LITHUANIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE YEARBOOK 2007

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The *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook* aims to provide a wide picture of the main fields of Political Science in Lithuania – Political Theory, Institutional Design, Electoral Process, Public Policy and Public Administration, International Relations and related disciplines. However, it is by no means limited to publications on Lithuania or by Lithuanian authors. Contributions are welcome both from Lithuania and abroad.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

We are happy to present the ninth volume of the *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook.* The main topic of this volume is the perspective of Russia europeanization with two articles devoted for this topic. The first one deals with the new EU-Russia Strategic Agreement as an instrument for Russia's europeanization. The new negotiations will reopen the opportunity for the EU and Russia to look for new methods of cooperation and improve the existing ones.

According to Živilė Dambrauskaitė, the principle of reciprocity should be given priority in negotiations of a new strategic agreement as a possible element of "checks and balances" that would limit Russia's participation in the EU internal market without facing proper obligations. The principle of reciprocity could work on the one hand as a prohibitive insurance to limit Russian influence on internal process of the European integration. On the other hand, reciprocity could turn to an incentive of europeanization for Russia. Russian participation in the EU internal market must be accompanied by consistent process of economic liberalization.

Dr. Nerijus Maliukevičius deals with a question of how modern Russia uses information technologies and media to retain (increase) its influence in the former Soviet space and specifically in Lithuania. The author argues that informational and cultural expansion in the post-Soviet space cannot be explained only on the basis of electronic colonialism or cultural imperialism theories. The power policy exercised by Russia in this region blends together the western principles of media expansion, highlighted by the critical communication theory, with the exceptionally Russian authoritarian tradition. This kind of symbiosis has resulted in Russia's specific geopolitics of information known for using hard power strategy in the information space of its opponents.

The difference between the concept of "military revoliution" and "revoliution in military affairs" and how they have influenced changes in the political and social levels of the state, is the main problem tackled by Deividas Šlekys in his article.

The *Yearbook* continues analysis of the public policy and public administration issues. This time, the first topic deals with the changing nature of partisanship in a post-communist society. Dr. Ainė Ramonaitė concludes that together with the weakening normative element of the communist - anticommunist cleavage the partisan attachment is gradually decreasing.

Dr. Vitalis Nakrošis seeks to assess the dynamics of Lithuania's governmental performance and comparing it to other countries. It has been unveiled that performance of the Lithuanian government is average and even poor if compared with the EU average or such countries as Estonia and Ireland. This is despite the fact the public mode of production is rather expensive in Lithuania and the number of public employees is similar to the EU average.

Over the past few years the European Commission has widely promoted the flexicurity strategy, which the Member States should adopt during the reforms of their labour markets. Žilvinas Martinaitis in his article seeks to provide a critical assessment of the potential merits of adopting the strategy in Lithuania.

In addition, the reader of this year's *Yearbook* is invited to get two interesting contributions on Belarus identity and German-Russian relations. Why there is no process of nation-building in today's Belarus, why national identity is so fragmented, why Belarus is called denationalized state, how this influences the political regime and country's national security? The author Jovita Pranevičiūtė found that the process of nation formation is yet very far from its completion in modern Belarus. At least two nation formation projects are being implemented at one time. The first is liberal and it aims at formation of citizens. The second one is implemented by the ruling regime. Its goal is formation of a unified community of Belarusians by consolidating them around the figure of the current president "the Father".

Matthias Räntzsch from Germany deals with the development of the German-Russian relations of the last two decades. He targets to answer the question if Berlin has been able to reach its main targets. By looking at the development of the Russia-German-EU relations and the German perception of Russia's policy, the author seeks to elucidate prospects for future development.

PERSPECTIVE OF RUSSIA EUROPEANIZATION

THE NEW EU-RUSSIA STRATEGIC AGREEMENT: AN INSTRUMENT FOR RUSSIAN EUROPEANIZATION?

Živilė Dambrauskaitė[*]

Abstract. The main objective of this article is an attempt to estimate if the EU possesses any levers of influence that could compel Russia to act accordingly to European „rules of the game". At the moment Russia seeks to avoid any particular legal or political commitments in relation to the EU. That is probably the central "red line" of Russian policy towards the European Union. This "red line" inevitably draws the contours of the new strategic agreement as well as limits of Russian European engagements. It is argued in this article that whereas EU possesses no levers of influence towards Russia, the principle of reciprocity should be given priority in negotiations of a new strategic agreement as a possible element of "checks and balances" that would limit Russian participation in EU internal market without facing proper obligations. To put it in other words, the principle of reciprocity could work on one hand as a prohibitive insurance to limit Russian influence on internal process of European integration. On the other hand, reciprocity could turn to an incentive of europeanization for Russia. According to this principle, Russian participation in EU internal market must be accompanied by consistent process of economic liberalization.

Introduction

The Chanty-Mansijsk meeting of EU-Russia Heads of states on June 26–27, 2008, gave the start reopening for negotiations of a new EU-Russia strategic agreement after a compulsory pause of one and a half year that has been conditioned by the Polish and later on Lithuanian vetoes. It is likely that the main issues of these negotiations are going to be trade (opening of Russian internal market) and energy. Although EU approved Russian membership in World Trade Organization (WTO) back in 2004, trade relations remain a sensitive

[*] The article is based on the study of Center of Eastern Geopolitical Studies "The New EU-Russia Strategic Arrangement: the Lithuanian perspective". The study has been presented on May 22, 2008 at the VU IIRPS during a seminar on "The Search for a Model of Russia-EU Relations Optimal for Lithuania".

issue with plenty of questions yet unresolved: such as railway transit of goods (as Russia employs discriminative means to direct transit flows through Russian ports and thus alienates part of profits that the Baltic states could benefit from), as well as taxation of air flights across Russian territory. Such issues might complicate negotiations of a new strategic partnership agreement. Moreover, Russian failure to join WTO could burden the negations even further. It is expected that EU-Russia negotiations on the strategic partnership agreement would take more than a year and the nearest term of it coming into force is likely to be as late as 2011. However, if Russia does not succeed to join WTO until new EU-Russia agreement comes into force, it might require a revision. Nevertheless, the issues of European Energy Charter and ratification of Transit protocol that provide for unrestricted circulation of third country energy resources using Russian pipeline infrastructure are by far most important to Russia. Russian participation in the common European energy transit area would mean that Russian energy exports to any European state would have to be pursued following internal European rules.

Obviously, all the above mentioned questions point to a much deeper problem: limits of openness of Russian economic system, dilemmas of its liberalization and depolitization.

The new EU-Russia strategic arrangement will replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It is one of the few institutional levers that can be used to bind Russia to European "rules of the game". However, what makes search for efficient binding methods complicated, is the fact that Russia is sensitive and reluctant to any external interventions into Russian domestic political and economic domain. Russia tries to profit from bilateral deals with EU member states thus fostering a kind of "re-nationalization" of European politics and hampering efficiency of EU policies as a whole. In such a way Russia is capable of influencing internal EU policies on questions the member states are not unanimous[1].

It is just as obvious that Russia will continue to avoid any binding political or economic commitments to the EU during the upcoming negotiations. This "red line" of Russian position will inevitably draw the contours of the new strategic agreement unless EU manages to accumulate proper levers to affiliate and bind Russia to European norms. Therefore the main question of this article is whether or not EU possesses proper channels of influence to do so.

It is argued in this article that at the moment EU does not possess any direct levers of pressure towards Russia; therefore negotiations on the new strategic arrangement should be based on principle of reciprocity. This principle could become a sort of an element of "checks and balances" that would prevent Russian participation in internal EU market unless Russia takes up proper obligations. To put it in other words, principle of reciprocity could work on one hand as a prohibitive insurance to limit Russian influence on internal process of European integration. On the other hand, reciprocity could turn to an incentive of europeanization for Russia. According to this principle, Russian participation in EU internal market must firsthand be accompanied by consistent processes of economic liberalization.

Search of a Proper Model of EU-Russia relations

The logic of EU external relations implies that the only measure how EU's impact on Russian domestic and external policies can be manifested is external europeanization, i.e., spread of rules, principles and political and economic regimes generated by EU. Spread of the "European method" in Russia can only take place through an institutionally binding mechanism. Therefore, the new EU-Russia strategic agreement should be analyzed in framework of such a "binding method"[2].

Principle of conditionality that has been broadly exercised in EU enlargement policy, European neighborhood policy and other cases of EU-third country relations has been questioned lately for being insufficient. This principle implies that EU should provide particular incentives for partners to overtake European rules. It has been doubted lately if this principle should remain the foundation of EU-Russia relations. The key-question is which of the principles suits better to define the new strategic partnership: conditionality or reciprocity?

The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 and in force since 1997, based on the principle of conditionality, is largely vague and abstract in its contents. If one tried to estimate to what extent international law generates mutual relations rather than describes and reflects the existing ones, it can be concluded that the PCA failed to do either. PCA failed to generate mutual relations as day-to-day agenda of EU-Russia relations was increasingly shaped by Russia unilaterally. Neither was the agreement capable of reflecting developments as it soon got supplemented with a multitude of

Table 1. Comparing the principles of Conditionality and Reciprocity

Conditionality in EU external relations	*Reciprocity in EU external relations*
Financial and technical assistance, advantages of "the four freedoms" of internal EU market or other privileges in exchange for internalization and enforcement of European *aqcuis communitaire*	Mutual legal convergence or "barter trade". Creating a common set of rules by mutual agreement
Asymmetric results: exportation of European norms in exchange for economic or political reform	Symmetric results: mutual concessions, a new set of rules satisfactory for both sides
Source of rules: EU	Source of rules: both negotiating parties

additional, often overlapping dialogues: EU-Russia Energy Dialogue since 2000, founding of the Four Common Spaces of cooperation in 2003, Common Space Roadmaps in 2005, etc.

The EU-Russia relations, mutual interdependence and even institutional framework exceeded the PCA as soon as the year 2000. The newly established dialogues partially duplicated the existing ones creating an increasingly complex and unclear framework of cooperation[3]. Nevertheless, the PCA remains a document of high importance as it did create legal framework of cooperation and draws general directions and priorities of cooperation even if they are vague.

Merits of the PCA. The key merits of the EU-Russia PCA of 1994 lie at the very fact that EU-Russian cooperation has been institutionalized. The PCA as an institutional framework created preconditions for control of bilateral relations that ought to be strengthened with the new strategic agreement.

Regular bi-annual Heads of states summits, permanent cooperation councils for transport, agriculture, justice and home affairs and other issues as well as a group of sectoral agreements are all positive institutional results of cooperation under PCA. Even if the PCA did not entirely coincide with expectations of neither side it created a background for EU-Russia dialogue and at least did not become a drag for developing cooperation outside its framework[4]. Besides, although it did not prevent Russian action through European capitals one by one rather than through Brussels, it does put such relations "on a leash" at least to the extent that some issues are beyond of national competence of states and must be sorted out in Brussels. This "leash" should nevertheless become tighter with the next cooperation agreement.

Flaws of the PCA. The main flaw of the previous cooperation agreement was that it did not compel Russia for modernization in concert with the Western standards. The economic advantages that have been offered to Russia under conditionality principle were too weak even a decade ago when Russian economy was on the decline. Therefore, it is no surprise that it does not coincide with current Russian interests after economy has rapidly recovered and grown. PCA does not accurately imply mutual liberalization of movement of goods, services and labor. It only prescribes Russia the *most-favored nation* status[5]. Although PCA does envisage a gradual liberalization of trade among parties, roadmaps, benchmarks and expected year of its conclusion remain unclear. Creation of a free trade area remains subject to willingness and initiative of Russia to implement *acquis communitaire* and European values. Doing so was not within Russian capabilities last decade and today it is not within its interests[6].

Flaws of the PCA can be analyzed in a more detailed way.

- **Bankruptcy of democratization.** Consolidating democracy in Russia through financial and technical support for democratic reform was one of the main goals of PCA. TACIS program that was launched in the year 2000, was linked to democratic reform. During 2000–2004 a reform of Russian federal structure and tax system had begun. It was to be finalized after public sector reform (administration, public services and budget reforms) were complete and social system reform accomplished. However "conditionality" of the financial and technical assistance encountered problems at both micro-level and macro-level. At the micro-level use of financial and technical support was flawed by institutional inaccuracies, corruption and absence of a strategy for absorbing aid. Whereas, at the macro-level the very direction of reform in Russia got increasingly contradictory to European expectations: administrational reform turned into centralization of power, consolidation of presidential rule (creation of a stiff political verticale), gradual abolition of party pluralism and restriction of media, information and civic liberties[7].
- **Bringing about the "structural overlap"**. The regional EU-Russia cooperation concerning the post-soviet area that was envisaged in PCA never really functioned. Instead of decreasing geopolitical tensions in the region it ended up in increasing them. Until the year 2003 the EU remained rather neutral concerning development of the post-soviet space. "Russia first"

approach was dominating; therefore the post-soviet area beyond candidate states was left for Russian influence. With the 2004 enlargement the EU policy towards newly independent states gained an impetus, however it did not lead to a common EU-Russian action in the region. *Firstly*, because as the Baltic states and Poland became members of EU, they started advocating a skeptical position towards Russia. They added a new political line to the "cohabitation" strategy that has been promoted by larger EU member states. Political stance of the new member states argued that "Russia first" approach should be substituted with a strategy of creating conditions under which willing countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) could move away from Russian sphere of influence. Such policy turn was interpreted as interference with Russian geopolitical interests in Kremlin. *Secondly,* European neighborhood policy (ENP) developed in 2002–2004[8] complemented this policy turn with actual political instruments and brought changes into the post-soviet geopolitical structure. ENP and conditionality it brought about, EU soft power ambitions in the region in antipode to Russian "Realpolitik" created a "structural overlap" and a dead-lock situation in the region. Contrary to European expectations, ENP did not prevent emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. Rather than that it simply moved the dividing line and zone of tension further eastwards. On the other hand, ENP did weaken Russian positions in the region. Though it does not work as planned, ENP has an effect of "socialization" on partner states and gives them a possibility to use the European alternative to counterbalance Russian influence to a certain extent. In the aftermath of "color revolutions", Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova declared European integration to be their main foreign policy vector[9].

- **Problem of institutional duplication in EU external relations.** This problem is closely intertwined with the above mentioned "Russia first" approach that has been dominating EU agenda for a long period of time[10]. EU accomplishes cooperation with ENP partner states both through ENP and individual PCAs that echoe the EU-Russia model of relationship. Therefore ENP agenda remains dependent on the agenda of EU-Russia relations. This allows Russia to become an unofficial mediator between EU and Eastern partners of ENP as Russia is interested that any favorable means of economic and political partnership that

are offered to ENP partner states get first implemented in EU-Russia cooperation framework. Russia seeks to retain the monopoly of relations with EU, and thus to control the content of ENP agenda (mediating the europeanization process of countries of South Caucasus and Eastern Europe)[11].

Russia in the Architecture of EU External Relations

The architecture of EU external relations is complex and rather inconsistent. The main problem consists of two aspects: *firstly*, EU lacks a standard model of strategic partnership; *secondly*, there is no direct correlation between *how detailed* strategic agreements are, *how "binding"* they appear in legal terms, *how much conditionality* they involve and what *factual level of association* they result with.

The European Security Strategy (2003) positions Russia as second among most important international security actors (right next to the USA). Theoretically EU-Russia model of relations should be analogous to other models of EU-third country strategic partnerships. However, EU relations with its strategic partners vary a lot and are often vaguely regulated. Strategic relations are often defined by non-binding common declarations concerning content of cooperation and its depth. For example, EU-US partnership is largely implemented via international organizations: the United Nations, WTO, NATO, etc.; EU-Japan relations are defined by an abstract declaration of cooperation; EU-China and EU-India relations are regulated by Trade and Cooperation treaties[12].

On the other hand, a deep factual integration often does not require legally binding strategic partnership treaties. EU relations with EFTA countries (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) are an example of such in-depth association without detailed legally binding strategic partnership agreements[13].

There exist three types of detailed and legally binding treaties that include the conditionality clause; these treaties are however signed not with strategic partners but rather with states that fall into the list of candidate states and ENP partner countries. Such agreements include: *firstly,* the European Agreements. These are the association agreements with countries of Central and Eastern European countries, these agreements clearly envisage EU membership after

these countries have internalized European *acquis*[14]. *Secondly*, the Association and stabilization agreements with Western Balkan states, these agreements do not imply EU membership perspective directly but do provide an opportunity of becoming a candidate state. *Thirdly,* the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements that do not foresee EU membership perspective, but do include conditionality clause thus paving the way for integration with the EU in an "everything but institutions" mode.

Lack of a universal strategic partnership model preconditions a solid list of problems concerning the new EU-Russia agreement:

- The new EU-Russian relationship that will be institutionalized through new strategic partnership agreement will inevitably be unique as compared to other models of relations. It shall not fit into abstract models of strategic partnership, or into ENP framework. Because of inconsistency of EU external relations architecture this model might take shape of some kind of integration without membership, without producing necessary obligations from Russian side. This may increase risks of Russia abusing this special relationship to further increase influence over internal processes in EU.
- The fact that there is no direct correlation between *how detailed* agreements are, *how "binding"* they appear in legal terms, *how much conditionality* they involve and what *factual level of association* they produce means that there is a possibility that the new strategic agreement shall omit a creation of efficient elements of "checks and balances". Elements of "checks and balances" are necessary to prevent Russian influence on internal process of European integration (for example through exercising bilateral capital-to-capital ties) and avoiding obligations. Exceptional standards that such an agreement might produce would increase the above mentioned problem of institutional duplication in EU external relations.

No other third country enjoys such a dense network of institutionalized relations with EU as Russia does[15]. On the other hand, all these institutional frameworks are not integrated among themselves, therefore possibilities of complex pressure towards Russia are low as Russia has the possibility to pick fields of cooperation that produce most value added. The concept of Four Common Spaces (2003) stands as good example for that. These spaces include:

I – economic cooperation, II – cooperation in field of freedom, security and justice, III – cooperation on external security, IV – cooperation in the field of research, education and culture. The Four Common Spaces are an example of how internal multisectoral EU integration logic might be transferred into external relations. Therefore the common spaces should first of all be analyzed as a mechanism of influence on external actors (Russia in this case)[16]. EU does not possess efficient means within a single sector to prompt economic and political reform in Russia. Therefore, EU seeks to expand cooperation to multiple sectors in order to exercise complex pressure.

Meanwhile, Russia rejects the strategy of "integration of sectors" that enhances EU capabilities of pressure. Therefore, Russia is only interested in cooperation in limited number of sectors thus securitizing itself from EU obtaining any levers of influence[17].

EU: position towards Russia and search for a "common denominator"

Although several political traditions of attitude towards Russia can be distinguished within EU (from "cohabitation" to "containment"); one can roughly delineate a common denominator of a general position towards the new strategic agreement with Russia:

Firstly, "wishful thinking" that was strongly reflected in the former PCA (attempts to directly foster developments of Russian political and economic system) have been gradually replaced by a pragmatic approach (orientation towards solving particular bilateral political and economic issues)[18].

Secondly, conditionality is gradually replaced by reciprocity[19]. This policy turn is, first of all, conditioned by low efficiency of conditionality principle (this principle has been dominating the former PCA). The incentives that EU has been offering to Russia appeared to be too little of motivation for Russia to align to European set of rules. Reciprocity should not be understood as a concession to Russia in this case. This does not mean an overall shift from europeanization towards mutual convergence of rules. Reciprocity is rather understood as a method of creating elements of "checks and balances" that are to prevent and control Russian participation in EU integration processes in case Russia does not take up reform in the very same sector in which Russia would prefer integrating with EU. For example, if Russia is interested in

investing in liberalized internal EU energy market, it ought to implement the "unbundling" principle in its own energy market beforehand[20]. Principle of reciprocity is orientated towards enhancing mutual EU-Russia dependency and the quest for sensitive issues within Russian domestic domain that could encourage Russia to take up reform.

Thirdly, despite of turn towards reciprocity that could give EU-Russia relations a push from abstract normativism towards political pragmatism, European values must remain inseparable from any relations or agreements. "Cooperating on the procedure, not on substance" cannot become the only solution; a certain level of normative charge must be retained[21].

Fourth, conditionality will inevitably be retained during opening of EU internal market to Russia. Russia cannot attempt to change any of norms that comprise the core economic principles of how the Community functions or rules that directly derive from those principles by a strategic agreement. Therefore, in economic field Russia will be forced to internalize a part of EU *acquis communitaire* if it seeks to deepen economic relations (for example by going into a free trade area with the EU). On the other hand, nearly ¾ of Russian exports to the EU consist of raw materials; this export will not be strongly affected by lift of custom taxes. Therefore, mutual liberalization of trade can only be used as a negotiation argument to a limited extent[22].

EU in the Architecture of Russian External Relations

The EU remains main Russian trade partner and European dimension remains one of the most important vectors of Russian foreign policy.[23] Approximate calculations of high level meetings and resources attached to European policy dimension show that EU scores second among Russian foreign policy priorities: 40 percent of resources are dedicated to CIS area, 30 percent – to the EU, 20 percent to China and India, 5 proc. – to the USA and 5 percent to other regions[24]. Despite active economic cooperation, the place EU takes in Russian external relations' architecture is defined not solely by economic interests but by Russian national doctrine and Russian foreign policy concept as well:

First of all, Russia "does not know how to participate" and is not keen on participating in any forms of international regimes. All of military, economic and political alliances Russia takes part in are either entirely intergovernmental or Russian participation is limited to formal.

Secondly, Russian position towards EU remains ambiguous. On one hand, Russia prefers acting via bilateral channels rather than supranational EU mechanisms as the latter limit Russian role in shaping Community agenda. On the other hand, EU as a subject of international relations may be helpful to counterbalance the USA influence on European security system.

Thirdly, divergent values. This cleavage draws a clear line of EU-Russia cooperation, especially in area of freedom, justice and security. Absence of a value dimension pushes EU and Russia into the "Realpolitik" field.

The factors that shape Russian attitude towards EU derive from Russian national doctrine and understanding of foreign policy:

Notion of integration. EU and Russia faced series of significant change after conclusion of the PCA in 1994. Former concept of mutual reapproachment through Russian turn towards European socio-political, legal and economic model via internalization of *acquis communitaire* today is largely outdated and does not comply with "Russian" vision of EU-Russia relations.

Economic stability. Growth of Russian economy though preconditioned almost entirely by rising prices of energy resources strongly increases both political and economic power of the country. Conditionality from the European side (adoption of a "stick and carrot" policy) becomes increasingly inefficient under these conditions. The need to diversify Russian economy and exports stimulates a critical view on long-term perspectives of Russian-EU economic partnership on the Russian side. Russian and EU economies are complementary at the moment (whereas Russian exports comprise mainly of raw materials and energy resources and EU exports to Russia are mainly communication technologies and IT). However, in the long run growth of Russian economy will depend on whether Russia succeeds to develop high value added goods to supplement exports of raw materials. Machine industries, military industry, machinery for processing raw materials are the most promising Russian industries of that kind. And demand of such exports is significantly higher and more likely to grow in Eastern markets rather than in EU market.[25]

Divergent values. Sovereignty is the central notion of the Russian national doctrine. Stability, economic growth and strong institutions have clear priority to individual rights. This makes the package of "common European values" (liberal democracy, rule of law, human rights, etc.) promoted by the EU weakly acceptable. To put it in other words, idealistic motivation is unlikely to become

a strong ground for EU-Russian partnership as Russian foreign policy is driven by pragmatic interests. Despite economic growth, Russian leaders claim that partnership "in the name of ideals" is still too much of a luxury for Russia.[26]

What is the "Russian" Vision of the New Strategic Agreement?

In 2005, during an official meeting with president of the European Commission J. M. Barroso V. Putin (president of Russian Federation at that time) declared that after the current PCA expires in 2007 a new strategic partnership agreement will be necessary. The main problem of negotiating such an agreement (and the underlying set-back of the former PCA) is absence of any common EU-Russian strategic goals.

The Russian offer envisages an agreement based on finalizing implementation of Four Common Spaces as lowest common denominator of European and Russian interests. In order to raise the new agreement into higher qualitative level, its principles should rely on Russian membership in WTO and possibilities of establishing an EU-Russia free trade area.

This (official) position declines any possibility of integration on the grounds of common European values. EU-Russian relations should rather be based on WTO principles and international law, not the allegedly "common" norms promoted by EU. Russia envisages EU-Russian reapproachment as mutual convergence, not as europeanization of Russia.[27]

The new strategic agreement should be a brief, long term document (credible for at least 10 to 25 years). Sectoral agreements and detailed roadmaps in the Russian view should better be distinguished from the strategic document thus leaving energy questions out of the treaty of strategic partnership[28]. Such expectations repeatedly approve the proposition that Russia strongly rejects strategy of "integration of sectors" which might increase EU influence over Russia.

Nevertheless, Russia is concerned with deepening cooperation in energy sector just as much as EU is. The EU is Russia's largest and most "convenient" client (in terms of infrastructure). The key setback to deepening energy cooperation is diverging interpretations of notions.

Another aspect of cooperation that has been repeatedly emphasized ever since talks on a new cooperation treaty began is extended cooperation on external security. Russian leaders have suggested deepening military cooperation on fight

Table 2. EU and Russia: Diverging interpretations of energy security

EU	*Russia*	*Lowest Common Denominator*
Energy Security - Diversification of supply - Insurance of reliability of supply - Enhancing energy efficiency - Enhancing use of renewable and alternative energy resources - Unbundling of energy supply, distribution and production industry and infrastructure ownership	**Security of demand** - Ensuring direct access to European consumers - Ensuring stability of European demand (retaining status of most attractive/ the only supplier)	Long term agreements on energy supply
Legal interpretation of reciprocity - Harmonized or equivalent regulation of energy sector investment both in Russia and EU - Unbundling of energy supply, distribution and production industry and infrastructure ownership by both parties - Mutual liberalization of energy markets	**"Barter" interpretation of reciprocity** – Exchange in energy infrastructure objects or deals of analogous value. For example, possibility for Russian enterprises to acquire energy infrastructure subjects on EU territory without any restrictions in return to exploitation access to energy resource fields on Russian territory to the European enterprises.	Absent

against terrorism, increasing interoperability of troops, humanitarian cooperation in cases of natural disasters and etc. Russia seeks to enhance its influence in relation to ESDP whereas a special status would create an opportunity to participate in early stages of ESDP decision making[29]. On the other hand, external security cooperation continuously excludes EU involvement in stabilization of "frozen conflicts" as in this case Russia gives priority to OSCE.

In addition to that, Russia is interested in integration in the field of free movement and transit of persons. Moscow seeks to gradually elaborate a vise-free regime between Russia and the new EU member states, a far more flexible Kaliningrad transit regime may become an important issue of negotiations as well.

Limits of Russian Europeanization

The factors that limit possibilities of Russian europeanization largely derive from the current state of institutional and practical EU-Russian cooperation.

(In) Efficiency of reciprocity: problem of "special relations" with Russia. Exercise of reciprocity principle increases the likelihood of striking a practical and tangible agreement instead of making common declarations. That is its key advantage. However, it is reciprocity, not conditionality that might contribute to emergence of yet another "special relationship" with Russia. When compared to other EU neighbors, Russia seems to be getting the access to advantages of European cooperation with fewer obligations and faster than any other external partner (ENP partners, for example). The free trade area prospect could serve as an illustration: for example, Ukraine ought to implement detailed reforms under the ENP Action plan in order to attain possibility of being considered as a possible free trade partner. Meanwhile, to Russia the free trade offer was presented without requirement of implementation of such an action plan of extended political reform. Even if the Four Common Spaces seem similar to an ENP action plan, it has no benchmarks and plays a secondary role as the very logic of this free trade proposal is rather "no trade barriers in exchange for gas", than "no trade barriers in exchange for political reform". The problem of "special relationship" is yet strained by absence of standard model of EU strategic cooperation that could limit possibilities of such extensive exceptions.

Russian aspirations to avoid any concrete political obligations; and European helplessness to compel Russia to commit to the European norms. This problem is directly related to tendency of Russian political and economic centralization and the fact that EU lacks channels of influence towards Russia. EU cannot freely impose same means of pressure that Russia tends to exercise (trade embargoes, exclusion of foreign capital from vital sectors of economy, etc.). Business interest of the community shares an opinion that economic relations between EU and Russia should not be overregulated by the EU. European and Russian business should have the possibility to develop cooperation without a strict interference of Brussels. This would not pose any threats if not the fact that Russian business is heavily grown together with politics through state control of main monopolies[30]. Methods of operation and directions of development of Russian business are therefore defined not solely by market incentives (such

incentives would be likely to lead towards recognition of unified rules in order to decrease costs and increase security of business environment). Rather than that, Russian geopolitical interests play an important role. Thus the EU faces a dilemma: in order to put "a leash" on Russian capital EU must turn less liberal towards European business (which is hardly possible). EU cannot convert economic means to political directly; the only lever the EU does possess and incentive EU can offer is further liberalization, not threatening restrictions.

Mutual liberalization of trade is nevertheless the sphere where the EU can legitimately compel Russia to take over European *acquis communitaire.* Russia would have to join the internal market under rules the market operates as they cannot be infringed by any external strategic treaties. Opening of internal market to Russia would in principle be accomplished via the classical principle of conditionality. However, it is still unclear if a free trade area appears tempting enough to Russia to comply with such conditionality.

Russian ability to influence European development on issues the member states remain divided on. This factor puts a strain on capabilities of individual EU member states to control Russian bilateral engagement with other EU countries, even though such engagement might have direct impact on overall integration processes and security of the community (as for the creation of common energy policy, for example). This is not solely an obstacle to "socialize" Russia with the European practices. Moreover, this reveals Russian capabilities to shape European policies without any control, transparency and obligations.

Resistance of Russian political system to external influence. Contrary to the democratic principle of balance of powers (between the legislative, executive and judicial), Russian political system is largely controlled from one center – the presidency, whereas the formally separate legislative, executive and judicial bodies are subordinate to president and do not have a final say in any important decision making. However, absence of balance powers is compensated with a sort of system of elite equilibrium in the informal network of competing elite groups. This informal balance of powers is key to stability of Russian political system. Influence ought to remain counterbalanced among competing elite groups with diverging preferences.

As elite equilibrium substituted democratic separation of powers the Russian political regime turned into what can be called "state corporation" or system of bureaucratic capitalism. Main traits of such system are the following: a highly

hermetic system resistant to external influence; grown-together political and economic elites; decision making following procedures of a board of directors; strategic branches of economy controlled by members of bureaucratic "corporation". A synthesis of those factors predetermines that any external attempts to "bind" Russia to a certain set of "rules of the game" (European attempts of Russian democratization, for example) are doomed to fail. So are any attempts to increase political or economic dependency of Russia on external factors (for example, through foreign direct investment in strategic branches of economy)[31].

Does the EU Possess Any Levers of Influence Towards Russia?

An overview of factors that limit prospects of Russian europeanization allows concluding that the main obstacle hampering any attempts of drawing Russia to European norms is the absence of efficient instruments and levers to affect Russian domestic politics. This precondition interferes heavily with intentions to provide a clear depth and content of EU-Russia relations. Therefore a question arises, whether EU possesses any possibilities yet unexhausted to bind solution of questions that are important to EU member states to issues important to Russia.

Energy sector: principle of legal reciprocity. Energy issues will inevitably be the magnetic axis of EU-Russian negotiation of the new cooperation agreement. When facing a centralized and monopolized Russian energy sector the EU is practically helpless in terms of channels of pressure. The only European argument is mutual interdependence: the "investment hunger" that Russian energy infrastructure suffers from and interest of Russian business to obtain direct access to end-consumers in Europe.

Additional impetus can solely be obtained if solution of European energy security problems were linked to foundation of an EU-Russia free trade area (and perhaps a common economic space in the long run) by liberalization in both sectors.

According to the reciprocity formula, EU would provide Russia with long-term guaranties of demand security, investment and opening of energy market in exchange for security of supply based on transparent and clear set of rules (ratification of Energy charter and Transit Protocol, for example)[32]. It is important to emphasize that any "binding" clauses can only be applied in EU-Russia energy relations if the legal and not "barter" interpretation of reciprocity is adopted in the new partnership agreement.

Table 3. EU-Russia Free Trade Area: estimated consequences to Russia[34]

Advantages	*Disadvantages*
FTA would favor diversification of Russian exports (exports of high value-added products to European market)	EU exports of high value added production comprise the bulk of current Russian imports from EU. If trade barriers for this production are lifted, domestic Russian producers of analogous production would experience tough competition
FTA stimulates development of cross-border investment and mutual investment into new technologies (inflow of know-how and technology)	FTA may cause a trade misbalance in Russian economy: if imports from EU shall exceed Russian exports, Russia would experience negative budgetary consequences
FTA decreases administrational and tariff barriers thus decreasing costs of trade and increasing profits	Membership in WTO will probably mean decrease of agricultural subsidies. Development of foreign financial institutions might cause a misbalance in Russian financial market, etc. FTA and WTO membership come with risks of various short-term instabilities
FTA allows exercise of internal and external economy of scale and improves investment climate	Trade liberalization means decrease of both import and export tariffs. A significant part (up to 40 percent) of Russian budgetary income are comprised of tariff revenues (including energy export tariffs) FTA might decrease budgetary revenues in the short run

Free Trade Area: an instrument of "binding" Russia to the European values? Free Trade Area (FTA) is one of the most important EU economic levers in respect to Russia. EU and Russia are mutually important trade and investment partners. Nevertheless, the share of EU investment in Russia remains relatively low. Investment and integration into the global market are both vital preconditions for diversification of Russian economy and decrease of reliance on energy exports. One of the crucial advantages that an EU-Russia FTA would bring about is a significant inflow of FDI into the Russian market because of decreasing costs of branch enterprise activities and development of cross-border investment[33].

Interpreted in terms of Russian europeization, creation of a FTA is important because of convergence it prompts. Creation of a FTA (i. e. free movement of goods and mutual treatment of foreign investment as equal to national capital) requires a broad harmonization of law and standards, i. e. a gradual liberalization of Russian domestic economics, increase of its predictability and decrease of state interference. An EU-Russia FTA requires Russian membership

in WTO, convergence of trade law, mutual recognition of quality standards, liberalization of public procurement, establishment of a clear mechanism of dispute resolution, implementation of international accounting standards, unrestricted competition of business; all that increases transparency and efficiency of entrepreneurship.

However, it remains unclear if a FTA is enough of a driving force to encourage Russia to converge to the European rules and accomplish an explicit economic reform.

The Most Likely Scenario of the New EU-Russia Agreement

The limits of Russian europeanization that have been analyzed in this article – (a) Russian reluctance to concrete political obligations, (b) interpretation of reapproachment with EU as mutual convergence rather that Russian europeanization (quest for another "special relationship"), (c) Russian ability to influence European development on issues the member states remain divided on, (d) weakness of EU levers of influence – all define the problematic field of EU policies towards Russia and simultaneously outline the contours of a most probable scenario of the new agreement.

The broad set of obstacles to Russian europeanization provides that a crucial (a qualitatively new) step forward is not reasonable to expect. Negotiation of a new strategic agreement is likely to develop according to logic of "legalization" of *status quo plus*[35]. This involves continuation of "best practice" (a type of codification of legal and institutional framework that has been elaborated during period of 1997–2007 in a single treaty, first of all based on Four Common Spaces). The new treaty will probably bring a health-check of institutional framework rather than significant change by merging institutions with overlapping competences, softening of conditionality and etc. This type of a new agreement falls under official expectations of Kremlin a lot both in its contents and form (a brief, long-term treaty based on implementation of Four Common Spaces)[36].

It is important to emphasize that replacing the former framework of cooperation with an entirely new agreement gives Russia an opportunity to re-negotiate the extent to which the former PCA and common spaces shall be transferred into the new agreement. Thus such scenario is unfavorable to the EU as it shall be hard to incorporate common spaces into the new strategic deal as a package

and Russia will be able to demand concessions and exclusion of elements of the former framework that push "too hard for europeanization"[37].

Such a formula of the new agreement is insufficient to solve the core problems of EU-Russian relations. For example, energy cooperation would then continue to be implemented via EU-Russia energy dialogue, i. e. the way Russia prefers it – in an entirely single-sectoral mode, via agreements that are not interrelated or bilateral "barter" deals.

Sectoral EU-Russian integration is unlikely to produce a political result as the spaces of cooperation and their roadmaps are not mutually conditional or directly intertwined in their mode of implementation. Although EU might attempt to spread the European values in Russia through common spaces, such mechanism still does not provide any instruments of binding Russia to any obligations, the extent and depth of cooperation remains dependent solely on Russian political decision.

The roadmaps for implementation of common spaces are not legally binding. Moreover, the notion of Common economic area is defined vaguely (as merely the possibility of participation of Russian standardization institutions in the standard harmonization procedures is defined explicitly). The implementation roadmaps of common economic space depict network-type cooperation in fields of telecommunications, transport, energy and environmental issues[38]. Giving priority to such inexact and loose cooperation indicates that Russia prefers sectoral and partial cooperation to fully fledged integration into EU internal market. The later mode of cooperation is often perceived as unfavorable because of intensifying dependence on the European norms. Therefore *status quo plus* of EU-Russia relations is likely to retain an indefinite prospect of creating a common economic area simultaneously allowing Russia to control the level of liberalization of bilateral economic relations.

Such scenario is obviously favorable to Russia as it would not strengthen EU capabilities of making Russian economic policy less politicized and more transparent.

Instead of a Conclusion: What Should EU Do?

In relation to the EU Russia cannot claim to "everything but institutions" (i. e. integration without membership) as long as it retains principles and standards that contradict to internal EU institutional constellation. Therefore, EU

should opt for a "minimum" model of the new treaty, a modernized version of the former PCA supplemented with "checks and balances" that limit Russian influence to internal integration processes of EU.

One of the most efficient "protectors" against such Russian policies is the principle of reciprocity. According to this principle Russian involvement in EU internal market ought to be accompanied by consequent liberalization and decentralization of Russian economy. Reciprocity could be embodied in the new strategic agreement as uniform regulation of energy sector investment, mutual implementation of "unbundling" principle and etc. To put it in other words, extent of Russian involvement must directly depend upon structural reform in fields in which Russia wants to "enter Europe". This model of EU-Russia institutional relations is orientated towards binding the European security issues to issues important to Russia.

