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YEARBOOK
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The *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook* aims to provide a wide picture of the main fields of Political Science in Lithuania – Political Theory, Institutional Design, Electoral Process, Public Policy and Public Administration, International Relations and related disciplines. However, it is by no means limited to publications on Lithuania or by Lithuanian authors. Contributions are welcome both from Lithuania and abroad.

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PREFACE

We are happy to present the seventh volume of the *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook*. The present volume of the *Yearbook* follows the previously employed structure and principles. The main topic of this volume is the Quality of democracy in Lithuania and other post-communist countries after almost two decades of transformation. Francis Fukuyama in 1991 in his seminal study declared “the end of history” and interpreted the sudden collapse of communism as the extinction of any viable alternatives to the worldwide ideologies of liberal democracy and market capitalism. The political processes following the decay of communism have proved that such optimism was unsound. Today the scholars, including the authors of this volume, declare “the end of the transition paradigm”. One of the focuses of this topic is the impact of globalization on the prospects of liberal democracy. Dr. Vytautas Radžvilas concludes that the present problematic situation of liberal democracy is a logical and consistent result of the project of modernization and globalization as its new radical stage.

According to Dr. Vaidutis Laurėnas, populism is a result of democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism. Populism is an inescapable aspect of political life. However in the Lithuanian case it can step on a dangerous line, and the ability to govern the state democratically may be lost.

Dr. Irmina Matonytė and William E. Crowther concentrate on analyzing the parliamentary elites in Lithuania and Moldova. In both countries numerous representatives of the *nomenklatura* have survived and managed to adapt to the new political conditions.

In addition, the reader of this *Yearbook* is invited to reflect on the relationships between art and politics, the perception of Muslims minorities in Europe.

The *Yearbook* continues analysis of the public policy and public administration issues. This time, the topic deals with the process of inter-

ests' representation of the subnational level actors in the EU governance system.

The part on International Relations and Euroatlantic Integration is rich in its diversity of academic insights. Here, the contributors to the *Yearbook* analyze the energy security challenges and perspectives in Lithuania, regional identities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and reflect on the constructivist debates in Lithuania.

**THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY
AFTER YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION**

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, GLOBALIZATION AND THE PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY IN LITHUANIA

Vytautas Radžvilas

Abstract. After the restoration of the Lithuania's independence, legal and institutional conditions were established to ensure the democratic rule. Although Lithuania is formally a democratic state, it has not yet become a mature and effective democracy. The article attempts to show that the difficulties of the spread of democracy in Lithuania are determined not only by post-totalitarian and domestic factors. Although democratic regimes are spreading throughout the whole world, the symptoms of decline and even crisis of liberal democracy are clearly visible. They are characteristic not only of the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, but also of Western countries with their old traditions of democracy. The origins of these tendencies should be looked for in Western-type modernization. The global postmodernity of our days should be regarded as the latest and the radical period in the realization of this project. Under global conditions, a significant complex of factors has exerted their destructive effects on modern democracy, and the ambiguous impact of the process of globalization on the development of democracy is becoming ever more visible.

1. Challenges of Democracy in Lithuania and Worldwide

The historical turning points of the past century have been critical to Lithuania. The occupation that had been lasting for fifty years ended. The country not only recovered its independence, but also became an equal member of the global community of states. By efforts of another ten years, it acceded the EU and NATO and entered into the cultural and geopolitical area of Western world, thus becoming formally a part thereof. Belonging to this world shall in fact mean that Lithuania is a state with its internal life based on values of Western civilization as well as with political and economical layers of its life based on principles of liberal democracy and of

free market. At first sight, changes that have occurred in its political and public life within almost two decades suggest that Lithuania is a successful and excellent example of the “third wave” democracy as proclaimed by many authors. Right after the reinstatement of the statehood, the basic human and civic rights and freedoms were established in the Constitution and in laws as well as the juridical and institutional foundations of democratic ruling were laid. Thus, one could absolutely expect that those victories would be entrenched and developed further as well as that the very development and consolidation of democracy would be irreversible.

Unfortunately, these expectations are still hardly coming true. After Lithuania re-established its statehood, first changes of public and political life, which should have been worrying, came to light soon. Disappointment about the independence was quickly spreading and intensifying. The revolutionary enthusiasm and uplift of the period of liberation were replaced by moral and political indifference and stagnation which settled over the masses. Soon the first signs of weakness of the institutional basis of democracy manifested. Over time, those signs were increasing and becoming more and more obvious. Constantly increasing distrust in major institutions of the state government, parties, and in the democratic political system as a whole became a direct manifestation of disappointment with political life of the country. For quite a long time, such trends were considered as inevitable “childhood diseases” of political life and democracy. Consequently, it was a belief that one just needed to get through them and that eventually they would disappear almost by themselves. Therefore, even the signs of the start of collapse of democracy’s foundations were seen, almost nothing was done to reinforce them.

Consequences of the naïve belief in the inherent power of democracy and in its triumph are already obvious. Although faithfulness to the basic principles and values of democracy is officially declared, many features of the country’s political life, especially the easily noticeable signs of oligarchic ruling, suggest that the simulated “managed democracy” – a specific simulacrum of Western liberal democracy – has insensibly entrenched the country. It makes one to be doubtful and worrisome about the future of Lithuanian democracy as well as about the perspectives of its establishment and development.

