubov Kudelina, who will also head the Defense Ministry's Chief Military Budget and Finances Department. When one thinks that the defense budget represents one-fifth of the total state budget, the importance of this job is obvious. Over the past decade the structure has been much criticized for its poor performance, and two of Kudelina's predecessors have been dismissed. There seems to be a new awareness that the department needs qualified civilian specialists. The Defense Ministry's Financial Inspectorate and Labor Department, where new directors are to be appointed, will be subordinate to Kudelina[7].

The dismissals followed given appointments. A top Russian Defense Ministry official known for hawkish statements toward the West, Col.-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, the head of the department for international military cooperation, to lose his job. Ivashov has become known for strong statements against NATO's eastward expansion blaming it for being a "criminal organization", and for the U.S. plans to deploy missile defense system. Presumably the situation can be interpreted as Russia's interest in military co-operation not only on bilateral but likewise on international-institutional basis. By the way, Mikhail Dmitriev, a person from Putin's entourage, former professional intelligence agent, and incumbent Deputy Defense Minister was appointed to head the military technological cooperation committee of the Defense Ministry. The outspoken, hawkish Gen. Valery Manilov was ousted as the first deputy Chief of Russia's General Staff[8].

Nevertheless, is it real to expect serious reforms from the obedient "aparatchik" and implementer of Putin?[9]. It could be expected that the appointment of Ivanov, the person nearly related to Putin, will end the conflict between the former Defense Minister Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvachnin over differing approaches to the Army reforms. However, it is hardly credible that this factor points to the reformist potential of Ivanov. It is more likely that Putin has started disassembling the military establishment (mostly based on the Soviet clan-corporate principal) replacing it with the bureaucracy structures consolidating the so-called vertical line of power. A statement of Ivanov made during his visit in Minsk on April 2001 confirms the version: "Today, the discussions are over. The armed-forces reform plans have been approved by the president, and it's time to implement the approved decisions"[10].

In reality, however, the appointment of one or even several civilians to the top defence posts could end up doing more to discredit the idea of demilitarisation rather than furthering its cause. To say nothing of the state of the civil society in Russia, it is worth to notice that Kremlin does not feel any need to inform the public on what is going on in the military. In the meantime changes in the personnel of the top of the Defense Ministry follow an old tradition – Kremlin eventually changes disloyal persons.

Except for the interest to consolidate the power of Putin, these appointments hardly change anything. The Defense Ministry is still a military rather than a political institution. Russia does not yet have hundreds of civilian officials with solid military knowledge it will need. Nor does it have top generals open minded enough to take orders from a minister close to the president, let alone from not-so-high-ranking civilian officials. Real demilitarisation of political institutions would have to start by removing the military status from dozens of ministries and government agencies run on military lines. Instead, it looks as though the military contingents in these government bodies will in some way or another

be made subordinate to the Defense Ministry. This could lead to the emergence of a militarised behemoth, encompassing over 2 million people, even with the planned military cutbacks. The problem is that the Kremlin does not seem to understand that demilitarisation of the military-related ministries is an important element in establishing civilian control. And this is not the only step - equally important is to encourage greater openness and transparency. But as Security Council Secretary, Ivanov preferred to keep all plans as secret as possible - the military-reform plans are still secret to this day. And as for Kudelina, when she was in charge of the military budget at the Finance Ministry, she insisted on maximum confidentially[11].

Cutbacks in numbers in the Armed Forces

Ivanov particularly emphasises that cutbacks are to take place in the number of servicemen. Over the coming three years, the armed forces are to be cut by 365 000 servicemen (the Ground Forces by 180 000, the Navy - 50 000, the Air Forces - 40 000; in total 90 000 during 2001) and 130 000 so called civil specialists. Given that the state cannot even properly feed and arm all its soldiers[12], this looks like a perfectly rational decision.

The biggest cuts can be expected in Siberia, the Far East and in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Cuts will also affect Russian troops in Trans-Dnestr and in the South Caucasus[13]. Though some army corps will be disbanded, it is emphasized that the cutbacks would not involve units on permanent combat readiness and the number of soldiers in some of them (the Southwestern and Central-Asian Strategic Zones) will even be increased[14]. While having reservations some analysts envisage certain changes in the priorities of Russia's security policy (Islam as the main threat)[15].

The significance of the cutbacks under way requires new approaches in the armed forces. The started battle over Russia's defence budget for 2002 shows that the Defence Ministry is prepared to bring military wages in line with those of public servants, and in parallel to abolish the benefits for the military. This could be interpreted as a tendency of shifting to the professional army[16]. Ivanov does not mask such intentions. Asked when Russia would move from conscription to a professional army, Ivanov said that at the moment it was "impossible to say" because it depended on the economic situation. The Defense Minister pointed out that the changeover can not occur overnight and that in the United States, for example, it took 10 years[17].

On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the decrease of the armed forces that started during the period of Gorbachov was fitful and because of the financial deficit. Let's not forget that this is the third major cutback since the Soviet times. The armed forces have shrunk, but this hasn't led to any

proportional increase in effectiveness. The resources saved were allocated to maintain the structure but not to reorganise it. Military authorities are following a simple logic in their planned cutbacks - if they can spend more money on each soldier, servicemen will serve better and have more resources. The catch is that this logic does not work. The problem is that the authors of the reform program have not veered an iota from the principles on which the Soviet army ran[18].

The reality of the matter is that compulsory military service in Russia is not compulsory for everyone. According to Gen. Vyacheslav Putilin, head of the General Staff's Chief Recruitment Department, 88 percent of young men who are called up get their service deferred. It's no secret that many educational establishments exist for the sole purpose of granting these deferrals. Putilin also finds himself forced to admit that the new soldiers heading off the Army are from the best. Most than half of the draftees have never studied or had a job. It's pure fantasy to imagine that these young men will become the soldiers of the 21st century. But despite all this, the office generals are doing all they can to prevent the changeover to a professional army. The country's military and political leadership still does not see the need for a corps of professional sergeants. One official argument the Russia's top generals give is that a professional army would mean drastically increasing the defense budget[19].

So long as the conscript system remains in place, there will not be any real quality improvement among soldiers. Meanwhile the traditionalism of Russian office generals, the concept of mutually assured destruction and "all-azimuth defence", "ideology of total siege" still substantially point to the existence of the conscript system[20]. Eventually the references that establishment of professional army requires a long time confirm the resistance against the plans of the establishment of professional army.

The correlation between the cutbacks and the officers' corps should be taken into consideration as well. Effective reform means that there will be winners and losers within the military. The point is that the Russian officers corps are not immune to what is going on within the country as a whole. In Russia, with its bureaucratic and organizational politics, the majority of officers who have remained in the military through the 10-year period of institutional decline believe that they have no employment alternatives[21]. Essentially, what this all boils down to is that cutbacks in the armed forces will not result in any serious change.

Changes in the command system of the armed forces

The contretemps regarding the structure of the Armed Forces were personified for a long time when the former Minister of Defense Sergeyev and the Chief

of the General Staff Kvashnin came out openly as antagonists. The known discussion on what armament should prevail demonstrated serious organisational tensions between the two institutions as well as the race for influence. In the framework of the discussion earlier created RVNS as a separate branch of the Army was undoubtedly expected to carry and enhance the weight of Sergeyev. However, Kvashnin managed to take over the initiative by both appealing to the war in Chechnya and calling to prioritise conventional armament.

A substantial moment was November 2000 when Kvashnin proposed strict division of functions between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff[22]. Under this plan, the Defense Ministry would take on political and administrative functions, while the General Staff would be responsible for operative command of troops. The concrete project supposed to be presented to Putin in January 2000. Still, the project has not been worked out[23].

Such situation speaks of portentous tension between the Kremlin and the General Staff. The next link down in the command chain is the military districts, which have both administrative and operative functions. Kvashnin's proposals would simply fragment command of the military. If they were implemented, Putin, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, would lose his direct link with the troops. At the same time the General Staff – the agency responsible for planning military operations for every occasion – would get the chance to meddle directly in political life. Currently, as an expression of the tension, Chief Command of Ground Forces, the Commander (Col-Gen. Nikolai Kormilcev) of which is designed to be Deputy Defence Minister, has been revived. He will take the supervision of military detachments and will be responsible for the military training of all armed forces. In parallel, it is tried to overcome the fragmentation of the military establishment. The military reform is treated as a structural issue and is to be conducted in association with the reforms proceeding in other "power institutions", including the Ministry of Interior, headed by Boris Gryzlov who is nearly related to Putin[24].

However, the status quo is that the Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin extendes his influence with the help of political capital made in Chechnya. So the talks that Kvashnin can be removed are doubtful[25].

It means that while Sergeyev will be a loser in the bureaucratic infighting, it will not be clear whether the General Staff will emerge as a winner. Nevertheless, the most important is that two tendencies develop - whether the office generals representing hierarchy of the army will take over the influence or whether the power of army hierarchy will be broken trough introduction of civil institute in the military sphere? In other words, we observe a silent discussion on the form of eventual authoritarianism in Russia: military authoritarianism or modernised authoritarianism based on extensive social-political basis.

Priorities for the armament

It decided that the Russian armed forces would be given a structure based on three main branches (the Ground Forces, the Navy and the Air Force)[26]. This could be interpreted as the return to the priority equalising conventional and nuclear armament (though still out of continuity). It is planned that the Strategic Missile Forces will form a branch of their own (till 2002) that will exclude the Space Forces, which will be made into a separate wing. Such thoughts both presume that nuclear armament is an essential assumption for retaining the image of superpower and can be one of the answers for the US missile defence plans. However, in one of his first interviews as defense chief, Ivanov said that the decision to make the Space Forces a separate wing is not a reply to the U.S. plans to deploy a Missile Defense system. Ivanov spoke perfectly seriously about how the Space Forces could back armed-forces subdivisions at a tactical level[27].

But even in this framework it is very well known that the Russian Space Forces have half the satellites of the U.S. Space Command, which really does provide tactical support for army troops. Furthermore, 70 percent of the Russian satellites have already exceeded their service life[28]. It is not at all certain that they can ensure in full their previous tasks - strategic intelligence, early warning of missile attacks and communication.

Finally in May a fire at the Russian satellite-control center showed how far the plans to create independent space force were from reality. It took almost a day to put out the fire at this strategic military site, suppressing the fact that Russia does not have specialized fire fighting equipment needed to fight this kind of fire[29]. All this leads to the conclusion that ensuring the reliably of early warning system at all times isn't a major Russian defence priority. Moscow does not seriously believe for a second that the U.S. could launch a sudden nuclear attack.

Generally, according to the last reports Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal is aging and shrinking, and strategic delivery vehicles have limited operational lives[30]. Russia's heavy missiles will be withdrawn from service in 2008 and they have long since passed their guaranteed service life (SS-19s would rapidly reach end of their operational live after 2007, the SS-24 will be phased out by 2007 regardless of START II, few if any SS-18s and SS-25s would remain by the end of 2010, the number of operational SLBMs may drop precipitously over the next decade as Russian SSBNs reached the end of their service lives[31]). With or without treaties, Moscow will be forced to dramatically reduce its nuclear arsenal over the coming years.

It's unlikely that Russia will be able to build new missiles of this class. During the Soviet time, these missiles were built in Ukraine. For understandable

reasons, Moscow is hardly likely to risk developing its missile-building potential on a foreign state's territory. This leaves the most modern of the Russian missiles, the Topol-M (the SS-27 ICBM). These missiles are designed to carry three warheads. It was hoped at one point that Moscow would be able to produce 30 new Topol-Ms each year, but the reality is no more than 10 a year; and last year, only four new missiles were produced[32].

Having in mind the capabilities of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, it is possible that Moscow is following a more rational logic. An indication of this is a recent statement by Sergeyev who said what matters today, is not so much the number of warheads or the discussion how to balance a strong nuclear capability with a robust conventional force structure or must Russia choose or the other, but the military command system[33]. The analysis above demonstrates that Sergeyev can appeal to the main issue - forthcoming political system in Russia. The same could be said about the influence of economy on the military domain.

Economy and the military reform

Russians openly declare that the pace and success of military reform in Russia and its security policy will depend on the economic situation. Even without discussing German Gref strategy of Russia's development till 2010 and planned annual growth of economy by 5 – 5,5 percent the decision on Russia's long-term defence strategy is still an open question.

First of all, it relates with eventual correlation between Putin's course towards more functional, market-oriented economy and Russia's huge and unreformed defense-industrial complex, which employs 2 million people[34]. At the beginning of April, Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, who oversees the military-industrial complex, said that the reform programme of the sector would be presented before May. The programme has not been approved yet. It is known that the draft-programme supposes creating 30-40 vertically organized holdings, consisting of the most effective defense enterprises for different arms production sectors. All companies in the holding would have to hand over controlling stakes to the state. The program's authors say this would allow the state to concentrate its limited resources on the most important military programs. It would also free the military-industrial complex from needless competition[35].

The paradox is that these plans are not new at all. The first plan to create holdings along arms-sector lines appeared a decade ago. Then as now, the main idea was not so much to rationalize production as to main cosy jobs for military-industrial complex bureaucrats. This same aim lurks in the current programme. Russia has only a handful of effective defense enterprises, and they are effective only because they export arms to China, India and "rough states".

On the other hand the decision on Russia's long-term defence strategy relates with the real funds for the military reform as well as with the situation in the defence budget. Over the past eight years, the armed forces have made only one-off arms purchases. Arms procurement accounts for 6 percent of total defense expenditure as opposed to a minimum of 20 percent in NATO member-states. The greater share of Russia's defense budget, according to Ivanov - 70 percent, goes to wages, food, uniforms and so on, as opposed to 25-27 percent of the defense budget in NATO countries. Russia's new-model military technology accounts for 15-20 percent, while the figure for NATO is 60-70 percent. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the armed forces haven't purchased a single new military transport plane. Most of the money the military receives goes to maintaining and modifying old arms and technology[36].

In financial terms, the defense-budget expenditure for 2001 has risen more than 150 percent compared with the last year (from 140 billion roubles to around 230 billion roubles, and it is planned to increase defense spending to 262 billion roubles for 2002[37]). But this is a low figure. Former Defense Minister Sergeyev said that, given the financial limitations for buying new arms and technology, money would be spent primarily on extending the service life of the existing technology[38].

Nevertheless, in Russia, there are vital claims to sustain nuclear parity with the U.S. Considered projects of the answers regarding the U.S. plans for the missile defense confirms such intention. One of such projects supposes four scenarios. So-called minimal deterrent scenario envisages 1 500 strategic nuclear warheads (SNW), i.e.17 billion roubles per year or 8 percent of the defense budget. The second scenario – "to keep the U.S. in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty" – foresees 2 500 SNW, i.e. 20 billion roubles or 10 percent of the defense budget. For the implementation of the third scenario – "to hold back the U.S. from the arms race" – Russia would need up to 3 500 SNW, i.e. 40 billion roubles or 17 percent of the defense budget. And finally, the fourth scenario – "deterrent from conventional, wide-raging attack" suggests 6 000 SNW, i.e.50 billion rouble or 25 percent of the defense budget[39].

Having in mind still existing inertness of the military-industrial complex, such considerations demonstrates the tendency to maintain Russia as militarised authoritarian state. However, the statements that Russia is able to implement the scenarios by "tightening its belt" are questionable. Verification of the economic validity of the described scenarios is complicated particularly as there is no transparency in Russia's defence budget. For example, who could describe the state of Russia's conventional armament in the case of the fourth scenario, without saying nothing about the living conditions of Russia's citizens or the perspectives of the civil society?

Meanwhile, according to Alexei Arbatov and Aleksandr Golts, Moscow should give preference to the model that projects to reduce the SNW to 1 500 and to decrease the military personnel to 0.8 million, and to change the ratio between maintenance and investment portions of defence budget to 50 - 50 percent in the long run[40]. In that case it should be said that the Russian leadership has come to the conclusion that nuclear deterrent does not automatically mean having to have nuclear parity with the U.S. Nevertheless this model will allow modernising of conventional force structure able to operate not only at the frontiers of the former USSR but eventually realising the claims of the great power (e.g. qualified for military actions in Balkans).

All the discussions demonstrate that for the decision on Russia's long term defense strategy the crucial factor is not the number of SNW and the quantity of conventional forces but the principle response to the question what will be the evolution of Russia's political system and how Russia sees its position in the international system.

Undoubtedly, the second Chechnya war plays a major role in the future of Russia's political system. As for the war in Chechnya, it should not be forgotten that Putin's arrival to power was directly linked to the exploitation for the electoral purposes the political context of the second Chechen war. It resonated well with the strong public support for the war and reinforced Putin's broader aim at rebuilding a strong state. Finally, its continuation enables Putin to keep public opinion in mobilization mode and to accuse the opposition of any sins he pleases, from insufficient patriotism to treason. For the second time, Russia is burying its potential for economic development in Chechnya. There is now little room for manoeuvre in the economy: the positive effect of devaluation has worn off, world oil prices are falling, the debt crisis continues and the temptation to soften the blows by printing money as elections roll around will only worsen the financial situation[41].

Putin is not going to be drawn into another Afganistan, nor he is going to withdraw from Chechnya. It should not be forgotten that Putin's appealing for assurance of national security in internal politics means that he behaves as it is written in the textbooks of realism – he emphasises that the main political function of national security is the validation and legitimation of the use of force and increasing self-power for internal opponents. Such thoughts re-emphasise the inertness of the direction towards the military authoritarianism.