A slow down of reproduction of multiple institutional frameworks of EU-Russia relations would deprive Russia of ability to mediate in EU relations with ENP Eastern dimension partner states (Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus). Russia would loose possibility to demand adoption of favorable economic cooperation beforehand ENP partners.

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RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION

Nerijus Maliukevičius

Abstract. It is important to understand how modern Russia uses information technologies and the media to retain (increase) its influence in the former Soviet space and specifically in Lithuania. This country applies traditional methods of electronic colonialism for the informational and cultural expansion: it keeps to the Russian language as a uniform code of communication and imparts former Soviet values, symbols and images into the Lithuanian mass culture. However, this informational and cultural expansion in the post-Soviet space, and specifically in Lithuania, cannot be explained only on the basis of electronic colonialism or cultural imperialism theories. The power policy exercised by Russia in this region blends together the western principles of media expansion, highlighted by the critical communication theory, with the exceptionally Russian authoritarian tradition. This kind of symbiosis has resulted in Russia's specific geopolitics of information known for using hard power strategy in the information space of its opponents.

Preface

In information age, media reality affects human political behaviour and shapes international security issues. Therefore, state governments tend to create media realities which are beneficial for their own purposes. They compete for public attention of internal and foreign audiences and some even resort to acts of information aggression in neighbouring information spaces.

When Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, thus attaining its vital foreign policy goals, Lithuanian political analysts raised the question as to whether the accession treaties had truly created a new state. These days, the Lithuanian community of political scientists has started to promote an "inside approach", constructivism and identity deconstruction[1]. This tendency reflects the natural wish to verify Lithuania's geocultural "return to Europe" and determine the level of its actual separation from "the other" – Russia.

Lithuania's integration into the Western political and economic space continues: Lithuania joined the Schengen area only at the end of 2007; it is still waiting for an invitation to the euro zone; and it is making an all-out effort to break away from the Soviet-made energy and transport systems. At the same time, now that western geocultural values (respect for human rights, protection of the freedom of speech, etc.) are gaining ground in society, Russia's influence is becoming increasingly marked in the Lithuanian information environment and mass culture. Interest in soft threats emerged in the Baltic States immediately after the withdrawal of Russian troops, but it was only beginning with 2004, when NATO extended hard security guarantees to Lithuania, that the focus really shifted on those soft threats. When in their public debates, politicians and intellectuals started scrutinizing foreign influences in the media and cultural environments, the danger of addressing new security issues in an irresponsible manner became real[2].

To make information security-related decisions fully adequate to potential information threats, it is essential to determine the methods used by Russia – a neighbouring country that has always exerted a significant influence on Lithuania and will continue doing so – in applying modern power tools in the post-Soviet space. Russia lost its status of a global power after the Cold War. Vladimir Putin compared the collapse of the Soviet Union to a major geopolitical disaster. Russian experts and politicians claim that today's international system is openly aggressive and that tremendous political, economic, cultural and information pressure is constantly exerted on Russia. Therefore, information, communication technologies and the media are treated by Russia as tools of geopolitical struggle in a modified international environment.

In Russia, traditional geopolitical thinking is transferred to the media space. Such policies are defined as the geopolitics of information in this article. To attain its geopolitical goals, Russia seeks to dominate the post-Soviet information space, control its information flows and tailor the political behaviour of the local population to its own political interests by using aggressive means of public opinion manipulation. The post-Soviet space remains "our" territory in the geopolitical imagination of the Russian elite and society[3]. The Lithuanian information space – just like those of other post-Soviet countries – has become a kind of a testing range for the Russian geopolitics of information.

The Substance of Concept

In most general terms, geopolitics is defined as the transformation of power in geographic space[4]. Classical geopolitical thinking links political space with geographical territories and traditional (e.g. diplomatic, military) methods of their control. In the second half of the 20th century, the neo-Marxist school of critical communication took a new approach to the international space: Herbert I. Schiller introduced the notion of cultural imperialism[5], while Thomas L. McPhail designed the theory of electronic colonialism[6]. After the threats of American cultural expansion to small nations were defined, in 1980 UNESCO approved the MacBride Report which outlined the main philosophical points of the New World Information Communication Order[7]. It is but natural that the first attempts to conceptualize the notion of geopolitics of information were made within this particular context. Thus the prefix "geo" was increasingly more often used to emphasize the amplitude of (geo)culture (Immanuel Wallerstein) or (geo)economy (Edward N. Luttwak). Works by neo-liberal scholars Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane provided yet another strong impetus for rethinking the power strategy within new spaces by introducing the notion of soft power into political science[8]. After the Cold War, the geopolitical discourse was modified to such an extent that some authors[9] started to speak about the end of geopolitics.

In Russia, however, geopolitical thinking remains a traditional political trend. Robert Kagan compares it to the conduct practised by the 19th century nations on the international arena[10]. Today's Russian geopoliticians and political technologists relate modern power resources to aggressive neo-colonial politics. Experts of Russian policies, both in the West (Janusz Bugajski, Edward Lucas) and in Lithuania (Raimundas Lopata, Nortautas Statkus), speak about neo-imperialism that oversteps geographical boundaries. However, it is necessary to point out that Western analysts tend to study benevolent imperial projects (e.g. European Union) or the principles of cultural hegemony (e.g. United States). In Russia, meanwhile, geopoliticians mostly address the problem of exercising control over the post-Soviet space, i.e. they seek to reconstruct the "Fallen Empire" by applying (post)modern power tools: information technologies, media networks and also aggressive methods of public opinion manipulation – information warfare.

Alexander Dugin – a popular representative of Russian geopolitics – has taken a step towards designing virtual projects of Russia as a New Eurasian

Empire[11]. Igor Panarin – an expert in information warfare – has flavoured this thinking with geopolitical insights and introduced the doctrine of the Third Rome Information Empire[12]. Andrei Manoilo underlines the importance of controlling public opinion to pursue an effective foreign policy[13]. These authors manage to paradoxically blend the economic reasons for informational and cultural expansion and the constructivist approach to the political environment with a strictly realistic tradition of international relations dominated by the problem of controlling the social space. The hard-line strategy of geopolitics of information in Russia is supported by public opinion control mechanisms: reflexive control, strategic deception and information warfare. The word "geopolitics" in the concept of geopolitics of information illustrates how "control mentality" in Russia is transferred from the geographic space to the media environment.

The theory of electronic colonialism which reveals the principles of power distribution in a globalized world highlights the relationship of subordination between technologically developed and lagging regions and explains modern cultural and informational dependencies. Based on this theory, the relationship between Lithuania and Russia develops within a semi-peripheral region. Russia's position here is exceptional because as a leader in this semi-peripheral region it can apply the basic principles of electronic colonialism when pursuing its political purposes. Such modern colonialism becomes possible where information spaces are linked by controlled telecommunication systems using a uniform information communication code (language and values). Representatives of the school of critical communication say that this code is rooted in the global use of English and the development of a global consumer culture. Meanwhile, in the post-Soviet space, the Russian language continues to keep strong positions. In addition, old movies, songs and symbols are easily recognizable in this region and they have started to re-emerge as part of a modern consumer lifestyle.

The process of globalization and the collapse of the Soviet empire not only opened new avenues for power dispersal, but also created conditions to review potential power strategies. These days, the success of a foreign policy mostly depends on the ability to captivate your allies and opponents by political ideas, projects and images – hence the increased importance of soft power. However, Russia's strategy in the post-Soviet space is still based on traditional geopolitical thinking rooted in "control mentality".

The substance of Russian geopolitics of information could be best understood in the context of Alexander Wendt's social theory of international rela-

tions. Based on the roles state-actors play on the international arena, Wendt presents three cultures of anarchy[14]:

1. Hobbesian culture – enemy roles and images;
2. Lockean culture – competitor roles and images;
3. Kantian culture – friend roles and images.

Each culture has its distinct understanding of "oneself" and "the other". In the case of Russia, the culture of interstate relations in the post-Soviet space is conditioned by a strong sense of insecurity that makes Russia distance itself from the external world and resort to information aggression in its foreign policy. Authoritarian regimes start manipulating external threats and stereotyped fears of their societies when they seek to consolidate power inside the country. Russia's strategy in the Baltic States also pursues specific long-term foreign policy goals: to ignite confrontation between Western European countries and EU newcomers.

Russia's policies in the post-Soviet space, and specifically in Lithuania, are permeated with the Hobbesian anarchy culture dominated by adversaries and the enemy. The decision of the Russian political elite to apply hard power geopolitics of information in the media spaces of its western and south-western neighbours has been supported since 2000 by consistent political and administrative decisions: the Russian Federation Information Security Doctrine with a special focus on Western information threats was approved in 2000; the Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was established in 2005, which was assigned to counter such threats in the entire post-Soviet region. Thus a policy promoting an aggressive control of the information space in neighbouring countries assumed a legal and administrative structure. Such policy sharply differs from the strategies of soft power – we can compare both in the following chart (see Chart 1).

Thus **the geopolitics of information** should be defined as *a policy based on the control of information flows and aggressive methods of psychological impact aimed at establishing dominance in a specific information space affecting the geocultural attitudes of a society for own benefit and motivating the political behaviour of individual persons***.** The architects of geopolitics applied their theories to geographically defined territories. They believed that *status quo* in international politics could be changed by military force. Meanwhile, modern Russian geopoliticians maintain that geographical territories are a secondary factor in the Information Age. They perceive dynamic geocultural spaces within the global

Chart 1. Information Age Power Strateges



Source: Chart by the author.

Chart 2. Dispersal of Geopolitics of Information in Opponent's Information Space



Source: Chart by the author.

information space which can be controlled through information flows and methods of influencing public opinion (see Chart 2). The geocultural values of the opponent's society – the nucleus which binds society together – are the main target of the geopolitics of information.

Although this is a broad theoretical framework of the geopolitics of information, it allows in a way to systemize Russia's actions in the Lithuanian information space. This framework can serve as a basis for empirical studies.

The Paradox

The results of electronic media (TV) monitoring, which was conducted in 2005–2007[15], revealed an increase of Russia's media presence in the information flows of Lithuanian information environment. Significant segments of Lithuanian society receive popular information as well as news about the world and the post-Soviet region through Russian TV networks. The same study shows that many Lithuanians still have a feeling of nostalgia for the "Soviet times". This might lead us to think that the Russian geopolitics of information is successful. However, the geocultural attitudes of the Lithuanian population reveal just the opposite: for example, Russia is considered to be the most hostile country by Lithuania society and the political system of Putin's Russia is perceived very negatively in Lithuania. Such a paradox – the competitive advantage Russia has for its information policies in the Lithuanian information environment and, at the same time, an entirely negative image the Lithuanian public has formed about modern Russia – tempts us to find a reasoned answer for this.

The information space of a country basically consists of three components: first, information and telecommunications technologies, media infrastructure, media and show business principles established in a specific national market, and regulatory legal framework; second, people who live in the territory of a specific country or beyond, but psychologically associate themselves with the information environment of this particular country, their language skills and preferences of media use, and also moral principles; finally, overall information circulating within the environment and mass culture products. Russia in most post-Soviet countries has a big competitive advantage in pursuing its geopolitics of information:

1. Russia's media channels (TV, radio and the press) can reach significant portions of the target societies and they are popular among the audiences;
2. Most of the populations in this region still have a good knowledge of the Russian language;

3. There are significant Russian ethnic minorities in those countries, who can contribute to Russia's goals.

Lithuania can be a good example to illustrate this situation. We can start with the language issue:

Table 1. Knowledge of Other Foreign Languages among Lithuanian Population

	Lithuanian	**Russian**	**Polish**	**English**	**German**	**No other language**
Lithuanians	–	64,1%	7,8%	18,0%	8,6%	28,2%
Poles	61,6%	76,9%	–	6,9%	5,8%	8,0%
Russians	65,8%	–	14,4%	15,9%	6,1%	19,5%

Source: Department of Statistics, 2001 Population Census results.

This indicates that Russian is the most spoken foreign language in Lithuania. Compared to the situation in the European Union where the Russian language is the sixth most popular language (7% of the entire EU population speaks Russian)[16], it is an enormous advantage for the Russian geopolitics of information.

In the Lithuanian information environment, television is the dominant medium for the general public. Surveys show that the majority of viewers (up to 70%) watch popular national TV channels. An analysis of the content of national TV channels shows that there is a significant portion of TV shows, serials and other programs made in Russia[17] (see Chart 3).

Most of Russian made programs are cheaper than American, European or even Latin American products, so TV channels are keen on buying them. The language issue and a wide spread cognition of Russian popular culture expands the potential audience of such programs.

Therefore several important characteristics can be set out in the Lithuanian information environment. First, the language competences of Lithuanian society create particularly favourable conditions for Russia's geopolitics of information. Second, television is the dominant information channel in Lithuania and it is hereto that Russian information flows are mostly directed. Third, the media habits of Russian and Polish ethnic minorities in Lithuania differ substantially

Chart 3. Duration of Russian programs in national TV channels (hours)



Source: Ramonaitė A., Maliukevičius N., Degutis M. *Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos*. Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2007.

from those of the Lithuanian population: they use the Russian media much more often and they easily enter the Russian information space.

However, the research shows that the Lithuanian population assesses the political system of present-day Russia in a very negative way: only 10.3 percent of those questioned describe it as good or very good (similarly as the political system of Belarus) and more that 50 percent of respondents think of it as bad or very bad[18]. Moreover, Lithuanian society perceives Russia as a major adversary. This country has a very negative image in this particular post-Soviet society in spite of the competitive advantage it has in the Lithuanian information environment (see Chart 4).

The opinions held by local ethnic minorities about Russia are quite unexpected and surprising: 40% of Russians in Lithuania perceive Russia as the most hostile country and only 9% of them think that Russia is a friendly country. In general, Russia has a better image among ethnic Poles than among ethnic Russians (see Charts 5 and 6).

J. Ney emphasizes that language and media resources are important for effective soft power politics, but even more important are a country's "political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies

Chart 4. Which country do yuo consider to be the most hostile to Lithuania



Source: Ramonaitė A., Maliukevičius N., Degutis M. *Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos*. Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2007.

Chart 5. Said that Russia is the most hostile country



Source: Ramonaitė A., Maliukevičius N., Degutis M. *Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos*. Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2007.

Chart 6. Said that Russia is the most friendly country



Source: Ramonaitė A., Maliukevičius N., Degutis M. *Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos*. Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2007.

(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)"[19]. The research shows that modern Russia does not have such moral resources in Lithuania. To put it in another way: Russia cannot lead other post-Soviet countries by its example.

The Answer

An analysis of concrete Russian media products that target the Baltic States could explain the above mentioned paradox. The most visible during the recent years were several TV documentaries that were broadcasted via Russian TV channels. The first one was "Secrets of the Century. Verdict for Europe" which was broadcasted by the PBK TV network, closely related to Russia's ORT TV, and which questioned the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact for Lithuania and its independence. Another television network – TVCi "Nacizm po Pribaltijski" based on the so-called FSB "historical archives". The same archives were later used by Europa Publishing House[20] to put out a book for each of the Baltic States[21]. Those books can be described as a classic example of black propaganda.

Such information attacks are difficult to comprehend within the context of soft power strategy. This is due to the fact that the Russian geopolitics of information is based on resonant communication with most post-Soviet societies and it targets the Russian home audience. The analysis of specific cases of Russia's information aggression leads to the conclusion that by using well-stereotyped "enemy-fascist" images, which are easily recognisable in Russia, the picture of a "beleaguered fortress" is further enhanced and society consolidates even more strongly around an authoritarian leader. For this reason, the Kremlin can achieve its internal policy goals, but in a long term perspective Russia loses popularity and attractiveness among post-Soviet societies. It tarnishes its image among Baltic populations.

In the future, it will be even more difficult for Russia to improve this image because it has started to lose the advantage it had. The Russian language is beginning to lose popularity: for example, the young generation in Lithuania does not speak Russian (see Chart 7).

Chart 7. Knowledge of foreign language by age groups



	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60+
Russian	53.3	61.3	86.1	95.8	98.4	97.0	93.5	92.6	96.3	75.3
Polish	5.8	10.0	19.9	11.2	22.4	19.9	12.0	15.1	15.2	15.8
English	72.0	46.6	24.1	18.5	19.0	9.9	9.6	9.8	4.0	2.6
German	13.7	12.4	12.4	9.4	9.7	8.5	6.5	10.6	4.3	3.3

Source: TNS-Gallup

Conclusions

Lithuania still remains a typical semi-peripheral state in terms of international communication and is yet unable to effectively control its information space and successfully develop its telecommunications infrastructure. Because of its foreign language competences, a significant part of Lithuanian society is exposed to the Russian information environment. Russian is the prevailing foreign language in Lithuania and it effectively performs the function of a communication code. It is true that young people are better versed in English, but the general level of English language skills is still very low. At the same time, Russia pursues an active media policy here: the percentage of the Pervyj Baltijskij Kanal audience (mostly popular among ethnic Russians) is growing. In addition, there is an increase in the broadcasting of Russian production by major Lithuanian television networks. In the largest Lithuanian cities of Vilnius and Klaipėda, Russian music radio stations hold dominant positions, while the Russian-language press published in Lithuania is mostly a digest of Russian news, further consolidating Russia's dominance even at primary source level in the Lithuanian information space.

This distances the Lithuanian information space from the information environments of Western European core countries and weakens its information culture – an important element of the society's information security. Lithuania's information culture has started to take over the Russian tradition of dealing with business and political problems through media levers. The insufficient immunity of Lithuania's information space opens the door to influence by Russia. Therefore, in its pursuit of informational and cultural expansion in Lithuania, Russia is able to successfully apply the main principles of electronic colonialism: to use the Russian language as a uniform code of communication and implant former Soviet values, symbols and images in the Lithuanian mass culture.

However, Russia's informational and cultural expansion in the post-Soviet space, and specifically in Lithuania, cannot be explained only on the basis of electronic colonialism or cultural imperialism. The power policy exercised by Russia in this region is called the geopolitics of information, which uses hard power strategy in the information space of its opponents. This strategic choice made by Russia has been conditioned by both objective and subjective reasons, of which the most relevant to Lithuania are the following three. First, Russia's soft power space is limited. When Vladimir Putin came to power, the Kremlin

launched a gradual and steady process of incorporating the Soviet past into the national identity of modern Russia – a process which is in sharp contrast to the popular and official narrative of history prevailing in Lithuanian society. Second, Russia's political elite is mostly concerned about power consolidation through the images of alleged threats "from the West". Due to the centuries-long confrontation between the Great Duchy of Lithuania (later on, the Republic of Both Nations) and Russia, Lithuania's case is very convenient in communicating an image of an "amber bridgehead for aggression" to the Russian public mind. Finally, Russia's modern political elite and political technologists responsible for the geopolitics of information in the post-Soviet region developed their practical skills within the framework of Soviet military and security community dominated by the concepts of reflexive control, strategic deception and, later on, by the notion of information warfare.

Finally, Russia's geopolitics of information based on hard power strategy could be changing. Proposals to modify Russia's policy in respect of the Baltic States and build it on soft power were voiced by the Russian community of political scientists during Yeltsin's presidency[22]. However, when Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, such an approach was rejected. It was only several years ago that experts in international relations started to speak about the use of soft power. Presently, the number of those who question Russia's prevailing strategy of geopolitics of information is growing. Russia has a huge potential for paradigmic changes its policy, as was revealed in the study of the Lithuanian information space, and the latest administrative decisions by Russian authorities only confirm this assumption[23].

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20 Information agency "Regnum" is one of the founders of this publishing house and Mr. Kolerov is the founder of IA Regnum.

21 For more see: Sbornik "Tragedia Litvi: 1941 - 1944. Sbornik arhivnih dokumentov o prestupleniah litovskih kollaboracionistov v godi vtoroi mirovoi voini", M.: Izdatelstvo «Evropa», 2006; Sbornik "Latvia pod igom nacizma: sbornik arhivnih dokumentov", M.: Izdatelstvo «Evropa», 2006; Sbornik arhivnih dokumentov "Эstonia. Krovavij sled nacizma: 1941–1944 godi", M.: Izdatelstvo «Evropa», 2006.

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23 In 2007 Modest Kolerov (head of the presidential department for interregional and cultural ties with foreign countries) was sacked and the same year Vladimir Putin established the Ruskij Mir foundation headed by Viacheslav Nikonov. This foundation declared that it will act on the principles of public diplomacy.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY

MORE THAN SEMANTICS: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF "MILITARY REVOLUTION" AND "REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS"[1]

Deividas Šlekys

Abstract. For the last fifty years the idea of *military revolution,* (MR) introduced by Michael Roberts, was one of the main concepts in the field of military history. According to him, the tactical changes introduced by Dutch and Swedish commanders at the beginning of the 17th century led to revolutionary changes in the social and political spheres. Roberts' idea of MR gave a theoretical framework, which helped to connect simple technological and tactical changes with the development and transformation of the state. From the early 1990's another concept, revolution in military affairs (RMA) also became very popular in academic, military and political circles around the world, especially in the U.S. The American successes in the First Gulf war, the growing importance of information, precision and stealth technologies forced experts in the military field to start speak about revolutionary changes in the warfare. The RMA was associated with changes in weaponry, doctrines and military institutions. Broadly speaking RMA is related with the changes in the armed forces. However, the concentration on the changes in the armed forces neglected broader issues. If the changes in the military sphere really are revolutionary, they definitely have to influence some changes in the political and social levels of the state. The inner logic of the concept of RMA could not explain the broader changes and issues. In this case it is better to use the concept of the MR. However, only few scholars have tried to analyze possible relations between these two concepts. The aim of this paper is to analyze the creation, development, and critique of both the above mentioned concepts and try to find a way in which using both concepts could help to analyze much broader issues.

[1] This article is based on master dissertation written in Glasgow University, Scotland, 2008.

Introduction

The German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, when speaking about words and language compared them with a tool-box:

> "Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects."[1]

If with the help of tools people are able to build houses, and machines then words can describe and give meaning to surrounding objects, and processes that they create. It is worth remembering an other great author, George Orwell, and his novel *1984* where he shows how the world, thinking and lives of people may change, by changing the language.[2]

This paper is not concerned with military history *per se*. There will not be any empirical research or analysis of a particular military campaign or battle. This paper is about the concepts which scholars and students use when analyzing military events, and describing them. The historical facts by themselves are useless unless they are systemized using particular conceptions, theories. The aim of this article is the analysis of two related, but at the same time different concepts – *Military Revolution* (MR) and *Revolution in Military Affairs* (RMA). It will be an attempt to analyze these two concepts by looking at their origin, original meaning, and interpretations.

The concept of MR was introduced by Michael Roberts more than fifty years ago. The main idea of Roberts' concept is that between 1560 and 1660 the conduct of war and its relationship with the state changed so dramatically, that we must use expression of 'revolution'. This revolution was the result of attempts to solve the bigger problem of tactics: "the problem how to combine missile weapons with close action".[3] The solution to this puzzle caused changes in four critical areas: tactics (role of firearms, siege warfare), size of armies, strategy (war became more complex; fighting on few fronts simultaneously) and the impact of war on society and state (new forms of administration, tax collection, etc.).

However, until now there has been no consensus among historians with regards when, where, how, why and if at all such a revolution or revolutions occurred. As for this moment it will be enough to say, that initially in this paper MR will be perceived as a radical change in military, political, social and

economical spheres caused by a combination of military, social, and political factors. As this definition shows, one of the main goals of this article will be to demonstrate that the military factor should be considered as an independent variable affecting changes in world in which we live.

On the other hand the idea of RMA became a popular topic after the First Gulf war in the early 1990s. The American successes in the First Gulf war, the growing importance of the computers, Internet and other new technologies related with communications, precision, and stealth forced experts in the military field to begin discussing revolutionary changes in warfare. There RMA will be defined as changes in the structure of the military institutions, conceptual framework (doctrine, tactics, and field manuals), technologies and weapons. Broadly speaking RMA in this paper will be seen as a concept which explains the changes in armed forces.

One of the main problems with the use of these two concepts is that there have only been a few attempts to connect them and to use the two as complementary ideas.[4] Furthermore, almost in all cases the MR is reduced to the changes in military sphere, neglecting its social and political impact.[5] In other words MR is used as synonym of RMA. The main aim of this article is to prove that to treat these concepts as equals is theoretically wrong, and it has far reaching negative consequences both in the academic field and real life. In this paper RMA will be treated as a subsidiary concept and process in regards to MR as a concept. RMA is only one part of the MR (see scheme Nr: 1).



Military Revolution: changes – new type of armed forces, new forms of administration, tax collection and distribution apparatus, etc; source of origin: social, technological, political (mostly some mix of all of them); level of change – state.

Revolution in Military Affairs: changes – technological (new weapons, technologies), structure and organization of armed forces, doctrine and training; source of origin: technological, institutional-political; level of change – armed forces

Scheme Nr: 1. Created by author.

The use of these two concepts is not simple a semantic game depending on intellectual taste. As previously stated, RMA is concerned with changes in armed forces and MR with much broader changes in the state. In such cases, when MR is reduced to the level of RMA the academics, and politicians lose track of the bigger picture. At present, the general consensus is that RMA is spreading from United States to the other parts of the world under the name of military transformation. New technological changes, new fighting doctrines (for example – network centric warfare) are discussed around the globe. Only few scholars have raised broader questions: what changes in the state and society is this military transformation bringing?[6] Reducing the meaning of MR to the level of RMA threatens to ignore and undermine the military's position as one of the independent source of change which might cause transformation at state level.

One of the reasons that prompted an analysis of these two concepts was that the last few decades saw a proliferation of the cases which claims to be called MR or RMA. Also there appeared more concepts with the word *revolution*: military-technical revolution, revolution in strategic affairs, and revolution in attitudes toward the military.[7] Attempts to name all, more or less important changes in warfare, as revolutionary, and also the introduction of more concepts, bring confusion. Sometimes it is really difficult to track the differences between these concepts and, the large number of possible revolutions inflates the meaning of using such word at all. To solve these difficulties, this paper will follow the advice given by William of Ockham in his famous principle of Ockham's razor. This principle states that "it is futile to do with more what can be done with fewer".[8] The concept of MR and RMA is more than enough to explain changes in the military sphere and beyond it.

The guidelines given by Ockham's principle are important for the second main goal of this article. The analysis of MR and RMA as its subsidiary will be placed in the context of various theoretical approaches and disciplines. It will be argued that the concept of MR directly or indirectly might be one of the focal points connecting different schools of military history, different fields of history as a discipline and most important connecting the history with social sciences.

This paper will be divided into three parts. The first part will define the theoretical framework of the paper. The second and third parts will be concerned with the analysis of the concepts of MR and RMA. The aim of these parts will be to show how these concepts were created, developed, criticized.

1. Theoretical framework

M. Roberts in his famous inaugural lecture at The Queen's University of Belfast in 1956 stated that:

> "The experts in military history have mostly been content to describe what happened, without being overmuch concerned to trace out broader effects; while social historians have not been very apt to believe that new fashions in tactics, or improvements in weapon-design, were likely to prove of much significance for their purposes".[9]

The following chapter will demonstrate Roberts' intention by introducing the idea of MR was an attempt to build a bridge between military and other the fields of history. The goal of this chapter is to establish whether it was really necessary to build this conceptual bridge among sub disciplines of history and also between history and social sciences.

The last few decades saw quite intensive cooperation between fields of history and social sciences. The disciplines of macrosociology, historical sociology, new institutionalism, comparative historical analysis showed possible ways of dialog between the two fields. However, the conflicting points of view will not disappear easily. What are needed are new conceptual bridges which could connect these fields. Military history in the form of concepts like MR and RMA could offer a conceptual bridge.

However before such a bridge could be built and sustained, the tensions within military history, the discipline of history and social sciences have to be resolved.

1.2. Military history

Military history is not unitary as a field as one might think. There are several different strands of military history. According to J. Lynn, military history could be divided into three distinct genres: popular, applied, and academic.[10] Popular military history is made for a broad audience: war memoirs, popular stories about heroic deeds during the wars, TV documentaries and channels.

Applied military history is taught in military academies and schools, and its purpose is to form the professional education of officers, and as a guide to help to establish doctrine, planning and waging war.[11] This is history of the operational level, where examples and lessons for the future conflicts are drawn.

The third genre academic military history is the most important in the context of this paper. It is concerned and devoted with the analysis of historical events, analyzed in their immediate context and not with the view to convey some particular advice for present day activities.

Yet as military history itself is not unitary so too is its academic subdivision. Historians can be divided it into three different types: old military school (so called school of "Drums and Trumpets"), new military history, and military history using cultural, linguistic methods and approaches. Each of them is important in their own and contemporary research in the field of military history is difficult without using a combination of all three.

The school of "Drums and Trumpets" is an old school of military history, concerned with analysis and description of actual fighting, operations, battles and conduct of particular commanders. Representatives of this school were not interested in the wider effects caused by war.[12]

With hindsight, it is clear that Roberts' criticism in some sense caught the attention of military historians.[13] Because of increasing criticism towards the old military school, it was blamed for narrow, conservative and too focused on glorifying military conduct. Military historians, trying to fix the situation in 1960s and 1970s concentrated their attention on the military institutions, their role in the state, and relationship with society. It was the development of the "new military history" by which military historians tried to silence their critics and adapt this academic field to the new trends in academia.[14] Military historians took this new approach very seriously. Under the subheadings like "war and society" they analyzed how soldiers were recruited, to what social strata the soldiers and officers belonged and, what their relationship was with the rest of society.[15] This approach was taken too far and it began to ignore the main thrust of this revisionism, the conduct of war itself. As M. Howard vividly described, the situation in this field of military history reminded him the "flight to the suburbs":

> "A populous and lucrative industrial estate has grown up around the older centre of military history, populated by social and economical historians who […] feel no necessity to visit that centre, and are barely aware that it exists." [16]

Despite of this, new military history at the moment is an irreplaceable part of military history. According to Citino, "it (new military history – D.S.) has been around so long, in fact, and has established itself so firmly, that it seems silly to keep calling it "new"".[17]

Since the early 1990s military history underwent another transformation by adopting the new trends in the other fields of history and socials sciences, more specifically studies of race, gender, ethnicity, labour.[18] Historians started to write about the role of black and other minorities, women recruits in the armies, their contribution during the war and on the battlefield. The popular notion about the Western way of war forced scholars to pay more attention to the cultural differences. As recent surveys by Citino and Lynn demonstrates, this new trend already established itself as a complementary part of academic military history.[19]

The concept of MR and its relationship with all these schools and trends of academic military history was one of the main links that connected these different schools, especially old and new military histories. It is also important to stress that the concept of MR not only links these different schools of military history together, but it also connects them with other fields of history.

1.2. Military history and its relationship with the discipline of history

At first glance it seems that military history is a popular topic, after all its main object of research is war, one of the main activities of humans. However, in the academic world, military history occupies the place similar to that of a stepson to his stepfather.

The old school of "Drums and Trumpets" was rightfully criticized for its narrowness, yet the situation has not changed even after the introduction of the new military history. Despite interesting and fruitful cooperation between military, economic, political, and social historians, military history still is regarded as a stepson to the discipline of history. Lynn, in one of his articles described the situation between military history and the other disciplines of history as a war itself.[20] Military history has always been regarded as morally and politically questionable. New trends in history have also had an impact. The discipline of military history is perceived as untheoretical, when current trends in academia emphasize speaking about theories. It is dominated by men, not only as objects of research but by male historians too, which is intolerable at a time when feminist and gender studies are so popular.[21]

Scholars, like Lynn, during their long academic career on many occasions showed how hostile the environment is in the universities for the study of mili-

tary history.[22] Chairs and places for teaching military history are disappearing from universities, the main academic journals are not publishing articles from the field of military history.[23]

However these various critical publications did not make the situation any better, in fact it had quite the opposite effect. The sad situation with military history was noticed also by mass media.[24] The recent surveys of Citino and Lynn show that situation is steadily becoming worse. According to Citino, "while military history dominates the airwaves, […], its academic footprint continues to shrink, and it has largely vanished from the curriculum of many of our elite universities.[25] Lynn concluded that the disagreement with other fields of history is fundamental: "they really do disdain us for who we are; that is, for our basic values and opinions."[26]

With this state of affairs the concept of MR is a bright spot on a dark horizon and in some senses the saviour of military history. Both Lynn and Citino, acknowledged the importance of MR for uniting different fields of history under one roof.[27] Actually, Citino finishes his superb review about the situation in the field of military history with MR.

> It (MR debate – D. Š.) has engaged a wide range of methodologies and schools; it involves political and social historians, historians of technology, as well as those who emphasize the primacy of operational history; and it goes well beyond parochial boundaries to touch upon fundamental issues of state formation, absolute monarchy in early modern Europe, and the subsequent Western domination of the globe.[28]

Summarizing what Lynn, Citino and others have said about the situation of military history, it has to be admitted, that because of the loyalty they have to history, they have not see one more possible solution. To raise the importance of military history is possible by cooperating with social sciences, and concept of the MR there can play an important role.

1.3. Military history and social sciences

One discipline already unites social sciences and military history, war studies. Often it is understood or perceived as military history which is not correct. Military history is only a part of war studies. War was, is and always will be one of the main activities of men. It is a complex phenomenon and the need to understand it as much as possible requires cooperation between all existing disciplines. M. Howard, speaking about the creation of the War Studies depart-

ment at King's College said that he was recruiting as "widely as possible among other disciplines", drawing scholars from the fields of international relations, strategic studies, economics, social sciences, law, anthropology, and theology.[29] Perhaps the boundaries of this discipline are quiet blurred, but it is definitely an academic forum which helps to unite different academic perspectives.

States and other political entities wage wars, and therefore social scientists are interested in how war and warfare helped to shape the form, structure, and development of the state. Alongside with obvious impact of war (victory and defeat) there exists more sophisticated ways and forms of studying how war influenced changes in the state.

For the last few decades several prominent sociologists, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, systematically in their works tried to show that it was not only the relationship between peasants and landlords, the bourgeois, or demographical, economical changes that were responsible for the creation of the modern western state and its continued development.[30] War and military together with other factors made this happen. Scholars like Tilly, try to prove that the military also was and is an independent variable.[31] As Tilly said, "war made the state, and the state made war".[32] Wars began because of political considerations, they are fought following the attitudes, and thinking of their age, but once started they make their own logic. The particularities of warfare, its changes in tactics, and weaponry all have had an impact on the conduct of war. Wars might be longer, more costly, and bloody than anticipated therefore the fighting states had to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances.

However, despite such prominent supporters like Tilly or Giddens, this approach still has fight for his place under the sun. The first main ideas and works of this approach were completed in the 1970s under the umbrella of ill fated state building theories. With the critique of these theories the idea of the importance of war also declined. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s it regenerated mainly because of the increasing popularity of the concept MR. MR with the capability to link tactical, and operational military history with the ideas of new military history, social, economical, technological histories for the social scientist offered new ways to support the idea of war's importance in the building and development of the state.[33]

This trend, mostly in sociology, is supported with interesting and important changes in the sphere of the political sciences. After the long dominance of positivistic, and behaviourist approaches for the last couple of decades politi-

cal scientists started paying more attention to history. One of the dominant theoretical approaches, new institutionalism, heavily borrows ideas and material from history.[34] Such concepts as path dependence, timing, sequence, and critical junctures are based on historical perspective.[35] Social scientists, in the words Paul Pierson, decided to prove that expression "history matters" is not only rhetoric.[36] According to him, social sciences, especially political, at the present has one serious weakness: "contemporary social scientists typically take a "snapshot" view of political life, but there is often a strong case to be made for shifting from snapshots to moving pictures".[37] It is important to put present events in the time perspective, otherwise a lot of important things may be missed and incorrect or misjudged conclusion drawn.

What role could military history play in all these processes? Wars and military have not ceased to exist. If in the past the military was affecting changes in the state, and society, why does it not in the present day. As the works of G.Craig, H. Strachan show, the military may play an important role in life of the state without exercising a coup d'etat.[38] After all, the armed forces are one of the main institutions in the state. Changes there may have affect to the changes in structure of the state. However, for better understanding, it is important to place all of this in historical perspective.

Contemporary debates about RMA could be one possible example of such an approach. Owing to the concentration of this debate on the armed forces the changes in wider context (state) might be lost and may have been not seen. Bearing in mind the situation in social sciences described by Pierson, the focus on present "snapshot" events, do not help to acknowledge the possible changes too. However one possible way to solve this problem is to use the sociological-historical "modern state formation" theories enforced by the idea of MR and to place them in historical perspective. Only by doing so it is possible to find out whether contemporary events and changes in the warfare really are revolutionary. In this case the concept of MR might help to link military history with the dominant approaches in political sciences and sociology.

The idea of MR supported by the concept of RMA are very important theoretical tool which helps to unite different perspectives of military history, different fields of history and history with social sciences in one coherent unit. This "map" of MR and RMA placed in the theoretical world shows that it is worth while to analyze the nature, origins and the use of these two concepts in a more detailed way.

2. Military revolution

For the last few decades one of the main topics in the field of military history is the debate about MR. Many prominent military historians took part in this debate. Some of them were in favour of this concept, some were more critical. The result, as was mentioned in the previous chapter is that it might be a possible contemporary conceptual bridge that connects history with social sciences.

2.1. Roberts-Parker's paradigm

In his inaugural lecture at the Queen's University of Belfast Roberts validated the idea of MR by saying that it was the result of interrelated changes in four areas. According to him, in the period between 1560 and 1660 Dutch and Swedish rulers were looking for a solution to the problem of the efficient use of the firearms, and therefore initiated radical reforms. The result of these reforms was fighting in linear formations, where drilled and disciplined soldiers in smaller units using countermarch could hold constant firing.[39] At the same time this discipline and drill also helped to coordinate actions of pike men, musketeers, cavalry and even artillery.[40]

Also during this period European countries started systematically fighting on more than one front: "Wallenstein sends Arnim to fight on the Vistula; […] Olivares dreams of seizing Goteborg, and of Spanish naval base at Wismar".[41] Roberts links this revolution in strategy with tactical revolution. According to him, tactical superiority of the Swedish army on the battlefield encouraged king Gustav Adolph to pursue his more ambitious goal of conquering Germany.[42]

The increased scope of warfare demanded more troops and logically it led to an increase in the size of armies. The armies not only became bigger, they also became a permanent. This meant that cost and supply increased in order to keep armies on the field. Only the state "could supply the administrative, technical and financial resources required for large-scale hostilities".[43] This is, perhaps, the most important part of Roberts MR concept. There he states and argues that to meet the increasing complexity and scope of war, European rulers had to introduce new forms of administration, taxation, and financial systems. As result this concentrated the more power in the hands of the rulers, helping to speed up centralization and paving the way for absolutism.