Such mood is evoked and maintained by many facts revealing the situation of the political life of Lithuania. Inner life and activities of political parties are affluent with manifestations of degradation and even of degeneration. No party operating in the country is following any at least a bit clearer ideological and programmed principles. They are experiencing scandals of political corruption¹. Before each elections, there occur one-day populist confluences, which call themselves "parties" and which participate successfully in the elections. Later, such confluences disappear quickly. Within fifteen years, any stable party system has failed to form in the country². Sociological polls show that parties in Lithuania are distrusted more than in the neighbouring countries. They also reveal other facts that negatively describe the political life of the country: over a half of residents value negatively the operation of democracy; almost a half thereof finds no sense in participation in elections; among the countries of Eastern Europe that have chosen the democratic direction, Lithuania is constantly distinguishing for its great number of citizens who long for the non-democratic regime of "strong arm"³.

A big, lasting, undoubtedly systemic crisis of the political and party system, which has happened to Lithuania, makes one to examine differently the issue of perspectives of democracy in the country, that is, much more seriously and deeper than before. For the meantime, these perspectives are viewed very inconsistently: as one pointed description of the country's political system says, "although internationally the Lithuanian state is viewed as a country of consolidated democracy and of consolidated market economy, its democracy is not effective yet"⁴. Consequently, this issue should also become a subject of solid academic researches. Undoubtedly, it cannot remain the issue of pure internal politics: it has to be analyzed in the wider context of globalization and of its effect on the global development of democracy.

After some deeper deliberations, an often-reiterated idea that upon its return to the Western world Lithuania has automatically joined the area of values of liberal democracy is much doubtful and not as persuasive as it might seem at first sight. That is so because the situation and perspectives of democracy are problematic in not only the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which undergo post-communist transformation: it was

admitted quite long ago that Western societies had also entered a new – post-modern – stage of their development. Such societies are undergoing big, ambiguous changes the further direction and long-range consequences of which are difficult to envisage. These changes are occurring in political life as well. Not accidentally, three decades ago, more provident social and political theorists (some of them even earlier) already started hesitating whether liberal democracy and the rule of law, which embodied it, was a great and glorious, however, short episode of Western history⁵. Now this question is a major and no longer marginal subject of many specialized researches. It is not necessary to prove the existence of this problem because it is evidenced by many examples of political reality. One just need to remember the long ago admitted and widely discussed “deficit of democracy”, which troubles the European Union and impairs the legitimacy of this super-state formation and institutions its. According to L. Siedentop, a prominent researcher of European integration processes, “... what might be called the crisis of European integration – the issue of democracy in Europe – is at the same time a crisis of liberal political thinking”⁶.

If to look even more widely, the situation of democracy is complicated and controversial throughout the world. The “third wave of democracy” of the late past century has obviously abated. The prophecy of F. Fukuyama about the coming global triumph of liberal democracy has not fulfilled: one’s hopes to see it are at best postponed *sine die*. It is too little to say that efforts to entrench everywhere the model of Western democracy are fiercely resisted. The very resistance is just a bare empirical fact, the significance of which can be understood and evaluated only after revealing deep causes of this resistance. The present state of democracy first makes us to remember one dispute which took place a century ago. An urge by W. Wilson, the US President, to make the world a safe place for democracy was rebutted by famous German philosopher M. Scheller saying that it is nonetheless important to protect the world against democracy⁷. This controversy of two prominent men reflects figuratively and straightly the very core of the problem. Usually, one tries to conceal it by invoking convenient ideological-propaganda clichés which pervert and simplify its essence. Most often, one recurs to the old, quotidian argument that resistance to development of democracy is just a sign of the obsolete, conservative, reactive, and even

ativistic thinking. However, the weight of this “argument” is much reduced by the abovementioned tendencies of erosion of democracy in Western countries. What is more – the inherent and unsurpassable values of democracy and its universalism are questioned increasingly: it is long before as these doubts cannot be rebutted by the famous phrase that democracy is *ipso facto* justified as it is the best form of ruling among all known bad ones.

Such is the context – polysemantic and controversial – in which one has to analyse the state and future of democracy in Lithuania. After the country became part of the Western world, its development and prospects are being increasingly determined by the interaction of twofold factors, *i.e.* global and local ones. This article aims at dealing with these factors and with their impact on the development and quality of Lithuanian democracy.

2. Globalization and its Impact on the Prospects of Democracy

It is universally accepted that accelerating globalization the whirlpool of which has sucked in the countries that are undergoing post-communist transformation, is influencing increasingly the processes of democratization. However, this fact raises to researches many theoretical and methodological difficulties which should be overviewed first.

Although the world “globalization” is common and fashionable, its definitions and conceptions found in academic literature are especially polysemantic and vague. A work, which generalizes authoritatively prior studies of globalization, defines preliminarily the process of globalization as follows: “Globalization may be thought of initially as the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to criminal, the financial to the spiritual”⁸. Right there this description is expanded and “specified”: “Accordingly, globalization can be thought of as *a process (or a set of processes), which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power*”⁹. Undoubtedly, it is a very

abstract and formal concept of globalization. It described globalization by invoking the widest parameters of space and time which could be used to define any reality. Therefore, the description lacks precision as well as the specific content and “essence” disappears from the definition. Perhaps most obviously this deficiency is uncovered by the not very successful attempt to make this process periodic with its origins even in times of early civilizations¹⁰.

Even a quick overview of the literature that analyzes problems of globalization allows us to see much disagreement among researchers on all material issues. These disagreements are so big and essential that they have allowed appearance of different streams or schools of interpreters of globalization. The causes of globalization are explained very differently in papers of their spokesmen. The evaluation of globalization is also controversial. In sum, it may be stated that in researches of globalization one can easily see a gap between the “phenomenology” of this process and its “essence”, *i.e.* numerous empirical descriptions, and analysis of its various aspects poorly reveals the nature and drives of this process as well as long-term perspectives and consequences of its spread. Therefore, fundamental duality and controversy are typical of explanations and evaluations of the process of globalization. Ongoing disputes whether globalization is the progress or regress from the point of view of historic development of the mankind are perhaps the most obvious manifestation of that. Perspectives of their resolution are still vague because opinions of its zealous apologists and harsh opponents are rather diverging than closing.