Regardless of the fact that the war in Chechnya revealed the limitations of Rusia's existing military capabilities, it annually costs about 25 percent of the defense budget, and Russia's losses rise to 2500 with 8000 wounded in action[42] the Kremlin is not going to fall back. Taking into account the support of Russia's public opinion for military campaign, it is hard so far to

forecast eventualities, which can be in connection with the current information on the new political initiatives helping to solve the problem and able to symbolize the shift from the course towards the military authoritarianism.

Conclusions

It is always hard to predict Russia and particularly in the meantime when Russia propagates the idea of specific development and stands for the idea of a multipolar global order. In addition, the influence of multiple specific economic, social and cultural factors is unpredictable for still going post-communist transformation in this part of the world. That is why the answers to all questions related to the Russian security, its direction and perspectives of its military components could hardly be given with much certainty.

Nevertheless, all the analysed aspects of Russia's military reform confirm the dilemma: will Russia choose the way of a modern state, though in authoritarian way, with the wide-range social-political base, modernised (civil control, professionalism, modern armament) as well as carrying the functions of minimal deterrent army; or will Russia take the direction towards military authoritarianism, i.e. will it still desperately lay claims to the status of superpower, will it allow the military-industrial complex to manifest by inertia and to dominate the soviet-type office generals standing for the ideas of the soviet-type conscription? Fundamentally it means a conditional decline of the living conditions in Russia and stagnation in the development of the civil society.

Russia's state and identity crisis that commenced with the end of the Cold War has inevitably touched the military of the country. Two factors are of great importance in the trajectory of the military development: the second Chechnya war and *the Kursk* catastrophe. In 1999 reactivated use of the Armed Forces in Chechnya determined preconditions for the authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin and for the emergence of a hypertrophied status of the military. Eventually there was a possibility to conclude the situation with a formation of military authoritarianism. However, in 2000 *the Kursk* catastrophe both brought the public attention to the disastrous deterioration of the military and put Putin into a dilemma: how to reform (modernise) the military by keeping up political leverage, that assisted in forming the authority of Putin? Therefore the Kremlin's trajectory with regard to the military reform reflects a certain contradiction.

The military issue implicates two scopes reflecting the above mentioned ambivalence:

1. Reshuffle at the top of the military and security establishment. In appointing a retired KGB general to head of the Defence Ministry and making a senior woman official from the Finance Ministry one of his deputies, Putin claims to

have begun demilitarising Russia. In parallel, Putin dismisses the so-called hard-liners. Nevertheless, is it real to expect serious reforms from the obedient Putin "aparatchik"? In reality, however, the appointment of one or even several civilians to the top defence posts could end up doing more to discredit the idea of demilitarisation rather than furthering its cause. To say nothing of the state of the civil society in Russia, it is worth to notice that the Kremlin does not feel any need to inform the public on what is going on in the military. In the meantime changes in the personnel follow the old tradition – the Kremlin changes eventually disloyal persons.

2. Cutbacks in numbers in the Armed Forces. The significance of the cutbacks under way requires new approaches in the armed forces. The battle over Russia's defence budget shows that the Defence Ministry is prepared to bring military wages in line with those of public servants, and in parallel to abolish the benefits for the military. This could be interpreted as a tendency of shifting to the professional army. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the decrease of the armed forces that started during the period of Gorbachov was fitful and because of the financial deficit. The resources saved were allocated to maintaining the structure but not to reorganising it. So long as the conscript system remains in place, there will not be any real quality improvement among soldiers. Meanwhile the traditionalism of Russian office generals, the concept of mutually assured destruction and "all-azimuth defence", "ideology of total siege" still substantially point to the existence of the conscript system. Eventually the references that establishment of professional army requires a long time confirm the resistance against the plans of the establishment of professional army. Essentially, what this all boils down to is that cutbacks in the armed forces will not result in any serious change.

3. Changes in the command system of the armed forces. It is affirmed that structural separation of the functions of the Defence Ministry and General Staff will be finished with the year 2001. Chief Command of Ground Forces, the Commander of which is designed to be deputy Defence Minister, has been revived. He will take the supervision of military detachments. It may look that the main purpose of these and similar attempts is to take the political functions from the military hierarchy. However, the status quo is that the Chief of the General Staff Anatoli Kvachnin extends his influence with the help of political capital made in Chechnya.

4. Priorities for the armament. It seems that the Russian armed forces would be given a structure based on three main branches (the Ground Forces, the Navy and the Air Force). This could be interpreted as a return to the priority equalising conventional and nuclear armament (though still out of continuity). It is planned that the Strategic Missile Forces will form a branch of their own (till 2002) that will exclude the Space Forces, which will be made into a separate

wing. Such thoughts both presume that nuclear armament is an essential assumption to retaining the image of a superpower and can be one of the answers for the US missile defence plans. Regardless that Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal is aging and shrinking, and strategic delivery vehicles have limited operational lives, Russians do not exclude a possibility to invoke the instruments of mobilized economy for asymmetric but adequate response.

5. Economy and the military reform. Russians openly declare that the pace and success of military reform in Russia and its security policy will depend on the success of the economical development. However, the decision on Russia's long-term defence strategy is still an open question. First of all, it relates with the eventual correlation between Putin's course towards a more functional, market-oriented economy and Russia's huge and unreformed defense-industrial complex. On the other hand, the decision on Russia's long-term defense strategy relates with the real financing of military reform as well as the situation of the defense budget. Finally, it is in relation with Russians plans to react adequately to the U.S. plans for the missile defense.

The ongoing discussion develops two tendencies. One of them illustrates the desperate attempt to increase the potential of strategic nuclear warheads, appealing to the possibilities of the mobilizational economy and ignoring the eventual consequences for the ordinary people. Another tendency represents efforts to modernize the military structure by limiting Russia's nuclear deterrent potential to the minimal level. These tendencies correlate with the arising dilemma for Russia's eventual political system: will there be the evolution towards military authoritarianism (by the way, the second Chechnya war has a huge impact on the tendency), or will Russia choose the way of a modern state, though in authoritarian form.

The context analysed reveals the necessity of Western political-diplomatic pressure on Russia's military sector. At the same time, it is essential to promote the segments of market economy and civil society, to encourage the Kremlin to find a political solution in the second Chechnya war, to evolve from the model of Soviet (Prussian) military sector. Various military servicemen training and re-training programmes, opening of the world armament market for the reformed Russian military-industrial complex (realising from dependence to Chine, India and "rough states") would be helpful.

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THE EFFECT OF CHANGES TO THE ELECTORAL LAW IN PREMIER-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: THE LITHUANIAN CASE

Terry D. Clark, Nerijus Prekevičius

The Puzzle

Duverger's Law states that proportional representation electoral systems create incentives for the emergence of multi-party systems whereas first-past-the-post systems (single mandate, plurality systems), such as those in the United States and the United Kingdom, tend to favor the emergence of a two-party system.[1] Efforts to test Duverger's Law in post-communist systems have had mixed results. Ordeshook and Shvetsova in their multi-country study found that the choice between proportional representation (PR) and single mandate districts (SMD) not only effects the number of parties, the latter had the further effect of attenuating the trend to a greater number of parties normally associated with ethnic and social heterogeneity.[2] Moser however has found that the standard relationship between electoral system and the number of political parties holds in Hungary and Poland, but not in Russia and Ukraine. In Russia, in particular, (PR) has benefited and strengthened a small number of parties while SMD has weakened parties and led to their proliferation. He attributes this to the lesser degree of party institutionalization in the two post-Soviet states.[3]

A change in Lithuania's electoral law just prior to the parliamentary elections of 2000 permits a unique opportunity to further consider the impact of electoral laws on the strategic behavior of parties and voters. Our analysis begins with a consideration of the within system effects of the modifications to the Lithuanian electoral law. We find weak support for the existence of Duverger's hypothesized mechanical effects in the Lithuanian case. Indeed, the number of effective assembly parties increased following the 2000 elections. However, we find substantial support for the existence of psychological effects among both voters and parties; there is clear evidence of strategic behavior among both as a consequence of the change in the electoral law. Noting that a decrease in the number of effective electoral parties in 2000 did not result in a decrease in the

number of effective parties in the parliament, we next turn to a consideration of the cause of this apparent anomaly. Our discussion focuses on the interactive effect of different rule sets in mixed electoral systems. We conclude by considering why two systems with similarly designed mixed electoral systems, Lithuania and the Russian Federation, have substantially different party systems. Our purpose is to identify plausible institutional explanations for the differences between the two party systems. We focus on the impact of presidentialism on the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems. Our primary argument is that the design of executive-legislative relations is an important factor determining the effect of electoral law on the strategic behavior of parties and voters. Systems in which presidential prerogatives are significant, but limited, create incentives for parties to engage in efforts to gain control of the legislature in the manner assumed by Duverger's Law. In such systems, we should expect the emergence of strong party systems. On the other hand, those in which presidents exercise extraordinary powers, threatening to usurp legislative control of the government as well as the policy-making function, create clear disincentives for the emergence of strong party systems. In such systems, electoral laws are not likely to be able to control the proliferation of weak parties.

Explaining the Behavior of Parties and Voters

Duverger argued that electoral laws carry with them both mechanical and psychological effects. In all electoral systems, the two work in tandem to reduce the number of political parties. However, the tendency is stronger in single mandate, plurality electoral systems and weaker in proportional representation. Hence, the former are associated with two-party systems while the latter tend to be associated with multi-party systems.

The mechanical effect operates on the premise that all electoral systems operate to reduce the number of parties in a legislature. Single mandate, plurality (SMD-P) systems, have a particularly strong tendency to under-represent small parties and in so doing reduce the number of effective assembly parties. This tendency of SMD-P systems is further enhanced by the psychological effect, the phenomenon of strategic voting. Realizing that small parties are being disproportionately disadvantaged, voters are less likely to "waste" their vote on them, casting their ballot instead for larger parties, more likely to get elected. Since PR systems do no under-represent small parties as strongly, the psychological effect is weaker and the number of effective assembly parties is greater.[4]

The psychological effect rests on an assumption of rational behavior by voters. Voters cast their ballots for those party candidates most likely to enact their preferred policy choices. Since single mandate, plurality districts produce only

one winner per contest, voters not wishing to "waste" their vote will cast their ballot for that party's candidate, closest to them on policy issues, which they perceive to have the highest likelihood of being elected. Sartori further extended the logic behind strategic voting to the strategic behavior of parties. Adopting Downs' maxim that parties are vote-maximizers seeking control of the legislative agenda in order to pursue policy ends,[5] he contended that the rational response of parties is to coalesce in the largest possible blocs to increase their chances of electoral victory. Failing to do so, they run the risk of being defeated in every district race. This creates a further pressure in SMD-P electoral systems to constrain the number of effective political parties, in most cases to two.[6]

Scant attention has been paid to single mandate, majority (SMD-M) electoral systems. As Taagapera and Shugart note, there is a tendency to fail to distinguish between plurality and majority single mandate district systems.[7] This owes largely to the fact that until recently, there were no pure SMD-M systems. (France's first round is SMD-M, but the second round winner is determined on a plurality basis.) Several post-Communist states, however, have adopted an SMD-M tier as part of a mixed system. Among them are Lithuania (prior to 2000) and the Russian Federation.

What little scholarly attention that has thus far been devoted to SMD-M systems has argued that they operate more like PR systems in their constraining effect on the number of effective parties. The most noteworthy of such studies is that of Lijphart who finds in a twenty-seven country analysis that SMD-M systems impact the mechanical effect and psychological effects similarly to PR.[8] Both single mandate, majority and proportional representation electoral systems change the calculus for voters and parties. In the case of the former, there is less incentive for voters to cast their vote for the party candidate with the greatest likelihood of victory in the first round since in most cases two candidates will vie for victory in a second round run-off. In proportional representation, parties with only a small vote share can be awarded seats in an election, the only restraint being the threshold (the percent of the popular vote that a party must receive in order to be awarded seats).

Hence, in both a SMD-M and PR electoral system, voters are more likely to cast their ballot for a larger number of parties than in a SMD-P system. This in turn should be reflected in a higher effective number of electoral parties, N_v, a statistic based on the vote share of parties in a political system. Further, in both systems, parties will be more likely to present candidates. The interactive effect of the two is that the index for the effective number of assembly parties, N_s,, will be higher. (This latter statistic is determined based on the seat share of the parties in the legislature).[9]

Most analyses of the link between electoral law and party systems focus on the mechanical effect. We will consider both it and the psychological effects

on the strategic choices of voter and parties. We consider first the within system effect of changes to the electoral law in Lithuania. In the concluding section, we turn to a comparative analysis of two similar electoral systems, Lithuania and the Russian Federation. Both employ a mixed electoral system. Prior to 2000, Lithuania elected 70 of 141 deputies to the *Seimas* on a PR basis and the remaining 71 in SMD-M. Half of the 450 deputies to the Russian State Duma (225 deputies) are elected on a PR basis and half (225 deputies) on the basis of SMD-M.

Throughout this paper we are guided by the premise that explanations should be as generalizable as possible. We agree with those who contend that one should resort to contextually dependent variables only after other plausible options have been exhausted. Hence, we eschew behavioralist hypotheses as well as those that reverse the direction of causality in Duverger's Law in favor of more easily generalizable institutional explanations.

The 2000 Parliamentary Elections and Electoral Law

Lithuania held parliamentary elections for the third time in the post-Soviet era in the fall of 2000. (The results of the election are at Table 1.) In the run-up to the 2000 elections, the ruling legislative majority forced through a change to the electoral law. According to Lithuanian election law, seventy of the seats in the *Seimas* are allotted on the basis of a PR (open list) vote, with each party achieving more than five percent of the vote and each bloc of parties gaining seven percent allotted seats in proportion to the vote they receive. Prior to 2000, the remaining seventy-one seats were determined on the basis of a majority rule in single mandate districts of roughly equal population. If no candidate received more than fifty percent of the vote in the ballot then a second round runoff decided the winner from among the two top vote-getters. The electoral law introduced in summer of 2000 changed the single mandate district races from majority to plurality contests, decided upon the "first-past-the-post" (plurality) principle associated with Anglo-American political systems. In such systems, the candidate receiving the largest number of votes in the first round is declared the winner. No majority is required

The parties in the ruling coalition, the Homeland Union (Conservatives of Lithuania) and the Christian Democrats, apparently reasoned that they stood a better chance of gaining more seats in the *Seimas* in plurality contests. (So much so that they were able to muster the votes necessary to override a presidential veto of the new electoral law.) Analysis of the election results demonstrates that the change in the electoral law most certainly had an effect on the election results. However, it was not as positive for the Homeland Union and the Christian Democratic Party as the two had hoped. Table 2

juxtaposes the election results based on plurality rules with those based on majority rules in the single mandate districts.

Table 1. **Results of the 2000 Elections**

Political Party	PR Seats	SMD-P Seats	Total Seats
Homeland Union (Conservatives)	8	1	9
Christian Democrats	0	2	2
A. Brazauskas Social-Democratic Coalition*	28	(23)	(51)
Democratic Labor Party	(13)	14	27
Social-Democratic Party	(11)	7	18
New Democracy Party	(1)	2	3
Union of Russians of Lithuania	(3)	0	3
New Politics Bloc**	(34)	(32)	(66)
New Union (Social Liberals)	18	11	29
Liberal Union	16	18	34
Center Union	0	2	2
Modern Christian Democratic Union	0	1	1
Peasants' Party	0	4	4
Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action	0	2	2
Lithuanian Freedom Union	0	1	1
Moderate Conservative Union	0	1	s1
Christian Democratic Union	0	1	1
"Young Lithuania," New Nationalists and Political Prisoners Union bloc	0	1	1
Independents	0	3	3
TOTAL	70	71	141

* - The parties of the Social-Democratic Coalition presented a consolidated slate of candidates in the PR race. The two largest parties in the Coalition, the Democratic Labor Party and the Social-Democratic Party nominated a single candidate in the SMD-P races.

** - The parties of the "New Policy" bloc presented a separate list of candidates in the PR races and nominated separate candidates in the SMD-P races.

Duverger's Law anticipates that the mechanical effect of introducing a plurality rule in single mandate races is that large parties gain a bonus in the legislature while small parties are under-represented in the final seat distribution. The hypothesis is confirmed in the case of the Social-Democratic Coalition. Presenting a consolidated list in the PR races and a single nominee in the single mandate, plurality district (SMD-P) contests,[10] the Coalition won a plurality of deputies in the new legislature. As the data at Table 2 indicate, the Social-Democratic Coalition won nine more seats in the plurality single mandate contests than it would have won under majority rules. The next largest bloc of deputies went to the Liberal Union. Here again the plurality rule magnified the victory. However, the effect was considerably smaller – a one seat gain.

Further, as argued by Duverger's Law, some smaller parties' losses increased with the introduction of the plurality rule. They include the Christian Democrats (a one seat loss), the Center Union (a two seat loss), the Peasants' Party (a one seat loss), and "Young Lithuania (a one seat loss).

However, Duverger's Law fails to anticipate the substantial loss of seats by the Social Liberals (a nine seat loss under plurality rules), which placed third in the election, and the gain of one seat under plurality rules by the relatively small Homeland Union. Even more problematic is that N_s, the index of the effective number of assembly parties, increased as a result of the 2000 election to 4.2 from the index of 3.3 registered in the 1996 elections. (See Table 3.) All of the gain was a result of the single mandate contests index increasing from 3.1 to 5.0 while that for the PR seats remained at 3.4. Hence, support for Duverger's hypothesized mechanical effect appears somewhat weak.