Bearing in mind Roberts words, already quoted in this paper about the lack of cooperation between military and social historians[44] highlights the **belief**

that the essence of MR is not pure technical/tactical military changes, but the impact of these changes to the processes of the development and transformation of the state and society.

In light of this connection of the wider political, social, and economic changes with the transformation in the military field, Roberts concealed in the concept of MR a very powerful theoretical device, which despite strong and well reasoned critique forced most of its critics accept Roberts proposal.

For the first couple of decades after its introduction in 1955 Roberts idea was left at peace. But in 1976 the concept was seriously revised for the first time by Geoffrey Parker. Parker entered the MR debate as its critic, but finally emerged as its biggest supporter and gave new impetus to this concept.

One of the main point of Parker's critics is that Roberts was incorrect by choosing 1560 as the starting date of the MR. According to him, permanent military units, standing armies, and greater professionalism of the soldiers existed from the 15th century in Renaissance Italy and other countries.[45] Although, he admitted, that innovations, introduced by Maurice of Nassau and his relatives, were important and novel.

Parker also doubted the strategic aspect of Roberts "revolution" saying that strategic thinking existed before Gustavu's Adolphu's. According to him, military thinking in 16th century was concentrated on the appearance of a new type of fortification, *trace itallienne*.[46] The building of these fortresses, besieging and capturing these were the main occupation of armies. The battle, which, according to Roberts, came back in favour during the Thirty years war, actually very rarely helped to achieve a "decisive" end. The capture of important fortress was more likely to end war or campaign than victory in the battlefield.

If Parker only partly accepted the tactical and strategic aspects of MR then the third one, the growth in army size, accepted fully. According to him, "between 1530 and 1710 there was a ten fold increase both in total numbers of armed forces […] and in total number involved in the major European battles".[47] However, Roberts and Parker's agreement ends when they try to explain the causes of this increase of armies. For Parker, the growth of armies predated the reforms introduced by Maurice of Nassau and Gustav Adolph. The increase of armies in early 16th century he relates with the advance in fortifications. The capture of the fortresses became a much longer and more difficult job which ultimately required more soldiers.

The increasing size of armies required more money, better supply. To achieve this there needed to be better administration and financial management. Therefore Parker agrees with Roberts' idea that changes in warfare, especially increasing size of armies had profound impact on political and social structures in Europe. This is why in the conclusion of his article, he states, that even his critique "has failed to dent the basic thesis: the scale of warfare in early modern Europe was revolutionized, and this had important and wide- ranging consequences"[48]

In the next decade, in 1988, Parker published a book, where he not only defends Roberts' idea, but develops it in more nuanced way, making it even more resistible to the critics.[49] In this book Parker clarifies his ideas and put them in more systematic way. Firstly he differs from Roberts in that according to him, MR started not in 1560, but 1500. The key, which explains this change of timing, is gunpowder.[50] According to him, "the catalyst of major change was the French invasion of the peninsula [Italy] in 1494-5"[51]. With artillery help, the French took town after town. The walls, which for decades or centuries were impregnable, could not resist the power of artillery. But the Italians very soon found the antidote in the previously mentioned *trace itallienne*, which could withstand the destructive power of artillery. The consequence of this change was the increase in size of armies, because sieges and garrisoning of the towns and fortresses required a lot of manpower[52].

Firearms were another important change in warfare. Despite the fact, that performance of the early firearms was uninspiring, they remained attractive "because it required virtually no training for use"[53]. That's why, at first in slow tempo, but later faster and faster firearms were replacing its biggest rival, the pike. Increasing armies and use of firearms required order, and this is where Roberts' idea of tactical revolution fits in. Parker corrects some aspects, but mainly he agrees with Roberts.

He also adds one more important aspect to the idea of MR. Parker develops and shows that revolutionary changes were happening not only on land, but also at the sea at the same time. The introduction of new types of ships, cannon, four-wheeled truck carriage, and the linear formation led to creation of permanent navies.[54]

Parker also in a more detailed way showed how changes in the military area were changing the structure of state, and society. The supply of food, weapons,

cloth; medical care and treatment of wounded and disabled soldiers; new ways of financing war, all of these forced rulers to take new responsibilities.

Summarizing both Roberts and Parker's views, it is possible to speak about one, not two concepts of MR. Both of them agree that in the early modern period changes in the military sphere had profound effects not only in the military, but also in the political and social spheres. Military factors, not only because of pure military victory or defeat, but also because of more sophisticated and deeply rooted reasons contributed to creation of modern state too. Also it is important to see these military changes as independent variables which happened because of new types of weapons, new types of military organization and fighting doctrine. Of course there were other factors: economic, social, geopolitical. However, at this moment any serious academic discussion about military, political, economic and social history in early modern Europe can not ignore the Roberts-Parker's paradigm of MR.

2.2. Critique of the idea of military revolution

Owing to its wide scope and generalization, the concept of MR had faced a lot of critique. Scholars were criticizing the timing of this revolution, the way in which cases of particular countries were analyzed, technological determinism or even the need for such kind of idea at all.

The most serious critique appeared from the scholars who are specialists in medieval, and XVIII century history. According to them it is unfair to ignore the changes in the warfare which happened in other periods.

One of the main critics of the early modern MR is Clifford Rogers. According to him, the timing of MR in the chronological scale should be moved back, to medieval ages, in particularly to the period of the Hundred Years war (1337–1453):

> "I believe, however, that the focus on the centuries after 1500 obscures the importance of the period in which the most dramatic, most truly revolutionary changes in European military affairs took place […]".[55]

Rogers argues that during the Hundred Years war not one, but two revolutions took place: infantry and artillery revolutions. The first is associated with the increasing role of infantry in the battlefield. The English archers, Flemish, Swiss pike men's during 14th century in many battles managed to stand by and defeat superior armies of mounted knights. Rogers even follows the guidelines

of Roberts and Parker and tries to look for social and political consequences of this "infantry revolution". The main political outcome of this revolution was the introduction and growing importance of the parliaments. Common people demanded more political rights as their military importance was growing.[56]

The artillery revolution gained its importance in the first part of 15th century helping to end Hundred Years war in favour of France. The artillery was very expensive, therefore only strong rulers could allow it while the others were compelled to surrender. In this sense artillery made the centralization of countries like France or Spain faster.[57]

Following his analysis of Hundred Years war Rogers proposes an alternative concept to MR. For him, the changes in the military field were more evolutionary than revolutionary, and proposed to use the idea of a punctuated equilibrium evolution. The idea of this concept is that evolution proceeds in short, rapid revolutionary changes followed by long period of stasis. In the case of military history it may help to explain why infantry and artillery for a long time being part of military system suddenly became important. The whole processes then could be seen as a series of small revolutions, but not as one big revolution.[58]

The biggest weakness of Rogers argument is that it is unclear how significant were the political and social changes which infantry and artillery revolutions brought. The increasing role of infantry did not end the role of mounted warrior. The chivalric ideas were as strong as they were in 12th century. Swiss in many ways were lucky because of their geographical terrain. The victories achieved by English archers owed much to the simple fact of French incompetence, not inflexibility.[59] The increasing role of parliaments probably owed more to increasing financial demands of the rulers to fight wars, not to political demands of the common people. The artillery's revolution also raises doubts. Why then it did not provoke the massive reconstruction of fortresses like in the early 16th century? Simply put, the results, which Rogers presented as the consequences of military changes, are quiet small compared with the changes in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Another important critic of the Roberts-Parker's paradigm is Jeremy Black, who specializes in XVIII century history. Therefore, it is not surprising that in his view, if a MR took place at all, it started at 1660 and continued into the 18th century.

> In so far as a military revolution occurred in the early modern period it could be dated more appropriately to the hundred years, especially the first fifty (1660–1710 – D. S), after the period highlighted by Roberts.[60]

According to Black the introduction of flintlock, the bayonet, increasing firepower and manoeuvrability of infantry, huge increases in the size of armies and their organization were as much radical changes in the warfare as the changes indicated by Roberts and Parker.[61]

Black uses the same indicators like Roberts and Parker trying to deemphasize their arguments. Black places a lot of emphasis on the increasing size of the armies, which at the end of 17th century reached unprecedented levels: "the bulk of the growth […] was of such order that it cannot be described simply in terms of a continuation of already established patterns of growth".[62] And following this argument he makes one more, even stronger criticism. He states that: "it can be argued that it was more stable domestic political circumstances of most states of that period […] that made these changes possible (military change – D. S)".[63] It was not military changes that brought about political reforms as Roberts and Parker argues, but quite the contrary.

This argument really threatens the foundations of Parker's idea of MR. However, Black leaves a lot of caveats, which makes all his argument a bit shaky. His idea, that the reconciliation of the nobility and the crown in European states was the main condition for this military change is questionable. Why were the nobility discontented? The answer is – because of the military demands and increasing control from the centre. The nobility's discontent was provoked by the fact that rulers, because of the permanent armies, forced noblemen to obey the orders. The research of other scholars is in favour of Parker's argument showing that the by the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV the basic structures and principles of the modern state were in place already.[64]

In his latter texts, Black is more cautious on this particular aspect. Overall his critique leaves mixed feelings, because at some points he makes quite interesting remarks, but at other it seems that he did not grasp the essence of Roberts and Parkers idea.

Other scholars mostly concentrated their critique on analyzing the growth of the armies. Black also based his critique on that point. Mostly the arguments are drawn from analysis of the French case as its army and organization were the etalons which were followed by other countries. Some of scholars were arguing

that during the Thirty years war the French army actually did not grow so radically as has been perceived and there was not any administrative or financial reform, which paved the way for the more bureaucratized state mechanism of Louis XIVMR followers.[65] However, at the same time other scholars are arguing on the contrary, saying that French army did really increase significantly during the reign of Louis XIII.[66] This entire historical dispute, in one sense is very important, but at the same time it is very distracting. The growth of armies and the development of administration which took care of them are very important in the discussion of MR, especially in the case of France. But at the same time, for the social scientist it is difficult to draw a generalization when historians are making contradicting historical conclusions. Therefore, the increase of armies was happening in stages, and the increase of armies during the reign of Louis XIV was the last in this chain.

There was also some criticism concerning the technological determinism, which is apparent in Parker's texts. Some criticized his neglect of technological changes in the 15th century, or for his concentration on the *trace italienne*.[67] All this critique actually improved than damaged the idea of MR. Lynn's words in his paper about MR probably reflects the broader picture of relations between MR and its critics: "Parker's theory survives this critique, but not intact".[68]

Parker himself, in the reply to all these criticisms defended his idea, making only one serious concession in that military change and political developments were independent but at the same time closely connected processes: "[…] we should perhaps envisage something like the […] the structure of DNA molecule, with two complex spirals interacting […]".[69] There he acknowledged that to see that development of state was moved by one causal model is too simple. For some scholars MR together with the Reformation, the geopolitical struggle between Hapsburgs and the rest of Europe was the driving force of all changes in the Europe.[70] It is true that there must be reasons why wars are fought, but once they started they are governed by their own logic.

2.3. Some reflections on MR critique

During the reading of articles and books that criticized the idea of MR one thought had occurred: most of these critics are missing the point of MR, or are not willing to look at all these processes from the distance. According to Robert Frost:

> "[…] many historians […] preferring to understand the Revolution (MR – D. S) as a purely military phenomenon […] miss the point: Roberts was concerned not with warfare as such, seeing changes in military technologies […] as merely the precipitants of the true revolution which was social and political […]".[71]

The processes in which the military played a very important role were the creation of the modern state. After the wars between 1540 and 1660 in Western Europe, a political organization emerged, which had all the basic elements of a modern state, "territorial sovereignty, centralized government, bureaucratic administration, permanent military establishments, […], an international system of states".[72] Of course it was not a linear processes, it did not happened in all countries at the same time.[73] But by the rule of Louis XIV the principles and foundations of modern the state had already been laid down. Later generations perfected these mechanisms, and introduced some new cogs into them, but at the core they were following the rules placed in the middle of the 17th century. In this light Black's proposal to move the date of MR does not stand up. The same could be said about Rogers' proposal. Despite much continuity from medieval ages some radical changes appeared during the 16th and early 17th centuries. The simple example of important change was the establishment of permanent armies and navies, which is one of the most important features of the modern state. It does not matter if you look from a theoretical perspective, the size of army could be 10, 0000 or 200, 0000, of the utmost, important is the organization, role and place of the armies in the structure of state.

2.4. How many MR ?

This debate about MR has concentrated around the processes in early modern times, but some scholars started to look for similar events at other times. However, they were not looking for the revolutions that Rogers or Black proposed, but for revolutions which brought immense and radical changes in the state and society.

Social scientists like Giddens, Tilly, Porter concluded that such events like the French revolution, or the First World War drastically changed and transformed modern states. Williamson Murray, following all these and other ideas proposed the idea of not one but of a few MR.[74]

Murray states that the creation of the modern effective nation-state based on the organized and disciplined military power in the 17th century, the French

Revolution and the Industrial revolution beginning at the same time during the period 1789–1815, and the First World War were MR's.[75] Later on in his other articles he discusses nuclear MR, which is debatable.[76] Bearing in mind contemporary changes related with computer, and communication technologies in the military and other spheres it is possible to speak about new MR.

MR, according to Murray might be compared with earthquakes: "they brought with them such systemic changes in the political, social, and cultural arenas as to be largely uncontrollable, unpredictable, and above all unforeseeable".[77] Also it is important to remember that these MR might be caused not only by technological, but also by social, political causes.

Probably there is a consensus that everyone could agree with the list of proposed MR. All these events brought about radical changes, and in all of them war and the military needs have played the important role in changing the state: conscription and the expansion of franchise, women's rights, the rise of the importance of labour unions, the introduction of welfare state, to mention a few. All these issues could not be analyzed ignoring the role of war.

It is not the aim of this paper to analyze these military revolutions. The analysis of Roberts-Parker's MR was important because it showed how the concept developed, what was its essence, and what strength and weakness it has. In the cases of all the other MR it is clear that issues of purely military origin have had much bigger impact.

3. RMA

For the last two decades RMA was and still remains the focal concept for any discussion or question concerning military issues, changes in warfare in the USA, Western countries, and in other parts of the globe. From theoretical and academic discussions this concept has transited into politics under the name of "transformation". It is difficult to find an advanced country which is not pursuing military transformation. As Murray noted:

> "[…] the persistence of the RMA concept over the past decade, in a town where concepts and their acronyms appear and disappear with startling speed, suggests that there is something to the idea of revolutionary transformation".[78]

One of the possible reasons of such success is that RMA has become a conceptual umbrella which covers topics ranging from discussions about pro-

curement planning to the cyber space warfare or fictional discussions about cyborg-warriors.[79] However such popularity has come at a price. According to Gray, "American RMA debate generated much more noise than illumination".[80] Alongside good, solid academic works on this issue it is possible to find texts where industrial or service interests are promoted concealed under the flag of RMA.

3.1. Soviet military thought and the birth of MTR concept

The origins of the RMA dates back to the period between mid 1970's and early 1980's and are traced in Soviet military writings about MTR.[81] At that period the Soviets started to discuss that American innovation in the areas of electronics, precise targeting, information processing and other technologies constituted a fundamental discontinuity in warfare. The Chief of the General Staff at that moment, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, in a number of texts emphasized that:

> "Both the latest state-of-the art technology, […], and the organizational changes, which had to be made to accommodate this emerging weaponry, would not constitute a phase in a process of evolutionary adaptation but a genuine discontinuity in military affairs".[82]

The explanation why Soviets saw radical changes in warfare is twofold. The first is related to the ideological-theoretical background in which Soviets developed their military thought and secondly the reaction and search for a remedy to the Western doctrines such as Air Land Battle (ALB) and Follow on Force Attack (FOFA) in early 1980's.[83]

The ideological differences between Western countries and the Soviet Union set a different normative, theoretical point of view to the surrounding world. Trying to avoid defeat in the war, the Soviets perceived the study of war as a science, which has its own laws and rules. In this scientific framework of military science the military-technical aspects was one of the main foundations of the whole military science.[84] Therefore Soviets saw the technology as one of the driving forces of war. In this context it is not surprising that the Soviets saw Western technological innovations as revolutionary. If Americans saw the development of a single weapon or platform as an incremental and evolutionary process, then the Soviets saw all these changes in a holistic way, seeing all technological innovations as one system. Such a holistic approach helped to see not individual trees, but the whole forest. Having a strict theoretical framework

where technical aspects were prime, the Soviets could see how new technologies could affect the lower stages of military sciences: military art, organization, military strategy, operational art, and tactics. The conclusion of this assessment was that there was a new MTR.

At the same time the introduction of new doctrines by the USA and NATO only strengthened the Soviet belief about MTR. After a detailed assessment they concluded that new technologies, allowing long range precise strikes linked with advanced command and control systems, could alter the whole military planning and doctrine.[85] The conclusions showed that the Soviet second echelon could be destroyed before entering the conflict zone; that the conventional phase of war was considerably increasing and that the volume of tasks for forces using conventional weapons also was increasing.[86] New conventional capabilities could have not only tactical and operational consequences, but even strategic ones. The Soviet strategic planners were even considering the potential use of new conventional weapons on a global scale. This meant that conventional weapons could help to achieve results which in the past were possible only by using nuclear weapons.[87]

Summarizing this it is clear that the Soviets saw new western conventional weapons and technologies as triggers which started MTR. From their perspective, this revolution affected all levels of the war, and in some sense was replacing nuclear weapons. As a result of that, radical changes were required in the organization of armed forces and fighting doctrines.

3.2. Development of the RMA concept

The most surprising aspect in the history of RMA is that Americans, who invented and introduced all these new technologies, did not see their revolutionary potential as the Soviets did. This theoretical framework of the Soviet MTR was only picked up a decade later by the Americans. The slowness of the Americans to grasp the importance of Soviet achievements is more surprising bearing in mind that they were following the development of this concept of the MTR from the beginning.[88]

It is important to note, that the Americans and their Western allies during this period were discussing new technologies, their impact to military doctrines, strategies and political consequences'.[89] However these discussions were more concentrated on individual technologies or weapon's systems. The new

technologies were seen as evolutional, a further step in strengthening existing capabilities:

> "U.S. forecasting efforts tend to be more piecemeal and less ambitious, extrapolating forward from current capabilities rather than trying to anticipate qualitative leaps that can bring about what the Soviets call a "revolution in military affairs".[90]

American defence establishment started paying more serious attention to the Soviet ideas about MTR only late in the 1980's, despite the fact that through the decade there was a constant call to look more seriously into the Soviet findings.[91]

It did not take long for Americans to grasp and understand the importance and magnitude of Soviet findings. In 1988 a work group was established by the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy and chaired by A. Marshall and Ch. Wolf. It reported that Soviets were right in what they stated about profound changes in the war:

> "The Working Group believes that the Soviets are correct in their assessment that the advent of new technologies will revolutionize war, and not merely make current forces marginally better at what they do. […] the new technologies will profoundly alter tactical requirements, operational possibilities, and even, in some cases, strategic choice in the early 21st century".[92]

According to report, the changes in war resulted from the innovations in the areas of stealth, unmanned vehicles, precision, long-range munitions, space and information technologies, etc. It was almost identical to the list of technological innovations, which the Soviets saw as revolutionary in the previous decade.

The report also concluded that new technologies might require "[…] radical surgery – in our current organizations, military doctrine, and philosophy of command".[93]

In 1991 all these predictions had been vindicated during the Gulf war. Despite the fact that this war had been fought according to the rules of industrial warfare, the media ensured that world attention was fixed on the precision-guided munitions destroying their targets. The use of computers, space satellites, new reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting systems, the speed of decision making, all these things surprised not only other countries, but the Americans themselves. A worldwide consensus was reached that a new era of warfare had arrived.[94]

During the war the head of the Office of Net Assessment in the Defence Department, A. Marshall, asked his colleagues to undertake an assessment concerning the changes in warfare. The result of this assessment was probably the most important and fundamental text about RMA, and was to lay down guidelines for future research and debate on this issue.

Report "The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment", prepared by A. Krepinevich, from the beginning stressed that the world was facing MTR and that "sooner or later leading military powers will exploit available and emerging technologies".[95] He defined MTR in the following way:

> "A Military-Technical Revolution occurs when the application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations."[96]

As this definition shows, American understanding about revolutionary changes in the war was a bit different to that of the Soviet. Despite using the same acronym, MTR, Americans tried to emphasize that technologies alone are not enough to make revolution reality.[97] They especially stressed the importance of organizational innovation and adaptation. Without it, new technologies, weapon systems and doctrinal innovations were not sufficient "to affect MTR"[98].

Another important difference from the Soviets was that the Americans thought the world was facing only the beginning of MTR and the Gulf war was not proof of an already existing revolution, but more as a hint of the future warfare.[99]

The last important difference between American and Soviet perceptions of MTR is the priorities placed in the list of technologies. Soviets stressed importance of deep strike, precision weapons, while Americans emphasized importance of information technologies: "establishing information dominance could well be the *sine qua non* for effective military operations in future conflicts".[100]

This assessment was well received by the U.S. defence establishment. A year later the second version was distributed. This document repeated ideas of first document in a more comprehensive form, except one important difference, the acronym MTR was replaced by RMA.[101] The reason of this change was that "MTR denoted too great an emphasis on technology. Therefore interested

community now uses the term RMA, which focuses on *revolution*, and clearly places *technology* in a supporting role".[102]

This "RMA introduction project" was finished by Krepinevich's article in the journal *National Interest*, where he put contemporary RMA into its historical context. According to him, "there appear to have been as many as ten military revolutions since the fourteenth century".[103] Into this list he included revolutions such as the infantry revolution in 14th century, Napoleonic revolution or nuclear revolution.[104] The analysis of these historical revolutions could help to compose something like a chart of indicators, which will help to recognize new revolutions and verify contemporary one.

Summarizing this it is possible to say that in merely a couple of year's a group of scholars and experts had laid down the framework of RMA by identifying its main features, displaying main requirements of this revolution and supported the idea with strong historical evidence.

All these publications set the tone and showed the path for future research concerning RMA. Scholars started to analyse different parts of this revolution. Some concentrated on the technological issues, others on organizational, and doctrine innovations. Scholars argued about the positive and negative aspects of RMA.[105] However, despite the enormous size of all these publications all of them followed the definitions introduced by Krepinevich and Marshall.

It did not take long time to transit ideas from RMA debate to practical politics. The proponents of such doctrinal ideas like system of systems, network centric warfare, swarming[106] were demanding to transform American forces making them more mobile, agile, lethal, and capable to use and pursue the informational dominance in the battle space. Soldiers of such armed forces on the battlefield would be connected with the whole range of reconnaissance, surveillance, precise targeting, information collection, and processing and dissemination assets into one seamless network. This is the essence of well known U.S. military transformation. At this moment it is possible already to see some practical results of this transformation.[107] The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq showed how these transformed armed forces are fighting.[108] Because of that the RMA debate is not simply a theoretical discussion among scholars. It has profound economical, political and social effects in daily life.

3.3. RMA critics

The concept of the RMA and its proponents sustained quite harsh criticism from many directions. Being not only the object of theoretical, but also of political discussions this concept's criticism came from diverse spheres like military theory or particular procurement politics.

One of the main criticisms of RMA is concerned with the role of technologies. As was mentioned, Krepinevich, Marshall tried to show that technologies are only one ingredient of this RMA. However, looking at the definition of RMA it still seems that technologies are the driving force, the catalyst that pushes forward doctrinal and organizational innovations. Scholars like Murray and Gray, to some extent accepting idea of RMA, always stress that technologies at the best is only one dimension of complex world and at the worst, only the secondary issue compared to political, social changes.[109]

Another criticism of RMA is also related with the role of technologies. For some of its ardent proponents it seems that RMA, with all new technologies, may eliminate friction from the battlefield. The lifting of the fog of war "is the strategic ambition of the RMA".[110]

Such approach was criticized by neo-Clausewitzian's such as Gray, Murray, Watts.[111] According to them, the victory in war depends not solely on the technologies. Such things as the morale and will of the soldiers, training and leadership, to mention a few are equally or even more important.[112] Present technologies have diminished some obstacles like the impact of weather, or information collection, but at the same time created others. For example, the previous problem of lack of information was now transformed into the problem of informational overload.[113]

On the other hand scholars like Martin van Creveld and proponents of idea of 4th generation warfare criticized RMA because it promoted the Clauzewitzian way of war, conventional warfare. For these critics the time of war between states are of a secondary issue compared with threats rising from asymmetrical threats like terrorism or insurgencies.[114] Therefore the U.S. and other countries are implementing wrong defence and military policies, developing wrong capabilities.

Another important dimension of the criticism of RMA concentrates on the notion that there is nothing revolutionary in RMA and that it is actually more of an evolutional processes. The leading scholar in this area, Stephen Biddle, argues that operation in the Gulf war, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and their

relative success was not result of superior technologies, but more product of the incompetent enemy and innovation skills of American soldiers. In reality the effects of new weapons were not as enormous as has been perceived, the old ways of fighting still are important.[115]

The universality of RMA is also questioned. In many publications it is referred to as the American RMA, as the concept, which promotes specific and unique American fighting traditions. However it is important to remember that the U.S. being the strongest military power in the world could dictate the trends in this field. In the past, countries copied the Frederician, Napoleonic or Prussian concepts and ideas of fighting, making them universal. So in this case the present situation with American RMA is not unique. Actually the ideas of RMA already spread around the world. European countries, Australia, Israel, Russia, and China, all of them at the present moment are implementing the transformation of their armed forces, more or less following the lines of American transformation.[116]

The last but not least criticism is related with the notion that idea of the RMA was and is developed in astrategic context. According to Gray, "[…] the great RMA debate of the 1990's was unusually apolitical […] and therefore it appeared hazardously astrategic".[117] The supporters and critics of RMA so heavily engaged in the discussion about various particularities that they made it an end in itself. The RMA for them became a substitute for strategy; it became the way to "define the rationale of strategy".[118] The Western countries, particularly the U.S. pursued and developed capabilities suitable for the war which they wanted to fight in the future. However, by doing this they so immersed into some kind of futurology that lost sight of the real and present changes in the world. Therefore Lawrence Freedman concluded that "it will hardly be a RMA if it leads those who embrace it to avoid most of contemporary conflicts".[119]

Finishing this overview of the RMA critics, just a few words in defence of it could be useful. The technological dimension of this concept has some strong sides. The computer and all other related technologies came to the military and will remain there. It is difficult to imagine the armed forces in the 21st century fighting without all these technologies. The use of these technologies requires a different approach, different training and despite all critics, different fighting.[120] And all these changes could be seen as revolutionary, only the best way to see them is look at the present situation through glasses of the concept of MR, not RMA.

Conclusions

The goal of this article was to analyze the concepts used by scholars, and experts as theoretical tools that try to explain the changes in the military sphere and beyond it. At the first look the concepts of MR and RMA look very similar. However, they have one crucial and fundamental difference. They differ on the object which they have to explain. The object of the MR is changes on the level of the state. On the other hand RMA concentrates its attention on the armed forces (new weapons, new doctrines, and new organization). In other words RMA could be considered as part of MR. It is important to notice that only handful of scholars have pointed to this relation between MR and RMA.[121]

However the biggest problem is that scholars mostly use these two concepts as synonyms. And what is more important MR is considered as synonym of RMA, not vice versa:

> "[…] while most would accord them status of super-RMA's (or MR's), I elect to refer to them as simply as RMA's"[122]

> "In this context, *military revolution* refers to changes in the weapons used to fight battles; the targets they attack; the systems that provide command and control, logistical, and intelligence support for the weapons; and the organizations that use the weapons and systems".[123]

All this is very important. There is not a competition trying to find which concept and acronym is fancier. It could be argued that concentration on the concept of RMA, its identification with MR threatens to ruin all work and efforts done by social scientists and historians. As was mentioned in previous chapters, scholars tried to show that the military could be, and must be, perceived as an independent variable explaining the processes in the political, social, economical spheres.

The problem of the concept of RMA is that it is perceived and understood as a technological revolution. Despite efforts to emphasize other factors, the RMA first of all is related with technologies. Because of the influence of the media the new weapons are the main story: "more and more, new military technologies, more so than the soldiers operating them, were apt to be profiled in leading television news segments […]".[124]

This perceived importance of the technologies leaves RMA open to harsh criticisms, as was already mentioned. By criticizing the technological deter-

minism, scholars emphasize the secondary role of technologies in comparison with political and social changes. By criticizing the role of the technologies the whole importance of RMA as driving factor of military change is neglected. By doing that the changes in the military sphere are seen as the result of political, strategic, social change, but not as independent transformation. In such a case we have the situation when the military factor in the past events and processes could be analyzed as an independent variable, but at present, because of concentration on the technological aspects of RMA it is not. However, if in the past, the military continuously through the ages was important in the development of political, social spheres, why has the situation to be different now? More light on this paradoxical situation could be shed if we look at the present changes through MR concept.[125]

Idea of the MR are neglected and ignored because it is a historical concept. According to Gray, "the realm of the strategist is the realm of possible RMA, not of MR".[126] It is very strange to hear this from a scholar who always emphasizes the multidimensional and complex nature of the strategy.[127] MR is much more complex and more dimensional than RMA concept. Scholars like Gray, Freedman are looking into the RMA from the perspective of strategy, trying to find out how these possible changes could affect the strategy of the state. And they are quite right by saying that even if RMA is important, equally important are the changes in geopolitical, strategic situation in the world. However at the same time by ignoring MR they are ignoring the possible changes in other areas, which eventually may change the strategy of the state. The essence of MR is that changes in the military sphere will influence the changes in the political and social sphere, more precisely in the state. By changing its political, social, and economic structure in particular, the state may change its strategic priorities and interests. For example, the French revolution was a domestic issue but it changed the nature of the French state in such way that it altered not only its strategic interests, but it also changed all international order.

By equalizing MR with RMA scholars are creating self isolation. There are other important issues and changes in the military sphere happening now, but all of them are analyzed separately, without one united framework.

At the present we can see some very interesting and possibly fundamental changes in the military: conscripted armies are replaced by professional ones, increasing reliance on the private security companies, talks about post-modern,

hybrid armed forces, and finally the RMA itself.[128] Actually some of these changes, like end of conscription and use of private companies, are partly related with the technological changes in warfare. If we place all these changes under the umbrella of the concept of MR we could see quiet an interesting picture. We could ask questions like, how the relationship in the spheres of civil-military, armed forces and society are affected. How, for the example, the military transformation in U.S. or European countries will change their civil-military relations. In this case, the concept of RMA will not be very helpful. Also bearing in mind the present discussion in social sciences about the changes in the nature and role of the state[129] all this looks quiet interesting. The concept of MR, by uniting different strands of military history and sub-disciplines of history gives a broader view, it places present events into the historical context and all this helps to see different changes in more coherent picture.

It is difficult to imagine contemporary discussions about military changes not using the term *revolution*. The debate of RMA created this discourse. However, if we have to choose which concept is better to use, RMA or MR, it would be better to use MR. Because of its complexity and depth this concept could help scholars, experts and politicians to see and analyze the changes in the military sphere far better than by concentrating on the discussions about technological determinism of RMA.

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS

CHANGING NATURE OF PARTISANSHIP IN A POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETY: COMPARING "OLD" AND "NEW" PARTIES IN LITHUANIA

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Abstract. The article explores the nature and the causes of changing pattern of partisanship in Lithuania. Even though the students of post-communist democracies seem to suggest that party systems in post-communist societies have been formed from above and are lacking social roots, the case of Lithuania reveals that old parties, established at the beginning of the party system formation, had a great deal of loyal supporters and quite a few members. New parties, on the other hand, are floating above the society. The differences between the old and the new parties in Lithuania are mainly apparent when analysing the reasons of joining a party and motives for keeping up partisan involvement. While members of the old parties are mainly motivated by value orientations, emotional engagement and group solidarity, the membership of the new parties is based on instrumental motivation and rational decision. Lacking social and normative grounds, these parties are not able to attach their voters and to develop ties with their electorate. Instead they are successfully using anti-party sentiments of the population and mass media-based electoral technologies.

Introduction

Post-communist societies are generally characterized by relatively low party membership and weak partisan attachment of voters. The party systems in Central and Eastern Europe remain unstable, voting volatility is substantially higher than the average volatility in Western states (Innes, 2002, Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006). The level of partisanship, however, is expected to increase in these democracies together with the stabilization of party alignments and the development of the voting habits of the citizens (Mair, 1993, Dalton and Weldon, 2007).

Contrary to the expectations, the partisanship in Lithuania is decreasing rather than increasing. The level of partisanship was relatively high at the beginning of

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the formation of the party system in 1990–1996, and is constantly decreasing afterwards. The "old" parties (i.e. parties established in 1989–1992) with relatively high party membership are challenged by the "new" parties (i.e. parties established after 1998) lacking developed organizational structure and loyal electorate.

The article explores the nature and the causes of the changing pattern of partisanship in Lithuania. It is based on the data from in-depth interviews with local party members and the data from pilot survey of party members collected in August – September 2005.[1] The research was carried out in three Lithuanian regions: Radviliškis district, Klaipėda district and Vilnius (the capital). The research included 6 political parties: the Social Democratic Party, the Homeland Union, the Liberal and Center Union, The Labor Party, the New Union and the Lithuanian Christian Democrats. Two parliamentary parties (the Union of Peasants and New Democracy and the Liberal Democratic Party) were not included in the research because of an uncooperative attitude of the party leadership. Moreover, the paper will draw on the public opinion survey conducted in September 2005 exploring the partisan attachment of the electorate.

In the first section of the paper, a brief overview of the development of Lithuanian party system is presented and the difference between "old" and "new" parties is explained. Further, the party membership level and the motives of joining a party are analysed, displaying the difference between old and new parties. In the next section, the partisan attachment in the wider electorate in Lithuania is examined. Finally, the explanation of the weakening party ties and changing pattern of party membership in Lithuania is given.

Overview of the development of the Lithuanian party system

Democratization process in Lithuania started in 1988, when Communist party monopoly was broken by opposition movement "Sąjūdis". Opposition political parties started to emerge in 1989 but they were still unimportant political players in the first free elections to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania in 1990, as the political arena was dominated by the Lithuanian Communist party and Sąjūdis. The formation of Lithuanian party system started in 1991 when Sąjūdis began to disintegrate and early parliament elections were announced in 1992 (see Ramonaitė, 2006).

[1] The research on 'The structural and functional capabilities of Lithuanian political parties' was carried out by the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. During the research, 36 in-depth interviews with local activists and a survey of 246 local party members was made.

In parliamentary elections of 1992, four parties crossed the 4 % electoral threshold. Ex-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party won the elections with 73 seats out of 141; remnants of Sąjūdis, later transformed into Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives), received 28 seats and became the second biggest political force in Lithuania (see Table 1). The other two successful parties – Lithuanian Social Democrats and Lithuanian Christian Democrats, "historical" parties claiming to be descendants of pre-war Lithuanian parties – received respectively 8 and 9 seats. Several other parties won some seats in single – member districts.[2]

Table 1. Results of parliamentary elections in Lithuanian (% of votes in the multimember district and total number of seats received)

Party	*1992*		*1996*		*2000*		*2004*	
	votes	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*	*votes*	*seats*
Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives)	21.2	28	31.3	70	8.6	9	14.8	25
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party	44	73	10	12	31.1	27	20.7	20
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	6	8	6.9	12		18		
New Union (Social Liberals)	–	–	–	–	19.6	29		11
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party	12.6	9	10.4	16	3.1	2	1.4	–
Lithuanian Centre Union	2.5	2	8.7	13	2.9	–	9.2	18
Lithuanian Liberal Union	1.5	–	1.9	1	17.3	34		
Lithuanian Peasants' Party	–	–	1.7	1	4.2	4	6.6	10
New Democracy (Women's Party)	–	–	3.9	1	*	3		
Labour Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	28.4	39
Liberal Democratic Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	11.4	10

Source: Central Electoral Committee, Krupavičius and Pogorelis (2004)

* In 2000 elections New Democracy ran in coalition with Labour Democrats and Social Democrats

In parliamentary elections of 1996, the same four parties – the Homeland Union, Social Democrats, Labour Democrats and the Christian Democratic Party, retained positions in the Parliament, even though the distribution of the seats changed drastically. The Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives)

[2] In Lithuania mixed electoral system is used: 71 members of parliament are elected in single member districts by majority system, while other 70 are elected by PR system in a multimember district (see Žeruolis, 1998).

won the elections with 70 seats. Christian Democrats moved into the second place, while former governing Labour Democrats having won only 12 seats went down to the 4th place sharing it with Social Democrats. Moreover, the Lithuanian Centre Union with its charismatic leader Romualdas Ozolas managed to cross the electoral threshold and received 13 seats.

Although electoral volatility was comparatively high and electoral success of parties was quite wavy, a bipolar party system of Lithuania appeared to be rather stable. The pattern of party competition was determined by the tension between ex-communist Labour Democrats and anti-communist Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives). Christian Democrats were considered to be a 'younger sister' of Conservatives since the political positions of both parties coincided on many questions. Social Democrats and the Centre Union were seeking to impose a socio-economic rather than communist – anticommunist conflict dimension; their attempt, however, was not successful.

The Lithuanian party system experienced rather unexpected shake-up in 2000, when two new parties – the New Union and the Liberal Union – came into political arena, pushing out Christian Democrats and the Centre Union. The pattern of electoral competition was drastically transformed since both new parties claimed to be centrist and ignored the communist – anti-communist political cleavage. Even though these two parties had different origins – the Liberal Union had roots in Sąjūdis and the New Union was a newly created political formation – both of them could be labelled as charismatic rather then programmatic parties (for the types of parties see Kitschelt, 1995).