Without getting into the peripeteias of this dispute, we note that the progress–regress dilemma involves all aspects of the course of globalization. It also follows from discussions about perspectives of democracy in the contemporary world which is becoming more global. On the one hand, the “third wave” of democratization that came in the late past century determined democracy’s expansion into all regions of the world. As the “mode”¹¹ of democracy was spreading rapidly, the number of states which denied principally the form of democratic ruling and did not have formal mechanisms and procedures of such management was decreasing. It is this massive “democratization” that has been feeding optimistic expectations about the supposedly coming global triumph of Western democracy. Proph-

esies of F. Fukuyama should be first deemed as a symbol of such expectations. Bright perspectives of democracy are directly related with globalization. It is maintained that exactly globalization is the most important factor determining the process of democratization. However, there also exist highly critical interpretations and evaluations of the impact of globalization on the development of democracy¹². According to proponents of this approach, only “façade” democracy exists in the Western world; therefore, it is naïve to expect that the model of Western democracy will ever entrench globally.

There is little hope to resolve this dispute in the field of academic studies of globalization, by referring to “undisputable” theoretical and empirical arguments. A review of the relevant literature reveals a really complicated and controversial view of the state of democracy in the contemporary world. On the one hand, many researchers admit that the crisis of democracy and liberal constitutional rule is increasing. It is also necessary to emphasize that some authors consider this crisis to be the consequence of “unlimited democracy”¹³. It is stated that this “unlimited democracy” is close to collapse and there is raised a task to revive democracy under new conditions or, as R. A. Dahl says, “the democratic process is to be adapted once again to the world”. Thus, few have any doubts regarding the manifestations of the crisis of democracy and the need to overcome it. However, it seems that there is much less understanding of how to deal with this problem. According to the author quoted above, “whatever form it takes, the democracy of our successors will not and cannot be the democracy of our predecessors. Nor should it be, because the limit and possibilities of democracy in the world we can only dimly foresee are certain to be radically unlike the limits and possibilities of democracy in any previous time or place”¹⁴. There is no lack of researchers who are trying to catch the contours of this future democracy. By their efforts, even several models of global democracy have been created: visions of liberal internationalism, radical republicanism, and cosmopolite democracy¹⁵. The word “visions” is proper here because all these conceptions of democracy are “normative” in a bad sense. In fact, they provide for the attractive ideal of future democracy or at least for its desirable condition. However, after a more careful examination of the contents of these visions, one finds them rather remind-

ing of Utopian projects because they explain little who and how could implement this ideal.

Nevertheless, the deficiencies of such “models” of global democracy, especially their Utopian nature, are rarely accepted, to say nothing of serious and critical deliberations. Ideological rhetoric about the insurmountable value of democracy and about its almost independent and inevitable development surrenders quite easily. Thus, the important question of what could be an alternative to the democratic development of the world is often missed. Such question would be a pure stimulus to remember things which over-ideological ambassadors of democracy tend to forget. Although the concept of “totalitarian democracy” was created in the 20th century, in fact, its possibility had been already foreseen by A. de Tocqueville who in his work had warned about temptations and dangers of egalitarian democracy and of “paternal and patronizing authority” originating in such democracy: “...It is much easier to create the absolute and despotic ruling in a country where equality dominates than in any other country... One must be very beware of despotism at times of democracy”¹⁶. This approach is not the only one. In her famous work “The Origins of Totalitarianism”, H. Arendt warns about the illusion that totalitarian ruling is the past which cannot come back, and reminds that temptation to recur to it lies deeply in the very nature of modern societies: “Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations, which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economical misery in a manner worthy of man”¹⁷. From this point of view, an insight by another author, Ch. Coker, is especially valuable. He maintains that modes of democratic and totalitarian ruling have derived from the same source – modern “transcendental philosophy”: democracies were striving to create the future from the bottom up to the top, whereas the totalitarian world from the top down to the bottom¹⁸. This brief, well-pointed description of the situation has a deep implication which makes one to pause. After all, it says or, to be more specific, warns that fierce ideological disputes or even conflicts between democracy and totalitarianism can be just a kind of “family scenes” which mislead an onlooker and conceal the common origin and deep similarities of these ideologies. It would mean that perhaps these allegedly incompatible modes of ruling are just different methods for organizing and

standardizing the social and political reality and that these methods are based on the same ontological and moral assumptions and attitudes.

Thus, irresolvable cognitive and moral antinomies are chasing as a shadow the studies of globalization and democracy. Therefore, when attempting to escape these traps, it is important to choose a proper research strategy and to find at least slightly reliable reference points and criteria for analysis and evaluation. The idea that these processes are the aspects of the project of modernization which has been implemented and developed already for a few centuries – the thread that relates the processes of modern globalization and democratization, – could perhaps be such first methodological reference and milestone of research. The Education Project, an ambitious programme of total “liberation” of a person, created already in the 18th century, should be considered as a symbol of strivings of the modernity. The programme was aimed at “liberating man not only in a narrow economic and political but also in cultural and religious sense”¹⁹. Today’s globalization should be viewed as an especial, highly radical stage of implementation of this project. Therefore, perhaps the main characteristic, the “essence” of the process of globalization is not its external features which are best seen and pointed out most often, but the accelerating and radicalizing course of modernisation – change and transformation of the concept of reality. Radicalism and especially its intensifying unpredictable and uncontrollable nature allow a meaningful distinction between “globalisation” and “globalism”. Here globalism should be understood as the most radical form of globalization. As it unfolds, the metaphysical and social preconditions of the project of modernization, its inner logics, drives, as well as its potential effect to the future of the mankind are uncovered. When viewing this project through the prism of globalistic perspective, the project can be seen as something much more than a mere experiment of social engineering. Its essence is anthropological engineering which can turn to reality the philosophy of “the death of man” which has been declared already in the past century. The public objective of the project of modernization is liberation of man and of his creative powers from constraints of tradition. A real and increasingly distinct consequence of this intention is the extinguishing of the human form that has been entrenched by Western Christian tradition. The nature of man becomes increasingly “open” and “flexible”. Man himself is turning into the demonic nothingness.