Table 2. **Comparison of Election Results Based on Plurality and Majority Rules in the Seimas Single Mandate Districts**

Political Party	Electoral Outcome				
	PR Seats	SMD-P Seats	Total Seats	SMD-M Seats	Total Seats
Homeland Union (Conservatives)	8	1	9	0	8
Christian Democratic Party	0	2	2	3	3
A. Brazauskas Social-Democratic*	28	(23)	(51)	(14)	(42)
Coalition Democratic Labor Party	(13)	14	27	8	21
Social-Democratic Party	(11)	7	18	5	16
New Democracy Party	(1)	2	3	1	2
Union of Russians of Lithuania	(3)	0	3	0	3
New Politics Bloc**	(34)	(32)	(66)	(41)	(75)
New Union (Social Liberals)	18	11	29	20	38
Liberal Union	16	18	34	17	33
Center Union	0	2	2	4	4
Modern Christian Democratic Union	0	1	1	0	0
Peasants' Party	0	4	4	5	5
Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action	0	2	2	2	2
Lithuanian Freedom Union	0	1	1	1	1
Moderate Conservative Union	0	1	1	1	1
Christian Democratic Union	0	1	1	1	1
"Young Lithuania," New Nationalists and Political Prisoners Union bloc	0	1	1	0	0
Independents	0	3	3	3	3
TOTAL	70	71	141	71	141

* The parties of the Social-Democratic Coalition presented a consolidated slate of candidates in the PR race. The two largest parties in the Coalition, the Democratic Labor Party and the Social-Democratic Party nominated a single candidate in the SMD-P races.

** The parties of the "New Policy" bloc presented a separate list of candidates in the PR races and nominated separate candidates in the SMD-P races.

Table 3. **Comparisons of Party System Indicators in National Parliamentary Elections, Lithuania and Russia**

	Lithuania 1992	Lithuania 1996	Lithuania 2000	Russia 1993	Russia 1995	Russia 1999
Party Lists	17	24	15	13	43	26
Candidates per District	6.8	12.4	10.0	7.0	11.7	9.8
Independents Elected	1	4	3	130	77	105
Effective Number of Parties						
Vote Share ($\mathbf{N_v}$)	4.1	8.0	5.6	8.1	11.0	6.7
Seat Share ($\mathbf{N_s}$)						
Overall	3.0	3.3	4.2	14.6	6.1	8.0
Proportional Representation seats	2.9	3.4	3.4	6.3	4.4	3.6
Single Mandate District seats	3.1	3.1	5.0	37.0	11.6	13.9

SOURCE: Calculated by the authors.

There is however substantially more support for the presence of psychological effects associated with the introduction of plurality rules in the single mandate districts. Duverger argued that voters would respond to the introduction of a plurality rule by voting strategically for larger parties instead of "wasting" their vote on smaller parties. That this indeed occurred as the result of the 2000 modifications to the Lithuanian electoral law is indicated by the substantial decrease in N_s, vote share, the index of the effective number of electoral parties, as reported at Table 3. The decrease indicates that voters were less willing to cast their ballots for parties they expected to lose. This finding, however, introduces an interesting paradox. If voters voted strategically, thus decreasing the effective number of electoral parties, why was this not reflected in a lower effective number of assembly parties? We shall return to this question shortly.

The psychological effect is also evident in the strategic reaction of the political parties to the new rules. Sartori's addendum to Duverger's Law argues that the rational response of parties to the introduction of plurality rules in single mandate districts is to consolidate in electoral blocs in order to maximize the outcome in the district-by-district races. This is precisely what the Democratic Labor Party and Social-Democratic Party did. The two lead parties in the Social-Democratic Coalition were the major beneficiaries of the new electoral law owing to their ability to cooperate in the construction of both a united party list and a non-competitive list of candidates in the single mandate districts. As a consequence, they avoided situations in which their candidates

were matched against each other in head-to-head contests and thereby gained maximum electoral advantage. Indeed, were it not for this, the Social-Democrats would most likely have suffered a fate similar to that of the Christian Democratic Party. (The Christian Democrats went from holding sixteen seats in the previous *Seimas* to only two in the newly elected legislature.)

On the other hand, the parties of the "New Policy" bloc - the Social Liberals, Liberal Union, Center Union, and Modern Christian Democratic Union – failed to coalesce in a single bloc and were hurt by the new electoral law. While two of the parties, the Liberal Union and the Social Liberals, remained large parties, they would have been larger had they been able to form a united electoral coalition. Failing to do so, they fell prey to the mechanical effect of Duverger's Law. Had they been able to reach agreement on an electoral coalition, they would have won nine more single mandate district seats between them. Instead they split the vote in these nine districts among themselves and delivered the victory to their opponents. (Table 4 indicates the electoral results had the "New Policy" bloc run a single candidate in the plurality single mandate districts.)

Table 4. **Results of the 2000 Elections Assuming the "New Policy" Runs as a bloc in the Single Mandate Districts**

Political Party	PR Seats	SMD-P Seats	Total Seats	Actual Seats
Homeland Union (Conservatives)	8	0	8	9
Christian Democrats	0	0	0	2
A. Brazauskas Social-Democratic Coalition*	28	(9)	(37)	(51)
Democratic Labor Party	(13)	6	19	27
Social-Democratic Party	(11)	2	13	18
New Democracy Party	(1)	1	2	3
Union of Russians of Lithuania	(3)	0	3	3
New Politics Bloc	34	52	86	66
Peasants' Party	0	3	3	4
Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action	0	1	1	2
Lithuanian Freedom Union	0	1	1	1
Moderate Conservative Union	0	1	1	1
Christian Democratic Union	0	1	1	1
"Young Lithuania," New Nationalists and Political Prisoners Union bloc	0	0	s0	1
Independents	0	3	3	3
TOTAL	70	71	141	141

* The parties of the Social-Democratic Coalition presented a consolidated slate of candidates in the PR race. The two largest parties in the Coalition, the Democratic Labor Party and the Social-Democratic Party nominated a single candidate in the SMD-P races.

The "New Policy" bloc was far less prepared than its major competitors - the Democratic Labor Party and Social-Democrats - to agree to run a single candidate in each electoral district. This owed in part to a major shift in the electorate creating substantial uncertainty about the relative strength of Lithuania's political parties going into the election. The uncertainty made a rational calculus more difficult for both parties and voters, a factor that undoubtedly helped to further mitigate the effect that the introduction of plurality rules might otherwise have been expected to produce.

Implications for Theory
Effective Parties in Mixed Systems

We noted earlier that a decrease in the effective number of electoral parties was attended by an increase in the effective number of parties in the new assembly. That is, while voters tended to vote for fewer parties than in previous elections, more parties were elected to the parliament, a finding that seems strangely counter-intuitive. We explain this outcome as the consequence of an interactive effect between PR and single mandate district rules in mixed systems, something that has received scant attention in the literature. Despite the increase in the effective number of assembly parties, there was a modest decrease in the number candidates per district. (See Table 4) The decrease is the expected response to the introduction of SMD-P in the district races. However, there was also a concurrent decrease in the number of party lists. Indeed, the number of parties participating in the party list vote was the lowest in the post-Soviet era. This seems counter-intuitive given that there were no substantive changes made to the law concerning the PR seats. In effect, the introduction of SMD-P to the mixed system appears to have affected both the single mandate and PR races.

There are good theoretical reasons for arguing for an interactive effect between the two elements of a mixed electoral system. In electoral systems in which the division of seats in the legislature is weighted to reflect the party-list vote, such as that in Germany, there is no such effect as the law itself predetermines that the final seat allocation will reflect the result of the PR vote. In truly mixed systems, such as that in Lithuania, however, the effect is the outcome of the logic of the interaction between the two parts of the electoral system. For mixed systems with both a PR and single mandate, majority component, the logic favors an increase in the number of parties. Small parties have a clear incentive to form to contest for the PR seats. The effect of the single mandate, majority races is to induce these parties to seek potential allies in the second round voting. However, there is no incentive to do so in the first round if a party assesses its potential for gaining enough votes to enter into the second

round as being relatively high. As for voters, the two-round system substantially increases information costs and complicates strategic voting. Since voters can expect to vote again in a second round, it is much less likely that they will vote strategically in the first round. Hence, both parts of the electoral system favor the formation of a multi-party system.

This has most certainly been the experience of the Russian State Duma with a mixed system. Like the Lithuanian *Seimas* before the 2000 changes to the electoral law, half of the 450 seats in the Russian lower house are determined on the basis of PR and the other half on the basis of single mandate, majority district races. As the calculations in Table 4 indicate, the number of effective party index for both vote share and seat share are quite high for the Russian Duma across all three elections in the post-Soviet era. What is particularly interesting in the Russian case is that the index for the single mandate districts has been consistently higher than that for the PR seats.

On the other hand, in mixed systems in which seats are determined on the basis of both PR and single mandate, plurality rules (SMD-P), voters should vote strategically in the SMD-P races and sincerely in the PR vote. This would in turn suggest that parties pursue different strategies in the PR and SMD-P races. However, closer examination of the logic suggests that this is highly unlikely. While a dual strategy would appear to permit the acquisition of the largest number of seats possible, it is not at all logical to expect parties to be able to successfully pursue such a mixed strategy. The logic of the SMD-P races requires parties to seek electoral partners with whom they agree to put forward a single candidate. In so doing, parties in these races begin to lose their identity, making it more difficult to put forward separate slates of candidates for the party-list seats. Further, if as the logic of Duverger's Law suggests (and as in fact happened in the case of Lithuania's Social-Democratic Coalition), these parties ultimately merge to form a single, large party, then there will be fewer parties in both the SMD-P and PR races. Hence, the number of parties in such systems should decrease. Further, the introduction of the SMD-P seats should create no upward pressure on either the number of effective parties in the PR race or the number of effective parties based on vote share, as we see in the Lithuanian case.

Executive Power and the Effect of Electoral Law

Lithuania's mixed electoral system, even before the introduction of the plurality rule in 2000, operated as most electoral systems do, the effective number of assembly parties remaining lower than the effective number of electoral parties.[11] However, as indicated by the calculations at Table 4, Russia's similarly designed mixed system has not operated in this manner. This owes

largely to the fact that very large numbers of independents are elected to the Russian State Duma from the single mandate districts. In comparison, relatively few independents are elected in Lithuania's single mandate districts. (See Table 4.) In essence, Russia's mixed system has produced substantially less strategic voting than has Lithuania's. While it is tempting to argue that the electoral law in Russia does not work in accordance to the expectations of Duverger's Law owing to weakly institutionalized parties, such an argument reverses the causal arrow and makes electoral law the dependent variable. We contend that it is possible, and theoretically more appealing, to continue to employ the electoral system as an independent variable. However, in order to do so, we must introduce the type of executive-legislative relations as an intervening variable.

By arguing previously for an interactive effect between two different components of an electoral system, we have already addressed the possibility that electoral laws may produce different outcomes in interaction with other institutions. Duverger's Law rests on assumptions about the strategic behavior of voters and parties. It is not at all certain that these assumptions operate with the same effect in different executive-legislative constitutional designs. What if control of the legislature does not bring with it substantial control of the government making and breaking process? What if control of the legislature does not even assure control over the policy-making function?

A limited degree of scholarly attention has been given to the effect of presidentialism on party systems.[12] Among the most notable findings, Mainwaring contends that strong executives can significantly reduce incentives for those seeking legislative office to coalesce in large parties. As a consequence, the number of parties in such systems is likely to be greater regardless of the choice of electoral system.[13] The argument is rooted in the broader discussion of whether parliamentary or presidential systems are the preferred choice for newly democratizing political systems. A number of scholars have argued that parliamentary systems are to be preferred to presidential systems.[14] Among the failures of presidentialism cited by these scholars are that it encourages the formation of weak party systems owing to a focus on a zero-sum contest for the presidency, which seriously undermines any incentive for party building to win legislative contests. In an earlier work Shugart and Carey took issue with this position by demonstrating that the dichotomy between presidentialism and parliamentarism is overly simplistic.[15] In their schema, there are three different types of presidential systems: US-style presidentialism, French-style premier-presidentialism, and president-parliamentarism. It is the latter which is the most problematic form of democratic governance owing to the extraordinary powers of the president, which includes the right to appoint and remove cabinet ministers, the right to dissolve the parliament, and the ability

to govern with minimal legislative oversight. These powers are so substantial as to threaten the marginalization of the legislature and reduce elite incentives for gaining control of that body.

As a consequence, there is decidedly less incentive for the formation of strong political parties. If we assume that the primary goal of a political party is to gain the largest number of seats possible in order to gain control of the legislative agenda, then there is less rationale for a political party to attempt to do so when the parliamentary control of the legislative agenda is undermined by the existence of a president with the powers to legislate by decree. It is further undermined when the legislature's control of the government (and hence policy implementation) is compromised. Moreover, weak legislative powers also serve to obscure the locus of responsibility in the eyes of the electorate, which in turn decreases the incentive for voters to cast their ballots for parties or candidates likely to win an election. In essence, the psychological effects of the electoral system for both parties and voters are substantially reduced.

Under such conditions, the parliament's options are largely limited to supporting or opposing the president. This further decreases party strength as deputies fearful of exposing their seats in the event of parliamentary dissolution are likely to opt instead to break with their party when it opposes the president. The president, of course, is eager to promote such "independent" behavior. Hence, we should expect that strong executive systems substantially attenuate the restraining effect of electoral systems on the number of political parties. In effect, the party system will be released from the constraints that the electoral system might otherwise have.

This appears to be what we see in the case of the Russian State Duma. In essence, Russian parties remain institutionally weak because the legislature is institutionally weak. The requirement that a party present candidates for the party-list races is the only reason that the overall index for the number of effective parties is as low as it is. The extraordinary powers of the president undermine any rationale for party building.

On the other hand, as we have seen in the Lithuanian case, electoral systems operate to restrain the number of parties in a fashion suggested by Duverger's Laws when executive powers do not threaten legislative prerogatives. Lithuania's President has powers placing it in Shugart and Carey's category of Premier-Presidentialism. More than a mere figure head, the Lithuanian President exercises the right to veto legislation and is Constitutionally responsible for foreign and defense policy. More importantly, the President appoints the Prime Minister (subject to legislative approval), and in the event of a legislative vote of no-confidence he may either choose to appoint a new Prime Minister or call for early legislative elections. Nonetheless, the President's powers are severely circumscribed by the Constitution. He can not rule without the legislature,

and his ability to influence government policy is dependent on his relations with the ruling coalition in the assembly.

We are left to conclude that there may well be good explanations for the relative strengths and weaknesses of party systems in east central and eastern Europe that are rooted in institutionalist and rational choice perspectives. They should be preferred by scholars to more idiosyncratic explanations offered by behaviorialist approaches insofar as they are more amenable to comparison and theory building. Duverger's Law offers one such example. Our analysis suggests that weak party systems are the result of the existence of institutional designs that mitigate the effects of electoral laws that would otherwise create incentives for the emergence of strongly institutionalized parties and party systems.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State,* London: Methuen, 1954; Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws,* 2nd ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989; Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

[2] Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties," *Amerian Journal of Political Science* 38 (1994): 100-123.

[3] Robert G. Moser, *Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia,* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001; Robert G. Moser, "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Post-communist States," *World Politics* 51 (April 1999): 359-384; Robert G. Moser, "The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13 (1997): 284-302.

[4] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State,* London: Methuen, 1954

[5]Anthony Downs (*An Economic Theory of Democracy.* NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957) argued that parties are vote maximizers. While subsequent theorists have argued that parties seek control of policy (see Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics,* Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970; Abram De Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1973; Lawrence C. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments,* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976., Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle (*Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Governments,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) argue persuasively that policy control is contingent upon vote maximizing behavior.

[6] Giovanni Sartori, "Political Development and Political Engineering," in J.D. Montgomery and A.O. Hirschman, eds., *Public Policy,* vol. 17, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

[7] Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 51.

[8] Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

[9] For a description of both the index for the effective number of electoral parties, N , and that for the effective number of assembly parties, N , see Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shuğart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoŝal Systems,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

[10] The two largest parties, the Democratic Labor Party and the Social-Democratic Party, eschewed any head-to-head contests in the SMD-P districts by presenting a single candidate. The two smaller parties, the New Democratic Party and the Union of Russians of Lithuania, however, did nominate separate candidates to four of the SMD-P contests.

[11] Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

[12] Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamic,.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[13] Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (July 1997): 449-471.

[14] Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy,* pp. 3-87, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," *The Washington Quarterly* 13, no. 13 (Summer 1990): 143-164; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (1993): 198-228; Alfred Stepan and C. Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation," *World Politics* 46 (1993): 1-22.

[15] Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamic,.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE LITHUANIAN CASE

Vitalis Nakrošis

The process of developing administrative accountability is the focus of this case. Accountability is defined as the process in which public agencies and civil servants operating inside the public administration answer to the public, directly or through the parliament, for public policy, financial management and administrative discretion. Accountability is understood as both "an end in itself – representing democratic values – and a means towards the development of more efficient and effective organisations"[1].

The following case analyzes the problem of a mismatch between the present situation and the need to ensure that the Lithuanian civil service becomes accountable to the public for its actions. Three case situations on accountability for policy, financial management and administrative discretion are presented. The case then outlines the main measures of public administration reform in Lithuania and their effects on administrative accountability, while the concluding section examines the process of implementation.

1. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM: LOW LEGITIMACY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Surveys demonstrate that after almost ten years of transformation, the legitimacy of the Lithuanian public administration among the public is low. Recent opinion polls show relatively low levels of public support to the government (27 percent) and the parliament (21 percent) compared to the media (76 percent) or the church (63 percent).[2]

The legitimacy problem has many causes. First, limited legitimacy of the public administration can be explained by a shortage of effective public policies, in particular redistributive policies, and the ineffective delivery of public services. Several studies have shown that post-communist governments have limited institutional capacities to formulate and implement public policies, in particular in the field of economic policy.[3]

Second, the intelligence of bureaucratic decision-making and, in turn, bureaucratic legitimacy suffers from the covert channels of interest representation and the absence of open competition of interests within the public administration. As a result, partisan groups enjoying privileged access to the government can prosper at the expense of other groups or the public as a whole.

Finally, the legitimacy problem stems from insufficient accountability of the Lithuanian public administration to the public, directly or through the legislature. Incidences of administrative corruption within the public administration, including bribes to overlook breaches of existing regulations, to smooth customs procedures or to win public procurement contracts, indicate that public agencies and civil servants do not always act in accordance with the rule of law. The recent World Bank"s study on corruption in the post-communist countries revealed a high level of administrative corruption in Lithuania compared to other countries in the Central and Eastern Europe.[4]

2. LITHUANIAN SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY AFTER COMMUNISM

In the first years of transition, institutional and policy changes in Lithuania, as in other Central and Eastern European countries, were driven primarily by a rejection of the post-communist legacy rather than comprehensive reform programmes. This destructive (rather than constructive) approach retarded the development of new accountability instruments. Although more than a decade has passed since democratic reforms were first introduced in Lithuania, the post-communist administrative legacy is still reflected in the Lithuanian system of accountability.

The Lithuanian system of administrative accountability is still heavily biased towards the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. The thrust of this doctrine is that ministers are accountable to the public, through the parliaments, for their own performance as well as that of their ministries, whereas civil servants are internally accountable to their political masters by explaining and justifying their actions through the institutional hierarchy of positions.

The persistence of this doctrine is partially attributable to the emphasis laid on hierarchical accountability structures under Communism. The Communist party, the only real decision-making power at that time, approved appointments and controlled the performance of officials employed in both central and local authorities. The doctrine of ministerial accountability mostly assigns blame for administrative failures rather than plays a more constructive role of ensuring democratic accountability.

The doctrine of ministerial responsibility is deeply entrenched in the main legal documents of Lithuanian government, including the Constitution, the

Statute of the Parliament and the Act on the Government. One of the most important and frequently used instruments of ministerial responsibility is "government hours" in the Parliament (i.e.questions to the Government). During the parliament sessions, members of the cabinet are invited every Tuesday and Thursday to the plenary to respond to questions from the MPs. However, this instrument is not very effective as the parliamentary review of a particular ministry is limited to discussing burning issues[5] and receiving "an account" from the Government about the implementation of a certain policy.

3. CASE SITUATIONS ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POLICY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

Specific aspects of administrative accountability are presented in three case situations on accountability for policy, financial management and administrative discretion respectively in the context of the Lithuanian situation.

3.1 Case Situation 1: Implementation and non-implementation of policy commitments

Governmental policy commitments are specified in numerous official documements. The most significant are the Government Programme and Strategic Priorities of the Government, the Government Action Plan, the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (European Union Accession Strategy) and ministries" strategic action plans.

A recent study found that about 85 percent of all policy commitments in Lithuania are respected, indicating that systems of monitoring and accountability for policy commitments inside the public administration are relatively proficient.[6] The apparently high rate of implementation success may be explained by the fact that implementation in Lithuania is often defined solely in terms of the formal meeting of a policy commitment rather than the quality or outputs resulting from the implementation of policy commitments.

This perception of implementation can, at least partially, be attributed to the hierarchical and legalistic nature of the communist administrative heritage. Under Communism public officials were primarily concerned with carrying out formal orders rather than implementing their substantive provisions in practice.[7] When priority is assigned to the formal implementation, policy-makers tend to respond to the demands for higher quality of public services with promises of new policy commitments rather than specific outputs. Frequently problems are solved in an overtly legalistic way, e.g. by setting up new institutions, adopting laws or even entire policies.

Very often, though, the government advisors in the Prime Minister"s Office identify factors internal to the state institutions (in particular inadequate structures of management) as the main reasons for implementation failures. However, non-implementation of policy commitments can also be related to factors external to the state institutions. Interviewed line ministries identified insufficient budgets as the most common reason for non-implementation.[8] This is not surprising when the policy process is disconnected from the budget process. In order to ensure that policy commitments are met, "it is imperative that the Government finds the necessary time on the Cabinet agenda, provides a slot on the legislative program, realistically assesses parliamentary capacity, and flows the necessary funding"[9].

3.2 Case Situation 2: Financial management

Although there are only 13 ministries in the central government, the Ministry of Finance has to deal with 150 managers of budgetary appropriations. They are entitled to submit requests to the budget and, after their approval by the Parliament, to draw down budget money from their individual accounts in the Treasury"s system within the limits of earmarked allocations.

Although an effective payment system has been set up in the Treasury, the reporting and monitoring system is still underdeveloped. A recent institutional review of the Ministry of Finance revealed a concentration on inputs with insufficient attention being paid to output-based management of budgetary appropriations.[10] This situation is partly and inheritage from the Soviet past when the role of the Ministry of Finance in the management of budget expenditure primarily concerned accounting. The SIGMA report indicated that the management of budget expenditures in most line ministries and other state institutions "appears to be essentially a bookkeeping function".[11]

Until recently, the role of the State Controller"s Office in the exercise of external control over the management of budget expenditure was limited to conducting financial and compliance audits. Although the State Controller"s Office is now empowered by law to carry our performance audits, its capacity is very limited.

The combination of ineffective control and management of budget expenditures undermines the efficiency and effectiveness of financial management systems in the public sector. The implementation of policy commitments, which are set out in various governmental documents, still remains the main indicator of public institutions" performance. In this situation, internal audit has a high potential of enhancing effectiveness and in particular efficiency of financial management inside the public service. The establishment of an internal audit system is described in the following section.

3.3 Case Situation 3: Administrative discretion: case study of inspection and supervision[12]

There are many inspection and supervision institutions entitled to supervise the operation of private companies and, if violations are discovered, to impose fines. Although all investors interviewed by the the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) agreed that many inspections are required for perfectly valid reasons, most investors asserted that many inspections are duplicative or redundant. In order to solve this problem, in 2000 the Government reorganised five market supervision institutions with overlapping functions.

First, the State Veterinary Service, the State Hygiene Inspectorate and the State Quality Inspectorate were re-organised into inspectorates for food and non-food products. Second, the State Seed Inspectorate and the State Grain Inspectorate were merged into one State Seed and Grain Service. Besides eliminating duplication of inspection activities, this reform allowed the central government to reduce the number of staff employed in all institutions by 537 with annual savings expected to be about LTL 8-10 mln.[13]

Moreover, inspections are a significant sources of administrative corruption. One the one hand, some private businesses attempt to bribe inspectors to hide infractions of existing regulations. On the other hand, some inspectors try to extort bribes from private businesses by even threatening certain actions against them.

To mitigate these problems, the FIAS study proposed to insert greater transparency and accountability in inspection and supervision systems. More specifically, it was recommended that the relevant legislation and regulations should be readily available to the public and that inspectors should follow clear guidelines regarding their activities.

Finally, the performance of inspectors and inspection institutions are not closely monitored. The FIAS study suggested that inspectors' reports should be reviewed regularly within each inspectorate and somewhat less frequently by the central government to check for evidence of inconsistent action, unusual patterns and unnecessary inspections.

4. REFORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

4.1 Introduction

The above analysis of accountability for policy commitments, financial management and administrative discretion revealed a relatively proficient system of monitoring policy commitments on the one hand and very deficient systems of accountability for financial management and administrative discretion on

the other. This situation was caused by the dominance of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, favouring accountability for policy at the expense of accountability for financial management and administrative discretion.

A combination of increasing demands from the public, accelerating accession to the EU and growing complexity of public administration institutions render the almost exclusive reliance on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility insufficient. For instance, the objective of ensuring the effective accountability of complex and large ministries is almost unattainable under the dotrine of ministerial responsibility without the introduction of "bottom-up" accountability instruments.

Although the introduction of market- and citizen-orientated forms of administrative accountability can be beneficial both from the standpoint of democracy as well as effective and efficient management, their development has gained little priority in Lithuania. To explain this, the following section discusses the dynamics of administrative accountability in the past few years. Since there was no comprehensive reform of administrative accountability, the analysis focuses on the implications of different public administration reforms on administrative accountability.

4.2 Measures of public administration reform and their effects on administrative accountability

The accelerating public administration reforms in the past few years have generated significant effects on administrative accountability. Since this article does not allow for an assessment of all public administration reforms, only the most important measures of public administration reform with current and future effects on administrative accountability will be discussed.

However, it should be emphasised that there have been no attempts to co-ordinate the introduction of new accountability instruments, nor have there been any attempts to comprehensively reform the system of administrative accountability. In the 1999 National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) the Government recognised the need to design tailored accountability regimes for institutions carrying out policy implementation functions, regulatory functions, inspection and supervision functions as well as licensing and certification functions. Although the Government committed itself to this objective in the period of 1999-2002[14], no progress was achieved by 2001.

Internal audit

Preparations to establish an internal financial control system were launched as early as in December 1997 when the Government decided to create a

commission to prepare an Internal Control System Implementation Programme and to draft necessary legal acts. Since 1997 the Government has taken a number of legal steps to enhance internal audit, culminating in the adoption of the Government Resolution of February 2001 on the internal audit of state enterprises and institutions. Under the Resolution internal financial control units should be set up (or re-organised) in all ministries, regional administrations and other public institutions or state enterprises employing more than 500 staff.

Despite the adoption of numerous legal and institutional measures, their implementation and application proved to be very difficult in practice. Bringing financial control into line with EU requirements requires a mobilisation of effort from officials employed in the central government and large amounts of external support. However, due to the fiscal crisis the Government could not allocate the sufficient amount of resources required for the establishment of internal audit units.

If legal provisions can be adopted and responsible institutions can be designated within a reasonable timescale, recruitment and training of competent staff as well as the full development and implementation of internal audit standards take much longer. For instance, in order to ensure the functional independence of internal audit units inside spending institutions, the mere adoption of relevant legislative provisions is not sufficient – politicians and seniors officials should recognise the power of internal audit units to control their financial decisions in practice.

Finally, the establishment of an internal audit system suffered from ineffective co-ordination. It was initially envisaged that the Ministry of Public Administration Reforms and Local Authorities would organise training for internal audit units staff, while the Ministry of Finance would co-ordinate the performance of these units, including the provision of necessary methodological guidance. For several months neither ministry wanted to take a co-ordinating role, but the Ministry of Finance finally conceded. In its report on Lithuania, the Commission urged Lithuanian authorities to re-consider the relationship between the two ministries.[15]

Performance management

In the NPAA the Government proposed to move towards a more managerial system of accountability based on performance management. It was noted that "effective control of responsible institutions and their effective accountability requires laying down performance standards, their improvement and ongoing collection of information concerning the implementation of the performance standards".[16]

In order to co-ordinate and facilitate the introduction and development of performance standards, the Government initially proposed to prepare a public administration evaluation and monitoring methodology in 2001. However, since no efforts were taken to carry out this measure, its implementation has been delayed until 2003. Again, ineffective co-ordination between the Ministry of the Interior (responsible for the introduction of performance management) and the Ministry of Finance (responsible for the introduction of a reporting and monitoring system for budget programmes) prevented synergy effects from the introduction of these two measures.

Strategic planning

The Government has achieved more progress in introducing the system of strategic planning in the central government. To co-ordinate and facilitate the introduction of strategic planning systems, the Government set up the Strategic Planning Committee of the Cabinet (in 1999), the Strategic Planning Division under the Government Office (in 2000) and adopted the strategic planning methodology.

The introduction of strategic planning during the 2000 budget process allowed the Government to bring strategic priorities of the government, fiscal resources and ministerial programmes into a single framework. Strategic priorities of the Government and budget ceilings guided all appropriation managers in the preparation of strategic action plans and budgetary programmes. The strategic action plans, which included the description of objectives, programmes, activities and outputs, were made available to the public.

The introduction of strategic management increased performance orientation and accountability of appropriation managers for strategic objectives of the government and fiscal resources. However, the strategic planning system is not perfect. For instance, a monitoring and reporting system, which is a fundamental part of any planning system, is not in place yet.

Scrutiny of functions and efficiency

When the 1999 economic crisis materialised into severe budget constraints, the Government was forced to accelerate the implementation of public management reforms. In order to achieve cuts in public expenditures in the short term, the Government resorted, at the outset of the reform, to such measures as forced vacations or reduced salaries in the civil service. Although they proved to be effective in achieving cuts of public expenditure, the negative side-effects of these measures (e.g. difficulties in attracting and keeping qualified personnel in the civil service) soon forced the Government to give them up.

In 1999, at the request of Lithuania"s Prime Minister, a working group carried out an audit of the Lithuanian public administration.[17] To implement the audit"s conclusions, the Government adopted a Resolution on further structural reform of the public administration and set up a "Sunset" Commission. One of its first tasks was to check the need for various public agencies and their functions.

For instance, the Commission recommended a re-organisation of two institutions with overlapping responsibilities for fisheries – the Department of Fishery Resources in the Ministry of the Environment and the Fisheries Department in the Ministry of Agriculture – into one Fisheries Department under the Ministry of Agriculture. It is expected that this decision, which was carried out in 2000, will bring annual savings of LTL 0.5 mln.[18]

Accountability to the citizens

To enhance the accountability of individual public administration institutions to the citizens and to introduce the principles of openness and transparency in the decision-making process, the Parliament adopted the Law on Public Administration in 1999. The significance of the Law lies in the establishment of "administrative procedure" defining the relationship between the citizens and public administration institutions.

Notwithstanding good intentions, the implementation and enforcement of the Law proved problematic. After the adoption of the Law, the Government passed few resolutions implementing its provisions, one example being the procedure for providing public services to the citizens in public administration institutions.

Following the adoption of the procedure, public institutions reviewed their internal procedures and made them more favourable to the citizens. Thus, the introduction of this procedure increased citizen orientation in the public administration and service delivery. However, in the absence of monitoring system at the central level, the enforcement of the procedure is problematic.

Ethics in public office

The Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests in the Public Service was passed in 1997 in order to attribute superiority to public interests vis-à-vis private interests during the decision-making process. The Governmental High Commission on Ethics in Public Office, which was set up to monitor the implementation of the Law, is authorised to scrutinise all cases allegedly violating the provisions of the Law.

The Law itself and the Commission"s performance contributed to increasing the transparency of public decisions. Under this legislation, public

officials are required to reveal conflicts of interest. For instance, its conclusions about unethical behaviour in public office forced several senior officials (including cabinet ministers) to leave public office. For instance, in 1998, after the Commission confirmed the media's announcement that the Minister for Agriculture used a public plane for private purposes, the Prime Minister forced him to resign from the cabinet.

However, the effectiveness of Commission's activities suffers from the non-binding nature of its decisions as well as unwillingness of public and private institutions to supply the Commission with relevant financial and other information. Although the Commission brought an action against two mayors to revoke allegedly illegal municipal decisions, court proceedings are being repeatedly adjourned.[19] Recently, one mayor, who provided municipal assistance to his private business damaged by storm, was dismissed by the municipal council. Moreover, ruling parties are reluctant to accept the Commission's decisions. Recently, one cabinet minister even sued the Commission for the damages caused by the Commission's unfavourable decision.

Personal responsibility of officials

The government has made efforts to enhance the personal responsibility of civil servants. The Law on the Civil Service, which was adopted by the Parliament in 2000, provides for disciplinary and financial penalties for unlawful activities committed by civil servants. For instance, civil servants are required to reimburse any damage arising from their unlawful activities.

Further, under recent amendments to the Criminal Code, a bribe is treated as a criminal from the moment a civil servant promises to accept or solicits a bribe. However, the former provisions are rarely applied in practice, whereas the latter provisions suffer from ineffective practices of investigation and prosecution.

Many policy failures, in particular in the privatisation area, were attributed to the problem of collective decision-making – "when everyone is responsible, no one is responsible".[20] Therefore, a wider application of personal responsibility was proposed to enhance the transparency of decision-making in the civil service.

5. FACTORS AFFECTING THE EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

Despite the introduction of new accountability instruments over the course of public administration reforms in Lithuania, the development of an administrative accountability system has been too slow to reduce the mismatch between the present situation and the need for effective accountability of the

public administration to the public. The main reason is the low status that has been given to accountability in the hierarchy of reform objectives. Until the economic downturn in 1999, public administration reform was driven primarily by the objective of Lithuania's accession to the EU, when it was complemented with measures aimed at reducing budgetary expenditures.

5.1 Limited capacity to reform

The capacity to reform has been low in Lithuania. With the exception of the two last governments headed by Prime Ministers Kubilius and Paksas respectively, most Lithuanian governments have lacked a strong commitment to administrative reform, including that of accountability arrangements.