The New Union (Social Liberals) was established by former General Prosecutor of the state Artūras Paulauskas in 1998 after nearly victorious second round of presidential election.[3] The party as well as its leader was not committed to any ideology. The party is considered to be a centre – left political force. Appealing mainly to dissatisfied electorate, the party received 20 per cent of votes and turned to be the first according to the votes and the 2nd according to the seats received.

The Lithuanian Liberal Union was more successful in single-member districts than in the national-wide constituency, and having received only 17 percent of votes, managed to get 34 seats in the Parliament, becoming the biggest party in the Seimas. The Liberal Union was created in 1990 by liberally oriented intellectuals. Its jump into the national political arena, however, was related

[3] Paulauskas lost the election to Valdas Adamkus by less than 1 percent of votes.

with controversial personality of Rolandas Paksas rather than liberal ideology. Rolandas Paksas was a Prime Minister of Conservatives in 1999. Refusing to sign a privatisation agreement of the biggest Lithuanian enterprise "Mažeikių nafta" and resigning from the office, he raised his ratings and changed the party (see Clark and Verseckaitė, 2005). Welcoming Rolandas Paksas and electing him the chairman of the party, the Liberal Union increased impressively its popularity but undermined its ideological purity. The collaboration of Rolandas Paksas and the Liberal Union, however, was short-lived, as Paksas soon left the party with his team and created his own party – the Liberal Democratic Party, later renamed *Order and Justice (Liberal Democrats)*. The Liberal Union subsequently merged with the Centre Union creating the Liberal and Centre Union.

The political shake-up of 2000, as it appeared later, was only a beginning of the disintegration of the Lithuanian party system. In parliamentary elections of 2004, the Lithuanian party system experienced a second transformation, as three new parties – the Labour party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Union of Peasants and New Democracy – entered the political arena, increasing dramatically the political fragmentation. The Labour Party was established by a businessman of Russian origin Viktor Uspashich several months before the elections. The leadership of the party is dominated by businessmen while the voters of the party are concentrated in the lower social stratum. The party is not an advocate of socialist ideology as its name would suggest. It is rather a populist party gaining from the popularity of its charismatic leader.

The Liberal Democratic Party was established to support Rolandas Paksas in the presidential elections of 2002. After unsuccessful tenure in the President's office and subsequent impeachment[4] (see Clark and Verseckaitė, 2005), the party turned to radical anti-establishment party and became an outcast in the Lithuanian party system. In the local elections of 2007, however, the party received 13 percent of votes on a national scale and was among the winners of the elections.

The Union of Peasants and New Democracy, later renamed the Party of Peasants and People, increased its popularity after the successful performance of its leader Kazimira Prunskienė in the presidential elections of 2004. Prunskienė was supported by ex-president Rolandas Paksas who was not able to run for the office again because of the break of oath. Prunskienė managed to get to the 2nd

[4] Rolanas Paksas was removed from the office by the impeachment procedure for break of oath in April 2004.

round but lost the elections to Valdas Adamkus (see Matsuzato and Gudžinskas, 2006). Her relative success was beneficial to the party in parliamentary elections in October 2004. The party is appealing mainly to rural electorate and is advocating the interests of farmers.

The radical transformation of the party system is related with the collapse of party competition space. Former adversaries – the Homeland Union and Labour Democrats which merged with Social Democrats and changed the name in 2000 (the party has chosen the name of the Social Democrats even though former Labour Democrats are dominating in the party) – are now cooperating to prevent new parties, especially the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats, from power. A divide between "traditional" and "populist" parties is replacing the Left-Right political dimension in the public discourse. The "traditional" camp is composed of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (former Labour Democrats), the Homeland Union and Christian Democrats. The label of "populists" is usually stuck to the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and Peasants, while the Liberal and Centre Union and the New Union (Social Liberals) are in an ambiguous position.

The division between traditional and populist parties, however, is somewhat misleading, since there are no considerable differences between the first and the second group of parties neither on campaigning strategy, nor on the actual economic policy. Therefore, in this paper, the division between "old" versus "new" parties rather than "traditional" versus "populist" is used. The Homeland Union, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats are regarded as old parties, while the Labour Party, the Union of Peasant and People (further the Union of Peasants), the Party "Order and Justice" (Liberal Democrats), and the New Union (Social Liberals) are assigned to the group of new parties. The Liberal and Centre Union is not assigned to any of these groups because it is not a genuinely new party but it cannot be regarded as traditional party either. In the next section, the differences in membership and motivation of members of the old and new parties are examined.

The members of old and new parties

The party membership in Lithuania is comparatively low. The membership rate of the biggest parties does not exceed 15 thousand members. According to the data of European Value Survey (1999/2000), self-reported party member-

ship in Lithuania is among the lowest in post-communist countries. In terms of membership, the biggest parties in Lithuania have always been the Social Democratic Party (former ex-communist Democratic Labour Party) and the Homeland Union (see Table 2). The "golden age" of the Homeland Union was 1996–2000 when this party was in the government. The Democratic Labour Party lost some of its members after the unsuccessful rule of 1992–1996, but retrieved the losses after merging with Social Democrats. As it is the ruling party since 2000, its membership is steadily increasing.

The third party that was able to compete with the leaders in terms of membership was the Christian Democratic Party. In 1996 it claimed to have 10,000 members and it was the second biggest party at the time. Poor electoral performance in parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2004 considerably diminished its ranks. Nevertheless, it is still one of the most numerous parties in Lithuania.

As can be seen from Table 2, in 1992–1996, the size of a party in terms of membership was correlated with the electoral performance of a party: the Homeland Union, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and Christian Democrats had most members and the biggest electorate while Social Democrats and the Centre Union were less numerous and less successful in the elections. Parliamentary elections of 2000 have changed the situation. The Liberal Union won the elections having only 2,000 members, the New Union (Social Liberals) won 20 percent of votes with 3,500 members, while Christian Democrats with 10,000 members failed to cross the electoral threshold.

The strategy of the new parties in regard to recruitment of members varies from party to party. The Union of Peasants, Liberal Democrats, the New Union and the Liberal and Centre Union do not strive for mass membership. The Labour Party, in contrast, put big efforts to the organisational development and recruitment of members. The membership rate of the party was increasing in extraordinary speed and now exceeds the rate of one of the strongest traditional parties – the Homeland Union. As our research shows, however, the membership rate of the party might be somewhat fictitious. Some respondents confessed that they formally joined the Labour Party together with their boss and had never been involved into the activities of the party.

Table 2. Party membership in Lithuania in 1992– 2006

Party	*1992*	*1996*	*2000*	*2003*	*2006*
Homeland Union	–	16,164	19,487	12,269	12,514
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party	13,600	9,200	8,300	12,506	14,805
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	500	1,500	4,000		
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party	5,251	10,500	10,500	10,000	4,660
Lithuanian Centre Union	–	1,500	3,000	3,640	4,466
Lithuanian Liberal Union	550	1,000	2,000		
New Union (Social Liberals)	–	–	3,500	4,926	6,224
Union of Peasants and New Democracy	–	–	–	1,500	2,500
Order and Justice (Liberal Democrats)	–	–	–	4,998	5,263
Labour Party	–	–	–	2,642	13,777

Source: 1992–2003 data from Krupavičius and Lukošaitis (2004), 2006 data from the Central Electoral Committee

The qualitative research revealed the problems in members' activism in other new parties as well. For instance, we witnessed how a leader of a branch of the New Union was desperately searching members that could come into a party meeting and fill in our questionnaire. Even though the branch officially had about 40 members, she was not able to find more than 10. The others were not active any more in the party though they still were included in the list of party members.

Interviews with local party members revealed the differences in the motivations for joining a party. The dominant membership motive in the old parties – the Homeland Union and the Social Democratic Party – is a continuation of political activity. The members of Homeland Union relate their membership in the party with the activities in Sąjūdis movement. In 1989, Sąjūdis could have had about 180,000 members. Many of them disengaged from political activity after the declaration and consolidation of independence in 1990 – 1991. Those who stayed in politics usually have chosen the Homeland Union which was considered to be the direct successor of Sąjūdis: "At the time I experienced the restoration of independence. It seemed to me that this party (Homeland Union – A.R.) was the most solid party, developing from the core group of Sąjūdis, where the biggest cohesion was felt." (member of the Homeland Union, Radviliškis region).

Decision to join the Homeland Union was based on anti-communist sentiments and group solidarity. A considerable part of members of the party are former political prisoners and victims of Soviet repressions. As one member

comments, a will to join an anti-communist party was natural for her: "I am a child of Siberia. I was conveyed from the North, my parents were deported. So there was nothing to consider, everything came naturally." (member of the Homeland Union, Vilnius).

Similarly, some members of the Social Democratic Party claim that the main reason of partisan involvement was a continuity of political activity from the Soviet times. In this case, however, the essential motive was inertia rather than emotional engagement. As one party member explains, she simply remained loyal to the party in the period of transition and naturally retained her partisan card even though the name and the program of the party have changed.

Joining motives of members of the Social Democratic Party, however, seem to be more diverse that that of Conservatives. The party is of catch-all type and is making efforts to attract members from different social and ideological background. Since it is now in a ruling coalition for more than 6 years, and it is probably the strongest and most well organized party in Lithuania, some individuals join the party because of instrumental motivation. Moreover, some members came to the party through the activities in trade unions. Still others claim to be engaged by Social Democratic ideology (see Table 3).

Christian Democrats recruited their members through the network of the Catholic Church. In Soviet times, the Catholic Church was the only social organisation relatively independent and alternative to the state. During transformation period, the Catholic Church in Lithuania was active in supporting democratisation and national liberation, therefore, it acted jointly with Sąjūdis. The Christian Democratic Party was established in 1989, well before the creation of the Homeland Union. Old members of the Christian Democratic Party claim to be involved into partisan activities through the religious community, while new members join the party mainly willing to be active in local politics[5].

In the case of new political parties, pragmatic and social motives of joining a party are dominating. The members of the Labour Party and the New Union explain their decision to get involved into party politics as a means of self-expression and desire to make influence on political decision making. Some

[5] Even though Christian Democrats currently are not represented in the parliament, there are more successful in local self-government institutions in Lithuania. In local elections of 2007 they received more than 5 percent of votes on a national scale and have two mayors.

Table 3. Motives of joining a political party

Party	*Motives for joining a party*
Homeland Union	Continuation of participation in Sąjūdis movement Patriotic feelings Victims of Soviet repressions Trust in the first leader of the party (Vytautas Landsbergis) Support for the program principles of the party, such as community building, importance of family
Lithuanian Christian Democrats	Commitment to the Church community Self-expression, enthusiasm Will to change the situation, to work for Lithuania Interest in politics Liked the leader of the local branch Ambitions to pursue political goals
Labour party	Self – expression, wish to share experience Influence of the employer Promises, entertainment
Liberal and Centre Union	Self – expression Commitment to liberal values Work in the electoral campaign of a member of Parliament
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	Self – expression Inertia, loyalty to the party from soviet times Social Democratic family traditions Political beliefs, ideas, ideology of the party Professionalism of the party Participation in the activities of trade union
New Union	Wish to participate in political decision making Desire to ascertain if parties function in the name of ideas Participation in the Paulauskas' electoral campaign Invitation of friends or colleagues

Source: in-depth interviews with local party members (2005)

of them reported the influence of friends and colleagues: "At the time I had a desire for some kind of activity; I met a playfellow, he participated in this activity (party activity – A.R.), he talked how much one can do, how much one can change; so I got attracted and joined. (member of the New Union, Radviliškis region).

Moreover, some members of new parties confess that the main reason of joining a party was a fear of loosing a job: "oh, perhaps colleagues [influenced], lets' say. (…) Just for safety's sake." (member of the Labour Party, Radviliškis region). As some party members report, it is usual that workers of an enterprise join the party together with the administration: "I think, in those enterprises where several managers joined [a party], they recruited those people to this circle." (member of the New Union, Klaipėda region).

The differences in the nature of members' involvement are visible in the partisan activities as well. Dominant activity in the Homeland Union seems to be political discussions; the Social Democrats attempt to engage members by extra-party activities, such as football games, fiestas as well as by soviet-style meetings of the representatives of different economic sectors, Christian Democrats usually combine partisan activities with religions celebrations. The Labour Party is attracting and mobilizing its members by free concerts, trips, etc., while the New Union activity is mainly limited to the working meetings of party elite and local activists.

In conclusion, the research of the party members revealed that the level and the character of party membership in Lithuania depend on the origin of a party. The ex-communist Lithuanian Social Democratic Party has the highest membership rate; its members joined the party for various seasons, including inertia, ideological beliefs, and pragmatic incentives. Anti-communist Homeland Union has a relatively high membership too. Members of the party tend to see their partisan involvement as a continuation of an activity in the anti-communist movement; the party is distinguished by high normative and emotional engagement of its members. The membership of Christian Democrats has diminished because of poor performance in the national elections. Most of its members were recruited during early 1990s as a consequence of national and religious enthusiasm. New parties in Lithuania have low to high but presumably unsteady membership. They are characterized by dominating pragmatic motives of partisan involvement and low normative engagement of the members.

Parties in the electorate

Public attachment to political parties is claimed to be one of the basic features of representative democracy and a sign of its vitality (Dalton, 2000). Partisan ties mobilize individuals to participate in politics and accumulate their support for political system. Strong partisan attachment of voters ensures stability of a party system and diminishes the chances of new parties to enter the political arena (Converse and Dupeux, 1962). Party identification is widely used to analyse voting behaviour in Western countries, even though there is convincing evidence about the decline of partisanship in post-industrial societies (Dalton, 2000).

Partisan attachment is usually analysed in the framework of the theory of party identification (Campbell et al., 1960). The theory, however, is hardly applicable to new democracies characterized by the instability of parties (Converse and Pierce, 1992). Nevertheless, the concept of party identification is used in the analysis of post-communist democracies with some methodological corrections, e.g. using some "softer" measures of partisanship such as closeness, attachment or "transitional partisanship" (see e.g. Colton, 2000, Paškevičiūtė, 2006, Rudi, 2006, Ramonaitė, 2007). Partisan attachment in new democracies can be defined as emotional relationship with a party that is not necessarily longstanding and stable but is nevertheless stronger than simple partisan preference.

The theory of party identification implies that partisan identification results from early socialisation and increases as individual gets older (Rudi, 2006). A social learning model of Philipe Converse (1969) assumes that young people inherit their partisan identification from their parents and the partisan attachment tends to strengthen over time. The model can be applied for new democracies with some modifications (Dalton and Waldon, 2007). Even though the citizens in new democracies could not have acquired partisan attachment in their childhood, it might be suggested that partisanship of the citizens in new democracies should grow over time as citizens become accustomed to democratic political process. In Lithuania, however, the opposite development is observed: partisan attachment of the voters is gradually diminishing.

The studies of partisanship in post-communist countries in early 1990s demonstrate high level of partisan attachment in Lithuanian. Evans and Whitefield (1995) report that about 50 percent of voters in Lithuania had a

party attachment in 1993, and it was a high score, compared with Poland, Estonia and other post-communist countries (see Table 4). The lack of comparable data from different points of time, unfortunately, does not allow tracing credibly the changes in partisanship of Lithuanian voters. A set of evidence, however, suggest that the partisan ties of the population are declining.

Table 4. Percentage of party supporters by party (1993)

Lithuania	49,6
Bulgaria	45,1
Romania	42,7
Hungary	39,8
Poland	22,5
Estonia	17,6
Ukraine	14,6
Russia	13,3

Source: Evans and Whitefield, 1995
Note: The question reads: "Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any particular party?"

As can be seen from Table 5, Lithuanian score of partisanship in 1996–1999 was among the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe. The data from Baltic Barometer 1999 and 2001 show that only about 5 percent of Lithuanian voting age population had a strong partisanship, 20 percent declared weak partisan attachment and 60 percent said that they did not support any political party (see Degutis, 2001). A question asked in the Baltic Barometer Survey was similar to that in Evans and Whitefield study; therefore, a negative trend in the level of partisanship in Lithuania is rather obvious. This claim is confirmed by other data as well: e.g., Degutis (2001) reveals that in parliamentary elections of 1996, 66 percent of voters had been determined in their voting preferences well before the electoral campaign, and in 2000, only 48 percent of respondents said they had made a decision before the start of the campaign.

The distribution of loyal voters, i.e. voters with partisan attachment, is distributed among parties very unevenly. The Homeland Union and Social Democrats (former Labour Democrats) always enjoyed the highest numbers of supporters (Degutis, 2001). Even though those two parties lost their dominant positions in elections of 2000 and 2004, they still have much more loyal voters than the new parties. As can be seen from Diagram 1, the Homeland Union and the Social Democratic Party has more than 5 percent of supporters on a national scale and it is more than enough to cross the electoral threshold having in mind that electoral turnout in recent elections in Lithuania was less than 50 percent.

The Homeland Union has the biggest share of voters with partisan attachment. As can be seen from Diagram 1, loyal supporters comprise more than

Table 5. Partisan attachment in 1996–1999 (percents of respondents with partisan attachment)

Ukraine 1998	69,4
Russia 1999	62,8
Poland 1997	52,3
Czech Republic 1996	48,8
Romania 1996	46,9
Hungary 1998	35,0
Lithuania 1997	34,3

Source: The Comparative systems of Electoral Systems (CSES) <http://www.jdsurvey.net/bdasepjds/cses/home.jsp>

Note: the question reads: "Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?"

half of those ready to vote for the party in the next elections. The Social Democratic Party has a similar share of loyal supporters and a slightly higher percentage of supporters without a partisan attachment. This seems to be a surprising finding because the social learning model would predict the advantage of ex-communist parties in stimulating party ties (Dalton and Weldon, 2005).

A difference between the percentage of potential voters and determined supporters of the new parties is much bigger. As data show, only a ¼ of those who are ready to vote for the Labour Party, the Liberal and Centre Party and the New Union consider themselves the supporters of the preferred parties. The supporters of the Peasants Union and Liberal Democrats comprise only less than 1 percent of Lithuanian adult population and it makes up only 14 and 15 percent respectively of their potential electorate.

Diagram 1. Party preference and partisan attachment by party (percentages)



Source: Lithuanian Value Survey, 2005

In conclusion, the differences between the old and the new parties are also reflected in the electorate. Event though the new parties demonstrated remarkable results in the parliamentary elections, they were not able to generate a network of supporters comparable to that of the old parties. Of the new parties, the Labor Party has the highest percent of loyal voters and this probably has to do with well developed organization structure of the party. In general, however, the new parties seem to be detached from the voters much more than the old parties.

Explaining differences between old and new parties

What explains the diminishing partisan attachment of Lithuanian population and the differences between old and new parties? Two alternative explanations might be suggested: one of them attributes these trends to the specific logic of the development of a party system in a post-communist society; the other relates the changes to the world-wide trends of transformation of partisan politics.

The formation and stabilization of the party systems in Western Europe are commonly explained by the influential cleavage model of Rokkan and Lipset (1967). As Bartolini and Mair (1990) claim, a cleavage is a specific type of division which refers to an *organized* social dividing line in a polity accompanied by a *normative element*, i.e. the set of values and believes which provides a sense of identity for the people of a particular social group. In other words, a cleavage is based on an emotional solidarity of an organized social group. This definition relates a cleavage model of Rokkan and Lipset (1967) with the party identification theory which originally stems from reference group theory.

It is often claimed that post-communist societies lack strong socio-political cleavages, therefore voting behavior of the citizens is more volatile and the conditions for the stabilization of party systems are rather adverse. First, the societies in post-communist states are said to be flattened by socialist "egalitarian" policy; second, they are said to lack organizational networks which could segment the electorates into stable and relatively closed partisan blocs (Mair, 1993). The research of the members' recruitment patterns and motives of joining a party in Lithuania revealed, however, that the formation of the party system in Lithuania was shaped by the communist – anticommunist political conflict that comes close to the notion of a cleavage as defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990).

First, the research demonstrated that the old parties – the Social Democrats, the Homeland Union and Christian Democrats – were building their structure on the existing social networks. The structure of the Social Democratic Party was built on the basis of the former Communist Party of Lithuania; the Homeland Union successfully used the network of Sąjūdis, while Christian Democrats employed the organizational structure of the Catholic Church. Second, the motives of joining these parties, the Homeland Union in particular, were related with emotional and normative commitments rather than pragmatic incentives.

The emotional solidarity with a social group seems to be an important factor stimulating the ties between the parties and their voters. As Alfred Erich Senn (2002: 20) reports, "By 1991 and 1992, politically aware Lithuanians had divided into *brazauskininkai* and *landsbergininkai*, supporters of Brazauskas (*the leader of the ex-communist Democratic Labor Party*) and Landsbergis (*the leader of Sąjūdis and later the Homeland Union*). (…) The politics became intense, sharp rivalries developed and emotions ran higher and higher." The tension, however, gradually diminished, as the Democratic Labor Party (later transformed into Social Democrats) were keeping on a pro-western and pro-liberal political line.

The new parties, in contrast, were not organized along the lines of socio-political cleavages. Instead they were employing the techniques of public relations and relying on the popularity of their leaders. The organization structures of these parties are poorly developed, except for the Labour Party which claims to have more than 13,000 members. The long – term efficiency of its mobilisation strategy, however, is doubtful as members of the party joined the party because of instrumental motives and apparently lack the sense of solidarity with the party.

Moreover, the new parties failed to mobilize and encapsulate their supporters. Instead of putting efforts to tie and discipline their voters through institutional intermediaries, they relied on populist appeals of the leaders and mass media-based electoral campaign. Their strategy was successful in the context of public disillusionment with the political establishment and, what is even more important, in the era of mass media election.

The partisan dealignment thesis in post – industrial societies is linked with the diminishing value of partisanship in contemporary politics (Dalton and

Weldon, 2007). As Dalton claims, general erosion of partisan attachments in advanced industrial societies is related with socioeconomic changes in the society and the transformation of the political context, i.e. changes in the technology of politics (Dalton, 2000, Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000, Dalton and Weldon, 2007). A shift from labour intensive campaigning to a capital intensive style of mass marketing, and increasing reliance of the parties on public financing diminishes the need for mass membership. Moreover, it changes the focus of the electoral campaign from mobilisation of collective identities to catch-all strategy and candidate-centred politics.

Even though dealignment thesis is primary applied to the post-industrial democracies, there is good evidence to claim that comparable trends are also present in new democracies (Dalton and Weldon, 2007). While in the beginning of the party system formation in Lithuania, electoral technologies were not used extensively because of the lack of know-how and financial resources, professionalization of electoral campaign and the use of new technologies increased substantially since 2000. The victory of new parties in parliamentary elections of 2000 and especially 2004 is linked with heavy use of media technologies in their electoral campaign. Moreover, the phenomenon of Rolandas Paksas and Viktor Uspaskich, the founder of the Labor Party, might be regarded as a direct consequence of mediatization of politics. For example, the popularity of Viktor Uspaskich is related with a popular Lithuanian political TV show "Dviračio šou". Being a member of parliament in 2000–2003, Viktor Uspaskich was used as a prototype of a popular character in the TV show, and it often believed that this laid the foundation for the subsequent rise of his popularity.

In conclusion, diminishing importance of the "transitional" communist – anticommunist cleavage eroded the partisan attachment of Lithuanian voters to the old parties, organized along the cleavage. Moreover, the loyalty of the voters was diminished because of high dissatisfaction with the politics of the ruling parties. The new parties, challenging the political establishment, were not, however, rooted in the society. Instead they were using the advantages of new technologies and have transformed the political competition in Lithuania into candidate – centred politics and campaigns of public relations.

Conclusions

In the article, the evidence was provided to support the claim that contrary to the logic of social learning model, partisanship in Lithuania is decreasing rather than increasing. The paper suggests that partisan attachment in Lithuania in the early 1990s was based on group solidarity rather than social learning of the voters. The communist – anti-communist social cleavage provided organisational and normative basis for the mobilisation of voters along partisan alignments. Together with the weakening normative element of the communist – anticommunist cleavage, however, the partisan attachment was gradually decreasing.

Even though the students of post-communist democracies seem to suggest that party systems in post-communist societies have been formed from above and are lacking social roots, the case of Lithuania reveals that the old parties, established in the beginning of the party system formation, had a great deal of loyal supporters and quite a few members. The new parties, on the other hand, are floating above the society.

The differences between the old and the new parties in Lithuania are mainly apparent when analysing the reasons of joining a party and motives for keeping up partisan involvement. While members of the old parties are mainly motivated by value orientations and emotional engagement, and group solidarity, the membership of the new parties is based on instrumental motives and rational decision. Lacking social and normative grounds, these parties are not able to attach their voters and to develop ties with their electorate. Instead they are using successfully anti-party sentiments of the population and mass media-based electoral technologies.

A phenomenon of new parties, trying to reach broad segments of the electorate, using an anti-establishment rhetoric and focusing on the novelty *per se* is not unique to Lithuania (Bågenholm & Johansson, 2005). It seems that institutional and media-related transformations of partisan politics that are discussed in Western Europe are evident in post-communist societies even more than in the West. Using picturesque words of Lithuanian philosopher Arūnas Sverdiolas (2006: 42), "We were going our own speed and in some cases we went further than the others. (…) With the tail of an eye we notice how the West comes up slowly and gingerly, using a parallel road."

The paper supports the claim of Dalton and Weldon (2007) that "the erosion of mass-based parties that personally engage the citizenry is a global phenomenon"; therefore it challenges their conclusion about the optimistic potential for new democracies to develop partisan ties and stabilize voting behaviour. The case of Lithuania suggests that the chances for building partisan attachments of the citizenry in post-communist societies are reduced both by the post-communist attributes and world-wide developments.

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MEASURING SYSTEMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT*

Vitalis Nakrošis

Abstract. This paper seeks assessing the dynamics of Lithuania's governmental performance and comparing it to other countries. It draws on a simple logical model, linking the inputs of the government to its outputs and outcomes. It was found that performance of the Lithuanian government is average and even poor, if compared with the EU average or such countries as Estonia and Ireland. This is despite the fact the public mode of production is rather expensive in Lithuania and the number of public employees is similar to the EU average. A few performance indicators have recently improved in Lithuania, but not as much as overall government expenditure since 2004. Therefore, the Lithuanian Government should accord higher attention to efficiency and effectiveness of its performance. This is especially relevant in the sector of education, where there is a clear mismatch between a significant share of expenditure, a high number of employees and rather poor educational outcomes.

Introduction

Lithuanian Prime Minister G. Kirkilas declared the objective of "result–based Government" in his presentation of the annual performance report of the Lithuanian Government[1]. However, Lithuanian President V. Adamkus in his annual speech to the Lithuanian Parliament claimed that "our politics is not yielding results in main areas of domestic life, where changes are absolutely urgent"[2]. These two quotes point that the performance of the Government has become a partisan political issue in Lithuania.

This paper concerns performance of the Lithuanian government. Performance can be defined as "any measurable outputs, outcomes or other results from public sector activities".[3] Performance could be assessed at the levels of

* This paper was prepared under the COST action No. ISO601 "Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector Organization" (CRIPO).

public policy, programmes, institutions, their structural units as well as public sector employees or their groups. Also, it is possible to measure performance at the level of inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes. Systemic performance concerns the performance of the government as a whole. To measure systemic performance, one can use overall performance measures or aggregate individual performance of institutions, programmes or individuals.

The focus on systemic performance has a few limitations. It is not very useful for management purposes (i.e. providing some evidence for politicians or managers to make certain corrective actions). Since "macro-level data encompass a diffuse set of activities of numerous units"[4], systemic performance could not be attributed to a single institution, unit or manager. However, the analysis of systemic performance is a good starting point for lower-level analysis of institutions or sectors.

This paper seeks assessing the dynamics of Lithuania's performance and comparing it to other countries. In addition to the European Union (EU) average, Estonia and Ireland were selected for the purpose of making this comparison because of two main reasons. First, these countries are similar to Lithuania in terms of their size and government expenditure as part of their gross domestic product (GDP). However, although Estonia is a poorer new member state of the EU, Ireland is a richer old member state of the EU. These differences may be important for linking performance with the level of socio-economic development. Second, Lithuania is often benchmarked against these countries in the public discourse because of a relatively large share of Lithuanian migrants in Ireland or allegedly more advanced Baltic neighbour of Estonia.

This paper draws on a simple logical model, linking the inputs of the government to its outputs and outcomes (results and impact). Public administrations use various (financial, human, technical, etc.) inputs to produce certain physical outputs. This paper analyses two main inputs of the government: government expenditure and human resources. Results are (immediate) effects on the direct beneficiaries (e.g. reduced journey times, transport costs or number of the employed trainees). This paper assesses main objective and subjective results of the Lithuanian government.

The analysis of systemic performance allows some assessment of efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. Efficiency is defined as the maximization of output for a given set of inputs or the minimization of inputs for a given set

Figure No. 1. Logical model



Source: adapted from The European Commission. *Working Paper No. 3:Indicators for Monitoring and Evaluation: An Indicative methodology,* 1999.

of outputs. Effectiveness is defined as the extent to which certain aims have been achieved. It is interesting to assess the link between government expenditure on the input side and (objective or subjective) government performance on the output/outcome side. However, such assessments are constrained by such factors as the lack of quantified objectives or the absence of price information in the public sector.

This paper draws on various sources of information for measuring systemic performance in Lithuania. They include international, European and national sources of information, some monitoring information and performance-related research. The paper starts with the analysis of main government inputs, proceeds with the analysis of main government outputs and outcomes and concludes in the end.

The paper concludes that performance of the Lithuanian government is average and even poor, if compared with the EU average or such countries as Estonia and Ireland. This is despite the fact the public mode of production (intermediate consumption and compensation of employees) is rather expensive in Lithuania and the number of public employees is similar to the EU average. A few performance indicators have recently improved in Lithuania, but not as much as overall government expenditure since 2004. Therefore, efficiency and effectiveness of government performance should be a main priority in the future (in particular in such sectors as education and health care).

Government expenditure

An important measure of the size of government is the ratio of government expenditure/GDP. In Lithuania, the volume of government expenditure, which is measured as a share of the GDP, is one of the lowest in the EU. In 2006, expenditure of the Lithuanian government stood at 34,0 % of its GDP (see Table No. 2). In 2006, Estonia had the lowest expenditure/GDP ratio from the EU 25 member states.

Table No. 2. General government expenditure as part of GDP in the period of 1995–2006

	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*
EU 27								46,9	47,5	46,9	47,0	46,8
EU 25				47,6	47,1	45,5	46,4	47,0	47,6	47,0	47,1	46,9
EU 15	52,6	50,3	48,7	47,7	47,2	45,6	46,6	47,1	47,7	47,2	47,3	47,1
Estonia	43,6	42,3	39,2	39,5	42,8	36,5	35,1	35,6	34,6	34,1	33,4	33,0
Ireland	41,1	39,1	36,6	34,4	34,0	31,5	33,3	33,6	33,4	33,9	34,2	34,2
Lithuania	35,7	37,4	50,3	40,4	40,1	39,1	36,8	34,8	33,2	33,4	33,6	34,0

Source: *Eurostat.*

Most countries of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) saw a decrease in government expenditure as a share of GDP over the period of 1995–2005.[5] The average of government expenditure in the EU 15 has decreased for about 5 % over this period. Lithuania's government expenditure as part of the GDP was rather stable since 1995 (with the exception of a single increase in 1997). However, in absolute numbers government expenditure of Lithuania started growing particularly fast since EU membership: it increased by about 65 % in the period of 2004–2007 (see Figure No. 3 below). This is associated with fast domestic economic growth as well as external financing from the EU. According to the European Commission, "windfall revenues have been mainly spent".[6]

However, the indicator of government expenditure does not fully reflect the scope of government. For instance, the government could support certain sectors or target groups through tax exemptions or concessions rather than direct

Figure No. 3. Government expenditure in Lithuania, 1999–2007 (LTL mln.)



Source: *Statistics Lithuania*.

expenditure, leading to lower expenditure/GDP ratios. Certain tax exemptions are provided in Lithuania to various sectors and target groups (in particular the farmers in the agricultural sector). The International Monetary Fund estimated that a revenue gain from eliminating tax exemptions in Lithuania would constitute about 1,5 % of GDP. This could translate in an expenditure gain in the range of 1–2 % of GDP.[7] According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance, in 2007 the impact of value added tax exemptions on the budget revenue in 2007 was about LTL 400 mln., that of income tax exemptions – LTL 360 mln. (in total amounting to about 4 % of the 2007 budget revenue).

Government expenditure by sector

The breakdown of government expenditure by sector illustrates certain outcomes of the Lithuanian budgeting (see Table No. 4 below). Low spending on social security in Lithuania (10 % of its GDP in 2005) explains largely its low level of government expenditure (as well as in Ireland and Estonia). The Lithuanian government provides less individual goods under the functions of housing, health, recreation, culture and religion, education as well as social security. The volume of such expenditure amounts to 21,7 % of its GDP compared with the EU 25 average of 32,5 %. Also, the Lithuanian govern-

Table No. 4. Government expenditure by function in EU 25, EU 15, Lithuania, Estonia and Ireland, 2005



	General public services	Defence	Public order and safety	Economic affairs	Environment	Housing and community amenities	Health	Recreation, culture and religion	Education	Social security
EU 25	6,6	1,6	1,8	3,7	0,7	1	6,5	1	5,3	18,7
EU 15	6,6	1,6	1,8	3,7	0,7	1	6,6	1	5,2	18,9
Estonia	2,6	1,4	2,2	4	0,9	0,2	4	2,5	6	9,8
Ireland	3,7	0,5	1,5	4,5	0,6	1,5	7,5	0,5	4,3	9,5
Lithuania	4,3	1,4	1,8	3,7	0,6	0,3	5	0,9	5,5	10

Source: *Eurostat*.

ment is providing less collective goods under the functions of general public services, defence, public order and safety as well as environment. The level of such expenditure amounts to 8,1 % of its GDP compared with the EU 25 average of 10,7 %.

The traditional government functions (general public services, defence, law and order) still represent a considerable share of overall government expenditure. In Lithuania, their weight amounted to 7,5 % of its GDP. Compared with Ireland (5,7 %) and Estonia (6,2 %) on the basis of this indicator, the Lithuanian government seems to be more traditional. Compared with Estonia, Lithuania spends more on general public services under all categories of this function ("Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs", "General services" and "Public debt transactions").

Nevertheless, the share of government expenditure for the traditional functions has slightly decreased in the four recent years in Lithuania. Government expenditure on the relatively new function of environment in Lithuania has increased from 0,1 % of GDP in 2002 to 0,8 % in 2006. This is associated with the need of implementing numerous EU environment requirements at the national level and the availability of EU assistance in this area.

Expenditure for the EU Lisbon strategy

It is possible to compare government expenditure for the functions and categories related to the EU Lisbon strategy. Two main government functions are closely related to the EU Lisbon strategy: economic affairs and education. In 2005, Lithuania's expenditure under these functions stood at 9,2 % of its GDP (compared with the EU 25 average of 9 %, Estonia – 10 %, Ireland – 8,8 %). However, within the function of economic affairs in 2005 Lithuania spent 1,1 % of the GDP agriculture (compared with 0,6 % in Estonia), which does not belong to the EU Lisbon strategy.

It is interesting that government spending on education is slightly higher than the EU 25 or 15 average. This fact could be contrasted with only sufficient educational achievements of Lithuania at the secondary or tertiary level (see the following part of this paper). Although Estonia spends even more resources on education, its educational achievements are higher, pointing to more efficient educational spending on aggregate. Despite recent strikes of the Lithuanian

teachers over higher salaries[8], decision-makers should consider the alternative of reforming the educational system.

Also, Lithuania earmarked about 55 % of its total 2007–13 EU assistance for the categories of the Lisbon strategy.[9] Although it falls below the mandatory target of 60 % for the Convergence regions in the old EU member states, the share of assistance for research and development (R&D) is particularly high: about 16 % (see Table No. 5 below). The Government's decision to allocate 10 % of the total allocation of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to R&D is one of the main changes compared with the 2004–06 programming period.[10] Interestingly, the Estonian government earmarked only 47 % of its total 2007–13 assistance for the categories of the Lisbon strategy.[11]

Table No. 5. Share of the EU assistance for the categories of the EU Lisbon strategy in Lithuania, 2007

Priority theme	*% of the EU assistance*
Transport	17.2
Research and development, innovation and entrepreneurship	16.21
Improving human capital	5.5
Information society	3.54
Energy	5.41
Increasing the adaptability of workers and firms, enterprises and entrepreneurs	3.17
Improving access to employment and sustainability	2.05
Improving the social inclusion of less-favoured persons	0.88
Environmental protection and risk prevention	0.60
Total share of the EU assistance for the categories of the EU Lisbon strategy:	**54.6**

Source: Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė. *Nacionalinės Lisabonos strategijos įgyvendinimo programos pažangos metinės pažangos ataskaita (2007 m.)*, 61. http://www.ukmin.lt/lisabona/lt/node/22

Despite relatively high and increasing expenditure for the Lisbon-related sectors or categories in Lithuania, it is not reflected at the level of outputs and outcomes (see the following part of the paper). Although Estonia and Ireland (with Finland, Sweden, Denmark) were unofficially ranked by the European Commission as more advanced in implementing the EU Lisbon strategy, Lithuania received a few recommendations, indicating its less-advanced status.

Government expenditure by COFOG

It is also interesting to assess the breakdown of government expenditure by COFOG (classification of the functions of government) (see Table No. 6 and No. 7 below). On the basis of this information one can compare the public costs of production, which include the compensation of public employees and intermediate consumption, among different countries. All public costs of production in Lithuania amounted to 16,2 % of its GDP in 2005 compared with 14,8 % in Ireland and 15,9 % in Estonia. However, the public costs of production have somewhat decreased in the recent years.