Thus, the distinction between globalization and globalism not only allows a better perception of the essence of the process of globalization, but also it should be considered as an important heuristic reference which helps to analyse and to value more adequately trends of development of democracy in the today's world.

3. Modern Democracy as Implementation of the Project of Modernization

When analysing the global factors that support or destruct democracy, one is first interested in links between modern democracy and the national state as well as in their changes under today's conditions. The pessimistic approach to the future of democracy is first of all based on statements that the process of globalization undermines the cultural, economic, social and legal preconditions of the national state. Such preconditions largely are the fundamental assumptions of the existence and survival of democracy itself. Nevertheless, in order to reveal more adequately the situation and perspectives of democracy in the epoch of globalization, it is not enough to analyze these links alone: the topics and problems of the research must be extended. In our opinion, four fundamental, closely interrelated concepts – *individual, national state, nation and society* – should be deemed as the reference points in researches of different aspects of modern globalization. All these concepts emerged simultaneously with modernity. They are the framework and the core of theoretical self-consciousness of the epoch of modernity. The modern conception of democracy is a derivative of these concepts, while existence of an individual, national state, nation and society was a precondition of formation and establishment of the Western model of liberal democracy, which started spreading in the 19th century. The content of these fundamental concepts has much changed in the contemporary epoch of post-modern mind. In fact, they have been “deconstructed”. As globalization intensifies, signs of decline and decay of these foundations of modernity are also coming to light. Therefore, although the “mode” of democracy is spreading throughout the world, the perspectives of its survival have become vague and problematic as never before.

Nevertheless, the role of these elements and of their interaction ensuring democracy can be understood only after extension of the conceptual

framework of the analysis, that is, by invoking another concept – the concept of *representation*. It is this concept that allows unification and giving sense to the “complex” of the abovementioned four concepts, which describes the general preconditions of the existence of democracy, but which almost never helps to understand the deep factors and inner mechanism determining its emergence and decay. Reference to the concept of representation is legitimate at least because formally representation is the core of parliamentary democracy. Anyhow, when democracy is conventionally defined as the “rule of people”, the question of democracy turns actually into a question whether the will of “people”, this dual and weird construct, can be represented “existentially” (here, E. Voegelin’s classification of types of representation fits perfectly) under today’s conditions. After all, decline of representation – the wane of distinction between the principal and an agent (in fact, the wane of distinction between the state, political parties, representatives and a citizen, and society) should not only be considered as the source of today’s political problems, but also as a sign of the crisis of democracy.

The concept of representation is also relevant as the basis and pivot for further deliberations because it allows narrowing and specification of the problem of the prospects of democracy in Lithuania under analysis. It can also be formulated as the issue of political representation – its assumptions and spread in the epoch of modernity and in the present epoch of global post-modernity.

Although in academic literature there are plenty of attempts to question the individualistic attitude which has been dominating social and political theory for a long time, in many cases the “individual” is still an irreplaceable point of reference for analysis. The origin and development of the concept of individual is still a subject of academic disputes. Although many researchers agree that its origins are Christian²¹, the modern individualism is soundly considered as a unique phenomenon of the history of the world’s civilizations. According to A. MacIntyre, the real “discoverers” of the modern individual are N. Machiavelli and M. Luther: “in works of both authors, there emerges a figure that had not existed in the moral theories of Plato and Aristotle times – the “individual”²². The concept of individual was also known in the medieval culture; however, it differed much from the modern one: “at best, what we meet here is the individual

as a moral status or role. It is not yet a social status or role because there is no institution like the state available to create and protect the rights which sustain the role of the individual”.²³ Without attempting to discuss more widely characteristics of a the modern individual, we will note only the fact that its very concept is highly controversial and even paradoxical. On the one hand, such individual is undoubtedly not a living creature “of flesh and blood”. It is the same theoretic construction and abstraction as the “atom” of modern physics. To be more modern, an individual is a “virtual” being, the unknown and mysterious *X* which can never be cognized directly. It is the centre of power, and the only “evidence” of its presence is a trace of trajectory of “self”, according to the figured description of A. Giddens²⁴. On the other hand, it is considered as the ontological source of reality because it is actually endowed with the power to create *ex nihilo* and because the basis of its disparate moral autonomy and value is its constant transcendental and lonely presence in front of God²⁵. Political thinking of the new ages and later the political ruling found these implications of the concept of individual to be equally controversial and paradoxical. They have started emerging already in the political theory of Th. Hobbes. There can be easily seen assumptions and possibilities of both the democratic and totalitarian rule.