A high degree of politicisation during the transition, stemming in part from the existence of two competing political parties (the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Lithuanian Conservatives), has led to two large waves of partisan replacement of career officials and political appointees following changes in parliamentary majorities. Consequently, due to its short life span and the lack of institutional memory, the political leadership in Lithuania has been unable to advance administrative reform by asserting legitimate control over the bureaucracy.

The ability of the political executive to exert control over the bureaucracy is further limited by the absence of governing ideologies with clear positions with regard to administrative reform. Platforms upon which Lithuanian political parties center their political campaigns, however, in most cases leave out public administration reform. A single exception is the recent political platform of the ruling Liberal party.

Also, the ability of civil servants to advise the political executive about public administration reform is limited. The Ministry of Public Administration Reforms and Local Authorities, which was set up in 1994 and merged with the Ministry of the Interior in the beginning of 2000, did not harbour sufficient expertise and, more importantly, authority to draw up and carry out a comprehensive administrative reform programme.

Most versions of the Public Administration Reform Strategy only set out broad directions of reforms without giving sufficient details on necessary public administration reform measures. Thus, public administration changes, which are implemented in the absence of a consistent and coherent reform framework, are un-coordinated and contingent.

5.2 Little interest in accountability

Transformation of administrative accountability is also impeded by a lack of interest among elected politicians or political appointees in accountability.

The ability of Lithuania's legislature to monitor the performance of public organisations is still limited due to limited expertise, inadequate flow of information and heavy legislative burden in the transition process.

Also, the ruling majority parties in the legislature were reluctant to scrutinise the activities of governments appointed with their consent. They started to exercise a more extensive scrutiny of governmental activities only after the appointment of the first coalition government in the end of 2000.

A recent study indicates severe "demand" problems in the Lithuanian system of accountability - elected politicians are unwilling to devote more time for the activities of legislative oversight.[21] For instance, the ruling parties have been reluctant to strengthen the authority of the Governmental High Commission on Ethics in Public Office or the independence of the State Controller's Office.

The slow introduction and especially practical application of new accountability methods can be partially explained by the limited interest of elected politicians and political appointees in more effective accountability.

5.3 "Bottom-up" efforts of reform

The previous sections have demonstrated that the transformation to a democratic system of accountability has been impeded by weaknesses of "top-down" reform efforts. The evolution of accountability arrangements has considerably depended on three main factors:

- the willingness of individual public institutions to recognise and eliminate the discrepancy between old instruments of accountability and new challenges;
- the receptiveness of the institutional environment to new reform efforts; as well as
- reform pressure stemming from the civil society, regulated communities and particularly external institutions.

In the absence of "top-down" guidance, these factors have affected public institutions at varying degrees. The fact that public institutions have a great deal of discretion in determining their own accountability systems has contributed to the emergence of an inconsistent accountability system.

The ability of individual organisations to recognise the inadequacy of old accountability instruments and to adjust to new challenges has been limited and uneven. "Bottom-up" adjustments were crucially dependent on the impact of individual personalities. If in some public offices reform-minded personalities introduced practices of consultation with concerned groups, other public offices have retained an "elitist" character based on old working habits and unwillingness to open up their proceedings to the public.

5.4 External and internal pressures for reform

Reform pressure stemming from the civil society and regulated communities has not been very significant in the first few years of transformation. This can be partly explained by the inherited culture of citizen passivity as well as the weak organisation of non-governmental institutions.

In the absence of strong domestic reform guidance, most changes in the system of accountability are clearly attributable to external pressures. The introduction of several significant accountability instruments were clearly linked to external pressures with the EU playing a dominant role.

The EU's impact on administrative accountability extends beyond internal audit discussed in the previous section. As a result of the EU's pressure, the Government made several important decisions with favourable implications for administratitive accountability, including the re-organisation of the Lithuanian Standardisation Board from a state institution into a non-profit association allowing for better involvement of the industry or the adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy to fight against corruption.

CONCLUSION

Despite the introduction of several accountability instruments, the system of administrative accountability remains biased towards the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. The dominance and persistence of ministerial responsibility favours accountability for policy at the expense of accountability for financial management or administrative discretion. The present deficiencies in the system of administrative accountability mean that the potential of administrative accountability to enhance the legitimacy of Lithuania's public administration has not been properly utilised.

There is a strong case for introducing market- and citizen-orientated accountability instruments of a "bottom-up" nature. For instance, since individual ministers can no longer ensure all aspects of accountability, financial management and administrative discretion could be brought into the officials' sphere of direct accountability.[22] However, despite the public administration reform in Lithuania, the development of an administrative accountability system is too slow to reduce the mismatch between the present situation and the need for more effective accountability of public administration to the public.

The reform of administrative accountability is constrained by a combination of limited capacity for reform and insufficient interest in accountability. In the absence of strong domestic reform guidance, most changes in the system of accountability are clearly attributable to external pressures, in particular the EU.

Since many public agencies are unwilling to introduce new instruments of "bottom-up" accountability, "top-down" reforms are critical. Fortunately, such domestic reforms as the scrutiny of functions and efficiency or the "administrative procedure" illustrates the increasingly "top-down" nature of public administration reform, driven not only by external reform pressures, but also by domestic considerations.

In the future, the public administration will come under increasing attack from the public concerned with the quality of public services and the lack of accountability and transparency of administrative decisions. In addition, Lithuania's accession to the EU will generate further challenges for the system of administrative accountability.

For Lithuanian decision-makers this means that significant institutional and policy reform efforts aimed at reforming existing accountability structures need to be carried out urgently. Recent public administration reforms have a high potential of transforming the present tradition of accountability into a more effective and democratic system of accountability, only if they are fully implemented and enforced.

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LITHUANIAN-POLISH STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: GENESIS AND PROSPECTS

Vladas Sirutavičius

The intention to discuss the content and development of the Lithuanian-Polish inter-state relations has been sparked off, at least formally, not only by the date of 5 September (on this date ten years ago, as we know, the two countries restored their diplomatic relations), but likewise by another date of not lesser importance – the middle of 2002, when it is planned to announce at the NATO Summit the second round of the Alliance's expansion. We believe that these two dates could also serve as a good background in assessing the present state of the relationship of these two states which is usually defined as "strategic partnership". (As we know, the first to use this term was the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Algirdas Saudargas, and later – in the autumn of the same 1997 – the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Geremek applied the same phrase to define the Polish-Lithuanian relations.)

If a succinct definition of the meaning of these two words (which, undoubtedly, sound somehow unusual for most ordinary Lithuanians and Poles) could be found, it would be possible to state that they express inter-state relationship at several levels: firstly, very good and friendly relations at the top political level, which usually are institutionalized in one or another form; secondly, intensive cooperation in the spheres of the highest strategic importance for both countries, first of all, in the political-military (and security) area; and finally, the third level, where good and friendly political relations are "transferred" to a lower – "public" level, which means dynamic and mutually beneficial economic relations, intensive cultural exchange, cooperation at the level of various NGO's as well as individuals. Such a definition of "strategic partnership" relationship, however formal it may be, shows that the development of this relation, and its intensity (at the various levels mentioned above), neither is nor can be uniform, that it depends (in the broadest sense) on the countries' resources and, it might indeed be more important to emphasize – on the influence of the international environment. In this article, there will be no contemplation on the achievements of the partnership (there has been written

a lot on this subject by the politicians of both countries), we will rather analyze two other problems: first, what factors have influenced the formation of the strategic partnership relation, and, second, what are the challenges to threaten this relationship.

It is obvious that since 1997, the Lithuanian-Polish relationship has acquired a new, particular dynamics, and political scientists as well as politicians find more than a few facts to confirm this[1]. True, it would also be necessary to note here that the second "upsurge" in the bilateral relations (the first, certainly, ought to be considered the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good Neighborly Cooperation, signed in April 1994) did not appear in an empty place. In the eve of the above-mentioned period, there occurred significant changes in the Polish-Lithuanian relationship. One of the most important events was the State Border Treaty and the Joint Declaration on the Consolidation of Bilateral Relations, signed in the spring of 1996 during the visit of the Polish President to Lithuania. There likewise were various joint statements made by the Heads of both countries, which also testified about the beginning of a new stage in the bilateral relationship. Thus, for example, in the autumn of 1996, the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania issued a statement which demonstrated an attitude of great meaningfulness for the security of both countries: that without a secure Poland there cannot be a secure Lithuania, likewise without a secure Lithuania there cannot be a secure Poland.

A significant and new feature of the already strategic partnership was the literal "institutional building of relations". In other words, there started a vigorous and qualitatively new institutionalization of bilateral relations, which also acquired new forms of cooperation. Without going into much detail, I would like to mention that in the year of 1997, the Presidential Consultative Committee was established, the legislative powers set up the Lithuanian and Polish Parliamentary Assembly, while the executive ones – the Government Cooperation Council. The parties started to increasingly coordinate their actions in respect to various regional initiatives. The cooperation developed in other important spheres as well: firstly, in the military and energy areas, likewise in the regional and trans-border cooperation, at the level of local administrations and many others.

It is also important to mention that the strategic partnership gained the momentum namely at the time when the prospects for Poland to become a part of the transatlantic structures were becoming increasingly evident, while it was also more and more obvious that Lithuania will not be included into the first round of NATO's expansion. Thus the anxiety that, with Poland getting increasingly integrated into the transatlantic Western structures, and with the prospects for its becoming a NATO member turning more definite, the relations with Lithuanian "might again deteriorate", turned to have been misplaced.[2]

Furthermore, the "strategic partnership relation" managed to escape any deeper crisis even at the time when in 1999 Poland became a member of the Alliance, while Lithuania was left outside the "closed door" of NATO. Just on the contrary, co-operation in the military sphere as well acquired a new momentum, which is exemplified by the formation and development of a joint military battalion LITPOLBAT and, especially, by the bilateral Treaty on Defense Cooperation, signed in February 2001.

The more pessimistic scenarios failed to come true, we believe, due to several reasons. From the point of view of Lithuania, the Polish "shoulder", or rather speaking less metaphorically but more geopolitically, the territorial contact with Poland (now a NATO member) acquired exceptional importance and started to be viewed as geostrategically significant (i.e. providing a counterbalance to Russia). While from the point of view of Poland (again as a NATO member), the enhancement and invigoration of strategic relations with Lithuania is also considered a matter of significance, as Lithuania, due to its relative political and economic stability and democratic development, forms an important geopolitical link connecting the Eastern Baltic region with the Central Eastern Europe (namely with Belarus and Ukraine), and thus occupies a strategically important position in the shaping of Poland's eastern policy, which aims at becoming in the future an important factor in the formation of the common NATO's (as well as the EU's) eastern policy. Finally, it is also impossible to disregard the fact that the "elevation" of the Lithuanian-Polish cooperation to a higher, strategic partnership level contributes to the generation of security and stability in the Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, thus turning into a certain positive accomplishment, a kind of a token of the cooperation of these countries with their partners in the West.

On the other hand, it is not uncommon among observers to start wondering about the content of the partnership and its effectiveness. Without embarking here on an extensive discussion of the issues related to this problem, we are, nevertheless, inclined to note that, in discussing the effectiveness of the strategic relationship and its prospects, the existing asymmetry between the countries could not be ignored. Even though the geopolitical orientation of the partners coincides, there nevertheless still exist considerable differences between them, which might affect the content of the cooperation. There are great differences in the cultural-civilisational, political and, eventually, in the economic potentials of Poland and Lithuania. Even of greater importance still can be the different geopolitical gravitation (i.e. the total of historically and objectively formed political, social and cultural prerequisites which influence the natural development of a state). Where the pro-western gravitation of Poland does not raise any major doubts, Lithuania is rather inclined to perform the function of a neutralizing buffer (between Poland and Russia). Suspiciousness or hostility

towards the West could be regarded as one of the expressions of the above (it is best illustrated by the attitude towards foreign investments).

Nevertheless, let us return to the issue of the genesis of strategic partnership. From the historic standpoint, and resorting to the geopolitical terminology, it is possible to state that the aspiration for "strategic partnership" between the countries was determined by their *contest for power*. In other words, a state, in its strive to increase (maximize) its own power and to limit (minimize) that of its rival, was forced to search for *strategic partners*. A concrete expression of such kind of endeavor was the formation of political-military alliances aimed at facilitating the implementation of the above-mentioned effort (or a political strategy). Namely such conception, typical to the realistic interpretation of international relations, prevailed in the Europe of the period between the wars.

It is evident that the "strategic partnership" between Lithuania and Poland took shape under the influence of different ideas and in a completely different context of international relations, which certainly exerted an objective influence on the particular content of the mutual relations between the parties. In a more schematic expression, and on the most general sense, the formation of the new context was affected by the end of the bipolar world order (expressed in the collapse of the soviet political system and, finally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself) and the eastward expansion of the Western democratic institutes. In this context, the geopolitical orientation of both Poland and Lithuania coincided: they linked their security with their aim of joining the Euro-Atlantic and European structures. This aspiration, or geopolitical orientation, "placed" certain "restrictions" on the candidate countries, one of the more important of which became "good relations with the neighbors", which implied unconditional acceptance of the existing frontiers and strict compliance with the democratic standards (first of all in relation to national minorities). Besides, the importance of the "outside factor" to the Lithuanian-Polish relations, especially to the process of "reconciliation", was emphasized by more than a few political scientists. At the same time, authors draw attention to the still persisting atmosphere of distrust in both societies, which obviously has been mostly affected by the historically formed differences in the social-cultural development of both countries[3].

It is therefore possible to maintain that the future development of the Lithuanian and Polish relations will also depend upon the interrelation of both the outside (changes in the international environment) and inside (social, political and economic dynamics of the states and societies) factors. As both elements mentioned above are intricate enough, with equally complicated being also their interrelation, thus it is hardly possible to present their comprehensive analysis within the boundaries of one article. I, therefore, would phrase my question in the following way: what are the main challenges to the strategic

partnership of Lithuania and Poland? (Probably the most serious mistake would be to get lulled by the prospects of the "real strategic partnership", without trying to realize the potential threats to this relationship.)

I will start from the impact of the outside factors or, in other words, from the question of how the Lithuanian-Polish strategic partnership can potentially be affected by the dynamics of the eastward expansion of the Western democratic institutions and the possible developments thereof. It is highly unlikely that, even in the eventuality of the most pessimistic scenario coming true, i.e. that Lithuania is not included into the second round of NATO expansion either, it could in any way directly affect (in the short term) the content of the strategic partnership and cause any significant disturbance in the cooperation of both countries. It would be far more detrimental if the US decided to reduce its influence and commitments in Europe. This could unleash the contest for power with the resultant direct threat to the stability of the Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the European visit of President Bush has demonstrated that Washington, at least rhetorically, is trying to coordinate the interests of its national security (MDI) with the commitments to take an active part in the European processes, and first of all, in NATO expansion. It would, however, be wrong to disregard a possibility (in a long term) that slackened processes of Euro-Atlantic and European expansion might cause instability, and first of all it could be said about Lithuania. This would find it expression within the society in the form of "disappointment with the West", anti-Western attitudes, increase of nationalism, while the political elite, in response to the crisis, might attempt to change the geopolitical orientation (e.g. by turning towards neutrality), which might already directly challenge the strategic partnership.

Another eventual contradiction, which could affect the strategic partnership, is inherent, first of all, in Poland's eastern policy and, secondly, is related to the situation of the Polish community and its treatment in Lithuania. In the newly adopted (in January 2000) Poland's Foreign Policy Strategy, Warsaw is balancing between two attitudes: to influence the democratization process of its nearest neighbors and their social-economic development. At the same time, it is noted in the Strategy that the national minorities ought to be viewed as an "important link of good neighborhood". Thus Poland, for the purpose of the development of cooperation, is trying not to escalate any disagreement with Lithuania about the Polish national minority. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that there exists another attitude: to promote the Polish issue in Lithuania disregarding any possible consequences either for Lithuania's internal situation or for bilateral relations. It could, therefore, be possible to presume that, in the eventuality of Lithuania's Western integration losing momentum, this second tendency in the policy of Poland might intensify. From the point of view of Poland, Lithuanian integration into the western

structures ought to facilitate the democratic resolution of the Polish national minority issue. This is confirmed by the address of Lithuania's Poles [in March 2000] to the international community with an urge to support the aspiration of Lithuania to become a member of NATO. In Lithuania any promotion of the issue of national minorities in such a context would most likely be interpreted as a threat to its statehood, which, in its turn, would again complicate the strategic partnership relation.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LITHUANIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP)

Živilė Šatūnienė

There are several features which underline the specifics of Lithuania's agricultural structure as compared to the EU countries:

– First, more than 20 percent of Lithuania's working population are employed in the agricultural sector. Abundant activity in agriculture characterises developing countries; the share of labour in the EU agricultural sector at average makes 5,1 percent[1];

– Second, approximately 3/5 of all farms in Lithuania are not bigger than 10 hectare, and one forth of the rest is 10-20 hectare[2]. This data shows that Lithuania's agriculture is dominated by small and medium-size farms, while the EU agricultural sector features medium and big farms (in 1987 three forth of all EU farms were bigger than 20 hectare[3], and among the three newly accepted countries in 1995, Finland and Sweden traditionally have big farms[4]).

Despite these differences in agricultural sector, Lithuania, as an aspiring EU membership country, is preparing for the complete integration of its agricultural and food industry into the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In this respect it is interesting to analyse how, taking into account CAP practice, state regulatory framework of agricultural economics and agricultural subsidies policy should be amended, and what impact might the implementation of EU regulations and subsidies' mechanisms have on Lithuania's agricultural sector producers and consumers.