In 2005, compensation of employees amounted to 10,4 % of the GDP in Lithuania (somewhat higher compared with Estonia and Ireland). About 35 % of this expenditure was incurred in the educational sector. The argument that the Lithuanian employees of public sector are underpaid compared with their foreign counterparts is not supported by the empirical evidence. Intermediate consumption (buying goods and services from the private sector) amounts to 5,8 % of the GDP in Lithuania (its level is higher in Ireland, but lower in Estonia). Although a mix of intermediate consumption and the employees' compensation has been rather stable in Lithuania in the period of 2002–2006 (with intermediate consumption in the range of 34–36 % of all production costs), in a few countries it somewhat changed.[12]

Owing to relatively low expenditure under the function of social protection it is obvious that the Lithuanian government spends less on social benefits (10 % of GDP). Also, compared with the EU 25 or 15, Lithuania spends slightly less on subsidies. Almost all expenditure on this individual good is spent in the sector of economic affairs. However, the sector of economic affairs considerably benefits through "gross capital formation" (i.e. the acquisition of fixed capital, inventories and other valuables).

The share of Lithuania's public investments reached 4,1 % in 2006. This is the only function, where the government expenditure of Lithuania (together with Estonia and Ireland), exceeds the average of the EU 25 and 15. It seems to be the effect of larger capital spending co-financed from the EU structural funds. However, a more detailed analysis shows that public investments have been increasingly directed to construction activities at the expense of machinery and equipment.

Table No. 6. Government expenditure by COFOG in Lithuania, 2002–2006



	Government expenditure as	General public services	Defence	Public order and safety	Economic affairs	Environment	Housing and community amenities	Health	Recreation, culture and religion	Education	Social security
2002	34,8	4,7	1,5	1,9	3,7	0,1	0,4	4,5	1	6,2	10,7
2003	33,2	4,6	1,4	1,9	3,7	0,1	0,4	4,4	0,9	5,8	10
2004	33,4	4,3	1,4	1,9	3,9	0,4	0,3	4,3	0,8	5,9	10,3
2005	33,6	4,3	1,4	1,8	3,7	0,6	0,3	5	0,9	5,5	10
2006	34	4,2	1,6	1,8	4	0,8	0,4	4,7	1	5,5	10

Source: *Eurostat*.

Table No. 7. Government expenditure by COFOG in EU 25, 15, Estonia, Ireland and Lithuania, 2005



	Government expenditure as percentage of	Intermediate consumption	Compensation of employees	Subsidies	Property income	Other current transfers	Social benefits	Capital transfers	Gross capital formation and acquisitions less
EU 25	47	6,4	10,8	1,1	2,8	2,2	19,9	1,2	2,4
EU 15	47,2	6,4	10,8	1,1	2,8	2,2	20,1	1,2	2,4
Estonia	33,4	6,6	9,3	1	0,2	1,6	10,9	0,4	3,4
Ireland	34	5,3	9,5	0,6	1	2,3	11,1	1	3,2
Lithuania	33,6	5,8	10,4	0,7	0,8	2,2	10	0,4	3,3

Source: *Eurostat.*

Number of employees in the public sector

Labour is the most important input in the public sector. In 2007, the Lithuanian public sector employed about 26 % of all employed labour force. The size of the Lithuanian public sector is similar to the average public sector in the EU 25: in 2001 the Lithuanian public sector employed about 28,1 % of all employed population, compared with the EU 15 average of 26,1 % (25,4 % in Estonia, 24 % in Ireland, see Table No. 8).

Table No. 8. Employment in the public sector of Ireland, Estonia and Lithuania, 2001

	Public administration and defence, compulsory social security, %	*Education, %*	*Health and social work, %*	*Other, %*	*Total, %*
Ireland	4,7	5,9	8,4	5	24
Estonia	6	8,8	5,3	5,3	25,4
Lithuania	5,5	11,4	7,4	3,8	28,1
				Average of EU 25:	**26,052**

Source: the author on the basis of *Public Sector Performance: An international comparison of education, health care, law and order and public administration.* Social and Cultural Planning Office, The Hague. 2004.

Interestingly, the education sector employed 11,4 % of the total employment in 2001 (see Table No. 8), which is the highest weight in all the EU 25 countries. As a share of all public sector employees, the sector of education employed about 36 % of such employees in 2007. Together with other data, this points to inefficient management of the educational sector on aggregate.

There has been a growth in the number of positions and employed civil servants in the civil service in the recent four years (in particular in the period of 2006–2007, see Table No. 9). According to the preliminary estimates, the number of the Lithuanian civil servants at the central and local level reached 26 817 in 2007. This is related to Lithuania's accession to the EU (in particular the management of the EU assistance) as well as new functions at the central or local level.

Although the size of the civil service in Lithuania is often considered as a proxy for the scope of government, this is a wrong assumption. The civil service accounts for only 11,6 % of the total employment in the Lithuanian public

sector (2006 data, see Table No. 10). The Lithuanian civil service is clearly not comparable to the civil services in other countries: the employees of education and science, culture, health, social policy and other public employees fall outside the scope of the Lithuanian civil service.

Table No. 9. Civil servants employed at the central and local administration

	2003	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*
Central administration:	*15230*	*15617*	*16785*	*19384*
Parliament's chancellery and institutions under it	810	852	885	1180
Courts	1003	1267	1493	1663
President's Office and institutions under it	95	94	93	95
Government chancellery and institutions under it	1466	1465	1597	1811
Ministries	1826	1964	2068	2228
Institutions under ministries	9236	9171	9787	11446
Counties	794	804	862	961
Local administration	*4338*	*4685*	*5032*	*5406*
Total:	**19568**	**20302**	**21817**	**24790**

Source: *the Civil Service Register of Lithuania* (see information of the Ministry of the Interior in Lithuanian http://www.vtd.lt/index.php?-559371720)

Table No. 10. Number of employees in the public sector in the period of 1998–2006

Year	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*
Thousands of employees	491,4	489,5	474,9	453,3	422,7	403,9	400,1	408,2	394,5
Percentage of the civil servants	13,8	13,8	13,5	13,0	12,2	11,7	11,6	11,9	11,6

Source: *Statistics Lithuania*.

The OECD found that countries with relatively low employment in government have higher costs per employee compared with the whole economy (such as Austria, the Netherlands). It was explained that such countries tend to have a more qualified workforce with many low-skilled activities outsourced.[13] In Lithuania, the average bruto salary of the civil servants exceeded that in the private sector in the period of 2003–2006 (by 24 % in the middle of 2006). However, the Lithuanian civil service employs better educated employees compared with the private sector.

Performance at the EU level

At the EU level Lithuania has one of the lowest deficits of transposing the EU directives in all EU Member States (0,6 % compared with the target of 1,5 %, see Table No. 11). It is despite the fact that Lithuania, together with other new member states of the EU, needed to implement a larger volume of EU legislation over a shorter period of time compared with the old EU member states. This indicator, which is measured by the European Commission, expresses the percentage of Internal Market legislation not yet introduced into national legislation by member states.

Table No. 11. Transposition deficit in the EU member states, 2007



Source: the European Commission. *Internal market scoreboard*. 2007, 12. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/docs/score16bis/score16bis_en.pdf

However, Lithuania it is unlikely to meet its targets under the EU Lisbon strategy. One of the main targets to raise the R&D expenditure to 2 % of the GDP by 2010 will not be met (the level of expenditure only reached 0,80 % in 2006, see Table No. 12). Lithuania is also unlikely to meet its employment target. Although employment was increasing in the period of 2003–2006, it is associated largely with growing economy. It shows that, in contrast to the outputs, it is difficult to attribute these Lisbon outcomes to the performance of government institutions.

According to the World Economic Forum's Lisbon Review 2006, Lithuania was ranked No. 20 among the EU 25 in the progress made in implementing the goals of the EU Lisbon strategy (see Table No. 13 below). This assessment was based on publicly available hard data (such as Internet penetration rates, unem-

Table No. 12. Achieving main targets of the EU Lisbon strategy in Lithuania

Indicator	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*Targets for 2008 and 2010*
Investment in R&D (% from GDP)	0,68	0,76	0,76	0,80	1,2 and 2,0
Employment of the population aged 15–64	60,9	61,1	62,6	63,6	66,0 and 68,8

Source: *Statistics Lithuania*.

ployment rates, etc.) and data from the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey (that is part of the Government Effectiveness, see below). Lithuania's assessment of horizontal priorities was also poor (No. 18 for information society, No. 20 for social inclusion, No. 21 for sustainable development).

Moreover, Lithuania has recorded decreasing fiscal deficits since 2004, reaching 0,5 % of GDP in 2005 and 0,6 % in 2006. In this period Lithuania beat its fiscal targets set in the national convergence programmes of 2005 and 2006 by about two times. However, in 2007 Lithuania missed its fiscal target (see Table No. 14). The situation is unlikely to improve in 2008: although the Convergence programme still foresees a deficit of 0,5 %, a real deficit is likely to reach 1,4 % of GDP.[14] This is despite of the EU recommendations to set more ambitious targets for 2008.

Table No. 13. Index of Lisbon progress, 2006

Country	*Rank*	*Score*
EU 25		4,84
Denmark	1	5,76
Finland	2	5,74
Sweden	3	5,74
Ireland	11	5,09
Estonia	12	4,93
Lithuania	**20**	**4,31**

Source: World Economic Forum. *The Lisbon Review 2006: Measuring Europe's Progress in Reform*. 2006. http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/lisbonreview/report2006.pdf

Finally, Lithuania's progress in absorbing the EU funds has been rather mixed. If Lithuania was more advanced among the new EU member states in 2004, it dropped to the bottom of this list in 2006: only about one third of all 2004–2006 EU assistance was absorbed in Lithuania by March, 2007.[15] After taking some measures to accelerate financial absorption (changes to the programme complement, the re-allocation of assistance among/within measures, some simplification of procedures and regular monitoring of financial progress), the pace of absorption somewhat increased and reached about 57 % towards the end of 2007.[16] However, Lithuania remains below the average of the new EU member states.

Table No. 14. Fiscal balance of the Lithuanian government, 2005–2009

	2005	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*
Targets of government fiscal balance, % of GDP	-1,2 (2005)	-1,4 (2005) -1,2 (2006)	-0,9 (2006, 2007)	-0,5 (2007)	0,0 (2007)
Actual government fiscal balance, % of GDP	-0,5	-0,6	-1,2	–	–

Source: the Ministry of Finance (see its information of 2005–2007 at http://www.finmin.lt/web/finmin//koordinavimas_es/konvergencija)

Worse-performing institutions are indicated in Table No. 15 below. All measures, which are financed from the European Social Fund (ESF), fell in the lowest rank of percentile. However, two worse-performing institutions are the Ministry of Economy and the Information Society Development Committee, whose measures are financed from the ERDF. Two ERDF-financed measures, whose absorption is the lowest, are strengthening business environment (36 % of all expenditure absorbed) as well as public tourism infrastructure and services (29 % of that expenditure).

Table No. 15. Absorption of the EU structural funds in the period of 2004–2006 in Lithuania

Institution	*Number of measures (source of financing)*	*% of absorbed expenditure from all committed expenditure*	*Percentile rank*
Ministry of Environment	1 (ERDF)	69,2	70,1–82,3
Ministry of Finance	2 (1 ERDF, 1 ESF)	60,1	53,7–61,0
Ministry of Social Security and Labour	4 (1 ERDF, 3 ESF)	60,6	53,7–61,0
Ministry of Transport and Communications	1 (ERDF)	80,3	From 75,1
Ministry of Health	1 (ERDF)	71,2	70,1–82,3
Ministry of Education and Science	3 (1 ERDF, 1 ESF)	58,6	53,7–61,0
Ministry of Economy	4 (all ERDF)	56,3	53,7–61,0
Ministry of Agriculture	7 (all EAGGF)	80	From 75,1
Fisheries Department	3 (all FOFI)	82,3	From 75,1
Information Society Development Committee	1 (ERDF)	53,7	53,7–61,0
Average		**65,5**	

Percentiles: 53,7–61,0 (well below average); 61,1–75,0 (around average); from 75,1 (well above average).
Source: *Structural Funds Monitoring Information System*, April 2008, www.esparama.lt

Government effectiveness and regulatory quality

Overall indicator of government effectiveness was constructed by the World Bank Institute on the basis of several individual indicators. According to the World Bank, it measures "the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies".[17]

Its dynamics in the period of 1998–2006 points to increasing level of government effectiveness in Lithuania.[18] With its score of 77,3 % in 2006 (see Table No. 16) Lithuania fell in the percentile of 75–90th (compared with 91 % of Ireland and 85,3 % of Estonia). In 2004, Lithuania's score of +0.89 was lower compared with the average score of the EU 25 estimated to be at +1,25. Lithuania is an average performer in Central and Eastern Europe, but its performance is lagging behind the average of the EU 25 member states. The Lithuanian Government seeks to achieve the target of +1,25 by 2015 set out in the 2007–2013 ESF-financed Operational Programme.

Table No. 16. Government Effectiveness in Lithuania, 1996–2006

Year	*Percentile Rank (0–100)*	*Score (-2,5 to +2,5)*	*Standard Error*
2006	77,3	+0,82	0,19
2005	76,3	+0,90	0,16
2004	78,2	+0,89	0,18
2003	80,1	+0,94	0,17
2002	74,4	+0,68	0,17
2000	65,9	+0,37	0,18
1998	71,1	+0,56	0,16
1996	41,7	-0,35	0,28

Source: *the World Bank*, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/mc_chart.asp#.

However, the indicator of government effectiveness can be somewhat biased. Its main method of measurement is an expert assessment by the staff of international organisations that may not have good knowledge about Lithuania. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration a view of the Lithuanian citizens, which are the main users of public services in Lithuania (see below).

Since the government is increasingly involved in the regulation of economic activities, it is also important to use the indicator of regulatory quality. In this area Lithuania scored +1,02 below Estonia and Ireland (+1,42 and +1,75 respectively), according to the World Bank's indicator of regulatory quality (see Table No. 17). Also, Lithuania falls below the average of the EU 25 member states estimated to be +1,29 in 2005. Lithuania seeks to achieve the target of 1,30 by 2015 set out in the 2007–2013 ESF-financed Operational Programme.

Table No. 17. Regulatory Quality in Estonia, Ireland and Lithuania, 2006

Country	*Percentile Rank (0–100)*	*Score (-2,5 to +2,5)*	*Standard Error*
Estonia	92,2	+1,42	0,18
Ireland	97,6	+1,75	0,20
Lithuania	81,5	+1,02	0,18

Source: *the World Bank*, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/mc_chart.asp#.

Also, regulatory environment is measured by the World Bank's indicator of doing business. Lithuania's rank of "ease of doing business" is good: Lithuania was ranked No. 26 out of 178 economies (see Table No. 18 below). However, Ireland was ranked No. 8, Estonia – No. 17 in 2008.

Table No. 18. Ease of doing business in Lithuania, 2007–2008

Ease of...	*2008 rank*	*2007 rank*	*Change in rank*
Doing Business	**26**	**24**	**–2**
Starting a Business	57	50	–7
Dealing with Licenses	57	55	–2
Employing Workers	124	125	+1
Registering Property	4	4	0
Getting Credit	36	32	–4
Protecting Investors	83	81	–2
Paying Taxes	71	74	+3
Trading Across Borders	23	23	0
Enforcing Contracts	18	18	0
Closing a Business	31	32	+1

Source: the World Bank. *Doing Business 2008: Lithuania*. 2008 *http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=114*

However, a mismatch was found in the research of various international institutions in the area of business conditions. They are oriented at foreign-capital enterprises, despite the fact that small and medium enterprises prevail in the Lithuanian market (estimated to represent 99 % of all enterprises in Lithuania).[19] For instance, one finding of the World Economic Forum that the Lithuanian infrastructure is problematic was approved only by 10 % of the Lithuanian entrepreneurs surveyed in 2008. According to the same survey, 63,4 % of the Lithuanian entrepreneurs agree that Lithuanian business conditions have stayed rather satisfactory, 24,4 % – have improved in recent 2–3 years.[20]

Performance of public services: health, education and e-government

The quality of public services is poor in Lithuania. For instance, one independent assessment found that Lithuania had the least consumer-friendly health system among the EU 25 member states and Switzerland in 2006.[21] This is despite the fact that Lithuania exceeds the EU average in terms of the number of beds and hospitals for 100 000 population. According to the Eurobarometer survey of 2007, the Lithuanian health care system is the third biggest problem for the Lithuanian citizens (20 %) after (increasing) inflation and (decreasing) crime.[22]

Also, according to most Lithuanian stakeholders, the quality of higher education is low, despite its good accessibility to the citizens. Table No. 19 below shows a particularly significant development gap between Lithuania and the EU 25 in the area of higher education (especially in terms of scientific publications and patents). This is despite a very large number of the population with higher education in Lithuania.

Table No. 19. Main development gaps between Lithuania and the EU in the area of higher education

Indicator	*Year*	*Lithuania*	*EU average*
25–34 aged population with higher education (per cent)	2004	35	24,8
Scientific publications for mln. inhabitants	2003	165	639
Patent applications to the European patent bureau for mln. inhabitants	2002	2,6	133,6

Source: *Eurostat*.

Moreover, Lithuania is lagging behind the EU average in the area of life-long learning (% of the adult population aged 25 to 64 participating in education and training). According to the Eurostat, in Lithuania 2006 participation in education and training was 4,9 %, compared with the EU 25 average of 10,2 % (Estonia – 6,5 %, Ireland – 7,3 %) in 2006. The Lithuanian Government pursues the target of 11 % by 2013 in the national strategic documents, but recent trends are unfavourable (the indicator of life-long learning stood at 6,3 % in 2005).

Finally, e-government is useful for measuring government performance. The full online availability of 20 basic public services was 35 % in 2007 compared with 40 % in 2004 and 2006 (see Figure No. 20). This indicator of Estonia stood at 70 %, Ireland – at 50 % in 2007. Also, according to the Eurostat, Lithuania is lagging behind the EU average in terms of using e-government: 18 % of Lithuanian individuals used the Internet for interaction with public authorities compared with 30 % of the EU 27 average in 2007.

Figure No. 20. Availability of 20 basic services online in the EU member states, 2002–2007

	2002	*2003*	*2004*	*2006*	*2007*
EU (27 countries)	–	–	–	–	59
EU (25 countries)	–	–	41	51	–
EU (15 countries)	36	47	49	56	–
Estonia	–	–	63	79	70
Ireland	50	56	50	50	50
Lithuania	–	–	40	40	35

Source: *Eurostat.*

Budgetary performance: monitoring information

Despite the availability of plentiful monitoring information in Lithuania, it could not be used for measuring the Lithuanian government. This is because of three main problems: some performance measures are not "SMART" (specific, measurable, achievable, reliable and timely), many targets are intentionally kept low or reduced during the implementation process as well as no aggregate information is available.

There are two main sources of monitoring information in Lithuania. The first source of information is the SFMIS, the Structural Funds Monitoring

Information System, measuring the implementation of the 2004–06 SPD in Lithuania on the basis of financial and physical indicators.

Financial absorption of the EU funds was already assessed above. Preliminary 2007 monitoring information showed that about 90 % of all beneficiaries of the 2004–06 SPD achieved their physical targets at the project level. However, it was possible to adjust the project targets during the project implementation. At the programme level it is likely that only a few targets will be missed. However, some monitoring indicators are not "SMART".

Nevertheless, the achievement of the planned results is likely to be mixed under the measure of direct business assistance under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy: although this measure will attract more private capital (the so-called "leverage effect") than expected, the indicator of gross jobs created will probably not be reached.

The second source of information is the monitoring information submitted by the appropriation managers to the Ministry of Finance on the implementation of the annual plans of evaluation criteria at the level of products, results and effects. Since there is no computerised monitoring system for this information, aggregate information at the macro level is not available.

However, some studies point to interesting findings. A sample of 2005 monitoring information from 37 appropriation managers indicated very good results. On average, these institutions exceeded their targets by 140 % at the level of results and by 125 % – at the level of outputs.[23] However, these appropriation managers self-assessed their performance (efficiency and effectiveness in 2006) as good (nearly 70 % of all respondents agreed). It indicates that the self-assessment is of more critical nature compared with monitoring information.

The ex-post audit of the 2006 budget programmes, which were implemented by four Lithuanian ministries (the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Culture), showed that their average performance was 132 %.[24] The Ministry of Education and Science beat its targets at the level of results on average by 271,6 %. It points that many targets are intentionally set low in view of ensuring their achievement over 100 %.

The media's opinion: implementation of governmental commitments and the rating of best Lithuanian institutions

A clearer expression of government commitments made it possible to assess their implementation. A Lithuanian paper *Verslo žinios* (Business news) assessed the implementation of commitments undertaken by the government of Prime Minister G. Kirkilas in the period of July 2006–April 2008. Table No. 21 below shows that about 50 % of main commitments have been implemented. A better implementation of social policy commitments is notable: it was easier for the minority government to reach political consensus in this area compared with the areas of tax policy and other political decisions.

Table No. 21. Commitments of the Kirkilas Government and their implementation, 2006–2008

No.	*Commitment*	*Status in April, 2008*	*Implementation*
		Tax policy	
1.	Reduce the personal income tax to 20 %	24 %	No
2.	Increase non-taxed minimum wage to LTL 400	LTL 320	No
		Social policy	
3.	Increase average wage to LTL 1 800	Net average wage is LTL 1 527, gross average wage is LTL 2 052	Yes/no
4.	Minimum monthly wage of LTL 800	From January 2008	Yes
5.	Average monthly pension of LTL 650	LTL 738 from February 2008	Yes
6.	Compensation of rouble deposits	Yes, LTL 1,135 billion allocated for these compensations in 2007	Yes
7.	Maternity allowance amounting to 100 % of the wage	100 % for the first year and 85 % for the second year since July 2007	Yes
		Political decisions	
8.	Complete land reform by the end of 2007	Delayed for indefinite period	No
9.	Decide on direct mayors' election	No decision yet	No
10.	Ensure fast accession to the Euro zone	Lithuania did not qualify because of high inflation	No
11.	Ensure fast accession to the Schengen area	Lithuania joined this area since 21 December 2007	Yes
12.	Achieve a breakthrough in main projects of energy and transport infrastructure	No tangible breakthrough	No

Source: Verslo žinios. *Pagyrūniška Vyriausybės ataskaita parlamentarų skepticizmo neįveikė*. 2008 04 18, 5.

Since 2005 a Lithuanian journal "Veidas" (Face) publishes annual ratings of best Lithuanian civil servants and public administration institutions. These ratings are based on the survey of more than 100 top managers in the Lithuanian executive. The institutional rating shows that in the period of 2005–2008 the most progressive and Europeanised institutions in Lithuania were the Bank of Lithuania, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of National Defence (see Table No. 22). Good ratings of these institutions are attributable to a number of factors (good ratings of their heads or other managers or the absence of bad publicity). However, it is not possible to judge the performance of individual institutions on the basis of this rating.

Table No. 22. Rating of best Lithuanian public administration institutions, 2005–2008

No.	*Institution*	*Number of points*				
		2005	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*Total*
1.	Bank of Lithuania	41	15	24	21	**101**
2.	Ministry of Finance	23	23	23	14	**83**
3.	Ministry of National Defence	19	19	17	18	**73**
4.	European Law Department	18	13	13	17	**61**
5.	State Tax Inspectorate	7	15	20	17	**59**
6.	State Control (National Audit Office)	9	15	15	19	**58**
7.	Ministry of Social Security and Labour	23	19	10	3	**55**
8.	Social Security Board	10	17	16	9	**52**
9.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	20	12	13	6	**51**
10.	Statistics Lithuania	16	9	5	3	**33**

Source: designed by the author on the basis of information from "Veidas": 30 June 2008, No. 26; 5 July 2007, No. 27; 6 July 2006, no. 27; 7 July 2005, No. 27.

Public trust and satisfaction

As it was mentioned in the previous sections, the quality of objective indicators is poor in Lithuania, and the assessment of international organisations can be biased. In this context it is important to let the citizens measure public trust and satisfaction with the government on the basis of subjective indicators.

The Lithuanians trust the EU (59 %) more compared with the national government (24 %), the national parliament (13 %) or the national system

of law and justice (25 %) (see Table No. 23 below). However, such low level of trust could be explained by a negative attitude of the public towards the Lithuanian political system in general.

Table No. 23. Trust in various institutions, autumn of 2007

	Lithuania			*EU 27*		
	Trust	*Do not trust*	*n.a.*	*Trust*	*Do not trust*	*n.a.*
EU	59	21	20	48	36	16
Government of Lithuania	24	69	7	34	59	7
Parliament of Lithuania	13	81	6	35	56	9
Lithuanian system of law and order	25	66	9	47	46	7

Source: The European Commission. *Eurobarometer 68: Lithuania.* 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_lt_nat.pdf .

Therefore, it is important to assess public trust in public administration institutions. According to the regular surveys of the Ministry of the Interior, overall trust in state and municipal institutions increased from 35 % in 2005 to 48 % in 2006 and to 51 % in 2007 (with the target of the Ministry of the Interior being only 38 % for 2007). This achievement was reported as a significant achievement of the Lithuanian Government in its annual performance report. Also, overall assessment of satisfaction with state and municipal institutions somewhat increased in the period of 2006–2007. 40 % of all respondents in 2007 (compared with 31 % in 2006) were fully satisfied with replies from these institutions they dealt with. However, the lack of satisfaction of some respondents can be explained not by poor quality of services, but by unfavourable administrative decisions.[25]

In Lithuania, there are a few surveys of public service quality measuring the performance of individual sectors or institutions. It is associated with the fact that only a few Lithuanian institutions apply various quality management models. One Eurobarometer survey of services of general interest in the ten EU member states illustrates that the Lithuanians, compared with the citizens of other new member states, are more satisfied with the provision of these services, but less satisfied with their price (see Table No. 24 below). However, this could be explained by higher expectations of the Lithuanians rather than higher prices of these services in Lithuania.

Table No. 24. The number of users satisfied with the provision of services of general interest and least satisfied with their price, 2005

	Lithuania		*New EU 10*	
	Provision	*Price*	*Provision*	*Price*
Electricity	88	82	89	79
Natural gas	93	75	91	73
Fixed telephony	87	77	82	75
Mobile telephony	92	63	91	63
Postal services	92	42	88	42
Local transport	79	52	76	41
Rail transport	87	47	65	39
Air transport	94	58	92	57

Source: the analysis of the author on the basis of data from the European Commission. *Special Eurobarometer: Prices and Quality of Services of General Interest*. September, 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_226_en.pdf

Results of performance audit and evaluation

Another source of performance information comes from performance audits and evaluations. In Lithuania, external audits are carried out by the State Control (the Supreme Audit Institution). The number of external performance audits has been gradually increasing: in 2006 35 such audits have been completed, 30 % of which concerned the budget programmes. However, these audits do not contain any performance rating. The only performance measure is a record of implementing audit recommendations. According to the State Control, 84 % of all its recommendations were fully or partly implemented in 2006. Nevertheless, this performance measure is not very useful.

The performance of operations, which are financed by the EU structural funds, are assessed in Lithuania on the ex-ante and interim/ongoing basis.[26] The evaluation of the EU-financed programmes is a regulatory requirement of the EU structural funds regulations. Interim evaluation of the PHARE (*Pologne et Hongrie: assistance à la restructuration des économies*) and Transition Facility assistance has been regularly conducted by one Lithuanian contractor. Ratings of this assistance point to overall performance of "good-sufficient" (3,5 points from 5) in the period of 2005–2007 (see Table No. 25 below). However, the efficiency of this assistance was scored as "sufficient" because of many management problems (such as implementation delays).

Table No. 25. Dynamics of overall performance ratings the period of 2005–2007

Date	*Relevance*	*Efficiency*	*Effectiveness*	*Impact*	*Sustainability*	*Overall*
Overall (February 2007)	Good	Good/ sufficient	Good/ sufficient	Excellent/ good	Good	**Good**
Overall (September 2006)	Good	Sufficient/ good	Sufficient/ good	Good	Good	**Good**
Overall (March 2006)	Good	Sufficient/ good	Sufficient/ good	Sufficient/ good	Sufficient/ good	**Sufficient/ good**
Overall (September 2005)	Good	Sufficient	Good/ sufficient	Good	Good/ sufficient	**Good/ sufficient**
Overall (January 2005)	Good	Sufficient/ poor	Sufficient	Sufficient/ good	Good	**Good/ sufficient**
Overall (2005–2007)	**Good**	**Sufficient**	**Good/ sufficient**	**Good**	**Good**	**Good/ sufficient**

Source: Public Policy and Management Institute. *Interim Evaluation of EU Funded Programmes*. Final report. 30 August 2007, 12. (Unpublished report)

Also, the interim evaluation of the PHARE and Transition Facility assistance in 2006 and 2007 showed more than two thirds (70,83 %) of the recommendations were fully or largely implemented, less than one quarter (22,22 %) of the recommendations were partly implemented, a small part of the recommendations (6,94 %) lost their relevance or there was no information on their status. Also, the largest number of partly implemented recommendations was in the sector of agriculture. The number of fully and partly implemented recommendations is about 93 %.[27]

Another commissioned evaluation designed an effectiveness rating of four horizontal priorities applied under the 2004–2006 Single Programming Document (SPD) in Lithuania. This rating was designed on the basis of different qualitative information (the SPD measures and their activities; the breakdown of expenditure; the number of indicators and their achievement; the declared and actual impact of the projects on horizontal priorities). Overall rating of all five priorities is only average (51,33 points from 100, see Table No. 26). Priority No. 1 of the SPD (the socio-economic infrastructure co-financed from the ERDF) contributed most to the implementation of sustainable development and regional development (a rating of 85 and 67,5 points from 100).[28]

Table No. 26. Rating of horizontal priorities according to the priorities of the 2004–2006 Single Programming Document

Horizontal priorities	*Priorities of the 2004–2006 SPD*				
	No. 1	*No. 2*	*No. 3*	*No. 4*	*No. 5*
Sustainable development	85	30	43,75	75	5
Equal opportunities	65	90	52,5	37,5	5
Information society	61,25	68,75	76,25	13,75	15
Regional development	67,5	38,75	53,75	50	2,5
Overall	**69,68 (good)**	**58,86 (average)**	**56,56 (average)**	**44,06 (average**	**27,5 (poor)**

Remark: the rank of percentiles: 0–33: poor; 34–67; average: 68–100: good.
Source: *Horizontaliųjų prioritetų įgyvendinimas įsisavinimas Europos Sąjungos struktūrinę paramą: vertinimo ataskaita.* Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerija, 2008, 229.

Conclusions and suggestions for the future research

The analysis of several performance indicators illustrates that overall performance of the Lithuanian government is only average or even poor, if compared with the EU average or such countries as Estonia and Ireland. Such performance of the Lithuanian government could be contrasted with relatively high public costs of production (16,2 % of GDP in 2006).

There is evidence that the Lithuanian government operates below the possible production frontier. The targets, which are usually achieved in the range of 125–140 %, are deliberately set low. Therefore, Lithuanian authorities should set more ambitious targets. Yet higher targets could only translate into better results for the citizens under certain conditions.

There is no single best indicator of government performance. Also, each indicator of government performance has its own limitations. The quality of (objective) monitoring information is poor in Lithuania. However, subjective assessments of international organisations can be biased owing to insufficient knowledge, whereas subjective assessments of the Lithuanian citizens are distorted by their negative attitudes towards the political system and specific monetary expectations. The same is true about the EU-level indicators: the indicator of transposition deficit is only capable of measuring legal compliance at the output level, whereas the achievement of the Lisbon targets depends on the functioning of the national economy.

Therefore, one can assess systemic performance by aggregating individual performance measures. A weighted score of performance of the Lithuanian government, which was calculated on the basis of ten important performance measures at the output and outcome levels, is 43 from 100 points (see Table No. 27 below).

Table No. 27. Score of government performance in Lithuania, 2006–2007

No.	*Measure of performance*	*Lithuania's record (poor, average, good)*	*Weight (in %)*	*Score*	*Dynamics since 2004 (negative, stable, positive)*
1.	Targets of the EU Lisbon strategy	Poor	10	2	Positive
2.	Government effectiveness	Average-poor	10	3,5	Stable
3.	Sectoral indicators of health care/education	Poor	10	2	Stable
4.	Public trust and satisfaction	Average	10	5	Positive
5.	Regulatory quality	Average	10	5	Stable
6.	Transposition deficit of the EU directives	Good	10	10	Stable
7.	Availability of basic services online	Poor	10	2	Negative
8.	Implementation of government commitments	Average	10	5	NA
9.	Absorption of the EU structural funds	Poor-average	10	3,5	Negative
10.	Fiscal deficit	Average	10	5	Negative
		Total:	**100**	**43**	

Remark: individual scores were calculated according Lithuania's record compared to the EU average or a group of similar countries. Scoring was as follows: poor performance – 2 points, average performance – 5 points, good performance – 10 points.
Source: prepared by the author.

Since 2004 the dynamics of two main performance indicators (targets of the Lisbon strategy and public trust, see Table No. 27 above) has been positive. A particularly positive development is the fact that public trust in public administration institutions and public satisfaction with them increased considerably in the period of 2005–2007. However, since this period the dynamics of three indicators has been negative (availability of services online, absorption of the EU structural funds as well as fiscal deficit). The last indicator is particularly worrying because of a high likelihood of underperforming in 2008 and 2009.

It is clear that growing government expenditure since 2004 (by 65 % in the period of 2004–2007) was not matched by improved performance of government. Therefore, one can argue that overall efficiency of the government could have even decreased over recent years.

Overall effectiveness of public administration was expressed in subjective terms by relating public expenditure to subjective quality. It is interesting that the lowest spending countries perform in general at a lower level and the highest spending countries – at a higher level.[29] However, there is a weak statistical relationship between government expenditure and subjective performance. It would be interesting to analyse this relationship in Lithuania, but this requires the availability of additional data.

The Lithuanian Government should accord higher priority to efficiency and effectiveness of government performance not only because of a mismatch between government performance and its expenditure. The Lithuanian authorities are planning to achieve a balanced budget in 2009. One of the main sectors, where there is a clear need for greater efficiency and effectiveness, is education. Despite a significant share of government expenditure and the high number of public employees in this sector, performance results are only poor (especially at the level of higher education). The same problem of inefficiency is acute in the sector of health care. However, recent decisions of the Lithuanian Government to increase the compensation of employees in the sectors and education and culture will further increase government expenditure.

Therefore, there is a need to undertake necessary institutional reforms and cut staff in the public sector. The OECD analysis based on the evidence collected in the sectors of education and health points that efficiency gains could be obtained by increasing the scale of operations.[30] Also, another paper argued that efficiency in the sector of education could be promoted by adopting an output orientation (as opposed to an input orientation) through institutional reforms that focus incentives on performance.[31] Although the sectors of both education and health have rather wide networks of service providers in Lithuania, there has been little institutional optimisation. Such optimisation should lead to the reduction of staff in the public sector.

Another way of increasing efficiency in the public sector is through competition. However, the involvement of the private sector in the provision of the public services is rather small in Lithuania. One Lithuanian think-tank argued

for making conditions for private providers of health services more favourable and legalising additional payments for the existing services.[32] Efforts to launch public-private partnerships in a few hospitals have been unsuccessful.

Also, the government could make its intermediate consumption more efficient. This could be achieved through better public procurement of goods and services. Also, it could be possible to change a mix of intermediate consumption and the compensation of employees in the public mode of production. For instance, servicing public cars, catering or utility services, which are still provided by several public administration institutions in Lithuania, should be outsourced to the private sector.

Input-output analysis of systemic performance in the public sector has certain limitations outlined in the introduction. Therefore, it is important to study the processes through which public sector inputs are translated into public sector outputs. The main drivers of institutional efficiency include budget practices, performance management arrangements, human resource management practices, e-government practices, etc.[33]

One assessment of performance management arrangements in Lithuania found that despite plentiful performance information, its quality is poor is its use in the decision-making is limited.[34] One survey found that the main negative motivating factors in the Lithuanian civil service are as follows: poor leadership (54 % of all respondents agreeing), inadequate remuneration (53 %) and too large "red-tape" (46 %).[35] It shows that in addition to the remuneration, other non-financial factors are important for the Lithuanian civil servants.

Quality management, which is another driver of institutional efficiency, has been adopted only a few Lithuanian institutions. The Common Assessment Framework (CAF), whose implementation has a recommendatory status in Lithuania, is fully applied only in five institutions, according to the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior.[36] Therefore, compared with other countries Lithuania has only initial experience with the CAF.

Also, it would be interesting to study the areas of good government performance in Lithuania. According to the Lithuanian Government, the good record of transposition is attributable to "a sufficiently rigid and detailed description of procedures, clear distribution of responsibility among institutions as well as a rational and flexible mechanism of solving emerging problems"[37]. It illustrates that an institutional set-up and actual processes can determine good performance.

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FLEXICURITY: WILL THE EUROPEAN MEDICINE HEAL THE LITHUANIAN LABOUR MARKET?

Žilvinas Martinaitis

Abstract. Over the past few years the EU Commission has widely promoted the flexicurity strategy, which the Member States should adopt during the reforms of their labour markets. This paper seeks to provide a critical assessment of the potential merits of adopting the strategy in Lithuania. The main findings are twofold. First, the paper found that the hypothesis behind the flexicurity strategy lack solid theoretical and empirical support, which implies that the widely promoted benefits of the strategy might fail to realise. Second, the paper argues that the labour market policy in Lithuania faces a number of country – specific challenges, which were inherited from more than a decade long economic and political transition. Hence, instead of attempting "copy-pasting" the reforms advocated by the EU Commission, the Lithuanian policy makers should put the institutional capacity building and increasing effectiveness of adopted policies at the top of the list of priorities.

Introduction

The European Commission strongly advocates that the Member States (MS) should reform their labour market policies by adopting the flexicurity strategy. It is argued that increasing competitiveness in the global economy and sustaining the European Social Model "<…> requires policies that address simultaneously the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour relations, and security – employment security and social security"[1]. Hence, flexicurity is an attempt to reconcile two apparently contradictory interests: the employer's plea for more flexibility and less regulation on the one hand, and the employees' requests for more security in the rapidly changing labour markets, on the other hand. The Commission argues that such reconciliation is not only possible, but also desirable – adoption of flexicurity strategy should bring more and better jobs[2].