According to L. Siedentop, the modern conception of the individual opened the way for the “discourse of the civic society”, which “introduced a primary role or status – that of the individual, a role shared by all equally... In that sense this discourse distanced its morally equal agents from particular social roles... By providing means for the critical evaluation of inherited social roles, this discourse became a revolutionary instrument – creating, in due course, an unprecedented kind of society in Europe, a democratic society”²⁶. To tell the truth, although this “democratic equality of members of society” in political philosophy of Th. Hobbes first supposes equal right and opportunities to fight for the highest positions of authority, it does not prevent in principle the democratic and enforceable ruling based on peaceful elections.

However, it is not the only opportunity. As L. Dumont notes pointedly about Hobbesian political philosophy, it reveals “the profound paradox of a mechanistic view of the human animal issuing in the forceful demonstra-

tion of the necessity of sovereignty and subjection; the vindication, that is, of the *Herrschaft* model on a purely empirical, atomistic, and equalitarian basis; and, as a result, the identification of the Individual with the Sovereign..."²⁷ The "*Herrschaft* model" mentioned in the quotation undoubtedly is the early prototype of the future model of totalitarian rule while the "Individual" is the prototype of the "Big Brother". The following insight by H. Arendt helps to uncover the deep meaning of these analogies: "The modern age not only produced at its very start a new and radical political philosophy – Hobbes is only one example, though perhaps the most interesting – it also produced for the first time philosophers willing to orient themselves according to the requirements of the political realm... It can be said that Hegel's transformation of metaphysics into a philosophy of history was preceded by an attempt to get rid of metaphysics for the sake of a philosophy of politics".²⁸ The author's idea is clear: emerged "orientation of philosophers according to the requirements of the political realm" and "attempt to get rid of metaphysics for the sake of a philosophy of politics" means that the political theory tries to take over one of the most important functions and perhaps the most important one of metaphysics, that is, to establish criteria and parameters of reality and certainty. In fact, it means that it is performed by the sovereign who embodies and represents all power of Leviathan. With the help of his adopted laws and rules, this Great Individual calls to order a natural individual, this chaotic bundle of passions, by giving him a publicly significant form, *i.e.* by means of political authority providing him with a shape of a "socialized" and "humanized" creature. Therefore, the slight specification of A. MacIntyre's proposition that after a modern individual is born it is the first time when "the Absolute Individual faces the Absolute State"²⁹ makes some sense. This proposition can be reformulated as a "thesis of identity": the Absolute Individual *identifies* himself with the Absolute State. Perhaps this equation is a formula of totalitarian ruling. Moreover, it allows viewing differently the very problem of democracy and globalization. It comes clear that the major problem of modern democracy is not only the issue of the form of political rule, its advantages and disadvantages to which actually the conventional theory of democracy used to restrict. The modern democratic rule has also the ontological but not only the political layer because first it is a means and tool of

ruling over reality. Perhaps the “essence” of the process of democracy is not accelerating the development of the network of global communications, but rather its basis is increasingly radical and drastic attempts to create the “new world” by changing recklessly the parameters of reality.

That is why the theory of Th. Hobbes, the father of modern political philosophy, can be treated as both individualistic and holistic³⁰ what allows inferring that presuppositions and opportunities of both forms of ruling – democratic and totalitarian – are “coded” in the nature of the modern society and politics. The excesses of totalitarian democracy in the 20th century are just the embodiments of these opportunities.

Surely, those opportunities were realized only upon big changes of the very conception of the individual. According to A. B. Seligman, this conception has been constantly being made immanent and secular: in the 18th century, transcendental reasoning of the moral autonomy and value of an individual, which had been still prevailing in the 16th–17th centuries, was replaced by a transcendent vision of Mind which constituted the individuality³¹. That was a halfway towards the purely “socialized” conception of the individual. According to it, man is just an animal which does not have a transcendental dimension, or according to the famous proposition of K. Marx, “... the essence of man is not an abstraction belonging to a separate individual. In its reality, it is a totality of social relationships”³². Undoubtedly, this definition is a formula of the coming total and final “deconstruction” of the individual. In different layers of modern socio-cultural reality, such “deconstruction” took place rather unevenly and acquired different shapes. For example, the act of separation of *ego* and the author as performed by A. Rimbaud was its manifestation in literature³³. However, in spite of the twists and inconsistencies of that trend, “deconstruction” of the individual was inevitable and irresistible. As mentioned above, the “individual” is never disclosing himself directly – he does that only through its formal roles or functions. He can be perceived as a “carrier” of such functions and even as the virtual, *i.e.* the only conceivable centre or point of their convergence. Consequently, any function through which he manifests himself as a “sign” does not get us closer to his “real” essence. Moreover, the question of his existence is even no longer important; therefore, in the 19th century that individual or “self” was easily

“deconstructed” as an empty and outdated relic of metaphysic thinking and as a senseless theoretical fiction.

However, the consequences of the decay of that “relic” were enormous, even fatal. That was so because in parallel to “deconstruction” of the individual, all other supports of socio-political reality of modernity were also decaying.

The links between the individual and the state perhaps are best explored and most obvious. The concept of the “state” is an invention of N. Machiavelli. The national state is a new form of management, which developed in the times of modernity (from the 15th to 17th century). Its most important feature is modernity³⁴. The thesis of identity of the Absolute Individual and the Absolute State as formulated earlier means that the individual and the state are interconnected as well as similar in their depth. They both carry an indelible sign of the “transcendental” origin. The ontological primordial nature of the individual and the unlimited sovereignty of the state are in fact the same – the power to create *ex nihilo* and to inchoate unlimitedly new forms of reality: “There is no logical limit... to the degree of innovation in a society with a state”.³⁵ That interconnection of the individual and the state could give rise to a new “quantitative” democracy which is in fact different from “qualitative” democracy, its antique predecessor never being egalitarian and always having its aristocratic layer. According to L. Siedentop, “the emergence of the doctrine of state sovereignty introduced a new model of society in Europe, carrying with it something we now take for granted, an egalitarian model of society — society understood as a collection of individuals”³⁶. It is the sovereignty of the state that enables emergence of the above-discussed primary role of the individual. Therefore, here the state forms and creates him as well as performs one of the most important functions – it “socializes” a natural individual. In sum, the relationship between the absolute, unlimitedly sovereign state realizing and disseminating its transcendental nature and the absolute individual, is the basis for the entire political structure of the modern West.