Judging by the utilisation of financial resources figures, it is obvious that in recent years government's intervention in the state regulatory framework of agricultural economics was gradually intensifying[5], getting the nature of "social support" rather than "market regulation" (as it will be later disclosed, the recent state regulatory framework of agricultural economics is focused on supporting the employment in rural areas and maintenance of farmers' minimal level of living, and not on the promotion of productivity in agricultural production or reducing of production surplus). One could argue that such government policy is "pushed" by the agricultural community – it is within government's interest

to respond to the needs of the abundant agricultural population in order to secure political support[6]. Taking these conditions into consideration, a few preliminary hypotheses might be drawn, which will serve as the base for the analysis the consequences of the Lithuania's membership in CAP on the agricultural sector producers and consumers: 1) it is likely that state regulatory framework of Lithuanian agricultural economics and policy of subsidies for agriculture is not autonomous and it is influenced by the agricultural interest groups; 2) current Lithuania agricultural policy could be better disposed towards some producers' groups over others; 3) changes in the state regulatory framework of agricultural economics due to the membership in CAP may alter the current well-being of Lithuania agricultural producers, their separate groups and consumers; 4) anticipated shifts in producers'/consumers' well-being and the political resources they possess might encourage separate groups to influence government's negotiations for membership in CAP.

The main objectives of this article are as follows:

1) to analyse how the implementation of CAP regulations' and subsidies' mechanisms in Lithuania may alter the well-being of the country's agricultural producers, their separate groups and consumers;

2) to explain what groups and how would be interested in adjusting Lithuania's position in the negotiations for membership in CAP, and what capabilities for influencing the government policy those groups possess.

To fulfil these objectives, the research is completed by using a "two-level" model, introduced by R. D. Putnam in his article "*Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*".[7]

At "the first level", where the focus falls on the relationship between government and agricultural interest groups (producers), first of all, groups of agricultural producers, who benefit more from the government's current agricultural policy, will be identified. At "the second level", where the relationship between Lithuanian government and the EU is analysed, Lithuania's measures to regulate agricultural market and farmers' support policy will be compared with adequate CAP mechanisms, and basic expected regulatory amendments, which Lithuania will have to implement due to the aspirations for membership in CAP, will be defined. In this level research will also focus on how the amended to CAP standards Lithuania's agricultural policy will affect the well-being of Lithuania agricultural producers, their separate groups and consumers. Finally, the theoretical aspects of the interest groups' influence on the government policy will be presented (mainly based on the arguments by R. Hague, M. Harrop and S. Breslin, as well as M. Olson, and other authors); based on these theoretical assumptions, considerations by various interest groups to influence government's negotiations with the EU for membership in CAP will be forecasted and their potential capabilities to engage in such political action will be measured.

1. R. D. PUTNAM'S "TWO-LEVEL" ANALYSIS

The "two-level" R. D. Putnam's model explains how the international politics is created, which factors determine whether international agreement will be reached, who/what is influencing the content of such agreement, etc. According to R. D. Putnam, the politics of international negotiations could be analysed as "two-level" game[8]:

– at the first, i.e. "national", level principal actors are a country's interest groups and national government; the interest groups endeavour to secure favourable to them of a policy the implementation, while the national government, on the other hand, is interested in gaining support of interest groups and forming the political coalition of such supporters;

– at the second (or "international") level national governments are negotiating among themselves[9]; here, at the expense of international agreements, each of them attempts to maximise the benefit of their interest groups, or, at least, to minimise the negative consequences (including the cases of reaching no agreement) to the national interest groups.

Thus, analytically the decision-making of international agreements could be divided into two levels: 1) "the international decision-making" level, i.e. negotiations among states, when agreement of some kind of content is approved (or not); 2) "the ratification" level, i.e. the evaluation of international agreements back home by interest groups. According to R. Putnam, "ratification" should not be considered as formal, i.e. the approval of international agreements by local interest groups is not required; "ratification" is understood as the approval and harmonisation of the international agreement with the interests of concerned groups[10].

Processes at both levels are inner-combined, i.e. changes at one level do influence the negotiations at the other level; thus, during the international negotiations a state representative, submitting any international resolution, must not only foresee its approval by other countries, but also "ratification" by the represented country's interest groups. Besides, an active national representative at the international negotiations has to do his or her best to lobby for such decision which would be the most favourable for the country's interest groups.

In general, according to R. D. Putnam, every national government at any international negotiations has a certain "win-set"[11], which contains options for possible international agreements, acceptable by country's interest groups and government itself, and which would be "ratified" by the country's interest groups, if they had to decide by having the only other alternative – "no international decision at all". Size of such "win-sets" to a great extent determines the likelihood for international agreements to be approved as well as the content of the approved agreements. R. D. Putnam specifies some factors influencing the size of "win-

set" and the flexibility of the government at the international negotiations[12], however in this article, with respect to foreseen analysis (of which one of the main goals is to learn, how country's interest groups can influence Lithuania's negotiations for membership in CAP), the allocation of interest groups' weight in the sector and their political influence on government will be considered as the major factors, determining the government's flexibility during the international negotiations.

The more autonomous in respect to interest groups a national government is, the more flexible its position might be during the international negotiations and thus – the fewer possibilities that no agreement will be reached[13].

Having R. D. Putnam's levels of negotiations/relations in mind, further analysis will focus on how Lithuania's membership in CAP will shift the beneficial situation of various interest groups and what influence those groups might have on government's negotiations for the country's participation in CAP.

2. LITHUANIA'S AGRICULTURAL MARKET REGULATION AND AGRICULTURE SUPPORT POLICY: DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS

2.1. Tools of State Regulatory Framework of Lithuanian Agricultural Economics

A close analysis of the country's agriculture support policy and regulation of agricultural market provides the following main intervention measures used in Lithuania:

1. The interventional purchases are the most important measures regulating the country's domestic market of agricultural products

The idea of such interventional mechanism is as follows: if supply of some particular agricultural/food products exceeds demand (due to the seasonal variations of agricultural production, etc.), state purchases the surplus production, aiming to maintain prices of agricultural products and to support farmers' income. Here are the main markets, supported by the interventional purchases' policy: cereal – wheat, rye, buckwheat, and peas; meat – cattle meat and meat conserves; milk – butter, milk powder, and milk conserves[14].

Interventional purchases are executed by the Lithuanian Agriculture and Food Market Regulation Agency established in 1998 upon the agreement from the Ministry of Agriculture's Board. Financial resources for these purchases are provided by commercial banks in the form of loan with state guarantee. Yearly

by July 1st, the government announces quotas of state purchases and the lowest marginal prices for the main agricultural products for the next year[15]. Under methodical considerations, allowing government effectively balance situation in various markets, several agricultural products' prices are determined yearly:

1) Target price – this is estimated approximate price which agricultural producers would have (and, of course, would like) to get if market conditions were perfect. Target or higher than target price theoretically would have to guarantee that a farmer who sold products in the market at that price will be able to cover his/her production costs, expenses of products' delivery to consumers, and would secure the ability to continue the agricultural activity the next season.

2) The lowest marginal price (or "*interventional price*") – this is relatively the lowest price for such agricultural products which cannot be sold out in the market. Every year the state pledges itself to purchase the surplus production (a fixed quota) at the lowest marginal price. For example, in the EU countries it is accepted that the lowest marginal price has to be lower than the target one by 20–30 percent[16].

2. Other measures used in Lithuania to support farmers: subsidisation of agricultural products purchase prices and the direct payments to farmers

Though in West European countries and the EU subsidisation of prices is gradually withdrawn[17], this kind of regulation measures is still rather popular in Lithuania (for buckwheat, flax, rape, etc.). Subsidisation is understood as the state "bonus" to the price offered by the processing enterprises for a certain product.

Direct payments in Lithuania were introduced only in 2000 for meat and sugar beet producers[18]. The purpose of this support tool is to aid farmer, i.e. to guarantee at least a minimal level of living, and not subsidise agricultural products' prices, which would boost the production surplus even more. A farmer sells as much products as market can absorb, and, according to the declared size of farming land and cattle, the government allocates a fixed allowance to support the farm's incomes.

3. Setting production quotas

In Lithuania this measure is used only for sugar beets. This is an establishment of high purchase prices and other kind of support, applied only for a certain output of production.

4. Other farming support measures – credits on favourable terms, training, etc.

Government allocates its funds not only for carrying out the above mentioned market regulation tools, but also for other purposes (assistance):

state investment programs, the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Funds, as well as for agricultural research, advisory service (consulting), training, etc. The state may, according to tender results, provide subsidised credits, compensate interest on the loans', assist in the event of accident, apply tax exemptions (e.g. for credit co-operatives)[19], etc. Since 1997, the Rural Support Fund has been the major financial source for nurturing rural economy and rural development; for the Fund's budget of expenditure in 1997-1999 see Table 1.:

Table 1. **Rural Support Fund's expenditures 1997-1999, million Lt**

Means	1997	1998	1999
1. Regulation of agricultural market economics and farmers' income support	260,0	241,5	183,6
1.1. subsidies for purchased (according quotas) agricultural products, export subsidies;	222,0	213,0	172,8
1.2. subsidies for materials of high quality;	16,0	14,6	7,6
1.3. partial covering of loans' interest;	19,0	6,7	2,0
1.4. support in event of accident, bee-keeping support.	3,0	7,2	1,2
2. State participation in priority investment programs:	94,0	103,7	76,8
2.1. Settlement of farmers;	61,0	68,0	29,5
2.2. Co-operation and agro-service;	0,2	1,2	6,1
2.3. New techniques and technologies;	3,0	2,1	1,8
2.4. Stock-breeding;	20,0	17,5	12,6
2.5. Organic farming;	1,0	1,4	0,2
2.6. Reorganisation of rural activities in less favourable areas;	2,0	1,7	1,5
2.7. Development of agricultural resources and products quality analysis system;	6,3	11,8	18,3
2.8. Registration and identification of livestock;	-	-	5,9
2.9. Compensation for diesel fuel.	-	-	0,9
3. Development of education, training, advisory service programs, and agriculture information system	20,0	23,0	18,0
4. Establishment of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund	8,0	20,0	2,1
5. Other means	-	-	115,9
In total:	382,0	388,2	396,4

Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture

5. Protection of agricultural producers against foreign competition, export inducement

The Lithuanian Government has set rather high, as compared to manufactured goods, conventional and preferential custom duties – especially for butter (conventional custom duty – 60 percent, autonomous – 65 percent *ad valorem*), wheat (accordingly, 50 percent and 55 percent), oil (if rape oil is among ingredients – accordingly, 50 percent and 55 percent, if not – 25 percent and 30 percent), sugar (87 percent), etc.[20] Besides, before Lithuania joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), facing critical market situation the country used to apply export subsidies (most of all for some milk and meat products exported to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)[21], and pledged to suspend any subsidies for agricultural products after Lithuania became WTO member state[22].

In Lithuania export is encouraged also by indirect means. According to the Lithuanian agricultural and food market regulation and export stimulation program[23], approved by the Lithuanian Government on June 30, 1998, the government can participate in the image making of Lithuanian agricultural and food products, can provide qualification training for export specialists, etc.

2.2. The distribution of wealth among separate agricultural producer groups as a result of the agricultural market regulation policy

Aiming to learn which Lithuanian agricultural producer groups relatively are better disposed to the current state regulatory framework of the country's agricultural economics and support policy, the following factors must be identified first:

1) what are the major problems in Lithuanian agricultural production and what are "market failures", the solutions of which (at least in accordance with liberalism logic) should ground government's role in managing the agricultural sector;

2) if and how effectively state regulation means actually help to solve the mentioned problems. (If regulation is targeted to other goals (other than solving identified problems), or if it is more intense than required, thus, which groups will relatively benefit from such government's policy?)

Lithuania's agricultural products' consumption and main (cereal, meat, and milk) agricultural production statistical data shows that these products (especially milk) are overproduced. For example, in 2000 local milk production satisfied consumer needs by 219 percent, meat – by 94-99 percent, cereal – by 110 percent[24]. **The production surplus** should be considered as one of the agricultural market problems in Lithuania, which oblige the government to

apply means endorsing farmers to limit milk and meat production, and the small-size producers (especially, milk) – to reorient themselves to other, not related to agriculture, activity.

It is understandable that speedy reduction of **abundant agricultural sector** (mainly at the expense of small-size farmers who form the majority) is hardly possible and could be dangerous due to the destabilising social consequences (spontaneous unemployment growth, public dissatisfaction with political decisions, etc.). Thus, for a limited period of time the government has to support even inefficiently working farmers, guaranteeing them the minimal level of living. However, saving resources, the government should gradually reorient from subsidising the inefficiently manufactured products' purchase prices to the direct payments to farmers.

A long run farmers' incomes uphold without intensifying the efficiency of agricultural production is unjustifiable. **The inefficiency of agricultural production** in Lithuania is mainly determined by the farm structure, also by the natural conditions, and lack of competitiveness. For example, according to the data of the Lithuanian Institute of Agrarian Economy[25], 42.6 percent of all farms that possess cows have 1 cow, 33.8 percent – 2 cows, 14.0 percent – 3 cows, 5.5 percent – 4 cows, 2.3 percent – 5 cows, and only 1.8 percent – more than 5 cows. **The dominance of small-size** milk **farms** in Lithuania determines relatively expensive milk production – the production cost is approximately twice higher than in West European countries[26]. Cereal production suffers similar situation – natural resources, climate, and other Lithuanian conditions do not give the country any advantage in competitive market: for example, in 1998 the average wheat yield in the country was 2.4 tons/hectare, while in the EU countries – 6.04 tons/ hectare[27]. Even in 1997, which so far (since 1990) is considered as the most successful in grain production, Lithuanian farmers' yield was more than twice lower than average grain yield in the EU countries[28]. Besides, since 1995 the cost of already inefficient cereal production was gradually rising due to the increasing fuel, fertilisers' prices as well as wear off of the technology, etc[29]. With the provided examples in mind, one could argue that the main aim in the state's regulation policy should be the promotion of efficiency in agricultural production, encouraging large-scale farming (horizontal co-operation) and use of modern technologies (with the partial compensation of the interests on the loans, provided for such equipment acquisition, etc.).

It is interesting to analyse if and how much the current agricultural market regulation in Lithuania and the current government's farmer support policy help to cope with the mentioned agricultural sector's problems.

For example, changes in cereal production in 1995-1999 were clearly visible (one year there was shortage of cereal, the other – surplus[30]), and cost of grain production, as mentioned, was increasing yearly since 1995. In 1995-1997

cereal price in Lithuania was much higher than yhe world as well as the EU interventional cereal price[31], however despite this, it was within the "country's strategic interests" to provide itself with locally produced grain crops[32], and thus subsidies for 12-19 percent of cereal purchase price sustained[33]. Besides, the lowest marginal cereal purchase price was estimated according to the cost of inefficient farmer's production, and thus, e.g. in 1998, wheat was interventionally purchased at average of 499 Lt/ton, which Agriculture Market Regulation Agency was able to realise only at 360 Lt/ton. Wheat growers received approximately 15 percent of profit, while the country suffered looses[34]. Moreover, e.g. in 1999, there were no quotas set for cereal purchases, and thus not the production surplus but all that year's cereal yields were purchased. In other words, there were no possibilities for free market; the state became the only farmers customer, offering the price which was too high to realise the production in the market. Thus, one could argue that the state's grain market regulations do not intensify the sector's productivity and, instead, are mainly directed to support farmers' incomes or even to secure their profit. By "supporting" cereal producers, the state is ignoring consumer interests, limiting their options to buy cereal products at a relatively lower price from foreign, more efficient grain producers.

The state's interventional regulation in meat market is less than in the grain market. For example, in 2000 the interventional cereal purchases were limited while meat and milk – eliminated. The head of the Lithuanian Agricultural Products and Market Regulation Agency V. Lapė explained that the decision to limit corn purchases and to eliminate them for milk products was made "due to the favourable market situation", while meat purchases were suspended as "being very disadvantageous"[35]. Bearing in mind that grain purchases are also detrimental (see above), such explanation could be considered as discriminating cattle farmers (or supporting cereal producers). A most visible state intervention in meat market was only in 1998-1999, when export subsidies were applied to beef and pork. The reason for those actions was very unfavourable changes in export market: Russian crisis (meat export to Russia and CIS in 1995-1998 was more than 10 percent of all meat production in Lithuania) and drastic fall of pork prices in world markets[36]. Currently Lithuanian meat import exceeds export: for example, poultry import makes 44 percent[37], despite the belief that cattle meat prices and production costs are "much lower in Lithuania than in the EU"[38]. Thus, one could claim that, compared with other agricultural producer groups, the protection of meat producers against foreign counterparts is relatively weak.

The milk product sector traditionally is characterised as being "prioritised", where Lithuania has "competitive advantages"[39], though the motivation of such assertions is unclear. As mentioned, Lithuania bear huge milk surplus, and

only 30-32 percent of supplied for reprocessing milk meets EU quality requirements[40]; besides, the sector is dominated by very small-sized milk farms, which causes relatively high milk production costs. Milk price, as compared to other agricultural products, still in 1999 and in the first half of 2000 was heavily subsidised (up to 27 percent of the purchase price)[41]. Since milk is a highly seasonable product, some state intervention in its production is necessary. Namely milk sector (though working inefficiently) is the widest among Lithuanian farmers. However, this kind of state support to milk producers (subsidising milk prices) is incorrect if seeking to gradually limit milk production and to encourage reduction of production costs (by co-operating in farming, combining farms to large scale). Such policy is beneficial for milk producers[42], but is incorrect aiming to increase efficiency.