Implementation of the flexicurity strategy in Lithuania would require considerable financial, human and administrative resources. Hence, the main question of this paper: is it worth adopting the flexicurity approach in reforming labour market policy in Lithuania? The answer to this question should contribute to the academic and policy making discussions in two specific areas. The first debate relates to our knowledge about the impact of labour market reforms on the labour market performance: are there any labour market policies, which universally deliver better performance in all labour markets, irrespective of specific context of each country? The literature provides three contradicting answers. The neoliberal authors (most vocally represented by the IMF[3] and the OECD[4]) argue that liberalisation of labour market regulation and clamp down on unemployment benefits will reduce unemployment. The EU Commission, argues that while country – specific context matters the liberalisation of labour market regulation and high level of unemployment protection (contrary to the neoliberal position) will reduce unemployment and increase employment. Lastly, another group of authors[5] argue that the impact of any labour market policy highly depends on pre-existing labour market institutions. This paper (after an extensive meta-analysis of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence) argues that *a priori* there are no universal policy-mixes delivering good employment outcomes across a wide range of different countries. The practical implication of this argument is that the widely promoted benefits of the flexicurity strategy are not supported by solid theoretical and empirical research.

The second debate focuses on the sequencing of reforms. Should the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) attempt to strengthen their current institutional model in order to form a strong base for further reform? Or should the CEEC attempt to solve the problems associated with the current model by changing the whole system altogether and copying the newest innovations of the West[6]? This paper supports the historical institutionalist argument by emphasising weak Lithuanian labour market institutions, associated with the specific transition path from planned to market economy. It is argued that Lithuanian policy makers need to strengthen existing labour market institutions before engaging in excessive "copy-pasting" of the reforms advocated by the EU.

The main argument of the paper is developed in three sections. The first one introduces the flexicurity strategy within the context of debates regarding the labour market policy. The second section seeks to assess the evidence behind

the widely promoted benefits of the flexicurity strategy. A re-examination of theoretical arguments and empirical research leads to a conclusion that the hypothesis behind the flexicurity strategy is not based on clear – cut theoretical research and hard evidence. The third section looks at the strengths and weaknesses of Lithuanian labour market policy. The main finding is that most of the problems are inherited from the decade of economic and political transition.

1. Flexicurity: attempts to balance flexibility and security

In theory, there would be no need for labour market policy, if there were no market failures, which pre-empted efficient allocation of resources by the invisible hand[7]. However, it is generally agreed[8] that there are three main market failures, which a labour market policy should tackle: unequal market power of employees and employers, imperfect information and lack of unemployment insurance markets. In order to correct these market failures, labour market policy regulates the negotiations between employers and employees, defines the minimum wage, provides assistance to the unemployed, etc. (see figure 1). While there is a consensus regarding the necessity of these policy instruments, it is not agreed how extensively they should be used: how strictly should the state regulate the labour market, what is the optimal level of unemployment benefits, etc.?

Figure 1. The logic of intervention in the labour market.



Source: compiled by the author.

Neoliberal authors[9] argue that extensive intervention into the labour market increases the security and wellbeing of employees, but it reduces the flexibility of the labour market, which leads to higher unemployment and lower employment levels. For instance, it is widely argued that in the 90s high unemployment benefits and strict labour market regulation in the EU lead to high unemployment, whereas liberal labour market policy in the USA lead to substantially lower levels of unemployment. On the other hand, the advocates[10] of the flexicurity model argue that it is possible to avoid the trade-off between labour market flexibility and security of the employed. Hence, it was not the lack of outright liberalisation, but rather an inappropriate balance between flexibility and security (and other factors[11]), which caused high unemployment in the EU in the 90s.

The flexicurity strategy is best understood, when examining the ways to achieve labour market flexibility and security of the employed. The flexibility denotes the following diverse labour market outcomes[12]:

- Numerical flexibility refers to the ease of hiring and firing employees. It is determined by the strictness of employment protection legislation: what are the conditions for firing the employees, what is the level of compensation in case of involuntary firing, how difficult is it to hire temporary or atypical workers, etc.?
- Functional flexibility refers to the capacity to allocate new types of functions and tasks to the employees. It is determined by the capacity to up-train and re-train present employees. Functional flexibility is largely a substitute for numerical flexibility. When a company radically changes the type of goods and services it provides, it has two main options: fire current employees and hire the ones with qualifications necessary to produce new type of goods and services (numerical flexibility) or the company could re-train its current workers to acquire necessary new qualifications (functional flexibility).
- Wage flexibility refers to the capacity to change the wage levels during economic upswings or downturns. Minimum wage is the main policy instrument, which has an impact on the degree of wage flexibility.
- Temporal flexibility refers to the potential to organise work in shifts, hire seasonal or part-time workers.

The security of the employed also denotes several rather different outcomes[13]:

- Job security refers to the probability of maintaining the same job with the same employer. It is regulated by the employment protection legislation (*inter alia* regulating conditions for dismissals) and is the mirror image of numerical flexibility: the easier it is to hire and fire employees (numerical flexibility) the lower the job security.
- Employment security refers to the probability of remaining in the labour market, but not necessarily at the same employer. In other words, the higher the employment security, the lower are the chances of becoming long term unemployed or dropping out of the labour market altogether. Active labour market policies (ALMPs), which include job brokering, labour market training, etc., are the main labour market policy instruments aimed at increasing employment security.
- Income security refers to the probability of maintaining certain level of income irrespective of the status in the labour market. Setting of minimum wage and ensuring implementation of collective work agreements are the main policy instruments for income security for the employed. Furthermore, unemployment benefits are the main policy instruments for insuring income security for the unemployed. Income security is incompatible with wage flexibility.

The flexicurity strategy is based[14] on the combination of numerical flexibility and temporal flexibility with employment security and income security (for the unemployed in particular)[15]. The underling idea of the strategy is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to liberalise regulation of hiring and firing of workers and regulation of work organisation. This should facilitate companies' flexibility and higher capacities to respond to fast technological changes and dynamics in the products and services markets. On the other hand, the strategy aims to compensate lower job security by increasing employment security and income security for the unemployed. Generous unemployment benefits should provide safety-net while extensive and intensive ALMPs should increase employability and adaptability of workers, who have (temporarily) lost their jobs due to higher numerical flexibility. Ideally implementation of flexicurity strategy should lead to a number of beneficial policy outcomes, including higher competitiveness, social cohesion and inclusion, etc. However, in terms of labour market out-

comes, the two main objectives are: higher employment rates and lower levels of unemployment.

The above discussion implies that flexicurity strategy rests on the following causal hypotheses:

1. Liberalisation of employment protection legislation (EPL) and more liberal regulation of work organisation (independent variables) facilitates adaptability of companies and increases their competitiveness (intervening variables), which in the long term lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels (dependent variables).
2. Effective and extensive ALMPs (independent variable) increase adaptability of workers (intervening variable) and lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels (dependent variables);
3. Generous unemployment benefits (independent variable) facilitate better job matching and in combination with ALMPs increase adaptability of workers (intervening variables), which lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels (dependent variables);
4. Implementation of all of these elements together (independent variable) create complementarities and increase their positive impact on the labour market (dependent variable).

The next section seeks to examine, whether there is strong theoretical and empirical support for these hypotheses. The theoretical feasibility of the hypotheses is tested by immersing into ongoing academic discussion regarding the positive and negative impacts of the independent variables. Furthermore, meta-analysis of previous empirical research (focusing on the performance of the labour markets in the OECD countries during the second half of the 20th century) should indicate, whether the hypotheses have strong empirical support.

2. Do the flexicurity measures lead towards superior labour market outcomes?

The *first hypothesis* argues that liberalisation of EPL and more liberal regulation of work organisation (independent variables) in the long term lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels (dependent variables). We can not test the impact of liberal regulation of work, because it is largely under theorised and under researched. However, we can test the impact of

liberalisation of EPL on the levels of unemployment and employment. This hypothesis rests on two main theoretical arguments. The first one is in line with the idea of Schumpeterian creative destruction[16]: globalisation, fast technological developments and other factors create an imperative for companies to adapt to the changing situation in the markets. Hence, the countries which facilitate fast adaptation of the companies should become more competitive. This in the long run should lead towards more and better jobs[17]. The second argument in favour of the hypothesis: if there is restrictive EPL, the companies are overly cautious regarding hiring new employees during economic upswings, because they are aware that during economic downturns they will face high costs of firing. Hence, restrictive EPL should lead to higher unemployment in the long term[18].

On the other hand, the sceptics provide counterarguments indicating that restrictive (not liberal) EPL should lead to lower unemployment and higher employment. *First*, restrictive EPL (high firing costs) perpetuates cooperation between employees and employers and encourages investment in up-training and retraining of the employees[19]. Higher investments in workforce training contribute to productivity growth and in combination with functional flexibility increases adaptability. Hence, in contrast to the hypothesis, restrictive EPL lead to higher competitiveness of the companies, lower unemployment and higher employment[20]. *Second*, the sceptics agree that restrictive EPL reduces incentives for hiring during economic upswings, but it also has direct effect on lower rates of unemployment during downturns, because restrictive EPL imposes costs on lay offs. Hence, restrictive EPL could work both ways: reduce incentives for hiring and reduce incentives for firing[21].

The above outlined theoretical discussion indicates that the outcomes of liberalisation of EPL are debatable: it is not clear, whether liberalisation will lead to lower unemployment and higher employment. What does empirical research tell us in this regard? A vast number of studies used econometric modelling and regression analysis in order to verify, whether liberal EPL lead to lower unemployment in OECD countries in the second half of the 20th century. IMF[22] and Stefano Scarpetta[23] found that there is a weak relationship between these variables. Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers[24] model indicates that restrictive EPL does not cause higher unemployment or lower employment, but has negative impact on the countries' capacities to absorb

external shocks. Stephen Nickell, Luca Nunziata, Wolfgang Ochel[25] and Gosta Esping-Andersen[26] found that strict (or liberal) EPL does not have any impact on aggregate unemployment levels, but determines what social groups are more likely to be unemployed. Furthermore, Carsten Ochen[27] found that there is a U-shaped relationship between the variables: very restrictive and very liberal EPL correlates with low unemployment and high employment. However, a vast majority of studies (see: Andrea Bassanini and Romain Duval[28], OECD[29], the EU Commission[30], Julian Morgan and Annabelle Mourougane[31], Michele Belot and Jan C. van Ours[32], Stephen Nickell[33], Joseph Gilles, Olivier Pierrard and Henri R. Sneessens[34], Sandrine Cazes and Alena Nesporova[35] and Dean Baker *et. al.*[36]) found that there is no relationship between strict (or liberal) EPL and the levels of employment and unemployment. Hence, only few studies found a weak relationship and majority of studies found no empirical relationship between strictness of EPL and the levels of unemployment and employment. The main implication is that the first flexicurity hypothesis has neither empirical nor theoretical support: it is far from evident that liberalisation in the EPL will lead to lower levels of unemployment or higher levels of employment.

The *second flexicurity hypothesis* argues that effective and extensive ALMP increase adaptability of workers and lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels. This hypothesis is based on several interrelated arguments. *First*, labour market training, job brokering services, subsidised employment and other ALMP measures increase employability of the temporary unemployed persons and act as a safety net preventing from dropping out of the labour market[37]. *Second*, ALMP (and labour market training in particular) facilitates adaptation of the unemployed to the changing labour market demand and increases the quality of the competences of the labour force, which fosters labour market flexibility and enhances productivity[38]. *Third*, implementation of ALPMP reduces the potentially negative impact of the unemployment benefits on the incentives to seek for work, because payment of the benefits is usually conditional upon participation in the ALMP.

On the other hand, the sceptics argue that extensive ALMPs could have a negative impact on the levels of unemployment. Extensive ALMPs could create a spinning – doors effect: the unemployed migrate between passive unemployment, participation in labour market training, subsidised employment, public works and other ALPM measures, but have no incentives to escape

this circle and find a permanent job[39]. Furthermore, extensive ALMPs could cause two negative side effects[40]. On the one hand, the unemployed could have been employed without the help of ALMP (subsidies, training, etc.), which causes the deadweight effect. On the other hand, the ALMP measures distort hiring incentives, when subsidies and other measures encourage hiring of participants of the ALMP and discriminate against non-participants (the substitution effect).

The above discussed theoretical arguments largely support the second flexicurity hypothesis, but warn against negative side effects and indicate several risks, which could dampen the effect of ALMP on the levels of unemployment and employment. What does the empirical research tell us about the relationships between EMPL and the dependent variables? A vast majority of studies argue that extensive ALMP (ceteris paribus) does lead to lower unemployment and higher employment levels and reduces the negative impact of unemployment benefits (see: the European Commission[41], Auer[42], Cazes, Nesporova[43], Nickell[44], OECD[45], Bassanini and Duval[46]). However, according to John P. Martin[47] (based on the analysis of OECD countries) and Lars Calmfors, Anders Foslund, Maria Menstron[48] (based on the Swedish case study) not all ALMPs have positive effects on unemployment and employment. Job brokering and labour market training have the biggest positive effect, while the public works and subsidised employment have the biggest negative effect. Hence, it seems that the second flexicurity hypothesis is correct: extensive implementation of ALMP does lead to higher employment and lower unemployment levels. However, the benefits of ALMP appear only when the preconditions for effective implementation are met: there is a right mix of policies and the turning – doors, deadweight and substitution effects are avoided. This implies that extensiveness of active labour market policies is a necessary, but not sufficient precondition for increasing the levels of employment and decreasing unemployment.

The *third flexicurity hypothesis* argues that generous unemployment benefits lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels. This hypothesis is based on the following logic: unemployment causes a loss of regular income, which creates strong incentives for finding a new job as soon as possible. However, in addition to reducing time spent in unemployment it is also the quality of the job that matters in the long perspective. Hence, generous unemployment benefits rely on two mechanisms for reducing unemploy-

ment. First, benefits create incentives for not taking up the first available job, but looking as long as it takes to find a job matching the qualifications of the unemployed person. This mechanism should prevent persons with high, but narrowly specialised competences from taking up low paid, low skilled jobs. Second, generous unemployment benefits should create incentives for the unemployed for upgrading current competences or gaining new competences, if the current ones are not in demand (because of changes in technology, product markets, etc.). Therefore, generous unemployment benefits act as a safety net for the unemployed and, more importantly, increases the chances that the persons who found a job will not become unemployed in the near future[49].

On the other hand, the sceptics argue that (contrary to the hypothesis) generous unemployment benefits should increase unemployment. They provide two main arguments. First, generous unemployment benefits reduce the incentives for looking for a job, which leads to long term unemployment[50] (the supporters of the flexicurity hypothesis provide a counter argument: it is the duration, but not the level of benefits, which reduces the job seeking incentives[51]). Second, generous unemployment benefits substantially increases the negotiating power of the employees over the wage level[52]. This leads to high wage level, which does not reflect the productivity levels and the demand and supply for labour. This, in turn, forces out of the labour market the low skilled employees (whose productivity level does not match the negotiated wage levels) and contributes to higher levels of long term unemployment[53].

Once again the theoretical discussion does not provide any definite answer regarding the validity of the third flexicurity hypothesis. The empirical research (focused on OECD countries in the second half of the 20th century) does not find evidence that generous unemployment benefits lead to lower levels of unemployment and higher levels of employment. The IMF[54], Stefano Scarpetta[55], Michele Belot ir Jan C. van Ours[56] and OECD[57] argue that the relationship is the opposite than hypostasised: generous benefits lead to higher (not lower) levels of unemployment. Similarly Stephen Nickell, Luca Nunziata and Wolfgang Ochel[58] and Andrea Bassanini and Romain Duval[59] claim that the level of benefits in combination with their duration have direct impact on higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of employment. However, Peter Auer[60] and Gosta Esping-Andersen[61] claim that it is the duration, but not the level of benefits, which causes unemployment. The EU Commission[62]

and Stephen Nickell[63] argue that duration and level of the benefits does have a substantial impact on unemployment, but this could be mitigated by effective management of benefits and extensive implementation of ALMP. Finally, Dean Baker *et. al.*[64], Gilles Joseph, Olivier Pierrard and Henri R. Sneessens[65] and Julian Morgan, Annabelle Mourougane[66] did not find any relationship between the level of benefits and the level of unemployment. To summarise: while the empirical research provides diverse conclusions, not a single available paper found that generous unemployment benefits tend to reduce the levels of unemployment and increase employment. Hence, the third flexicurity hypothesis does not have any empirical support.

The *fourth flexicurity hypothesis* argues that implementation of all of the flexicurity elements (deregulation of the labour market, extensive ALMP, generous unemployment benefits) together create complementarities and increase their positive impact on the labour market. There is in fact a vast literature, which argues that the impact of a policy change largely depends on the extent to which the new policies are complementary to other policies and other initial conditions[67]. However, it is difficult to test the fourth hypothesis by assessing the complementarities between the above mentioned three elements of the flexicurity strategy. The difficulties are associated with the fact that only two countries – Denmark and the Netherlands – have adopted all three elements. Furthermore, despite the similarities, the labour market policies in these two countries differ substantially, which leads some authors to talk about the Danish and the Dutch flexicurity approach[68]. In addition, the labour market policies in Denmark and the Netherlands developed historically, as response to specific challenges, rather than being part of a clearly defined strategy of change. Therefore, it is premature to argue that the complementarity of the three flexicurity elements leads to superior labour market outcomes. It might as well be the case that the complementarities between flexicurity elements and other (under researched) country specific institutions and policies established in the Netherlands and Denmark, which lead to superior labour market policies. If this is correct, then the success of flexicurity strategy in the Netherlands and Denmark is not easily replicable: complementarities should exist not only between the three flexicurity elements, but also between flexicurity strategy and country-specific institutions.

To sum-up, what have we found in this chapter? The four key hypotheses behind the flexicurity strategy were put to test and the results show that:

- There are strong theoretical arguments in favour and against the first flexicurity hypothesis. Furthermore, meta-analysis of empirical tests does not provide support to the argument that liberalisation in employment protection legislation leads to higher employment and lower unemployment. Hence, the first hypothesis is not confirmed. However, further interpretations of these findings diverge. On the one hand, one could argue that that the strictness of EPL has no substantial impact on the levels of employment and unemployement, hence liberalisation of EPL is irrelevant. On the other hand, the findings could be interpreted differently: the impact of strict (or liberal) EPL depends on country-specific institutions. Since these institutions vary across cases, large n-studies did not indicate any clear-cut relationship.
- Overall, extensiveness of active labour market policies does have positive effect on the levels of employment and dampens the levels of unemployment. However, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings indicate that ALMP has positive effects only when the preconditions for effective implementation are met: there is a right mix of policies and the spinning – doors, deadweight and substitution effects are avoided.
- The third flexicurity hypothesis – generous unemployment benefits lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment levels – has neither strong theoretical base, nor empirical support. In fact, none of the reviewed empirical studies found that increase in unemployment benefits lead towards higher employment and lower unemployment benefits.
- Due to small number of countries, which adopted the flexicurity strategy, the paper was not able to assess the fourth hypothesis arguing that there is complementarity between all elements of flexicurity strategy.

These findings show that there is a lack of theoretical and empirical support behind the flexicurity strategy. It does not imply that adoption of flexicurity measures will do more harm than good. Instead, the findings indicate that we do not *a priori* know what the potential impacts of flexicurity strategy are. Available evidence suggests that the impact most likely depends on country specific institutions. Hence, there are no universal policy-mixes (including the

flexicurity strategy), which deliver good employment outcomes across a wide range of countries. Instead of devising universal solutions, more attention needs to be paid towards country specific problems and the extent to which established labour market institutions are appropriate for transforming weaknesses into strengths. Having this in mind, the next chapter assesses Lithuanian labour market institutions.

3. Labour market institutions in Lithuania

The last chapter concluded that while there are no universal prescriptions for healing labour markets in a wide range of countries. The institution-specific context of each country matters. Hence, this chapter focuses on labour market institutions in Lithuania: what are their strengths and weaknesses and what reforms are the most urgent? The answer to this question should also illuminate debates on the labour market reforms in Latvia and Estonia due to several reasons. First, the main contextual factor in all three countries is the transition from the command economy to the liberal market economy. Second, during more than a decade of transition all three countries adopted largely similar reform packages, which lead some authors[69] to classify the Baltic States as post socialist liberal countries (see Figure 2).

This chapter focuses on the following Lithuanian labour market institutions: employment protection regulation, unemployment protection and effectiveness of the ALMP. The main finding of this chapter is that the labour market institutions remain weak because of insufficiently effective implementation of adopted policies. This implies that radical changes in the direction of labour market policy (for instance, adoption of the flexicurity strategy) are unlikely to be implemented in practice. Furthermore, low implementation capacity implies that policy makers should focus on strengthening of institutional implementation capacities.

3.1. Strict employment protection legislation and unregulated labour market

Transition from planned to market economy posed two challenges in the area of EPL. First, which employment protection legislation model should be adopted? Second, how the EPL should be implemented? The response to the

Figure 2. Employment regimes in Europe.



Adopted from: Erzsébet Bukodi, Péter Róbert, *Occupational mobility in Europe*, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, 2007, 8.

first challenge was faster and easier than tackling the second one. Lithuania (as well as Latvia and Estonia) largely copied the labour codes from continental European countries[70]. Therefore, in comparison with the OECD average the EPL in Lithuania is relatively strict (see Table 1). This is revealed by two main indices. The World Bank rigidity of employment index[71] is based on the opinions of lawyers and civil servants of involved countries regarding the regulation of working time as well as formal restrictions on hiring and firing of workers. The OECD employment protection legislation index assess legislation in order to compare the costs and difficulties imposed on employers in: a) firing workers with permanent contracts; b) firing and hiring of temporary workers; c) executing mass lay-offs[72]. Both indices (despite their methodological differences) imply that the regulation of hiring and firing workers in Lithuania is relative strict.

On the other hand, despite *de jure* strict labour market regulation, *de facto* the labour market is relatively flexible. This is indicated by several factors. First, strong external negative aggregate demand shocks have strong impact on

Table 1. The strictness of Employment protection legislation

	The World Bank Rigidity of employment index (the higher the number the more rigid the EPL)	*OECD employment protection legislation index (the higher the number, the stricter the ELP).*
Lithuania	**48**	**2,8 a (2,6 b)**
Latvia	53	(2,5 b)
Estonia	56	2,3a. (2,8 b)
Poland	37	2,1
Denmark	10	1,8
Germany	44	2,5
Sweden	39	2,6
United Kingdom	7	1,1
USA	0	0,7
OECD average	30,8	2,15

Sources: rigidity of employment index:: The World Bank, *Doing Business 2008*, Washington, D. C., 2007. OECD EPL strictness index is provided in: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Employment Outlook*, Paris, 2004 51 – 68. The sources for OECD EPL stricteness index for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia: a) Sandrine Cazes, Alena Nesporova, „Labour Markets in Central and South – Eastern Europe: from Transition to Stabilization", in eds Sandrine Cazes, Alena Nesporova., *Flexicurity: a Relevant Approach in Central and Eastern Europe*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2007, 37. b): Jaan Masso, Raul Eamets, „Macro – level Labour Market Flexibility in the Baltic States", in Tiiu Paas, Raul Eamets, *Labour Market Flexibility, Flexicurity and Employment: Lessons of the Baltic States*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006, 104.

the levels of unemployment[73]. This is paradoxical because strict EPL should dampen the impact of external shocks on the levels of unemployment. Second, strict EPL should act as a safeguard against dismissals, but in 2003 in Lithuania 32 % of surveyed employees reported that they could loose their job within next 6 months (the EU-25 average was 9,1 %)[74]. All of this in combination with anecdotal evidence[75] suggests that in practice a substantial proportion of employment relations are not covered by the rigid EPL.

The gap between *de jure* rigid and *de facto* flexible labour market could be explained by low levels of implementation of the labour law[76]. The State Labour Inspectorate inspected around 19 % of Lithuanian enterprises annually and in 57 % of the enterprises found on average 3 violations of labour relations regulation between 2000 and 2006[77]. This data only includes violations related to employment contracts: undated signed requests for dismissal, payment of 'unofficial' salaries (in order to avoid income and social security taxes), absence

of the employment contracts altogether, etc. Furthermore, surveys carried out in 1998 and 2002 found that respectively 17 and 14 % of the surveyed employees were forced to sign additional documents (for instance, undated requests for dismissal) as a condition for employment[78]. It is highly likely that the proportion of the abuses has substantially decreased since 2004, but that was a result of fast economic growth, high levels of emigration and resultant lack of labour, rather than changes in the EPL or its implementation capacity.

To sum up, the data indicates that *de jure* regulation is strict, but in fact the labour market is relatively flexible in Lithuania. Low implementation capacity and outright violations of law implied that large proportion of employment relations were not covered by the EPL. This lead to a low level equilibrium. On the one hand, strict regulation imposed relative high costs on the law abiding employers. On the other hand, low levels of implementation of EPL meant that substantial proportion of the employed had virtually no job security and bore all the costs of extreme labour market flexibility. The situation improved between 2004 and 2008: lack of labour power increased the bargaining power of employees who requested that the employment relations should be legalised. However, this problem could bounce back if the levels of unemployment increased. Furthermore, if the regulation implementation capacity was to remain weak, further debates on radical change in labour market regulation seem pointless: it is doubtful that the new policies could be implemented and therefore could make any difference in practice.

3.2. Employment and income security in Lithuania

In the communist times there was virtually no unemployment, hence there was no need for a system of unemployment insurance and active labour market policy. This implies that during early transition these labour market institutions had to be built from scratch. Creation of passive (mostly unemployment benefits) and active labour market policies (ALMP) faced dual challenges during early transition (1990 – 1995). On the one hand, economic restructuring created considerable levels of unemployment virtually overnight. On the other hand, establishment of ALMPs and unemployment insurance was impeded by output collapse, which created substantial fiscal tensions. Hence, the active and passive labour market policies were characterised by limited coverage of the population and small scale of the interventions. As this chapter argues,

Figure 3. Proportion of the unemployed who registered at the Lithuanian labour exchange

Source: Eurostat, 2008

these two characteristics remained of utmost importance in Lithuania, despite positive trends in the last several years.

At the macro level, the main indicator of coverage is the proportion of the unemployed who have registered at the Lithuanian labour exchange. If the unemployed do not register, they are eligible neither for the unemployment benefits, nor for the labour market training and other ALMP measures. Between 1998 and 2006 on average 60 % of the unemployed registered at the Lithuanian labour exchange annually (see Figure 3). This implies that 40 % of the unemployed did not consider that passive and active labour market policies were relevant and as a result almost half of the unemployed were *a priori* excluded from any kind of assistance.

Are the labour market policies effective in providing employment security and income security? Initially, let's consider the effectiveness of passive labour market policies in ensuring income security. The *first* indicator in answering this question is the proportion of all registered unemployed, who are subject to unemployment insurance benefits. As Figure 4 indicates, less than 50 % of the registered unemployed (who compose around 60 % of all unemployed) received unemployment benefits until 2005. After the new Law on the Unemployment Social Insurance was adopted in 2005, the proportion of unemployed eligible for the unemployment benefits has substantially increased. The *second* indicator

Figure 4. Income security.



Source: own calculations based on the data provided by Lithuanian labour exchange, 2008.

for measuring effectiveness of unemployment benefits in providing income security relates to the size of the benefits. As Figure 4 indicates, the size of benefits substantially increased since 2005 and in 2007 on average amounted to 463 litas (around 134 eur.). However, from a longer perspective, over the last 10 years the average unemployment benefit was equal to 51 % of the minimal wage and 32 % of the net average wage. The low level of benefits are also illustrated by the comparison with the EU: in 2005 (the latest available statistics) Lithuania spent 0,1 % of its GDP on passive labour market policies, while the EU – 25 spent 1,3 % of GDP[79]. Hence, despite the positive trends over the last few years, the unemployment benefits (due to their limited coverage and size) did not substantially contribute to income security of the unemployed.

Several indicators are useful in estimating the effectiveness of ALMP in providing employment security. The *first* indicator measures the extent to which ALMP contributed towards employability of the unemployed. Figure 5 indicates what proportion of the registered unemployed was employed within one year. Since 1992 the employability has substantially increased. However, it is quite evident that improvement in macroeconomic situation has substantially contributed to the growth of employability of the unemployed. Hence, the *second*

Figure 5. Relative success in employing the unemployed and the dynamics of GDP



Source: own calculations based on the data provided by Statistics Lithuania and Lithuanian labour exchange

indicator seeks to directly measure the employment success of the participants of the ALMP measures. In total 27 % of the participants of ALMP measures were employed. In addition, around 70 % of the unemployed registered at the Lithuanian labour exchange are the re-registered unemployed. This indicates that the ALMP has created a spinning doors effect: substantial proportion of the unemployed migrate between passive unemployment, participation in labour market training, subsidised employment, public works and other ALPM measures, but could not escape this circle and find a permanent job. Hence, the data show that the ALMP is not effective in providing employment security.

What explains low level of effectiveness of the ALMP? On the one hand, one should take into account that ALMP is targeted towards those groups of unemployed, who face severe problems in the labour market: the long term unemployed, disabled, etc. On the other hand, it seems that there is a shortage of institutional capacity among the providers of ALMP services and the quality of services is not very high on the list of priorities. For instance, the Labour market exchange purchases labour market training services from the market and the main criteria for assessing the competing bids is the lowest

price. In response to such public procurement procedure, the vocational schools and Labour market training centres (which usually provide competing bids) have the incentives to cut the costs of training by sacrificing quality. Hence, emphasis on the price of labour market training services creates incentives for race to the bottom in terms of the lowest price and potentially lowest quality. Furthermore, low effectiveness of ALMP could be explained by the inadequate choice of specific ALMP measures. As Table 2 indicates, public works is a single biggest measure in terms of the number of participants, but it is also the least effective one. The labour market training (despite potentially low quality discussed above) is the most effective measure, but it is also the smallest one in terms of participants. Hence, in line with the best international practice, more participants of ALMP should be directed towards labour market training and the number of participants in public works should be substantially reduced.

Table 2. Effectiveness of active labour market policies

Measure	*The monitoring data provided by Lithuanian Labour exchange*		*Data provided by the Institute of Labour and Social Research*
	The total number of unemployed who were involved in the measure (from 2006 08 01 until 2007 08 01)	*Percentage of participants, who were subsequently employed*	*Percentage of participants, who were subsequently employed*
Subsidised employment	1752	43,2	71
Labour market training	1149	72,8	77
Public works	26739	24,0	26
Work rotation	73	61,6	No data

Source: Darbo ir socialinių tyrimų institutas, *Aktyvios darbo rinkos politikos priemonių efektyvumo tyrimas, IV-ojo mokslinio tyrimo etapo ataskaita*, Vilnius, 2007, 24 – 28.

To sum up, active and passive labour market policies are not effective in providing employment and income security. While the situation has somewhat improved over the past few years, effectiveness is hindered by limited coverage and scale of the policies. This could be explained by lack of funding and low institutional capacity to implement the policies effectively and efficiently. The impact of low effectiveness is well summarised by Gruževskis and Blažienė:

„It is clear that the services and policies provided by the employment service play only a secondary role in terms of employment promotion and security in Lithuania."[80]

Conclusions

This paper sought to assess, whether it is worth adopting the flexicurity approach in reforming labour market policy in Lithuania? The paper argued that it is doubtful that the widely promoted benefits of flexicurity strategy will materialise, because most of the hypothesis behind the flexicurity strategy lack clear-cut theoretical support and empirical base. Furthermore, the labour market policy in Lithuania faces a number of country – specific challenges, which were inherited from more than a decade long economic and political transition. Hence, instead of attempting "copy-pasting" the reforms advocated by the EU Commission, the Lithuanian policy makers should put the institutional capacity building and increasing effectiveness of adopted policies at the top of the list of priorities.

The findings presented in this paper have several theoretical and practical implications. First, the flexicurity strategy does not provide a universal labour market reform road map. While one could argue about the specific strengths and weaknesses of the strategy, it is seems that the problem is more general: research conducted so far does not show that there are any labour market policies, which universally deliver better performance in all labour markets, irrespective of specific context of each country. Hence, policy makers should be more sceptical regarding "universal antibiotics" curing all labour market diseases. Instead more attention should be paid to country specific institutions and challenges. Furthermore, assessment of hypothesis behind the flexicurity strategy indicates that policy analysts should not ignore the black boxes linking policy inputs and outcomes. Instead, researchers should provide a critical assessment of each of the causal link between proposed reforms and expected outcomes.

Second, this paper contributes to the discussion regarding the sequencing of reforms in the CEEC. It is argued that "copy-pasting" of the newest innovations of the West will not solve current labour market problems. The economic and political transition created country (and region) specific problems, which include the weakness of labour market institutions. Hence, more attention

should be paid to strengthening the institution capacity to implement current policies. Otherwise, discussions regarding the changes in policy direction might be meaningless, because low capacity will preclude the actual implementation of the newly adopted policies.

This paper being limited by its scope did not provide answers to all questions and solutions to a number of policy puzzles remain to be found. On the general labour market policy level, further research could focus on the extent to which the flexicurity strategy has been implemented in the MSs, and what were the results? Furthermore, more research is needed in analysing specific preconditions for effective implementation of active labour market policies. Within the context of Lithuanian labour market policy two theoretical and practical puzzles stand out, which were not extensively tackled in this paper. First, given the strict EPL and low capacity to implement the regulation: should Lithuania liberalise the EPL and would that lead to a decrease in the number of violations in the labour law? Second, over the past few years the unemployment benefits in Lithuania have somewhat increased, but still remain relatively low, hence, what is the optimum level of unemployment benefits, which would strengthen income security, but would not have negative effect on incentives to seek for a job?

NOTES

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13 Eamets and Paas, 51. Taip pat žr.: European Commission, 2006, 78.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION PROCESS

BELARUS IDENTITY: IDEALS OR TRADES-OFF?

Jovita Pranevičiūtė

Introduction

Considering the Belarusian case, scholars try to answer the question why there is no process of nation-building in today's Belarusian territory, why national identity is so fragmented, why Belarus is called denationalized state, how this influence its political regime and country's national security. There are numerous competing theories explaining this situation in Belarus.

The difficulties of defining and predicting the situation in Belarus is twofold: first, theoretically it's very difficult to decide and to define what identity is, especially if we have the case with the competing identities or undeveloped identities. Second problem is practical. The political regime in Belarus controls and censors academic field as the rest of the social life, which leads to undeveloped social sciences inside the Belarus, which causes the lack of the academic inside analysis (most of the existing works on Belarus is ideologically driven) as well as bans any possibility of the objective opinion polls on national identification of the local people. Even if the concept of identity is very complex and multilevel, scholar has a possibility to decide and choose the way of analysis, the second problem is difficult to resolved until the change of the political regime, but this makes analysis more challenging.

Although the term "identity" is richly indeed for an analytical concept, hopelessly – ambiguous, Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 6–8) identify a few key uses: first, understood as a ground or basis of social or political action, "identity" is often opposed to "interest" in an effort to highlight and conceptualize non-instrumental modes of social and political action. Second, understood as a specially collective phenomenon, "identity" denotes a fundamental and con-

sequential sameness among members of a group or category. Third, understood as a core aspect of (individual or collective) "selfhood" or as a fundamental condition of social being, "identity" is invoked to point to something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational. Fourth, understood as a product of social or political action, "identity" is invoked to highlight the processual, interactive development of the kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or "groupness" that can make collective action possible. Finally, understood as the evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses, "identity" is invoked to highlight the unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and fragmented nature of the contemporary "self". But none of them is overwhelming and inclusive enough or they are too general and lack the explanation power. In the framework of social sciences the theoretical background of the conceptual understanding of identity has been developed by scholars of nationalism. But the linguistic turn in the social sciences in the middle of the last century brought identity as ideal object of analysis to international relation theories and other disciplines of the political sciences. Identity as the representation of relations between "I" and "other" and "we" and "others" as well the practice of moving state or community borders attracted attention of the international scientist as well as practitioners towards ideal factors possibility influencing the rise of conflicts, instabilities, social movements and developments of relations of neighboring countries.

The theorists of international relations focus on external factors of the identity formation and fragmentation as the result of power maximization. Within the framework of international relations studies fragmented Belarusian identity is considered as the results of clashes of the interests or social practices of neighboring state. According to realists, the nationalism can be treated as a source for military mobilizations to maximize state's power (Lapid, Kratochwil, 1996: 113). Those authors do not deny that identity or culture in general can influence the country's ability to mobilize human and material resources, but they treat non-material factors such identity, values, high or popular culture instrumentally. Neoliberalists argue that calculation of power is more delicate than counting military capabilities. They believe that economical interdependence affects world politics and the behavior of states. By creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments

regulate and control transnational and interstate relations (Keohane, Nye, 1989: 5). Nye defines three types of power – military, economical and soft. The soft power is understood as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them" (Nye, 2004: 5). Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others by cultural influence, values and implemented policies.

Constructivists (Cox, Hopf, Kubalkova, Frederking, Messari, Adler, Ruggie, Onuf, McSweeney, Wendt and etc.) have challenged this view by arguing that a shared sense of identity can reduce or even eliminate perceptions of threat posed by power asymmetries. According to them, we have to look for the roots of conflicts and wars in the culture and identity. On micro level we observe inter-ethnic conflicts, analyzed by number of authors in nationalism studies (Kuzio 2001, 2002, 2005, Brubaker 1996, Snyder 1993, Barrington 2006, Ioffe 2007). On macro level we find very popular and recognized theory of clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1997). Huntington argues that one of the trends in post-Cold war period is "revitalization of religion throughout much of the world" (Huntington, 1997: 47).

Theories of nationalism have been traditionally divided into two main categories, instrumentalism and primordialism (Conversi, 1995: 73). The former conceive nationalism as the product of elite manipulation and content that nations and their identities can be fabricated and invented. The latter see nationalism as a spontaneous process because of the natural existence of the sense of nationhood. There are several more theories of nationalism, which try to avoid this kind of opposition: *ethno-symbolism* (A. Smith, G. Smith, Hutchinson, Amstrong) believe that nations are modern phenomenon, but the rely on a preexisting texture of myths, memories, values and symbols; *transactionalism* focus on the exchanges and relationships of human groups and material and symbolic meaning of borders and the border-generating processes (Barth, Conversi, Brubaker); *homeostatic,* or *modernism*, does not consider nationalism and formation of identity aside from the rise of the modern state. Gellner, Nairn, Hroch, Laitin analyze the processes of the state-building and formation of national movements, groups reaction towards other groups, the state and other power institutions.