The modern state is a transcendental formation, the synthesis of “form” and “matter”. The source of its potentially universal political form is doctrines of sovereignty and of equality of all subordinates or citizens before the sovereign. This form is turned into real upon its embodying in some

material “substrate” – pre-modern ethnical formations, which are gradually transformed into modern nations. Consequently, in fact, the modern state is the national one: it not only emerges as a dual ethno-political formation, but also creates the very modern nation. Such nation is not a “natural” community of people in the same sense as natural things have been perceived until modern times. The origins of the modern European nation should be looked for in the Renaissance when the first uprisings against all prior traditions of cultural and national life started. According to the well-pointed remark by J.-F. Lyotard, the modern nation forms like “people” because it is a socio-cultural and political community constructed reflexively and based on a new type of “knowledge”, that is, on scientific one. “Surely, what is called here “people” is totally different from traditional narrative knowledge”³⁷. The nature of this community is perhaps described best by the concept of “imagined community”³⁸ made popular by B. Anderson. The national state, which has been forming at that time, provided it with political certainty and with a stable form.

Both the development of the national state and the turn of traditional “natural” ethnos into artificial communities – modern nations – took much time. On the other hand, the artificial nature of those establishments determined their fragility and transience. They also had to be “deconstructed” and “transgressed”, what happened in the end of the 19th century. In her work “The Origins of Totalitarianism”, H. Arendt described comprehensively the destructive effect of colonial imperialism (as emerged at that time) on the national state and of racial thought (as became popular) on the conception of nation³⁹.

Here, however, we find relevant only the effects of such “deconstruction” on democracy. The national state embodies the principle of egalitarian democracy and is based thereon. Consequently, there exists an inevitable question whether the emerged tendencies of its decay are not a sign of irreversible decline and stagnation of democracy or, more broadly, of politics in general. To tell the truth, the prospective “end of politics” was foreseen already in the 19th century by K. Marx who had impatiently been waiting for it to come true.⁴⁰ Answers to that very important and nonetheless difficult question were searched for later as well. C. Schmitt, a famous philosopher of politics and theorist of constitutional law of the past cen-

ture, was the first to analyse it in the context of the theory of political representation. Not only he, but also other authors turned their attention to how paradoxical from the point of view of representation were the following formations: national state and the very “authority of people”. The underlying insight of C. Schmitt is the fact that only persons and personalized ideas can be represented⁴¹. Consequently, the first hitch of representation is clear. The modern individual, who is an abstract construction and a fiction of political thought of the new ages, is certainly not a person. A state formed by such individuals – Hobbesian Leviathan – is not a natural form of human life or some living Greek city-state. A modern state is just a mechanism – an artificial machine which cannot be represented: “As soon as the State becomes a Leviathan it vanishes from the sphere of representation”.⁴² Another hitch of representation is the primordial dualism of the modern political nation, or “people”, its capability to be simultaneously the subject and the object of power. C. Schmitt described this paradox in terms of law: a nation is a primal body of authority, which creates the parliament as the secondary body without which, however, it has “no will”: “The two juridical persons are but one person and constitute two organs but one person – and so forth.”⁴³ J.-F. Lyotard describes slightly differently this paradox or rather a vicious circle in which not only representation, but also the entire political life of the modernity is captured: his language is more philosophical and more political. “People” formed during modernity are a new “socio-political” subject”; these “people are disputing among themselves what is right... and what is wrong...”⁴⁴ From here, the insurmountable “dialectics” of authorities, which makes dual and controversial the very idea of democratic representation, arises: “The modern state is legitimated by people, and the state in turn, hiding behind the interests of the nation ... takes over directly the teaching of “people” and directs it to the path of progress”⁴⁵.

Seemingly this brief overview of the problem of representation and of paradoxes lying in it allows stating that the origins of self-destruction lie in the nature of modern democracy and even of the state. However, this spring has not been discovered at once. Modern political theory has made a long way from Th. Hobbes to K. Marx. It is hard to believe, but the author of “Leviathan” at the beginning of that way was writing: “Nothing created by

the mortal can be eternal; however, if people followed their mind of which they are boasting so much, their states would be protected at least against internal diseases”⁴⁶. After remembering the prophecies and expectations of K. Marx, we must state that in the end of the way the first intention of this theory to design almost an eternal state not only runs out of steam, but also turns into its real opposition, namely into impatient waiting for the death of the state. Because of such huge metamorphosis, it becomes difficult to speak of a mere change of the attitude: explanations are necessary.

Having broken its ties with the tradition of political thought of Plato and Aristotle, political philosophy of the new ages also renounced the underlying principles of that tradition. It is sufficient to state that the classical conception of the natural sociality of a human has been replaced by modern individualism. The opinion of antique thinkers that political life, a natural and necessary form of human life, had to give way to the theories stating the contractual origin of the society and the state. It seems that it is the connection of these two features of political thinking – individualism and contract – that have created a destructive mix which is destined to burst from the inside the modern state and even the very idea of politics. To compare with the traditional state, the state created by the contract of individuals is fragile and vulnerable. Its obvious weakness is the fact that it has to justify constantly its existence. In fact, it is possible only by satisfying the unconditionally constantly growing needs of citizens. Consequently, from the very beginning, the modern political thought is penetrated with what is called by C. Schmitt “economical philosophy”: “As the thought of the age becomes more and more exclusively economic, the understanding of any kind of representation disappears”⁴⁷. In fact, this implies that the very state and politics are extinguishing because “economical philosophy” is the belief that the state must first be an institution rendering social services to its citizens and that its major objective is to ensure their wellbeing.