Among the other (not essential) agricultural production sectors (flax, rape, vegetables, fruit, etc.), producers of flax, rapes, and sugar beet get the biggest share of the state support. Flax and sugar beet subsidies make in average 50 percent of the purchase price, rape – 45 percent[43]. Besides, custom duties for imported oil or fat, if they contain rape oil, are twice as big as those for fat without rape oil[44]. It is interesting to notice that, for example, an average profit from flax production in 1993-1997 made 84-107 percent (based on the data provided by agricultural enterprises)[45], and from sugar beet – 21 percent in 1991[46]! There is no big local nor external competition for these products, and such high profitability achieved with state support, is rare even for the non-agricultural sector entrepreneurs.

In summary, current Lithuanian agricultural support policy is mainly directed towards the maintenance of farmer income, but not towards the stimulation of efficiency in agricultural production. For example, as showed in Table 1, in 1997-1999 the state spending on co-operation did not account for even 2 percent of the Rural Support Fund's resources, and the state spending to compensate the interest of farmer loans taken for acquiring modern technologies, interests were yearly decreasing. Considering the producer groups, that are at the best disposition to the current state farmer supporting policy, cereal and oil producers as well as sugar beet producers should be firstly singled out. Milk producers receive a substantial profit as well, however bearing in mind the abundance of Lithuanian milk production sector as well as the structure of milk farms, the lack of support to the milk producer group might cause painful social consequences. Thus, the state assistance to the milk producers is partly justifiable due to social considerations.

On the other hand, rather generous state assistance to flax, rape, grain, and sugar beet producers has no "social motivation": employment in these sectors is relatively tenuous, there is no excess production, and all together these products make up only to one forth of all country's agricultural production

value[47]. Uneven custom duties for different products also may help to identify which agricultural producer groups are protected by the government more than others. For instance, the conventional custom duty for imported rye is 50 percent, for wheat – 40 percent, for rape oil – 50 percent, for sugar – 87 percent (but no less than 1.68 Lt per kg), for butter – 60 percent, as for eggs – only 35 percent, for fruit and vegetables – 10-20 percent[48], etc.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF CAP-CHARACTERISTIC AGRICULTURAL MARKET REGULATIONS AND FARMER SUPPORT MEANS IN LITHUANIA: REDISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS AMONG VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER GROUPS, PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS

In this part of analysis the mechanisms of Lithuanian agricultural market regulation are compared with those in the EU, regarding CAP principles as EU standpoint during the negotiations for Lithuania's membership in the EU. As mentioned in the theoretical part, some kind of (planned) decisions at the "international level" might condition some changes in the relation between the government and interest groups at the "national level" – changes, which might cause some adjustments in the government's position during the negotiations at the international level. Thus, in order to anticipate those changes (which might influence the government's position during actual negotiations with the EU), it is important to learn how the implementation of CAP characteristic agricultural market regulations and farmer support means might influence the interests of separate Lithuanian agricultural producer groups, farmers (as relatively "monolithic", "united" group) and consumers.

Most of Lithuania regulations and stimulation means in agricultural markets are alike those in the EU, however differences lie in the rigidity of the means used. Besides, the intervention into EU agricultural market is strictly regulated and it is justified only in the event of specific situations, unfavourable for farmers. What consequences the harmonisation of Lithuania's agricultural policy with CAP regulations and practise may have to Lithuania farmers, their different groups, and consumers?

For instance, the Law on the State Regulation of Economic Relations in Agriculture (1994) provides a "limited use of land" as one of the means to control the agricultural production supply, however these provisions are practically unused. In the EU, farmers who poss a large-scale farms receive compensations on condition that only up to 15 percent of their farmland will be used[49]. Obviously, in Lithuania, dominated by small-scale farms, conditions of this kind are hardly realisable. This kind of policy, first of all, would be unprofitable for large-scale farmers, who make a small share in Lithuanian

agricultural sector and who work relatively more efficiently than small-scale farmers.

The other obvious difference in Lithuania's and CAP agricultural support policy is the different focus for assistance. As it was mentioned, subsidies for agricultural product purchases are still rather favourable in Lithuania, while in the EU, especially after 1992 *MacSharry* reform, farmer support policy is geared to the maintenance of the minimal farmer income. After 1992 CAP reform, interventional prices for grain and beef in the EU were sharply reduced (by 15-35 percent)[50]; the decrease in farmer incomes was compensated by direct payments in accordance with the size of the farmland and/or size of livestock (in other words, financial support was directed to maintain farmer incomes and not production prices). The elimination of subsidies for purchase prices in Lithuania would be especially painful for oil, flax, and sugar beet producers.

Yet another vivid difference between the Lithuania and EU agricultural market regulations is the lack of clear conditioning, under which interventional purchases are allowed. In Lithuania, the interventional purchases start with a suggestion from the Lithuanian Agriculture and Food Market Regulation Agency and after the authorisation by the Ministry of Agriculture Board and the Minister (pass the order). There are no determined objective criteria based on the market indicators. This kind of policy up till now allowed the Government/Ministry of Agriculture groundlessly support some production groups; for example, as it was mentioned, in 1999 the Agency bought all grain produced in Lithuania for the price which it couldn't realise later. The main idea of interventional purchases is that the state buys the production surplus which the market cannot absorb. However in Lithuania, in some cases the state buys all yields before the free market rules could even be applied.

In the EU there are clear circumstances foreseen when the interventional purchases could appear; e.g., a simple intervention in the beef market occurs when for two weeks in a row the market price for some sort of beef carcass is lower than 84 percent of the intervention price, or when an average price for this sort of carcass in the local market of some EU member-state is lower than 80 percent of the fixed EU interventional price[51]. The regulations when to start the purchases are applied for other products as well. If such practice of regulations was implemented in Lithuania, the state would lose a part of leverage to patronise some groups of agricultural producers over others, and thus Lithuanian grain producers would relatively "suffer".

Other than interventional purchases, regulations over private storage (for milk, meat) are also broadly used in the EU, i.e. the surplus production storage is fully or partially compensated (up to 6 months) from the EU budget. The storage facility is chosen according to the results of a tender; products are required to be stored in the EU certified refrigerators. Private storage distorts market

less than interventional purchases (under "private storage" regulations, products are not bought but stored to mitigate the effects of seasonal variations of agricultural production), yet, this strategy is not used in Lithuania (there are no suitable conditions). Private storage would benefit meat and milk producers.

The implementation of the EU agricultural market regulations and farmers' support measures would mainly weaken the relatively advantageous position of the Lithuanian grain, flax, rape, and some other producers (talking only about the benefit redistribution among various producer groups). On the other hand, the essential conditions to measure how Lithuania's membership in the EU would benefit the whole country's agricultural sector (not separate producers groups), are as follow: will agricultural support conditions and funding be the same for the "new" EU member-states as for the current ones, and will common CAP spending be increased according to the needs of new member-states following the currently applied CAP regulations? If the current EU agricultural support standards were applied upon Lithuania's membership in CAP, all Lithuania agricultural producer groups would benefit. For instance, although the current EU interventional grain price is lower than the Lithuania lowest marginal purchase price in 2000[52], direct payments for EU grain producers in 2000 were 772 Lt/hectare while in Lithuania – 80 Lt/hectare[53]. It would completely compensate the decrease in the purchase price. The situation is also similar in the milk market.

In 2000 the EU purchase price was twice as big as the average Lithuanian purchase price in the same year[54]. Truth, as it was mentioned, more than half of the milk produced by the Lithuanian farmers is disqualified according to the EU standards, thus, some (especially small-size) milk producers might not get any benefit from Lithuania's membership in CAP if they do not increase milk quality. Besides, membership in the EU would eliminate Lithuania's milk producers' fixed quota and, thus, part of the small-sized milk farms would gradually vanish due to the high production costs and increased competition. If the EU market regulation measures were applied to Lithuanian cattle farming, farmer incomes would increase three times[55]. According to the estimates of the Lithuanian Institute of Agrarian Economics estimates, Lithuania's membership in the EU would have positive, though not very high effects upon the most subsidised in Lithuania producers of flax, sugar beet, and rape.[56]

However, Lithuania's membership in the EU would eliminate the inner EU barriers for agricultural product trade, and thus the estimates for most of Lithuania's agricultural producer benefits from the membership in the CAP are rather conditional, not taking into account increased competition with the agricultural producers of other EU member-states. Therefore, the efficiency in productivity, reaching EU standards, remains the major condition for Lithuania's producers to achieve the anticipated benefits of EU membership.

As for the consequences of the membership in CAP to consumers, one could argue that first of all, consumers will have access to products of much better quality, while the financial burden of the membership in CAP for the tax payers will be insignificant. For example, if Lithuania had been a EU member in 1997, its dues to the EU budget would have been 407 million Lt, while revenues from the EU budget would have reached 5.052 million Lt with 459 million Lt being allocated only for the direct agricultural payments.[57] In comparison, the Rural Support Fund's revenues in 1997 were 382 million Lt (see Table 1).

4. FACTORS AND MEANS FOR THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUPS: HOW ARE THEY USED IN LITHUANIA?

According to R. Hague, M. Harrop, and S. Breslin, the influence of interest groups influence on the government policy depends on the group's ability to use these main "channels"[58]:

– direct contacts with the government, its representatives;
– indirect contacts with the government through the political parties;
– indirect attempts to influence the content of political decisions by using public opinion.

The further analysis of how effectively Lithuanian agricultural interest groups are using those channels for political influence reveals those groups' abilities to influence governmental negotiations with the EU on CAP conditions. The ability to use influence channels efficiently is not the only characteristic which defines how influential a particular group is - the group's inner characteristics also matter: how big the group is, what resources the particular group has in its control, what possible sanctions the group could use, what type of leadership dominates, etc.[59] The bigger the group, the more "serious" its requirements might appear to the government. However, on the other hand, according to M. Olson, big groups suffer the "free-rider's" problem much more often than the small ones[60], besides, a mobilisation for collective actions in big groups is more complicated.

These criteria, determined by Hague, Harrop, Breslin, and other authors will serve as the base to estimate the potential of Lithuanian agricultural interest groups' political influence on the government policy (regarding its positions during the negotiations with the EU). *However, in order to forecast the scope of real interest groups' influence on governmental negotiations for CAP (according to R. D. Putnam model), not only the strength of the interest groups' political influence matters, but also the (possible) shifts, caused by integration, in the well-being of various interest groups, which would force these interest groups to influence the government'position, defining the acceptable "win-set" of international agreements.*

Relying on the findings of several authors'[61], one could claim that those groups whose well-being would be most "endangered" by CAP norms implemented in Lithuania's framework of agricultural economics, will be the most interested in influencing the government negotiations with the EU.

There are three groups which show the most interest in shaping the current Lithuania agricultural policy – the Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture (LŽŪR, chaired by J. Ramonas), the Association of Agricultural Enterprises in Lithuania (LŽŪBA, chaired by J. Kraujelis), and the Union of Lithuanian Farmers (LŪS, chaired by J. Čiulevičius). The two later organisations according to their statute have all the rights to act independently, however both of them are members of LŽŪR and also participate in its activities. There is very scarce public information on the attempts by various agricultural producer groups to independently influence the government position. For instance, during January 9-13, 2001 appraisal of vegetables and fruit growers against, in their words, weak protection of the sector against foreign producers, President of LŽŪR J. Ramonas was the one to represent the interests of those producer group; LŽŪR is the organisation representing the interests all agricultural sector . Producer groups which would suffer from Lithuania's integration in the EU CAP do not defend their interests independently, and instead provide this "opportunity" to the organisations, which, on their side, represent the whole variety of other interest in the agricultural sector. Thus further analysis will focus on the political influence potential of those organisations.

Direct contacts with government, its representatives. Although, theoretically, the institutional organisation in Lithuania is very convenient for interest groups to search for influence channels among all power levels[62], the data from 1997-2000 and earlier shows that most of Lithuania's agricultural producer interest groups' direct influence attempts were addressed mainly to the Government (in the form of applications). Other features of direct communication between the Lithuania's agricultural producer interests groups and governmental institutions are as follows: first, when agricultural interest groups seek direct impact on the government policy, public petitions, appeals, and similar applications are the most popular tools of influence; second, agricultural interest groups usually chose tactics of "dissatisfaction and threatening after decisions are made".

This proves that Lithuania's agricultural groups have not secured any stable and long run contacts with governmental representatives. The "guilt" for lack of communication is two-fold, i.e. not only interests groups are incapable and inactive to allocate contacts with authorities, but also, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture is lacking "willingness" to co-operate. Also, insufficient practise of such co-operation could be the reason. Despite this, some of interests groups' strategic "failures" are obvious.

Closer co-operation with the government is discouraged by the "tone", chosen by the groups to express their interests. For instance, in September 1999, when the specialists of the Ministry of Agriculture presented the Draft of Lithuania's Agricultural Development Strategy for 2000-2006, the representatives from ŽŪR and the chair of LŪS J. Čiulevičius publicly accused the Lithuanian Government for disrupting the country's agriculture, being indifferent to the interests of farmers, and so on[63]; however, when the strategy was still under preparation, only LŽŪBA did contribute with some suggestions[64]. At the end of the same year the leaders of LŽŪR, LŪS, and LŽŪBA approached Seimas Chairman V. Landsbergis and Prime Minister A. Kubilius, expressing their dissatisfaction that the 2000 State Budget provided even further cuts in farmers incomes, as compared with the previous year. The appeal was "backed up" by the agricultural leaders' threatening (if government fails to respect farmers' demands to review the 2000 Budget, "we all will find ourselves in the chaos of unpredictable social turmoil"[65]) and by absolutely irrational prognoses (supposedly such government policy, i.e. the reduction of agricultural assignations, "complicates the achievement of the major political target – membership in the EU"[66]).

Indirect attempts to influence official politics through political parties. Unlike, for example, in Great Britain[67], party affiliation with certain interest groups is tolerated in Lithuania[68]. Besides, there are parties which do not support any particular ideology, and thus provide more venues for agricultural interest groups to search for certain party-partner or closer co-operation with several of them.

According to several sources, during the LDDP (Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party) governance (1992-1996) agricultural interest groups had quite "loyal" supporters among Social Democrats, LDDP, and Nationalists[69], however current agricultural interest groups' political influence through political parties is rather weakened. The co-operation tactics chosen by agricultural interest groups before the parliamentary elections in 2000 served as detrimental factor to weaken their front of supporters. The Chair of LŪS J. Čiulevičius and Chair of LŽŪBA J. Kraujelis (at the same time – LŽŪR Vice-presidents) showed preference to the institutionalised co-operation with the New Union (they were enlisted into the party candidate list), while J. Ramonas, President of LŽŪR (umbrella organisation for the other two) decided to run for Seimas under the Moderate Conservative Union. It is obvious that neither ideological attitudes of those parties nor their election programs could match, thus farmers, supporting the leadership of their interest groups, found themselves in an ambiguous situation. The rural electorate was dispersed, perspectives to find supporters for agricultural interests were weakened.

The co-operation with a few political parties would be possible and even beneficial only if there were no clear-cut program/ideological differences among those parties, or/and when parties were potential partners in governmental coalitions. Based on this rationale, one could judge the LŽŪR initiative before elections as ineffective: LŽŪR proposed an agreement on the future co-operation in solving the main agricultural questions (the question of subsidies for agriculture, consultations between the Government and ŽŪR on draft projects, etc.) to all, bar non political parties[70]. The Lithuanian Liberal Union, for example, refused to sign this agreement because the provisions for state support to agriculture contradicted the party's attitudes that "the agriculture sector must function according to market rules"[71]. On the other hand, the current Liberal Union coalition partner, the New Union (Social Liberals), guaranteed LŽŪR to secure 10 percent of the state budget spending to rural and agricultural developments, to compensate diesel fuel excise duty for 120 litters of fuel per one hectare of cultivated land, etc...[72]

Summarising the efficiency of the recent co-operation between agricultural interest groups and political parties, one could conclude that these attempts to influence the country's agricultural policy were absolutely ill-considered and unprofitable for agricultural interest groups: rural electorate was diluted, agricultural interest groups did not form any "effective" coalitions with political parties. Besides, Chair of LŽŪR J. Ramonas once said that he ran for elections "as a citizen, as a private person", and "no party will be prioritized" at the Lithuanian Chambers of Agriculture[73]. Therefore one could doubt if LŽŪR's Chair has enough leadership competence and skills for strategic planning, if he does not consider contacts with political parties as one of the ways to represent and support the interests of his organisation.

Attempts by agricultural interest groups to influence government's policy through public opinion. Although all of the agricultural public organisations' titles clearly define which interests they are supposed to represent, judging by their public speeches, it is rather difficult to comprehend what those groups are actually aiming for, what demands they pose to the government. For example, on April 11, 1996 agricultural organisations appealed to the public by inviting to protest against the "population impoverishment policy run by the government" (published in "Kauno diena")[74] and urged to uprise against almost all possible economic/social evils: collapsing industry, increasing unemployment, low wages, pensions, and welfare subsidies, stolen deposits, "catastrophic situation" not only in agriculture, but also in the energy industry, banks, justice system![75] These kinds of appeals mislead the public about the real agricultural interest groups' identity and their interests. Appeals to government to take care of agricultural sector's problems very often go together with the demands that are absolutely irrelevant to the

groups' specifics. Thus, one could conclude that the Lithuanian agricultural groups are unable to mobilise public opinion favourable to their interests, which could be one of the channels to influence government's policy.