To schematize those understandings of the identity I tried to put the aspects of identity formation mentioned above into the table (See table No. 1). I have

divided those factors into two main groups interior and exterior. The dominated understanding of identity is based on the relation between "we" and "other". Even if self-description is the process of self-reflection, those there are different factors which could not be controlled or isolated and they are influencing the self-reflection by modifying, changing or even stopping the process. On other hand, when we talk about national identity we have in mind the group process. The group process is even more fluid and un-bordered. Finally, the groups can be informal without the formal membership, based on the common values, traditions, history as ethnic or national groups or they can be based on formal affiliation bounded by existing or created institutions as states and religious groups. In some cases informality of ethnic identity was denied (for example in the Soviet Union), in other cases unrecognized states such as Palestine or Chechnya in the past controls certain territory, at least partially they are self-sufficient and is forming identity of the local people as well as the identity of the inhabitants of neighboring regions and states. When I speak about interior factors of identity formation, I have in mind the state and the nation in the same territory as well as the group of people, who affiliate themselves with this particular state or nation even if they formally live in the different territory. The exterior factors here are the influence on the identity of the nation state from abroad or from the territory, which is under control of different nation and state.

The other grouping of the identity formation factors here is the suggestion to divide them into three groups: normative, legal and socio-political. Actually the first group consists of the ideal factors influencing identity. Those factors are difficult to measure, to control their influence on the independent variable (here – human mind) and in most of the cases to separate them from each other due to their inter-relational nature. As Wendt notes, when we have to deal with the ideal factors and the structures we cannot empirically observe, we have to use not the causal analysis, but the constitutive analysis, which helps us to answer questions not only "who" and "how", but mostly "why" (Wendt, 2005: 99). He believes that we can observe reality as positivists suggest and believes that causal relations still exist and that social scientist have an obligation to look for the empirical proofs for their theories. On the other hand, he suggests that ontologically social world is the world of ideas and social scientist has to analyze them as poststructuralists suggest. This point of view Wendt calls scientific realism (Wendt, 2005: 103). This realistic argumentation suggest that we can analyze social world as the world

of ideas and as the world as facts at the same time in particular if we deal with such a complex phenomenon as identity.

Most prominent scholars of nationalism Gellner, Brubaker and others believe that nations (as based on ideas) and states (as material/ institutional facts) are very closely inter-related. As the Roman Catholic Church is the material representation of the Catholicism of millions, so the state or other form of governing institutions is representation the nation. As Wendt probably could put state and nation constitute each other.

	Interior	*Exterior*
Normative	State and nation history, experience of nationhood and statehood; Myths and symbols; Racial, ethnic, national, religious, ideological and other types of identity; National consciousness;	Context of the history of international relations and history of the region; Political will of the great powers and international community at the moment of the rise of the national consciousness and formation of the state; Identity of the other nations and states (especially big states, and neighboring nations);
Legal	Subjectivity of the right to the self-determination; control of the claimed territory	interpretation and practice of the international legal norms at the moment of the self-determination and formation of the state;
Political-social	demographical, national, religious, social, economical background within the controlled territory; legitimization of the governing institutions by people of the territory and by nation;	recognition of the political regime change; political, economic, social and cultural relations with the great powers and neighboring countries

International relation theories analyze the material existence of the states and communities as given. Those theories focus on external factors of identity formation, which means that they cannot provide the full scale answer to the main question, why Belarusian identity is so fragmented and what is the expected development of the identity. Theories of nationalism see the importance of the interior factors as the main objectives of the analysis. Those theories can provide with the answer about momentum status quo and direction of the dynamics of the formation of national identity and national consciousness.

In this article I claim that the separate analysis of the interior and exterior as well as ideal and material factors identity formation does not help to explain the situation in Belarus. In the first part of this paper I will analyze interior factors of Belarusian identity mostly focusing on the interpretation of history. The second part will be attributed for the analysis of the exterior factors of Belarusian identity. The main attention will be given towards the Belarusian – Russian relations. The legal factors in both parts are not broadly analyzed as very well know and usually are not interpreted controversially. I will conclude by showing the link between those two groups of factors and the mutual constitutive nature of them.

In this article I will use the concept of Belarusian identity and Belarusian national consciousness interchangingly for the practical reasons and this is done in order to fall under common vocabulary of the majority of the scholars, though I am aware about the difference between theoretical differences of those two concepts. On the other hand, I understand national consciousness as a massive group's understanding about their own nationhood, ethnicity, statehood, its history. It exists at the level of myths, symbols, stereotypes and narratives. It is not deeply reflected by the group itself (Statkus, etc, 2003: 17). Usually massive consciousness is one-leveled and much easier to observe through opinion polls.

Belarus national consciousness: disasters, pride and rationality

To structure the analysis of the Belarusian identity I am going to compare two periods of history, which are not the same length, but differs in the treating history as part of nation identity a lot. Firstly, I will introduce the history interpretation trends during the first years of independence in 1991–1994. Second, I will discuss the understanding of the history in nowadays Belarus.

As Kuzio notes, the formation of a new national identity that unites populations is impossible without recourse to some myth making (Kuzio, 2002: 246). In states re-emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union the myths of an honorable past and the golden era of a country or nation were extremely popular. Those history myths were supposed to help to promote the state and nation building, ensure the links of society/community with the states. The

most important aspect of the history myth making process is to legitimize the independence of the newly created state and to help to differentiate the new state from the former "elder brother". In this case the history issues can become the security questions if the former colony prevents the process of the differentiation and questions the independence.

In the first years of the independence the issues of history were the most important security issues, helping to ensure the recognition from abroad. Lithuania emphasized its long-lasting statehood in the Preamble to the Constitution basing it on the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In Ukraine the myth of the state deriving from Kievan Rus' predominates. Belarus inherited the population without the part of population which could remember the life before the Soviet Union (the Belarus became part of the Soviet Union in 1922). The glorious myths of the golden age have been related to the Soviet Union, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has been understood more distance and unknown. As Shevtsov notices, the identity of Belarus is built on disasters (Shevtsov, 2005).

In 1991–1994 the most important history issues has been associated with two words: Kuropaty and Chernobyl. The political debate about those two historical disasters started even before the Belavezh agreements were signed. In June, 1988 the article named "Kurapaty: The Road of Death" was published in "Literature and Art," a Belarusian magazine. The authors of this article were an archaeologist Zenon Pozdniak, who became a significant political actor. The article presented information about the mass burial place, which had been found in the Kurapaty area on the outskirts of Minsk. There were about two hundred and fifty thousand people who resisted the Soviet regime and were murdered by the NKVD from 1937 to1940 and buried in this burying ground. After the investigation, the Soviet government was constrained to confess that the remains found there belonged to the victims of NKVD. The discussion about the crimes committed against Belarus nation during the "golden age" of the Soviet Union became the core stone of the nation building process as well as the process describing Belarus differently than Soviet Belarus Republic and Russians.

The other disaster is more recent. On April 26th, 1986 the disaster took place in Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Although Chernobyl was a Ukrainian city; Belarus was the country most affected by the disaster. The consequences of the Chernobyl disaster were belittled by the Soviet government. Despite the

extremely high and harmful level of radiation, the May Day demonstrations were held and even children participated in them. The independent researchers and foreign mass media managed to bring out the real degree of the outcomes of Chernobyl disaster. What disappointed Belarusians' most of all was the fact that the government they treated as being on their side could have dealt with them in such manner. Belarusians' expressed their disappointment and indignation through a demonstration on the streets of Minsk in 1987. Thousands of people took part in those first demonstrations. The disappointment of the politics of Soviet Union and mostly Russian politicians responsible for the liquidation of the consequences of the disaster helped Belarusian to distance them from Russia and Ukraine just after the official independence and to securitize this issue, which could be helpful to legitimize the claims for the compensation, but as well as escalating the conflict between those three countries.

In a case of the period starting after the election of Aleksander Lukashenka we can see different history issues moved from the area of social life and personal experience to the realm of politics: as in majority authoritarian states, the rule of one man or a group leads to the claim (and realization) of the overwhelming control on all the issues of social life: politics, economy, military as well as culture, identity, education, etc.

In 1998 the Belarusian People's Front held a large-scale demonstration near Kurapaty. There is no doubt that a part of this society was already prepared to recognize the negative aspects of the government of the Soviet Union at that time. In recent years the events to remember the tragedy of Kurapaty pass off almost unnoticed in Belarus. The society was reminded of Kurapaty in 2002, as according to the project of the Minsk Ring Road widening plan the abovementioned road should have stretched along the Kurapaty site. The indignant members of non-governmental organizations managed to stop this construction. However, their success was not a result of making this issue as anissue of national identity. Rather the government found it was not useful to create favorable conditions for the opposition to argue that the history was disrespected. From 2005 to 2006 Kurapaty was mostly mentioned in the press as foreign diplomatic representatives would come to visit it. The number of participants in the commemoration events in Kurapaty never exceeds 60 people.

Approximately five thousand people participated in the mass demonstration named "Chernobyl Road" (Černobylskij šliach) in 2001. According to the

internet news media of that time, a significant amount of Special Forces were drawn up to Minsk. The same actions attracted about three thousand participants in 2002 and 2003 and only 1.5 thousand in 2004 and 2005. In 2006 "The Chernobyl Road" took place just a month after the presidential election. In theory, the indignation of society caused by the illegitimate election, or at least the doubt of its legitimacy, should have stimulated a much higher participation in this activity. However the number of participants did not exceed three thousand in 2006. These actions have been politicized right since 1996 and are somewhat an expression of disobedience to the regime rather than distancing from the history of the Soviet Union on „older brother".

The attitudes toward those two historical disasters changed dramatically under the Lukashenka rule, the importance of Kurapaty is minimized and the people's participation in the commemorative actions of "Chernobyl Road" is considered as the action that could damage public security. In Belarus the ruling regime neither tries to securitize the history or national symbols *per se* nor tries to differentiate Belarusian identity from any other identities. Contrary, the regime is trying to ban the alternative way of interpretation of history or other language than Russian or Soviet style. Questioning the dominating narrative of history or using Belarusian language or complains about the Soviet style national symbols among the officials are/could be understood as the disloyalty to regime. Those acts of the state can be analyzed as the conscious elite's move towards certain identification and the aim to create the same consciousness within the society. This top-bottom identity is an opposition to any kind of „belarusization".

According to optimistic public surveys 35 percents supports the opposition and a bit more than 50 percents of supporters of current regime (NISEPI, 2003). 47,5 percents are not worried to lose the national distinctiveness and traditions, compare to 28.2 percent of respondents in Russia, and 33 percent in Ukraine (Ioffe, 2007: 49). The questions is not about why Belarusians are so supportive for the leader who has humble origin and peasant upbringing neither he speaks only *trasianka*, the issue is that for Belarusians has been and remained difficult to describe as community apart from Russia. The question is if the lack or more precisely the competing national consciousness is not going to lead to the question of the existence of the community of Belarusians as such. The opposition strongly believes that only the distancing form Russians or trying to find the roots and myths of identity except the language can ensure

the survival of Belarusian community. Belarusian ruling regime see this kind of identity first of all as the threat for the bilateral relation, and secondly as a threat for the state (and regime itself) survival.

In nowadays Belarus the prevailing history narrative is of the glorious Soviet Union and mortal, but honorably lost World War II. The opposition attempts to reinforce the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to emphasize the significance of independence (though conditional) during the interwar period and the prospect of the cultural renascence of Belarus.

The interpretation of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the foundation of Belarus statehood, has the strongest links to the Belarus opposition and first of all the right-wing parties such as the Belarusian People's Front and United Civil Party of Belarus. However it should be noticed that the present Belarusian government cannot reject it as well. This stage of the Belarusian statehood history is not disregarded in the websites of the Belarusian President and Parliament. And contemporary Belarus is the Belarus of Lukashenka. It is worthy of note that the Belarusian Academy of Science (which has a very strong connection with the President administration) has in recent years been holding various academic conferences and public events on subjects of the history of Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Minsk as well as in other places of large historical importance such as Navahradak and Hal'shany. Of course, the government does not miss the propitious moments to remind the public about which language was used in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the official language. On the other hand, the main avenue in Minsk, previously called the Avenue of Francysk Skarina, has been renamed to the Avenue of Independence in 2006. The gossips going around the town at that moment was that the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is the issue of security for Lukashenka, he is afraid of the competition even from the history heroes.

Though the historical illiteracy of Lukashenka is often noticed in the public sphere, however the government does not allow the opposition to monopolize the interpretation of history according to which the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is considered as a head stone of the statehood of Belarus. According to the data provided by Independent Institute of Social-Economic and Political Research (NISEPI) the above-mentioned part of society is not small. When asked what was the first Belarusian state even 35 percent of respondents answered that it was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 15 and 17 percent accordingly answered that it

was the national state of Belarus which originated in the interwar period and the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (Svirko, 2004). The only stage of Belarusian statehood incompatible with the ideology of governing regime is the establishment of Belarusian People's Republic in 1918. Any references to the puppet government, which had the security guarantees from Germany, are considered as the security issue for ruling regime: according to Soviet history interpretation this part of Belarusian history is tightly connected to Nazis regime. But on the other hand, during the period of the existence of Belarusian People's Republic the red-white-red flag was established as the main symbol, Belarusian language schools instead of Polish schools were re-introduced. For ruling regime those symbols are the symbols of nowadays opposition. The public polls conducted just after the celebration of the 90th anniversary of the Belarusian People's Republic on March 25 showed that (as it can be seen from Table 1) almost a half of the respondents (46.4%) suppose that declaration of the BPR is a great event that must be celebrated. Under the conditions of historic vacuum (the debate of historians "The BPR: over the bars" published on March, 22 in "Sovetskaya Belorussia" is an unexpected exception) it is quite a lot.

Table 1: Distribution of answers to the question: "Some of our citizens are going to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the Belarusian People's Republic declaration on March, 25. What is your attitude to this event?" depending on the estimation of the respondents of their personal winning or loss due to independence acquired by the country, % (NISEPI, 2008)

Variant of answer	*All respondents*	*Including:*		
		Have won (43.1)	*Have lost (25.8)*	*DA/NA (31.1)*
It is a great event, which should be celebrated	46.4	54.5	40.9	39.7
It is an insignificant event and it should not be celebrated	28.6	27.7	42.2	18.6
DA/NA	25.0	17.8	16.8	41.7

It does not seem that the opposition is capable of making an advantage of the normative content of the history of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The appeal of the opposition's leaders to the tradition of professing European democratic values in Belarus hardly ever appears in the independent mass media. The rhetoric of the Presidential Election of 2006 gives enough evidence that the opposition's

candidates declared neither their value orientation nor interpretation of history. These can only be apprehended through their pronouncements of other topics such as democracy. The latest however is referred to as an alternative form of government but not emphasized as a societal security issue by itself. Though Lukashenka is constantly criticized for not using Belarusian language, not knowing Belarusian history and the prominent historical figures, those issues are not interpreted as the threat for the identity (Rovdo, 2006).

However it should be noticed that though not emphasized in public speeches the concepts like national or cultural renewal are present in their programs (Kozulin, 2006; Milinkevich 2006). It is not a part of the narrative of the governing regime. This very aspect corresponds to the selected scheme of social mobilization rhetoric. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Belarusian language was flourishing and the society was harmonious. Nowadays the Russian language and culture prevail therefore the situation should be changed. Then again, as some historians aptly remark, although the history interpretations of the governing regime are amateur and limited, there is nobody to discuss them anymore. At least five generations back have never been told anything about the period of history starting from lawmaker Leu Sapega and ending in 1918. The patriotic intelligentsia who could remind the masses of this bright stage of history suffered at least four total "cultural disasters" during the last two centuries. The authors like Bykov, Korotkevich, and Alekseev, who do not surrender to the pressure of the government, are also unfavorable. They appeal to conscience and the opposition remembers them during times of crisis.

Any tries to bring back forgotten history of Middle Ages and interwar period by government and special by Lukashenka are called Nazis or national socialists (for example, when Lukashenka saw the red-white-red flag colors used by high ranking orthodox priest, see in Podgol, 2005: 34), which symbolize the most terrifying threat. The nowadays Belarusian president usually uses insulting wording for describing nationalism of opposition or their requirements to speak in Belarusian language: "The ones who speak Belarusian cannot do anything else except speaking Belarusian, because using this language is not possible to express anything great. The Belarusian language is poor" (Narodnaya gazeta, February 1, 1995). Such strong and incorrect names come from general understanding of Belarusian national ideology: to lean towards Russia's high culture, to pull its energy recourses, and strategic unhooking of Belarus from

Russia would be "tantamount to the rejection by Belarusians of their civilization identity" (Feduta, 2006, 120–144).

"The huge merit of our nation (and Belarusians' most of all) is the rescuing of humanity from the brown plague," states Lukashenka (Lukashenka, 2001). This is a brief but highly expressive example of the way a governing regime treats the Belarus nation and its history. On the other hand, in 2002 Lukashenka encouraged the authors of school textbooks to make the training appliances which correspond to the "emotional – historic level of society development" (Pozniak, 2003). A concept, the teaching of Belarus history, was prepared to meet this object. It suggests studying Belarus as a part of the Eastern Slavic civilization. Although the concept had never been approved, the preference is nevertheless given to the history of World War II at schools. One of the extra subjects available for schoolchildren is expressively called "An Introduction to the Orthodox Culture." In 2005 even a new textbook was published, and a new subject, named "The Great Fatherland War in the context of World War II," was introduced. There had been only two subjects devoted to the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the faculty of history at the Belarus State University during the last five years. One of them deals with the period before the Union of Lublin and the other covers the history following it. Students can also choose one of the three courses related to the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The opposition has clearly no administrative resources of spreading it sown interpretations of history and all the more, is it also unable to compete with the governing regime in spreading them within educational institutions. The outcome of the "historical free-thinking" of the European Humanities University is well known to Lithuanians who gave this University a shelter in their country.

In general, the point of view towards history and its significance adopted by the governing regime is probably best reflected by the name of the subject taught at Belarusian schools which is "An Introduction to Belarus State Ideology." The history of Belarus is only one of the measures helping the governing regime to mobilize the majority of Belarusian society. In other words, history is a part of state ideology. Baring in mind his contradictions as well as the controversial statements and decisions Lukashenka still managed to create the myth which though eclectic has its clear boundaries. The brick stone of this myth is the history of World War II and the Belarusian SSR. The history of the Grand

Duchy of Lithuania, as well as the one of independent Belarus before the election of Lukashenka, though not denied still play only a secondary role in this myth. The present regime succeeded in connecting the history of the country with its prosperity and modernization of economy. Among the republics in the former Soviet Union, Belarus was clearly positioned among five most developed. The history of the state begins in the 20th century. The state has always been the victim of accidents and the policy of foreign states. The Belarusians as inhabitants of this state have many enemies inside and outside its frontiers. Lukashenka's rhetoric is based on assumption that despite all the changes in the world and around Belarus, the country remains independent and stable, because of the keeping the level of Soviet style economy and social system. The life in Belarus is much better in comparison with the worst cases. And the golden era of Belarus was the very beginning of its history – the Soviet time.

If Lukashenka is going to follow the example of keeping the Soviet style economy and social life, he has not much to choose: de facto Belarus has not existed as a state before the Soviet Union, the short lived Belarus Peoples Republic under German protection and lack of popular support, finally the strongest memories for Belarusians are under the time of Soviet rule and World War II. The Soviet Union is a case of success for the Belarusians because of modernization and industrialization after the War, and the rising standards of living that followed those developments (Lausten, 2003: 67). All those developments promoted the loyalty to the state and it can be seen as the state building process, and since 1919 Belarus never experience the process of the nation formation, while the opposite developments took place in most of the Western, Central and Eastern European countries.

Meanwhile, the opposition emphasizes the co-operation with the West and its politics is retrospective – no radical statements and no attempts to create either an alternative historical myth or the vision of the politics of culture. The opposition is afraid to announce that if they come to power the life will get worse but the prospects of future will arise instead. The ideas of independence and neutrality are strongly supported in Belarus nowadays. Therefore, an intense stress on relations with the West would be as disastrous as are the attempts to prove that the contribution of Belarusians was not crucial in World War II. There is a wide range of opposition parties able to form an alternative agenda of public debates including Conservatives and Christian Democrats

on the right wing and the Communists on the left. Therefore, it is hard to believe that politicians and intellectuals of so different political attitudes could reach an agreement on some common interpretation of history. On the other hand, the opposition avoids raising historical questions and discussing them not only because of the monopoly of information, but rather because of its political interest.

Firstly, the opposition is afraid of losing even more of their supporters. Secondly, it is worried about providing the governing regime with a pretext to stereotype the opposition by epithets like "fascists," "the instigators of nation," and "the despisers of history," etc. That is why the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is romanticized but not discussed. Lukashenka succeeded in consolidating his conception of state ideology. In other words, he managed to establish the thinking of history as of a process of ensuring economical wellbeing and to thrust the public opinion on this thought. The Belarusian SSR was the starting point of Belarusian Statehood, because then Belarusians "obtained" their republic. Moreover at that very time Belarus "became the most internationalist country" (the total consolidation of Russian language) and "was the bravest republic" (World War II). It was also "the most educated nation as being an assemblage department of the whole Soviet Union" as well as "the most diligent and therefore the richest nation in the Soviet Union" (Podgol, 2007).

Belarusian opposition, trying to establish and to sustain an alternative narrative about Belarus and promote "more European, not Soviet" consciousness fails to do this because of the lack of socio-economical component. As it was mentioned above the prosperity of the Soviet Belarus Republic and the feeling of ownership of the whole processes which took part during the Soviet rule creates a kind of social-economical consciousness of Belarus nation. Those economical myths implicate clearly that the state and the nation is able to arise and survive solely if a certain living standards are ensured or at least promised. It seems that the relations between citizens and the government are based on rationalist arguments. This good lead to conclusion Lukashenka is going to survive as a leader until he is able to ensure certain level (or an illusion) of living standard. Another possible conclusion could be that "we - other" relations are as well constructed through the Belarus economical (movement of the labor force, trade, investments) contacts.

In this section the ideal factors forming national identity in Belarus have been reviewed. The national consciousness of Belarus people are based on their understanding of history, firstly on the reflection about the statehood traditions. What is important in Belarusian case the national consciousness during the last century has been formed by state and it is based on loyalty to state institutions and mostly on perception of the socio-economical aspect of the community. In the next section the material factors influencing today's Belarusian identity is going to be reviewed. The primary focus will be given to the external definition of the identity.

"Soviet Identity" or "Oil and Gas Identity"

There is a dominating opinion, that in Belarus *homo-sovieticus* is the main identification pattern based on dependency on the state and its social system, nostalgia about the Soviet Union and its attributes, as well as reliance on the Soviet style social networks: nomenclatorial hierarchy, gray economy and a fear as emotional atmosphere. In this section I'm going to show that analyzing the major material factors of the formation of national identity we can see that Soviet nostalgia is only the bases on which identity is constructed, but the Belarusian attitudes are fluctuating depending on the status of the relations with Russia.

Russian speaking Belarusians are not Russians, although it is difficult to describe who Belarusians are without the Soviet context (Mihalisko, 1997: 233, 236). Belarusian population is called *homo-sovieticus* not because speaking Russian or understanding only Soviet interpretation of history, but because of their controlled economy, Soviet style social system and the perception of the role of government. Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka (2004: 14) gave the precise characteristics of the basic values typical of the collective identity of *Homo Sovieticus*: collectivism, safety, social stability, conformity, state social security, personal non-responsibility, egalitarian income equality, dogmatism and intolerance (quoted from Titarenko, 2007: 86).

Belarus is ethnically homogeneous country: 78 per cent of the population considers themselves Belarusians, 12 per cent – Russians, 4 per cent – Polish, 3 per cent – Ukrainians (Beyme, 1996: 57). Russians in Belarus do not consider themselves as national minority, there never ever have been any issue about

the rights of Russian compatriots or Russian speaking population raised by Russian government or NGOs.

During the nation opinion poll conducted by independent sociologists in March-April of 2006, interviewees were asked the question "Do you think you are rather a European or a Soviet man?" Answers were distributed in the following way: think they are rather Europeans – 36% of respondents, rather Soviet men – 52% and found it difficult to answer – 12% (NISEPI, 2006c).

There's nothing surprising in Soviet-like identification of the Belarusians. The Soviet past can't disappear. In addition, after voting for its restoration in 1991 the Belarusians found themselves in the conditions when the Soviet pattern of behavior is still demanded. Data in Table 1 demonstrate the trend of change of the key Soviet trait – attitude to work. The European tendencies increased till 2000 in this regards. More and more Belarusians were ready to give up guaranteed equal poverty and take a risk for the sake of future well-being. However, the power got consolidated by the second presidential election and set up basic characteristics of the Belarusian model of state. In this model, economic initiative of citizens is accepted in narrow fields only that for certain reasons are not profitable for the state-run economic entities.

Table 2: Dynamics of answer distribution to the question: "Which of the variants below would you prefer?", % (NISEPI, 2006c)

Variant of answer	*06'97*	*11'97*	*11'99*	*08'00*	*08'01*	*06'06*
High but occasional earning	32.8	38.0	40.2	46.8	34.2	30.8
Not high but regular wages	65.3	58.4	57.8	51.8	49.8	53.6

The Soviet type attitude to work (when the government "pretends to pay" and employees "pretend to work") is a response of citizens adaption and dependence on state to the tough hierarchal life organization undertaken by "the president's vertical of power." Furthermore, difference between a Soviet man and a European is quite expectedly revealed in their attitude to the power (and its personified carrier Lukashenka). There are four times more of those who prefer to work in a Soviet style among president's supporters.

Despite the processes of globalization, disintegration and reintegration with Russia, clashes with neighboring countries and even believes of some analysts about sharp changes in Belarusian economics and politics over the past 15

years, a half of Belarusian citizens say that nothing has changed in their lives. They make 58.1% among A. Lukashenka's supporters while only 11.4% said they have to spin round. As for A. Lukashenka's opponents, they spin around four times more – 55.4% and only 28.3% of them live at a usual pace (NISEPI, 2006c). We can think that the current situation appears quite acceptable for a Soviet man. It is worth to notice that the deep nostalgia for before-Gorbachev's life is not registered in Belarus. The number of those saying that the life before perestroika was worse (21.5%) is two times less than those who stick to the opposite viewpoint (46.9%) (NISEPI, 2006c). Positive attitudes towards the living standards during the Soviet time do not mean that people would like to live in the same system as 20 or more years ago. The good example of that is representative opinion poll conducted in Lithuania (Ramonaitė, etc., 2007: 21).

Table 3: Attitude to USSR restoration, %

Variant of answer	*11'93*	*11'97*	*11'99*	*04'02*	*06'04*	*12'05*	*04'06*
Negative	22.3	25.5	30.1	42.6	50.8	48.3	63.4
Positive	55.1	49.9	38.0	38.8	39.5	38.0	26.7
DA/NA	22.6	24.6	31.9	18.6	9.7	13.7	9.9

The same could b said not only about Lithuanians, but as well about Belarusians. As it could be seen from Table 3, only 26.7% of Belarusians, which is almost equal to the number of pensioners, have it presently, are nostalgic about the Soviet Union. Judging from the dynamics, very soon not only veterans will stop recalling their "happy Soviet childhood" but even the youth poorly aware about the Soviet Union and its communist orders will stop using appropriate attributes.

Even if the Soviet history narratives as a representation of the Soviet nostalgia are still predominant in the society, but the comparative analysis of behavior shows that for Belarus society economical questions (i.e. simply the survival) are of the highest importance. While 59.33 percent of Ukrainians and 54.55 percent of Russians consider the aim to success as being the motive of economic activity, only 54.55 percent of Belarusians share this point of view. However in the latter the share of society motivating itself with the aim of avoiding the failure is biggest (37.91 percent). By comparison in Russia and Ukraine only

18.18 percent and 3.33 percent of respondents accordingly motivate themselves in the above-mentioned way (Zaiko, 2006). L. Zaiko suggests calling such persons *homo economicus*, the ones who do not care about anything but survival. Therefore, the attempts of social mobilization using political arguments are condemned to failure. On the other hand, there is no accurate data about the standard of living in Belarus. Only the indexes of some other countries and international organizations can be referred to. On the issue of conditions of establishing and developing a private enterprise Belarus is ranked 129th out of 155 countries,40 the inflation rate reached about 10.3 percent in 2005 (World Factbook, 2006), and in the index of Economic Freedom Belarus was ranked 151st out of 157 countries (Heritage Foundation, 2006). Now more than ever, politics is most urgent to those people. As if it were not enough, the activity of the biggest state enterprises is maintained by government subsidies. If the subsidization stopped because of the alteration of political power, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians would lose their jobs. Now it is clear enough why those people do not struggle for their political rights.

This standard rhetoric of Lukashenka is an expressive example of how and why the ratings of this leader if not growing then at least ever go lower than 50 percent. The state leader seeks to create an image that all the main goals either normative (such as stability) or economic and social are already achieved. According to independent surveys, 70 percent of respondents supporting the regime gave a positive answer to the question, whether Lukashenka, as a president, succeeded in coping with the problems such as maintenance of stability. Merely 24.8 percent of the opponents of the regime answered the same question negatively (Timoshevich, 2006). When asked whether they believe that the five-year plan named at the All Belarusian People's Assembly (Lukashenka, 2006) will be put into practice, 63.8 percent of respondents answered that they believe in the fulfillment of the promises related with agriculture. 60.5 percent of respondents accepted the plans of raising wages and pensions as true. More than half respondents believed that favorable conditions to develop small and medium enterprise would be given in the nearest future. Slightly less than half of respondents are confident that the government will create auspicious conditions to work and get a good pay for it.

The distribution of the answers to the question: "How do you think will socio-economic situation in Belarus change in the near future?" shows that in

June 2006 number of believers in better future increased by almost one third (46%) comparing with 29.7% in 2005 (NISEPI, 2006).37 It is clear, that this change of the opinion is related to the very active governing regime rhetoric during the election period. The main thesis of this period was "the life is getting better".

While some nonmaterial identity factors do matter, a common sense of being Slavic brothers does not appear to play a critical role in Lukashenka's choices. While this variable might at first seem plausible, Lukashenka and his Russian counterparts have acted much more like typical political leaders, vying for economic and political security, than leaders imbued with brotherly love (Hancock, 2006: 119). Belarus' economical wealth is almost absolutely dependent on relations with Russia. This evidence could be seen while analyzing the behavior of Belarusian and Russia's leaders, who have sparred over the extent and type of hierarchy between them. Furthermore, an exclusive focus on a common ethnicity cannot explain the path of Ukraine another Slavic state, which its leaders have pursued a slow crawl toward Western policies while keeping Russia at arm's length. Belarusian-Russian relations are based primarily not on cultural similarities or the common perception of Eastern Slavic identity, but on more material interaction between the two.

As Hancock notes, weak Belarusian nationalism that allows Lukashenka to pursue pragmatically the state or states with the most lucrative economic offer, weak democratic norms that enable Lukashenka to engage in authoritarian rule and thus squelch opposition to his economic policies, and strong Russian interests in an economic hierarchy (Hancock, 2006: 119).

The Belarusian "economic miracle" is largely preconditioned by low costs of Russian energy resources and therefore created a state of energy and political dependence: if Lukashenka wanted to remain in power, he had to remain in close relation with Moscow. The foreign direct investments (FDI) flows from Russia amount to round 30 percent of Belarus annual foreign direct investment. Even if some part FDI comes from EU, it is often off-shore Russian capital registered in Cyprus, Netherlands and etc. As for Belarusian external trade Russia amounts to 50-60 percent of it, Russia buys 70 percent of military industry products produced in Belarus and provides more than 90 percent of energy resource. Russian "donations" – lift of energy debts (see Table 4) and low energy price add around 20 percent of Belarus annual GDP (258 881

million USD) (Hedenskog, 2007: 45-60). With the annual gas consumption at the level of 16.2 billion m3 (British Petroleum report) only 30 million m3 come from the Belarusian deposits, 100 per cent of gas imported by Belarus comes from Russia.

Table 4: Debts of the CIS states to Russia in 2005[1]

Debts of the CIS states to Russia in 2005	
Country:	*Debt in million USD:*
Armenia	1.881
Belarus	258.881
Georgia	158.045
Kyrgyzstan	181.815
Moldova	140.739
Tajikistan	305.730
Uzbekistan	654.343
Ukraine	1 583.355

Source: Regnum, cited in Ozerov, Viktor (2005), 'Neloyalniye ostantutsya bez nefti i gaza [Disloyalty Will Remain without Oil and Gas]', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, last accessed: 17 October 2005, Internet: http://www.ng.ru/printed/politics/2005-10-31/1_notloval.html.

N. B. Debt in USD on 1 January 2005.

Belarus imports 75% of the oil it consumes. The oil and gas prices before "gas crisis" at the beginning of 2007 the price for oil and gas Belarus paid was not much higher than the price for Russian consumers and it was several times lower than the prices for other countries of the region. This cheap Russian natural gas forms the basis of the competitive advantage of many Belarusian enterprises, including several largest chemical companies, whose production amounts to about 15% of the Belarusian exports. In 2005 Belarus imported 19.31 million tons of Russian oil, paying 60% of the world price. It consumed 5.85 million tons for its own needs, and the remaining 13.48 million tons, after processing in two Belarusian refineries in Mozyr and Novopolotsk, were exported to the West as petroleum products (IPM Research Center, 2004: 2). This system was very profitable for Belarus in the last years – the value of petroleum products exports amounted to 4.85 billion dollars in 2005.

[1] The data is agregated by Živilė Dambrauskaitė for the essey „STATE OF PLAY OF THE UNION STATE: Any Prospects of a Political "win-win"?", Vilnius 2008 (unpublished)

Table 5: "Import and export of oil from/to Belarus in the years 2001–2006" (IMF Country Report, 2006: 40–41)

Year	*Oil import (millions of tons)*	*Petroleum products export (millions of tons)*	*Oil import value (USD billions)*	*Petroleum products export value (USD billions)*
2001	11,91	7,65	1,37	1,20
2002	14,02	9,87	1,50	1,47
2003	14,88	10,56	1,98	1,96
2004	17,81	12,96	3,23	3,29
2005	19,31	13,48	4,22	4,85
2006	19,7	14,5	5,41	6,72

Consequently, income from the sale of processed Russian oil amounted to 35% of earnings from the Belarusian exports. As a result, the country owed almost 50% of the value of its exports (petroleum and chemical products) to low prices of oil and gas. That situation last till January 2007 – till the biggest energetic crisis with Russia. Then, until mid-2006 Belarusian-Russian gas relations developed without any conflicts. Belarus purchased gas for about 47 dollars and avoided price increases, which affected other post-Soviet republics in the beginning of 2006. Ukraine started to pay 95 dollars, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 110 dollars, Moldova 150 dollars. A lower gas price for Belarus was kept, although the negotiations on transferring a part of Beltransgaz shares to Gazprom were *de facto* halted. It was a sign of political support for Lukashenka before the presidential elections of March 2006.

Those relations between Russian and Belarus changed at the beginning of 2007. After winnings presidential election for the third time Lukashenka, Russia decided to start offensive energy policy in order to ensure its own economic interests. Gazprom announced increasing gas price to 200 USD from approx. 47 USD and Russian government started talking about implementing customs duties on the export of oil, what supposed stop process of re-export of that source by Lukashenka regime. After lengthy negotiations and the Russians' threat to withhold gas supplies, on 31 December 2006 a new contract was signed, under which the price rose to 100 USD and a new schedule of further price increases was established up to 2011, when the price is to be equal to the "European price". In exchange for a transition period, Minsk allowed Gazprom to take control, by 2011, of 50% of the shares in Beltransgaz. Furthermore The Belarusian-Russian gas crisis was continued by promised oil crisis, caused

by Russia's imposing customs duty of 180 USD per ton on the export of oil to Belarus in December 2006. In 2007, Minsk reacted by charging transit duty (45 USD per ton) on Russian oil transported along Belarus' stretch of the Druzhba pipeline and then began pilfering oil. As a result, Russia withheld the transport of oil through Belarus, thereby stopping supplies to Poland and Germany as well. The dispute between Minsk and Moscow was not settled until January 2007. The duty on oil was reduced to 53 USD, but that change will still mean that the existing scheme of processing Russian oil in Belarusian refineries, which was a major source of income for Lukashenka's regime, will be much less profitable (Wyciszkiewicz, 2008: 95).

The measures adopted by Russia forced Lukashenka to restrict some government spending and to look to Western banks for the loans. The major source of income for Lukashenka's regime has been restricted to the minimum and the existing model of Belarusian economy, which over the recent years has experienced the growth, mostly because of the oil boom, has been undermined. The mentioned factors encouraged Belarus to introduce the concept of a "new foreign policy" as a way to mark its independence from Russia, which was essentially based on such dimensions as promoting the efficiency of domestic energy producing and saving, diversifying its foreign energy supplies by fostering closer ties with energy-rich countries and adopting a pro-EU discourse in official declarations, asking for closer cooperation with the EU in several mutually beneficial fields, namely energy.

On the other hand, Belarus relations with the EU (and the majority bilateral relations of the member states) have been quite problematic since the first years of the rule of Lukashenka. Undemocratic regime, fake elections, obstacles for the activities of political opposition and any NGO which does not support governing regime as well as the suppression of independent media made European policy more radicalized towards Belarus and its unchanging leader Lukashenka. On political level the contacts between Belarusian government and the EU counterparts has been lowered to bureaucratic level, more than 30 persons at the moment are in the "visa ban list", and Lukashenka by himself as well. European reaction during the elections and the "gas crisis" generated and encourage even more negative stand of the Belarusian leadership as well as by general public especially if compared with the Russian reaction towards the political and even economical developments in Belarus (see Table 4).