That delayed-action charge burst not outright: it was inhibited by what could be called the pressing of the Christian tradition of the Western cultural and political life. The objectives of wellbeing of an individual, *i.e.* consumerist intentions, were restricted by norms of Christian ethics, and the “contractual” nature of the state was concealed and prevented from bursting by the feudal estate system and absolutism which were still pre-

vailing in many states. However, the explosion was coming inexpiably. The discovery of the society, one of the most fatal events of the 18th century, became its detonator. K. Polanyi, who revealed comprehensively and deeply the reasons for the then breakthrough of thought, described briefly and precisely its effect on the earlier conceptions of politics and the state. According to him, at that time the epoch started by Machiavelli and Luther, Th. More and Calvin, the discoverers of the state, ended and the 19th century “in which Ricardo and Hegel discovered from opposite angles the existence of a society that was not subject to the laws of the state, but, on the contrary, subjected the state to its own laws”⁴⁸ started. The statement that the society has been discovered sounds innocently, but its sense reveals itself only in some wider anthropological perspective. In fact, a dramatic break of the very conception of a human occurred: the distinction between man and animal, always stressed by Christian and antique thinking, was denied. According to K. Polanyi, “Hobbes had argued the need of a despot because men were *like* beasts; Townsend (the economist of the 18th century – V. R.) insisted that they were *actually* beasts and that, exactly for that reason, only a minimum of government was required”⁴⁹. By invoking a well-pointed construct of H. Arendt, one may maintain that such denial of distinction between a human and an animal allows viewing the very humanity as a special “kind of social animals”, and this changes tangibly the method and assumptions of political thought. It is too little to say that social and economical thinking is penetrating the political theory. According to K. Polanyi, it is also the beginning of a new way of cognizing political reality – the beginning of political science. After identifying a human and an animal, the explanation of the human nature is made radically biological and “a new concept of law is introduced into human affairs”⁵⁰. A human is treated naturalistically, as a creature governed only by natural laws. After this “breakthrough”, classical political reality must also become a “relic” because its underlying problems simply lose their sense in the new intellectual context. Therefore, the abovementioned era of political science comes. However, it took little time for the practical consequences of those theoretical changes of the conception of man and politics to reveal. The thought, expressed as far back as the 18th century by J.-J. Rousseau that only the law that answers the expectations of people is right started tak-

ing its real and potentially dangerous meaning. On the one hand, during “socialization” and “economisation” of political thinking the contours of “democracy of masses” emerged in the horizon. On the other hand, an opposite tendency was increasing in parallel. The quickly spreading “economic philosophy” was destructing the space of conventionally perceived politics and rising hopes that provoked many thinkers some time “to replace the rule of people by the rule of things”. This narrowing and declining of the political field was pointedly described by C. Schmitt who invoked the terms of representation theory and formulated the core of the problem as follows: “God or the People of democratic ideology or such abstract ideas as Liberty and Equality are conceivable subjects for representation, but not so Production and Consumption”⁵¹.

It remains just to overview the turns of the development of society as the last element of the body of modernity. No such formation of the human life as “society” existed in the Antiquity and in the Medieval Ages: it started emerging only in the new ages. According to H. Arendt, “the emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the new age and which found its political form in the nation-state”⁵². This author describes society as a “curiously hybrid realm where private interests assume public significance that we call “society””⁵³. This brief and very pointed description is useful because it reveals outright the essential difference between modernity and the earlier epochs: the distinction between the public and private areas of human life, so much important earlier, is disappearing. Another important characteristic of the society, pointed by many authors⁵⁴, follows from this description – in fact, it is created by the emerging modern state. In general, “society” emerges when the state “socializes” the individuals; therefore, the underlying feature of its members is conformity, which in extreme cases turns into total anonymity of an individual, *i.e.* into “dissolution” of an individual in standardized schemes of behaviour.

Modern society, a projection of interaction between the absolute individual and the absolute state, formed as a special area of “virtual” publicity. “Perspective”, *i.e.*, openness to new possibilities of spread, was its underlying feature. However, from the very beginning it was a paradoxical and

fragile formation with a dual nature. On the one hand, this society is a product of reflexive thinking which has emerged in the new ages, it is a perspective, *i.e.* a constantly renewing social project. On the other hand, another, nonetheless important precondition of its prospective nature was the religious and political Western tradition, *i.e.* the transcendent and later transcendental justification of the absolute uniqueness and incomparable moral value of the “individual” as the basis of that society. The reserve of spiritual and moral resources gathered by the tradition still relatively long protected an individual from increasing forces of modernization. On the one hand, the tradition, the real source of resistance of an individual, started helping an increasingly “socialized” individual to resist quite successfully the “totalising” intentions of the modern state with respect to him. On the other hand, it impeded and slowed down for quite a long time his turn into a “social animal”. Therefore, society emerged in-between two poles – the individual and the state – and existed in the field of their tension. That tension allowed crystallizing the civic society – at first a hardly visible form of that society.