Importance of interest groups' characteristics (size) to political influence. It seems that only the fact that more than 20 percent of Lithuania's population (i.e., one fifth of the electorate) depend on incomes from agricultural activities should be a sound factor to the authorities. However, the ability to mobilise this abundant mass of electorate would be relevant only if some common problem appeared to all employed in agriculture sector, despite of their production type, the size of farm, location, etc. As estimated earlier, Lithuania's membership in CAP would bring overall benefit to farmers[76], thus united and organised opposition to Lithuania's membership in the EU CAP attempts to disrupt negotiations, or the like resistance is highly unexpected. Other characteristics of a group – the importance of resources under the group's control, possible sanctions which the group could use, and the like – do not provide agricultural groups with much leverage to influence the country's government either. It is rather complicated to consider agricultural groups' resources as "vital to the state's well-being", when agricultural production runs significant surplus. As for the availability of agricultural sanctions such as blockade of highways with agricultural equipment, the legitimisation of such actions might be questioned and would diminish groups' prestige in the eyes of the government and the public.

To summarise, at the present agricultural community may be considered as politically "influential" only due to its size, while other tools of political influence are used inefficiently. Besides, agricultural community's influence on the government policy would be visible only if all agricultural producers were mobilised by some common problem. Regarding Lithuania's membership in CAP there is no such common threat (e.g., decrease in benefits to all agricultural producers as to relatively "united" group); only a few producer groups may experience some conditional losses. Besides, structural ground for united representation of various agricultural producer groups is rather weak, since existing agricultural interest groups – LŽŪBA and LŪS – are better organised on regional base rather than according to different interests, while LŽŪR is an umbrella organisation of wide national various producers' network. Thus there is no potential force to influence the government position during the negotiations with the EU either. On the other hand, consumer interest groups' representation and any organised activities are limited due to the abundant size of the sector, and "collective actions" of consumers would be hardly possible (M. Olson).

CONCLUSIONS: ARE INTEREST GROUPS CAPABLE TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAP?

It was concluded that the implementation of EU farmer subsidisation measures and CAP regulations in Lithuania would have impact on the redistribution of conditional advancement of some agricultural producers over others. If Lithuania joined the EU CAP, the best currently disposed producers of flax, rape, sugar beet, and grain crops would suffer most as compared to other producer groups. At the same time, the overall welfare of Lithuania's agricultural producers will increase as Lithuania joins the CAP.

Relying on Hague's, Harrop's, and Breslin's assertions, the above mentioned separate agricultural producer groups would have the strongest interests to influence the government's official negotiations with the EU (demanding to maintain the subsidisation policy for agricultural product purchase prices as long as possible, etc.). However, those groups, though having established various associations, do not seek to influence the government policy autonomously. The Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture, the Union of Lithuanian Farmers, and the Association of Agricultural Enterprises in Lithuania represent major agricultural community's interests. These organisations unite all agricultural producer groups: those who will relatively suffer the most from Lithuania's membership in CAP, and those who will relatively improve their position (e.g., meat, vegetable producers). Therefore the above-mentioned organisations are "inappropriate" channels for political influence to those producer groups who will face relative decrease of their benefits when compared with other producer groups due to Lithuania's membership in the EU.

Besides, the current LŽŪR's, LŪS's, and LŽŪBA's influence strategy is uncoordinated and inefficient which weakens their possibilities for political impact on the government's agricultural decision making and policy implementation. Abundant membership of agricultural sector and their supporters is the only "advantageous" characteristics for political influence, however, most probably, this pre-eminence will not be used either, since overall, Lithuania's membership in CAP will benefit all Lithuania farmers (or hurt, if Lithuania never joins CAP). Mobilisation of all the country's farmers to influence the government's position in the negotiations for CAP or to interrupt these negotiations seems highly unlikely.

There is also very little plausibility that any organised consumer group could have influence on the government's official negotiations for membership in the CAP, despite of the consequences that this membership will bring (Olson's "free-rider" problem).

Based on these conclusions, one could claim that the Lithuanian government remains rather autonomous in respect to existing interest groups in its CAP negotiations, and its position ("win-set") is independent from specific demands of interests groups. Probability that the local interest groups might refuse to "ratify" the government's obligations to implement CAP regulations are also very little, since Lithuania's agricultural interest groups are mainly organised on regional/national base and, in general, Lithuania's membership in the CAP will benefit all farmers of the country.

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[1] Even in Estonia and Latvia the portion of labour force active in agriculture is much smaller than in Lithuania – in Latvia – 15.3 percent of total labour force, in Estonia – only 9.2 percent. For more see Kriščiukaitienė I. Makroekonominės situacijos prognozės // *Rinkotyra: žemės ūkio ir maisto produktai.* – 1999. – Nr. 1 (3). – P. 7.

[2] *Baltijos šalys. Regioninė ekonominė analizė: OECD ekonominės apžvalgos.* – Vilnius: Diemedžio leidykla, 2000. – P. 212.

[3] Tracey M. *Maisto pramonė ir žemės ūkis rinkos ekonomikos sąlygomis. Žemės ūkio politika Europos Sąjungoje.* – Vilnius: Diemedžio leidykla, 1998. - P. 20.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Still back in 1994 adopted Law on the State Regulation of Economical Relations in Agriculture of the Republic of Lithuania rules that yearly the state has to allocate no less than 10 percent of national budget resources for agricultural support. In the period of 1997-2000, the budget of established in 1997 Rural Support Fund increased from 382 mln Lt to 421 mln Lt. For more see Krasauskas D. Į pasaulinę rinką – su viltimi stiprėti // *Kauno diena.* – 2000 m. gruodžio 14 d. – P. 7.

[6] According to R. Hague and others, for interest group to attract the government's attention its size, i.e. the membership, is important: the probability of government's attention to the group's needs grows with the amount of workers from particular sector represented in the interest group which form the significant part of electorate. For more see Hague R., Harrop M., Breslin S. *Comparative Government and Politics.* – London: Macmillan Press, 1992. - P. 215.

[7] Putnam R. D. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games // *International Organization.* – Vol. 42. – No. 3. – P. 427-460.

[8] Ibid., P. 433-435.

[9] In this analysis – national government (Lithuanian) and the EU institutions, representing the interests of the EU member states.

[10] Ibid., P. 436.

[11] More on this see Ibid., P.435-441, also in Moravcsik A. Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining // *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* / Ed. by P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson, and R. D. Putnam. – Berkeley, Los Angeles: California University Press, 1993. – P. 23.

[12] According to R. D. Putnam, the following factors determine the state's flexibility at international negotiations (the size of "win-set")" 1) the distribution of strength, preferences, and possibilities for coalition with government of interest groups at the "ratification" level; 2) political institutions at the

"ratification" level; 3) strategy of negotiations of the state representative at the "international " level, etc. For more see Putnam R. D. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games // *International Organization*. – Vol. 42. – No. 3. – P. 442-452.

[13] Ibid., P. 437. Also see Moravcsik A. Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining // *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* / Ed. by P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson, and R. D. Putnam. – Berkeley, Los Angeles: California University Press, 1993. – P. 25.

[14] See *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita*. – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 99.

[15] See State Regulatory Framework's of Agricultural Economics Law No. I-734 (1994 m. gruodžio 22 d. LR Žemės ūkio ekonominių santykių valstybinio reguliavimo įstatymas Nr. I-734) // *Valstybės žinios*. – 1995. – Nr. 1-5

[16] See Tracey M. *Maisto pramonė ir žemės ūkis rinkos ekonomikos sąlygomis. Žemės ūkio politika Europos Sąjungoje*. – Vilnius: Diemedžio leidykla, 1998. - P. 159-160.

[17] For example, according to P. Nedergaard, one of the most important principles of CAP reforms in 1992 was reorientation from the subsidies for agricultural product prices to the farmer support. See Nedergaard P. The Political Economy of CAP Reform // Laursen, F. (ed.) *The Political Economy of European Integration*. – The Hague: Kluwer Law International. – 1995. – P. 115-116.

[18] See *Lietuvos žemės ūkio integracija į Europos Sąjungą*. – Vilnius, Europos komitetas prie LRV, 2000. – P. 14.

[19] See Negotiations' Position of the Republic of Lithuania, Chapter 7 "Agriculture", approved by the Decree of 20 December 2000 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and Law on the State Regulation of Economic Relations in Agriculture Nr. I-734 (1994 m. gruodžio 22 d. LR Žemės ūkio ekonominių santykių valstybinio reguliavimo įstatymas Nr. I-734) // *Valstybės žinios*. – 1995. – Nr. 1-5.

[20] To compare, for example, conventional and autonomous custom duties for manufactured goods, for glass they are respectively 5 percent and 10 percent, for footwear – 10 percent and 25 percent, textile-made goods – 15 percent and 25 percent, etc. See 1997 m. kovo 24 d. LR Vyriausybės nutarimas Nr. 268 "Dėl prekių eksporto ir importo reguliavimo Lietuvos Respublikoje tvarkos" // *Valstybės žinios*. - 1997. – Nr. 27-645 and later amendments.

[21] *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita*. – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 114.

[22] See Krasauskas D. Į pasaulinę rinką – su viltimi stiprėti // *Kauno diena*. – 2000 m. gruodžio 14 d. – P. 7.

[23] See Government Decree No. 788 (Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos reguliavimo ir eksporto skatinimo programa, patvirtinta 1998 m. birželio 30 d. LR Vyriausybės nutarimu Nr. 788) // *Valstybės žinios*. – 1998. – Nr. 61-1746.

[24] Kriščiukaitienė I. Lietuvos, Latvijos, Estijos žemės ūkio bei maisto produktų kainų palyginimas. – *Rinkotyra: Žemės ūkio ir maisto produktai*. – 1999. – Nr. 1(3). – P. 9.

[25] *Lietuvos pieno ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjunga (santrauka)*. – Vilnius, Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 2.

[26] *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita*. – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 69-74.

[27] Ibid., P. 46.

[28] Ibid., P. 45

[29] Ibid., P. 49

[30] From 1.954 thousand tons in 1995, satisfying only 75 percent of the country's demand, to 3.052 thousand tons in 1997, satisfying inner demand by 117 percent. See Ibid., P.46

[31] See *Lietuvos grūdų ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjungą (santrauka)*. – Vilnius, Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. - P. 3-4.

[32] See Ibid., P. 1.

[33] See *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita*. – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 104.

[34] See Ibid., P. 100

[35] See Agentūra mažina intervenciją į grūdų, pieno ir mėsos pramonę. *BNS*. – 2001 m. sausio 8 d

[36] For more see Kuodys A. Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų užsienio prekybos pokyčiai // *Rinkotyra: Žemės ūkio ir maisto produktai*. - 2000. – Nr. 1(7). - P. 14-16.

[37] See *Lietuvos mėsos ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjungą (santrauka).* – Vilnius: Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 1.

[38] Ibid., P. 2.

[39] See *Lietuvos pieno ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjunga (santrauka).* – Vilnius, Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 1

[40] See Lietuvos ūkio ekonominės ir socialinės būklės 2000 metų sausio-birželio mėnesiais APŽVALGA // *http://www.ekm.lt/muitai/EKMIN/AP00_6.HTM#a42*

[41] See *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita.* – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 104.

[42] For example, in 1995-1998 average milk sector's profitability was 14 percent, while the cattle meat producers, though selling all their stocks, in 1995-1998 faced losses. See 19.37 Profitability of Products Sold // *Lietuvos statistikos metraštis (CD).* – 1999.

[43] Ibid.

[44] For example, conventional custom duty for mixed vegetable and animal oil, which contains rape oil, are 45 percent ad valorem, autonomous custom duty – 50 percent; while for other mixed vegetable and animal oil – respectively, 15 percent and 20 percent. See 1997 m. kovo 24 d. LR Vyriausybės nutarimas Nr. 268 "Dėl prekių eksporto ir importo reguliavimo Lietuvos Respublikoje tvarkos" (Government Decree No. 268) // *Valstybės žinios*. - 1997. – Nr. 27-645 and later amendments

[45] *Linų sektoriaus integravimosi į ES pasekmės.* – Vilnius: Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 5.

[46] See *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita.* – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 128.

[47] See different parts (according to the products' type) in Lithuanian Negotiations' Position. Chapter 7 "Agriculture", approved by Government Decree, 20 December 2000.

[48] See Ibid.

[49] More on 1992 CAP's reform see Nello S. S. *Applying the New Political Economy Approach to Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Union.* – Florence: European University Institute. – RSC No. 97/21. – P. 4-5.

[50] More on that see Tracey M. *Maisto pramonė ir žemės ūkis rinkos ekonomikos sąlygomis. Žemės ūkio politika Europos Sąjungoje.* – Vilnius: Diemedžio leidykla, 1998. - P. 171.

[51] See *Lietuvos žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų rinkos organizavimo ir reguliavimo priemonės. 1999 metų ataskaita.* – Vilnius: Lietuvos agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 1999. – P. 21.

[52] *Lietuvos grūdų ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjungą (santrauka).* – Vilnius, Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. - P. 4.

[53] See Ibid.

[54] See *Lietuvos pieno ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjunga (santrauka).* – Vilnius, Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 5.

[55] See *Lietuvos mėsos ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjungą (santrauka).* – Vilnius: Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 4.

[56] See *Lietuvos cukraus ūkis: situacija ir pasekmių analizė integruojantis į Europos Sąjungą (santrauka).* – Vilnius: Lietuvos Agrarinės Ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 7-9, 11; *Linų sektoriaus integravimosi į ES pasekmės.* – Vilnius: Lietuvos Agrarinės ekonomikos institutas, 2000. – P. 3-12, and other.

[57] *Lietuvos žemės ūkio integracija į Europos Sąjungą.* – Vilnius, Europos komitetas prie LRV, 2000. – P. 11.

[58] Hague R., Harrop M., Breslin S. *Comparative Government and Politics.* – London: Macmillan Press, 1992. - P. 215.

[59] See Ibid., also Wilson G. K. *Interest Groups.* – New York, 1991. – P. 164-165, and others.

[60] See Olson M. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* – Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. - P. 30-36.

[61] For instance, according to Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, most of the interest groups get active when the government policy intervene into their interests, i.e. they act as some kind of watchdogs – see Hague R., Harrop M., Breslin S. *Comparative Government and Politics.* – London: Macmillan Press, 1992. - P. 204-205.

[62] For example, in parliamentary societies (especially, with two chamber systems, e.g. Great Britain), the power of decision making is concentrated in the executive body, more precise – in the Cabinet of Ministers, thus, the "wisest" strategy for interest groups would be to seek direct contacts and thus

political impact through the members of Ministerial cabinet, and not through parliamentarians, or e. g., justice institutions. In opposite, in countries, there is a clear division of powers (as in the USA), Congressmen's or Senators' favor is rather more valuable, not eliminating courts as another very powerful mean to defend one's interests (depending on the problem which the interest group attempts to push onto political agenda), or personal contacts in President's environment. More on that see Ball A. R. *Modern Politics and Government.* - London: Macmillan Press, 1993. - P. 106-107.

[63] See Pranckevičius K. Žemės ūkio strategija: tarp socializmo ir kapitalizmo // *Lietuvos aidas.* – 1999 m. rugsėjo 29 d.

[64] See Ibid.

[65] Žemdirbių savivaldos pareiškimas // *Valstiečių laikraštis.* – 1999 m. lapkričio 27 d.

[66] Ibid.

[67] For example, according to G. K. Wilson, members of political parties in the Parliament avoid open communications with interest groups which might be interpreted as "biased behavior". More on this see Wilson G. K. *Interest Groups.* – New York, 1991. – P. 160.

[68] For example, during the last Seimas elections (in 2000) political parties did not mind to include representatives from various interest groups in their electoral lists (I. Balsienė ran under the Moderate Conservative Union, J. Kraujelis - under Socialliberals, etc.). This situation also appeared in 1996 elections.

[69] For example, see Gaižauskaitė V. Nauja kredito emisija? // *Respublika.* – 1993 m. balandžio 24 d. arba Pritariame // *Valstiečių laikraštis.* – 1994 m. vasario 26 d., where Socialdemocrats voice their support for the strike organized by farmers, etc.

[70] For agreement's text see http://www.zur.lt/^aktual/20000823.html

[71] See Požėra K. Naujasis Seimas grumtynių į Seimą išvakarėse // *Ūkininko patarėjas.* – 2000 m. spalio 12 d.

[72] See Ibid.

[73] See Požėra K. Liberalų antausis Jonui Ramonui. Žemės ūkio rūmų pirmininkas klausia, ar liberalai žada laikytis įstatymų // *Ūkininko patarėjas.* – 2000 m. rugpjūčio 29 d.

[74] See *Kauno diena.* – 1996 m. balandžio 11 d.

[75] See Ibid.

[76] For example, if Lithuania had been a EU member in 1997, its net incomes from the EU budget would have made 4.645 bln Lt – see *Lietuvos žemės ūkio integracija į Europos Sąjungą.* – Vilnius, Europos Komitetas prie LRV, 2000. – P. 11.