Table 6: Belarus relations with EU and Russia (Ambrosio, 2006: 2–12; BBC Country Profile)[2]

	EU politics towards Belarus	*Russian politics towards Belarus*	*Results*
1993		First deal on the future Union State – ruble zone and monetary union	Economic, political and military union with Russia becomes the official policy of Belarus
1995	EU refuses to sign a PCA with Belarus, ends inter-ministerial contacts and financial support	Deal on custom union and military integration	
1996		Treaty on establishing Belarus-Russia Community supranational elements added to the Union States structure Common symbols and budget	Discussion on the level of subordination of the Union State to Russia
1997		Treaty on establishing the Union State Goal – voluntary junction of the states	Debates on the energy prices
1998	Restrictions on travel in the EU territory for the highest representatives of Belarus' regime	Deepening the Union State Attempts to set a time table of integration	Belarus as toolbox for Russia: voices support towards Russia's position on the states of "axes of evil" Strikes a deal with Serbia on military support (from experts to guns)
1999			
2000	EU condemns the parliamentary elections in Belarus as undemocratic	Russia congratulates the elections as successful Lukashenka awarded a Russian medal for "merits to the Homeland"	Belarus supports the undemocratic regime in Libya with military experts
2001	EU declares conditionality of lifting isolation on democratic reform in Belarus	Establishing EurAzEC (economic union, FTA, custom union)	

[2] The data is agregated by Živilė Dambrauskaitė for the essey „STATE OF PLAY OF THE UNION STATE: Any Prospects of a Political "win-win"?", Vilnius 2008 (unpublished)

Table 6 continue

	EU politics towards Belarus	*Russian politics towards Belarus*	*Results*
2002		Establishing CSTO (the Russian NATO analogue)	Heavy debates on Beltranzgaz sells to Russia Belarus says the conditions are bad so Russia cut of the gas supply So Belarus gives up
2003	ENP initiative. Belarus willing to participate but does not qualify the conditions. EU declares self-isolation of Belarus	EurAzEC turns into failure so Russia initiates the Common Economic Area (Russia + Ukraine + Belarus + Kazakhstan) Putin says Union State is dead, Lukashenka says it's not	
2004	EU strengthens conditionality due to undemocratic development in Belarus	Russia congratulates the parliamentary elections and referendum	Belarus supports the unaligned movement in the UN and Russia as for the "negative impact of Western influence in the developing world"
2006–2007	EU repeats its invitation to come into closer contact under conditionality. No response from Belarus. EU removes Belarus from its trade preference list	Russia strikes a deal with Belarus to raise the energy price but gives Belarus a credit of 1.5 billion USD that may be "forgotten" in 15 years period	
2008	Support for United Democratic Forces in the forthcoming Parliament elections in Belarus	Apathetic observation of the election process	Belarus is not looking for the new cooperation possibilities with the EU

The policy of the EU and the USA is unambiguous – the opposition fighting against the undemocratic regime is supported. Any government, of course, seeks to survive. Therefore it is not surprising that Belarus looks for allies in the East. The culmination of strategic partnership with Russia – the signing of the Constitution of the Union Republic – has never come true. The conflict of the gas prices in December 2005 as well as the silent war of gas and oil prices, starting right next to the election, the taxation of transit of some Russian goods in Belarus and finally the abstain of buying Belarusian goods for the state money in Russia tell about a clash between the interests of the two states and the business inside of them. Lukashenka has been maintaining quasi-diplomatic relations with the regions of Russia and visiting them constantly. Now however, he is forced to search for new partners, necessary to ensure the survival of the country economy. These are Venezuela, Tajikistan, and Cuba, the so-called non-allied countries. Belarus is in need of cheap energetic resources and the

returns of illegal weapons market (which undoubtedly is almost impossible to prove) (Douglas, 2006).

No doubts that Belarusian public consciousness consider Russia as more friendly than European, especially having in mind the Belarusian reliance on what they hear on TV and see in the press, without the no influential independent media. Belarusian disassociation from Russia gets easier each time Russia threatens to stop subsidizing the Belarusian economy or energy sector. If we start to analyze the statistics of the perception about history, describing the value of independence or the value of associating with Russia or Europe, we can see a strange correlation between the differences in numbers comparing different periods of time. If the questions about importance of economic improvement and national pride are asked in the period of stability the answer would be in favor of material wealth. If we ask the similar questions during the elections period and especially post-election periods we would find out that the ideal factors are reflected in the answers. The same could be told about the "Europeanness" or "Russianness" of Belarus people.

The answers to the question "What is more important to you, economic improvement or national independence?" in Belarus are quite obvious – 62 per cent favors economic wealth to 25 per cent independence. Even among those who support opposition not Lukashenka 51.4 per cent favors life improvement to independence (Ioffe, 2007). The dynamics of answers has not changed and we can see certain correlation between the economic events and trust and loyalty in the state and nation as such.

Table 7: Dynamics of answering the question: "Have you personally won or lost due to the fact that Belarus became an independent country?", % (NISEPI, 2008)

Variant of answer	*10'06*	*01'07*	*03'08*
I have won	49.8	38.1	43.1
I have lost	15.6	29.4	25.8
DA/NA	34.6	32.5	31.1

In the Table 6 it can be seen that economic pragmatism of the Belarusians is quite aptly illustrated here: the last year's January crisis of Belarusian-Russian relations led to an evident (–11.7 percentage points) decrease in the number of those who won thanks to independence. However, judging by the results

of the March opinion poll the general feeling of winning is being gradually restored in the public opinion.

Difference between political preferences of losers and winners is the most obvious in their assessment of the Belovezhskoe Agreement. (See Table 8). Thus, for losers this is first of all a tragic event that entailed disastrous repercussions for the country and the people. Winners three times more often take it as a victory of democratic revolution. Certainly, not all have such an opinion about the Belovezhskoe Agreement: nearly 40% of respondents on the whole sampling assume that December events of 1991 were just an episode showing struggle for power (NISEPI, 2007c).

The Soviet Union collapse should not be considered as loss of the status of a great power. For the majority of losers (and not only for them) memories about the Soviet Union are first of all memories about golden age when they were young and a kilo of good sausage cost 2,20 rubles, and when for reasonable money they could travel around the sixth part of mainland to see their relatives.

Table 8: Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to events of December 10, 1991?" depending on answers to the question: "Have you personally benefited or lost from that Belarus became an independent country?", %

Variant of answer	*All population*	*Benefited*	*Lost*	*DA*
It's the victory of democratic revolution that put an end to the power of Soviet Communist Party	15.5	**24.8**	7.7	11.5
It's a tragic event that entailed disastrous repercussions for the country and the people	32.4	23.1	**58.8**	18.8
It's just an episode showing struggle for power in country's top echelons	38.3	42.8	29.2	41.6
DA/NA	15.9	12.2	6.4	29.6

For some time the Belarusian authorities actively exploited the nostalgic feeling about USSR collapse which was particularly reflected in converting to the State Symbols of Soviet times. Data in Table 8 show that the society is getting accustomed to the new (old) symbols. Difference between winners and losers is insignificant among those who approve them which is not the case among those who disapprove. Yet, in general the part of those disapproving the current State Symbols is less than 1/5 even among winners.

Table 9: Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to the current State Symbols of Belarus?" depending on answers to the question: "Have you personally benefited or lost from that Belarus became an independent country?", %

Variant of answer	*All population*	*Benefited*	*Lost*	*DA*
Approve	59.2	60.7	67.2	50.2
Disapprove	12.1	17.6	6.5	10.5
Doesn't matter	26.3	20.1	24.7	34.9

Unlike the National symbols, geopolitical choice of Belarus appears a much more sensible indicator, and so the part of those who found it difficult to answer the question below is lower than in general on the sampling. (See Table 10). The winners divided into two approximately equal halves while losers split 3 to 1.

Table 10: Distribution of answers to the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and accession to the EU, which one would you choose?" depending on answers to the question: "Have you personally benefited or lost from that Belarus became an independent country?", %

Variant of answer	*All population*	*Benefited*	*Lost*	*DA*
Integration with Russia	48.5	43.5	**64.7**	39.7
Accession to the EU	33.6	**42.3**	22.6	33.5
DA/NA	17.8	13.7	12.3	26.9

Answers to the question: "In what spheres was the activity of president Lukashenka in general successful, and in what spheres – unsuccessful?" give us an opportunity to become acquainted with the public assessments of the activities of the president in economical sector. In the beginning of 2007 Belarusian were more optimistic about the bilateral relations with Russia and economical development, but the attitude seems to be changed in March 2008. This could be explained, that Belarusian believed that "the Big brother" is not going to pursue real market based oil and gas trade and Lukashenka has been seen as the fighter for the brighter future. Belarusian optimism about Lukashenka's activities in the field of development of the Belarusian language and culture is seen as successful: the positive attitude increased from 43.9 per cent in 2007 to 54.9 per cent in 2008 by 11 per cent. More than 5 per cents are more positive about Lukashenka's success in dealing with western countries and much more are positive about the creation of Union State with Russia (NISEPI, 2008).

Most likely, the very fact of cessation of mutual complaints submission at the end of the last year is regarded by the public opinion as renewal of the Union State creation process.

Table 11: Dynamics of answering the question: "What is more important: improvement of Belarus economic position or independence of the country?", % (NISEPI, 2008a)

Variant of answer	*06'04*	*08'06*	*09'07*	*03'08*
Improvement of Belarus economic position	73.7	48.5	59.4	64.5
Independence of the country	19.2	41.9	32.2	24.1
DA/NA	7.1	9.6	8.4	11.4

This helps as to conclude that state independence has not become a priority value for the majority of Belarusian population. Data of Table 10 help us to realize the link between the Belarusian pragmatism and patriotism. The results of September opinion poll of 2007 could be explained by rationalization of the Russian policy regarding the terms of oil and gas delivery to Belarus. The public opinion has become extremely sensible to the slightest economic fluctuations for the last years. Just after the presidential election and all political rhetoric the number of "patriots" has raised, but the gas crisis indicates the pragmatism coming back. During the steady increase of income (from the end of 2003 until the end of 2006) the choice between economic pragmatism and independence stably shifted to the latter. However, in September a reverse tendency began to show-the share of pragmatics increased 10.9 per cent, and the share of patriots reduced virtually as much. Once-famous Soviet principle "May our dear country live and we do not care about anything else" is to all appearances losing its topicality (NISEPI, 2008a). Other concerns are coming out to the front line more and more actively, and the need for economic stability is at the head of them. Stability is a synonym of security. It is in the human nature and that is why it is one of the baselines. For the sake of stability preservation the majority is ready "to trade-off their principles", moving aside independence and freedom.

In the light of the above-stated, changes in answers to the question of Table 12 look quite natural. In this case, too, the number of those who want to solve their personal problems at the expense of giving up independence (the matter concerns joining, not creation of a Union State) directly depends on perception by the society of the economic problems acuteness.

Table 12: Dynamics of answering the question: "If the consequences of the rise in prices for the Russian energy carriers are going to be hard for you personally and for your family, will you approve of Belarus joining Russia?", % (NISEPI, 2008a)

Variant of answer	*01'07*	*05'07*	*03'08*
No	49.0	**56.9**	47.0
Yes	35.1	31.7	37.8
DA/NA	15.9	11.4	15.2

Table 13: Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the question of Belarus and Russia integration were being conducted today, how would you vote?", % (NISEPI, 2008b)

Variant of answer	*11'99*	*10'01*	*12'02*	*03'03*	*06'04*	*11'06*	*01'07*	*09'07*	*12'07*	*03'08*
For integration	47.0	51.3	53.8	57.5	42.9	46.4	35.1	33.8	43.6	35.8
Against integration	34.1	26.4	26.3	23.8	25.0	33.5	39.3	47.4	31.6	41.6

At that, however, distribution of opinions returned in essence to the one which had existed during almost the whole previous year. The tendency changed only at the beginning of 2007 in connection with the oil and gas war. At the present moment fluctuations round this new "post-war" value are taking place. As we can see, generous presents brought by Vladimir Putin at the end of the year–relatively low gas prices in the first quarter of 2008 and a credit amounting to one and a half billion USD – did not contribute to any special growth of sympathy towards Russia. Moscow strict measures cause a drop in pro-Russian attitudes, but a milder policy does not automatically lead to an increase of pro-integration sentiments.

Turning back to the question about factors that do not let positive assessments of European life become transformed into pro-European aspirations, one should mention the eternal and one of the most important factors out of them (see Table 14). If Belarusians are asked the question "With what country/union should Belarus establish the closest relation?" 58.6% of respondents said with Russia, 44.5% – with the EU and 35.2% – with CIS (NISEPI, 2007a).

As it can be seen, when one has to make an alternative choice "either…or", more Belarusians still prefer Russia to Europe. When an independent Minsk-based institute asked Belarusians to decide between Russia or the EU, 47% of respondents selected Russia while 36% went with Europe. Furthermore, 60%

Table 14: Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and entering the EU, what would you prefer?", % (NISEPI 2008b)

Variant of answer	*09'03*	*06'04*	*12'05*	*06'06*	*01'07*	*05'07*	*12'07*	*03'08*
Integration with Russia	47.6	47.7	51.6	56.5	48.5	47.3	47.5	45.3
Entering the EU	36.1	37.6	24.8	29.3	33.6	34.7	33.3	33.4

supported Belarus becoming a member of the EU (RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report, October 21, 2003). To join Europe, however, Lukashenka would have to believe that it could provide greater economic opportunities than Russia (Hancock, 2006: 133). Good relations with Russia helped Belarus to keep the price of gas low and hence to ensure the competitiveness of Belarusian goods (though not always corresponding to European standards) and the budget returns from the resale of Russian oil. Therefore at the moment the pro-Western arguments of the opposition frighten not only the employees of state enterprises but the businessmen as well. In this alternative we can see the trend of relative disillusion about Russia, but the pro-European attitudes are not increasing, and the answer could be the EU responses to the political, economical and social developments in Belarus (as it was shown in Table 5). Even under the choice between Russia and Europe, Belarusians, unlike the ruling regime during the oil crisis, Belarusians didn't show muchof their pro-European attitudes. They appeared pragmatics and chose Russian bird in the hand to two in an abstract European bush.

On one hand, this data confirm the official myth about "the united Belarus people" to a certain degree. From the point of view of the need for improvement of Belarus economic position it is really so. On the other hand consolidation of the society on such "ideological" foundation is extremely unstable, though (NISEPI, 2007). For example, according to the surveys conducted in early 2006 by the agency *Eurasian Monitoring*, 47.5 per cent of those probed in Belarus are entirely unworried about the possible loss of national distinctiveness and traditions. For comparison, only 28.2 per cent of respondents in Russia and 33 per cent of Ukrainians are in that category (Ioffe, 2007: 49). It is interesting if we research Belarusian emotional climate we could have quite opposite results in comparison with Russia: to the question "What new feelings have you got or what feelings got stronger within you (within people around you) over lately?", 17 per cent of respondents pointed "pride of my nation" and only 5 per cent in

Russia (NISEPI, 2007b). Perhaps, the reason is that Belarusians are the nation with young statehood and they haven't yet got accustomed to it, this is why they feel so happy about every appearance (true or pretended) of their common success. As for the Russians, they most likely compare their current state (or, to be more exact, what they had in 2003) with the other pages of long Russian history. This comparison appears not in favor of the present time.

Conclusions

In the opinion of contemporary German philosopher J. Habermas, "The nation has two faces. While the nation of citizens (product of voluntary aspiration) is a source of democratic legitimization, the nation of fellow countrymen provides social integration". In Belarusian context those two faces are seen as a mirror-image: in a certain way constructed nation can provide legitimization for the ruling regime or any other forthcoming power, depending on what kind of identity is going to dominate in this country in the future. As for social integration or nation formation, it can be constructed within the country under the influence of ideal factors pragmatically used by the leader of the country or influenced by material factors – economical relations with Russia.

The process of nation formation is yet very far from its completion in the modern Belarus. It is more difficult now as at least two nation formation projects are being implemented at one time. The first is liberal and it aims formation of citizens. The second project is implemented by the ruling regime. Its goal is formation of a unified community of Belarusians by consolidating them around the figure of current president "the father".

Simultaneous implementation of the two projects finds its reflection in controversial assessments of state independence, nation, and history by population. This is why their assessments are often ambivalent but this shouldn't surprise because self-contradictoriness is one of basic characteristics of public opinion in any country. It is many times strengthened in modern Belarus due to unfinished nation formation taking place in the conditions of competition of at least two national projects.

If the first nation formation project more know as the oppositional narrative appeals to nationals and it attempts to integrate them by revival of lost cultural values (as ideal factors and first of all internal ones), the second one

The second project induces the Soviet emotions based not on loyalty on state, but on dependency on it (as material factors). Logically the Soviet nostalgia should melt through the time, because the Soviet Union does not exist anymore and there is no any actor who is supporting the pure Soviet identity in Belarus. Although analyst repetitively are using the concept, which shows that certain "sovietism" exist, but it is more like a framework or bases for the current Belarusian identity.

The predominant rhetoric about the implemented economical goals and bright future, examples of negative experience of neighboring countries and promotion of Russia's obligation to help for the younger brother lead to the actualization of material factors influencing Belarusian national identity. The public opinion has become extremely sensible to the slightest economic fluctuations for the last years. Just after the election campaigns or other noticeable actions and all political rhetoric the number of "patriots" or those who are concern more with the preserving culture or differences from other nation is raising, but the gas crisis or other economical clashes first of all with Russia but as well with the EU indicates the pragmatism coming back. It is important that even being so pragmatic, even willing to trade-off independence for better living standards, Belarusians do not feel less Belarusian. According to population census, Belarusians make around 80 per cents of the country and according to research data only every second of them follows this type of self-identification, almost the same number feel as citizens of Belarus (NISEPI, 2005c).

The willingness to trade off independence or not indicating nationality as the first identity could be explained only partially by ideal internal factors, insecurity, and the lack of stability in the long run opens the doors for the material factors to lead the decision about who you are. What the boundaries of the "we-group" Belarusians decide relying on factors who and how can provide more stability, wealth and guarantees for the future. At the moment this guarantor is Russia.

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THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS – FROM STABILIZATION AND INTEGRATION TO STAGNATION?*

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Abstract. For centuries the German–Russian relations were crucial for the European security. Luckily, they are not an issue of war and peace anymore, the time of mortal rivalry belongs to the past. The breakdown of the Soviet Union gave the possibility to open a new chapter in bilateral affairs. This article deals with the development of the German-Russian relations of the last two decades. It tries to examine if Berlin was able to reach its main targets. By looking at the development of the Russia-German-EU relations and the German perception of Russia's policy, this article seeks prospects for future development.

Preface

To speak about the German-Russian relations is a wide field, with all kinds of contrasts, contradictions and curiosities. Over centuries the relations vary from mortal rivalry and competition to cooperation and exchange. Already in the first century Germanic people appeared in Russia, in the middle ages, clashes between Germanic and Slavic tribes arose when Prince Aleksandr Nevskiy drove the Teutonic knights from Russian land. Russia's permanent drive to expand westward led to various conflicts with the German or more specific Prussian and Austria-Hungarian interests in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. But rivalry and tensions are just one side of the relations. In the middle of the 16th century Ivan the Terrible invited German armourers and manufacturers to work and settle. From the mid 18th century on, Catherine the Great and later Alexander I attracted tens of thousands of immigrants from German states to colonize and cultivate southern

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Russia, and the area around the Volga river. Germans also played a crucial role in the economic, academic and aristocratic elite of the Czarist Empire. German philosophers and thoughts have had a big influence over hundreds of years.[1]

For generations the German and Russian relations were crucial for the whole European security and the question of war or peace. Often Russians and Germans stood on opposing sides, but at least in comparable numbers they were alleys. Like in the Great Northern War from 1700–1721 or in the battle of nations when Austrians, Prussians, Russians and Swedish troops defeated Napoleon in 1813, near Leipzig. But cooperation between Russia and Germany not always brought peace and safety for its neighbours. After the struggle of World War I, the Russian October Revolution and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk the relations between the two "new" states came to normalization with the treaty of Rapallo, in 1922. The Weimar Republic and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the later Soviet Union, re-established their diplomatic relations and renounced all territorial and financial claims against each other.

World War II brought the relations to an "end". The announced "total war" finished in a complete German defeat. In 1955 chancellor Adenauer tied new contacts with the Soviet Union. The governments of Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl developed ascending "bilateral co-operative policies with Moscow".[2] The Federal Republic of Germany became a vital economic partner of the Soviet Union.

This path was supplemented by the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt, which detente the relations to the Warsaw Pact states. Later on the chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl tried to follow this narrow path of rapprochement on the one side and distance to undemocratic regimes on the other side. Certainly this process became more and more difficult in the end of the 1970s and the middle of the 1980s, especially after the uprising of Poland and the declaration of material law, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the NATO dual-track decision. Dialogue with the countries in the East was complex and tough for all German chancellors, at any time. But even more difficult to handle were maybe the reactions of the allies, which always were sceptical and suspicious towards Bonn's engagement in states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the CPSU this tensed situation changed. He saw the signs of ruin and disintegration that took place in the Soviet sphere. With Perestroika and Glasnost he opened the floodgates for epochal changes. With the fall of the Berlin wall, the reunification and

the withdrawal of Russian troops from the heart of Europe, Germany realised all its main political targets.[3] The old bloc confrontation, which divided the continent for more than 40 years, was eliminated.

Stabilisation and Integration

For a short time it seemed that all foreign political topics were solved. But Russia, the former boogyman, became the child of sorrow and Germany had to handle new problematic issues. From the early beginning the newly founded Russian Federation was convulsed by various political, social and economical crises: Coup d'état against Gorbachev, electoral success of extremists and nationalist, war in Chechnya, hyperinflation and the de facto bankruptcy of the state were just some of the major problems. The Kohl government felt the need to help Russia – with financial aid, economical assistance, consultancy and political advocacy – to avert chaos and destabilization.[4]

To prevent isolation from Europe and western structures, Germany tried to integrate Russia in international organisations and lobbied actively for membership, to antagonise the feeling of being pushed from a central place on the world stage to a marginal position at the periphery. Kohl wanted to help his friend Yeltsin, which was under growing internal opposition, and advocated successfully Moscow's participation and membership in the group of seven industrialized nations. Also in other areas Russia came closer to the West. The partnership and cooperation agreement between Russia and the EU was signed in 1994 and ratified in December 1997. Furthermore, the NATO-Russian founding act was enacted in the same year. With the end of 1998 Russia was integrated in NATO, EU, G7.[5] It seemed that Russia was successful integrated in the new world order, not least because of the German encouragement. While the political relations improved, the economy was always fundamental in the German-Russian relations. Mutual interests and interlacement were and are dominating the affairs. In 1971 the Deutsche Bank was the first western company which obtained the permission to open a branch in the Soviet Union.[6] Since 1973 West Germany purchased gas from Moscow. In the end of 1991, 20 billion euro worth of gas was imported.[7] After the fall of the wall different initiatives were launched to intensify the economic relations. Like the German-Russian Cooperation Council in 1992, to promote the bilateral trade

and economic collaboration. On the 5 March 1997 the German Chamber of Commerce was opened in Moscow.

The German government offered low interest rates for medium sized companies who wanted to invest in Russia through the *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* and the *Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft*. With special guarantees, so called *Hermes-Bürgschaften*, Bonn supported economic activities in Russia by giving investment protection against political risks.[8] The programmes showed success, in 2008 4.600 German companies were active in Russia.[9] Between 1991 and 2002 German banks gave credits in a volume of 11 billion dollars to the Russian market. German banks also provided financial consultants for acquisitions, foreign investments and initial public offerings.[10] The total turnover in trade amounted more than 53 billion euro in 2006. With 30,2 billion euro Russia stands on place number six of German imports, and with 23,4 billion euro on rank ten of exports.[11] Vice versa Germany is Russia's most important partner in foreign trade. The emphasis of Russian exports to Germany is connected to gas, oil and other raw materials. Germany is Russia's main costumer for energy products, and Russia is Germany's biggest energy supplier. The share of Russian gas to the German market grew constantly, from 1 percent in 1973, to 17 percent in 1980, 32 percent in 1990, to over 40 percent in 2004.[12]

This constant growing economical merge is embedded in close governmental relations. Since 1998 annual meetings on ministerial and governmental levels are held, alternating between Russia and Germany.[13] At a common meeting in June 2000 both sides declared to renew the relations and to develop a strategic partnership. In the sense of a long term orientated corporation between equal partners for mastering future tasks, which should also include a closer economic and political cooperation, and an intensified dialogue in different fields like civil society.[14]

In his speech at the German parliament the former president Putin spoke of real partnership and deepening of the relations between both nations. He also mentioned the friendship between Europe and Russia, and that Germany has a special function to bring Russia and Europe nearer to each other.[15]

The bilateral relations show an astounding stability and continuity, through all global and regional changes, conflicts and recessions – reinforced by 15 years of male bonding on the highest political level. Even if it seems that these times are gone, the relations remain friendly and trustworthy. The old lines of

policy continue also between chancellor Merkel and president Medvedev. In June 2008 Dmitry Medvedev officially visited Germany, as the first western country. Tone and form have changed, unlike the content, questions of energy security, strategic partnership, and economical cooperation dominate the political agenda, or like Medvedev said: „Nichts bringt Menschen näher als das Geschäft".[16] It seems that there are no problems in the bilateral relations. However, this status is not a natural one, it is mainly based on the consequent German unwillingness to engage in common problematic issues. Hotspots like Kosovo, Georgia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh were simply ignored, possible disputes on how to deal with Sudan, North Korea, Iran, or organisations related to Hamas remain unanswered. Covered were also the conflicts between Russia and other European member states. Berlin avoided nearly all discussions that could have provoked or offended Moscow.

Russian policy and German perception

There was no authentic critic or even activity on the highest political level against the first war in Chechnya, just lip service. Institutions like the Bundestag remained calm. Some parliamentarians organised meetings with critical groups and NGOs, but in fact the initiatives had no profound output.[17]

When Boris Yeltsin won the presidential election in 1996, because of the massive help of some oligarchs and their media companies, German politicians remained silent. They kept also quiet when a small clique despoiled the Russian state, all was subordinated under the goal of stability. Largely accepted without comment were also the violations of values like freedom of media and expression, a growing legal uncertainty, nationalization in the economy, the glorification of the past and a uncritical view of history, which reached the highest political level.[18] As long as military hardliners and right- and left-wing extremists were contained, Germany's interests were achieved. Differences in basic values between Germany and Russia are growing. Moscow claims own interpretation of democracy and some German politicians actually accept this gap.[19] Criticism is rejected as intervention in domestic affairs. The challenge of modernization and transformation is mainly understood as technical and economical, and not as a political problem. Real opposition or critical discussion is undesired, the Kremlin is not interested in free media and also not in

independent major enterprises. From the time when "Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it" is not much left – Russian leaders building their own Moscow-centred system.[20]

But trickier than the domestic political conditions, questions of democracy and human rights, is the economical situation – as Germany is Russia's main costumer for energy products. Whereby the main German concerns should not come from the rhetoric about a new "raw material superpower" or the struggle with Byelorussia and Ukraine over gas prices and oil delivery. More important are the facts about the technical status of the oil and gas industry. Essential is if Russia is able to cover the future requirements, as more than half of the pipeline network is older than 25 years, 89 percent of the conveyors is obsolete, and more than three-fourths of the known fossil preservation is already under exploitation.[21] According to the Russian energy strategy enormous investment are needed to secure the long term delivery: In the oil branch about 12 billion dollars the year and for the gas infrastructure nearly 10 billion.[22] A sufficient delivery is important for the export – which makes more than 50 percent of the state revenue – but also central for the domestic situation. More than two-thirds of the gas gathered in Russia is used in the inland.[23] The low cost for gas at its domestic market, which is just one-fifth of the world market price, leads to a massive dissipation.

Problematic is in fact if Russia can back the German and European future demand for gas and oil. Growing future needs but stagnating delivery – in this situation Russia launches different projects to verify its channels of distribution. The first project is a gas-pipeline which should connect the gas resources of East Siberia with China, Japan and South Korea, till 2015. The second one, the so-called Altai pipeline, should transport gas from West Siberia to China, starting from 2011. Since West Siberia is a main gas producing region for Europe, the activity stands in competition with German and European interests. New resources like the Shtokman field or the Yamal Peninsula will deliver at the earliest in 2013 to Europe. Medium-dated the Russian energy reserves shall be enough to fulfil the European and Chinese energy requirement, but from the current situation it is doubtful if the needed resources are accessed in time.[24] At the moment the EU, Germany and Russia are highly interwoven in their energy policy. Moscow needs the foreign currencies and the European

capitals gas and oil, a classical dependency. With the completion of the new energy projects this balance might change. Berlin, respectively the EU, have not found an adequate response yet. Mainly because of Russia's ability, like in the Nabucco pipeline, to avert all alternative projects.[25] The fact that Russia actively tries to change the existing state of dependence is not reflected, it seems to have no influence on the practical policy.

Critical is also that all important companies, which operate in the gas and oil sector, are directly or indirectly influenced by the Kremlin. The market is dominated by a few major (state controlled) enterprises. Private medium-sized businesses, which are essential for innovation and progress, are nearly completely out of the market. Thereby especially the privatization of such companies was an essential part of the Russian economic recovery and modernization. Additionally, potential investors also deal with an enormous shadow economy, and a corrupt police and justice system.[26]

A discordant triangle: Russia – Germany – EU

Moscow is more than just a "petrol station" or simply a market for Germany. Berlin is interested to associate Russia closely with European and Western structures. But the progress in bringing both sides together is limited, since the end of the 1990s they appear to drift apart.

In Russia's foreign policy the EU had just a very low profile, the organisation was not seen as a foreign policy and security actor in its own right.[27] Moscow was more interested in building strong bilateral relationship with major European players like France, Germany and Italy. In 1997 the EU and Russia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which provides profitable regulations in the economic field, stimuli for the advancement of direct investments, and a long term option for a possible free trade area. Both sides also agreed on semi-annual meetings at the highest level. But the expectations from this agreement remain unfulfilled. The documents have a quite unspecific character, without real obligations or duties.

In May 2003, at the St. Petersburg summit, both sides reinforced their cooperation and agreed to accelerate the process by creating four common spaces. A common economic space, mainly about free trade and collaborating in high technology, a common space for justice, internal security and freedom

including questions of democracy and human rights, a common space for external security including the possibility of Russian participation in ESVP, and a common space for culture, education and research.[28] Russia was more interested in speaking on trade, visa free travelling and liberalisation. The EU on her part was not willing to discuss these questions separate from democracy and the development of Russia.[29] In the end the negotiations got stuck, also the attempt to negotiate a new partnership agreement between both sides are in a dead-end road. Besides friendly words and charmed gestures, no results are to be expected in the next years. The situation is deadlocked, some states within the EU block any initiative, but also Russia is not so keen anymore to integrate in the Western community, and discusses questions of human rights and common values.

A quite similar picture can be seen in the topic of EU enlargement. The uncritical perception deviates to a sceptical position when possible problems of the process became visible. Russia was afraid for his Kaliningrad area, transit and visa questions. Some Russian analysts and politicians "saw the situation as a signal that behind the facade of declared EU-Russian partnership might be a hidden EU agenda to isolate Russia from the united Europe".[30] The enlargements in 2004 and 2007 changed the geopolitical situation. Brussels got direct borders with Byelorussia, Ukraine and Moldova, countries which Russia sees at its sphere of influence. Through a direct neighbourhood policy the EU tries to stabilise its eastern periphery, to reduce the economic gap and potential security risks. This engagement, which also includes states in the Caucasus, strengthen the Russian fears of isolation, to loose more of the traditional influence sphere in the EU, even in its own backyard. But in reality it was not the EU which needed to expand to the East, it were the countries in Central and Eastern Europe which wanted to join Europe as soon as possible, and for nearly every price. Now some CIS states are knocking on the European door, the only political actor in the region which promises stability, prosperity and democracy for them.

Russia's own efforts towards closer integration of the CIS failed, while it seemed for Moscow that the EU is becoming bigger and stronger.[31] After more than a decade of putative geopolitical defeat, Russia wants to react to actions which it sees as challenging its zone of interests. There is no common position towards these challenges, disagreement dominates also the question whether and when the Union should take the next step to the East.

The EU, as well as nearly all member states have no interest in escalating the situation with Russia. They try to tie – not only Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the South Caucasian states but also – Moscow in the European neighbourhood policy and the cross-border cooperation.[32] In some practical issues Russia and the EU succeeded, including the adoption of the most-favoured-nation clause in the trade relations, Russia's admission as a market economy through the EU, the regulation of the transit question to Kaliningrad, and the gradual adoption of the EU trade law into Russian trade law.

However, with the beginning of the new millennium all kind of negotiation processes became more difficult. Russia's behaviour changed, the new wealth limited the needs to make compromises or even to subordinate its interests on global level. Moscow sees itself as a major international player, back on the world map.[33] The results are growing tensions between Russia and the West, and both sides have an allotment on this development. At the level of factual decisions the USA does not care about Russian sensitivities, it seems that they seek an open geopolitical confrontation in the post-Soviet space.[34] The USA supported the revolution in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), which led to a regime change from pro-Russian to pro-Western governments. The Russian foreign minister blamed the West in this context to use "illegal methods" to provoke upheavals in the former Soviet Republics.[35] A hard conflict grows furthermore with the US plans for a National Missile Defence System, where some parts of it should be installed in Central and Eastern Europe.[36] The Russian defence minister warned for a new split of Europe in two blocks in this context, and that Russia would react with "asymmetric and cheaper countermeasures".[37]

In 2005 Russia transacted more than 48 percent of its external trade with the EU, 74 percent of the direct investments in Russia allotted to eight European countries. One third of the demanded gas for the EU comes from Gazprom. Russia exported goods to the EU with a value of more than 104 billion dollars. The Russian export to the USA amounts round 6 billion dollars, the US contingent of direct investments in Russia is just 4,3 percent.[38] Economically the EU, Germany and Russia are much higher integrated than Russia with the USA, and this tendency accelerates. Good, or at least pragmatic relations to Moscow are much more needed for European states than for the USA, simply because for economical but also of geographical reasons. It makes a difference if the conflict is at the own front door or if continents are in between.

Furthermore, on the continent serious rifts appear between some European states and Russia. Moscow reacts allergic, even rude to every critique and instruction from Warsaw, which led to a circle of growing tensions, and even an embargo of Polish goods. After the riots in Tallinn and besieging of the Estonian embassy in Moscow for one week, also the relations between the smallest Baltic country and Russia are high tensioned. Furthermore Russia had in the last year's trade conflicts with Moldova and Georgia, gas disputes with Byelorussia and Ukraine, and permanent conflicts with the Baltic states on Russian minorities, transit questions, and different interpretations of history which lead to growing subliminal tensions.

Additional burdening for the EU-German-Russian relation is the Nord Stream Project. EU members claimed that they would be ignored, and Germany would just follow its own egoistic interests. They remind the principal of solidarity in Europe, the common values which bind, and criticised the alleged special relation between Germany and an authoritarian Russia.[39] Critics fear that this project will enable Russia to separate EU countries. With direct pipelines to Germany and Western Europe, Russia could deal differently with Western European and Eastern European countries simultaneously. The pipeline is seen as a potential tool for an increasingly authoritarian regime, for energy blockade and for energy power politics.[40] A fact which is not completely understood by all partners, which puts even higher tensions on the discordant triangle.

Future Prospects

Germany is the European country which collected the biggest capital in trust in Russia in the last decades. Especially with the fall of the Berlin wall the bilateral relations in the cultural, economical, political and security field made an immense progress, and it is in particular the economical interlacing which is still highly dynamic and prosperous. Also the political relations are close and trustworthy, but it seems that the times of increasing convergence have past. Whereby Berlin's policy of stabilisations and integration was largely successful, the chaos of the Yeltsin years seems to be ages ago. With giving credits or convert debts, financial aid, economical assistance, consultancy, advocacy and other kinds of support German politicians did everything, within the realms of possibility, to prevent destabilization to its East. Also Russia's participation

and membership in different international organisations like NATO, EU or G7 were successfully advocated. But the alleged integration is in fact just a formal one. Real partnership and dialogue does not develop. With the beginning of the new millennium Russia and parts of the western community lost their interest in a further integration. The project of rapprochement to the west as condition for a modernization of Russia and a westernization of the political culture ended. Policy reprobates to ceremony, democracy and free elections are just simulated.

It seems that for the foreseeable future, the idea to integrate Russia in the western sphere and to promote democracy failed, a possible diagnosis which remains widely unreflected in the German political strategy, as it would counteract the political efforts of the last years.[41] Moscow left the western sphere and tries to create an own system, changes whose consequences are not properly analysed. Especially the two main German parties, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, have problems to define a policy referring the new circumstances. The old romantic view of Russia and the thinking in political categories from the 1990s continues.[42] German chancellor Angela Merkel, grown up in East Germany during the Soviet occupation, is more "sceptical about Russia's democratic prospects as well as their human rights record and seems to share many of the post-Soviet states' anti-Russian sentiments", than her ancestors Kohl and Schröder. But still she "fully appreciates the opportunities that German and European businesses have in the fast-growing Russian economic market. She thus remains committed to the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia".[43] How a real strategic partnership should develop, when both sides have different targets in mind, persists obscure. It is more likely that varying intentions and expectations led to growing frictions in the bilateral relations.

Additional tensions increase in the triangle: Russia – Germany – EU. Russia and the EU are difficult partners, a lot of projects were initiated just a few had success. The most are held on ice, rapid progress is unlikely, a longer adjournment in the negotiations seems to be necessary.

What not means to stop all efforts, a creative restart is necessary. But Moscow sees the EU increasingly as a geopolitical challenge and has no interest to strengthen the community. Quarrels with other EU members, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, complete the delicate picture. Germany its low

profile in this region complicates the dilemma.[44] The target to integrate Russia in European structures will need much more time. Europe would need to speak with one voice, as one player, but conflicting interests are paralysing the community. Especially in the energy sector every state tries to push its own national community of interests. Russia searches bilateral agreements and finds European partners. If German, French, Italian or Austrian companies, all are willing to tout for Gazprom's favour.

Without a doubt it is possible to cooperate with difficult partners, but German politicians should hold no illusions about the boundaries of such a liaison. There is no alternative to a constructive partnership between Moscow and Berlin, too short memory will not suffice the Russian phenomena. But German politicians should find a strategy which realistically looks at the new Russian power politics and at its consequences. For the moment both sides face an interdependent situation, which brings mutual certainties. Nevertheless, the relations become problematic if one partner tries to change this equilibrium at expense of the other.

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