The latter is a dualistic formation. That dualism was determined by the dual relationship of the individual and the state: the negative defensive and the positive collaborative attitudes. From there, two different theoretical conceptions, one of the public spirit and the other of the civic society, the traditions of civic morality and civic sociality, come⁵⁵. Therefore, naturally, some authors like G. Hegel or K. Marx attack in their works the civic society which is disdained as the fortress of “egoism”, while others like J. Locke or I. Kant defend and celebrate it in their political works⁵⁶.

Such different approaches reflected specifically the status of the very civic society. In any case, this “curious hybrid formation”, as called by H. Arendt, was partially autonomous for a long time and its contours were still visible: the civic society was an independent field of public life, relatively separated from the individual and the state. However, the relative equilibrium of the relationship of the individual and the state (thus, of the public and private fields as well), maintained mostly by the tradition, appeared to be fragile and short-termed: it was constantly destructed by the nature of modernity or, more specifically, by the irresistible spread of sociality. Its nature and direction were clear – they were reflected by the gen-

eral tendency of parallel change of Western values: “from religious values to moral ones, from moral ones to social-political ones, from social-political ones to family ones, from family ones to personal ones”⁵⁷. According to one author who sums this tendency up: “...in some sense, one may maintain that the history of Western culture is the history of the increasing loneliness of man”⁵⁸. However, after getting deeper into the abovementioned spread of sociality, one more history reveals, namely the history of the victorious triumph of “economical philosophy”. According to H. Arendt, “economics... could achieve a scientific character only when men had become social beings and unanimously followed certain patterns of behaviour”⁵⁹. The incarnation and standard-bearer of economical philosophy was a consumer, a new type of humans quickly forming and penetrating the scene of public life. Little by little, such individuals became the statistical majority in Western countries: “Politically, this means that the larger population is involved in any political body, the more likely the public realm will be social rather than political”⁶⁰. As sociality is increasingly “substituting” politics, the very society was also transforming progressively, at first becoming the “society of crowds” and then the “society of masses”. Although, in researches of the latter, one dispensed long with the word “consumerism”, when reading such works of the first half of the past century as “Revolt of the Masses” by J. Ortega-y-Gasset no doubt arises that the society of masses described here has clear features of the consumer society: “In fact, measureless opportunities open to today’s customer. One could hardly imagine an article which he could not be able to buy and, *vice versa*, no man who would be able and who would wish to buy all things which are sold could exist in the world”.⁶¹ Despite its unattractiveness from the point of view of higher morality, the consumer society of masses itself perhaps would not have become dangerous to the world and to itself. However, it was the society of democracy of masses as well. Democracy became the main instrument that allowed legitimizing the constantly growing needs and requirements of a consumer as the “voice of people” and an authentic expression of its will. That will not only gradually “swallowed” the political field and the state, but it also destroyed the civic society. The society of masses, which emerged in the late 19th century, was not at all a follow-up of the civic society established in the beginning of that century. It was

rather a burlesque of the latter. The civic society structured under the classical criterion was like a protective shell to prevent “short circuit” in the field of tension between the Absolute Individual and the Absolute State. After its collapse, there left no obstacles for the individual and the state to converge and to dissolve in some “superior unity”. In the 20th century, that “unity” was embodied and became a reality. Society, that “curious hybrid” of H. Arendt, was reborn with a new socio-political form – totalitarian rule not ever seen in the history. Upon its emergence, the thesis of identity of the Absolute Individual and the Absolute State, which first seemed to be a mere abstract theoretical possibility, became the principle of organic unity and mutual substitutability of the “commander” and “people” constantly implemented in the totalitarian political reality. Its most obvious manifestation was a degenerated and grotesque kind of “representation” – the unlimited power of the “commander” over the masses of “people”⁶².

4. Has the Danger of Totalitarian Systems Disappeared?

Everybody would like to believe that the 20th century’s period of the totalitarian regimes is an already past story with a happy end. To tell the truth, the opinion that the democratic Western world has finally and irreversibly overcome “atavistic” forces of the totalitarian camp prevails perhaps even among specialists and judges of history and politics. However, one may find more cautious views as well. They are determined not only by the obvious difficulties of reestablishment of democracy in post-totalitarian countries, but also by the emerging abovementioned signs of the decline and crisis of Western democracy. Insights occurring here and there in academic literature that the conflict between democracy and totalitarianism in 1917–1989 has in fact been the *civil* war of the Western world are raising concerns⁶³. The description “civil” in this context presupposes a certain equality of the combatant parties.

After a theoretical and historical cross-section of the modernity’s conceptual body and of its decay is made, one could hardly dare to state that the period of totalitarian ruling is just an incidental deviation of the modern world from the “right” way of democratic development. It turns out that the origins of totalitarianism are much deeper than one often admits. They lie in the very nature of modernity. That makes one to hesitate whether

the present wave of democracy, which has come a few decades ago and which, to tell the truth, seems to be slowly abating, is not, at least in part, only a show, a façade of external changes of institutions hiding continuing silent work of forces and factors adverse to democratization. Therefore, instead of uncritical reiteration of banal propositions about the inherent value of democracy and about the need to establish it all over the world, a researcher must examine whether “temptations of totalitarianism” have really finally disappeared, that is, whether in the today’s post-modern society there actually do not exist any conditions for the rebirth of this phenomenon. One of the ways to answer, at least approximately, this principal issue, to prove or to reject the arising doubts and hesitations about the future of democracy is to compare post-modern Western and “post-communist” Eastern societies. It is also important to examine whether these, at first sight very different, societies are not related by some underlying features and whether there are no similarities of their political and social development.

After the wave of “velvet revolutions” of Central and Eastern Europe, the meaning and further direction of their changes seemed almost inherent for some time. After collapse of the totalitarian political system and centrally managed planned economy, civil societies of Western type with the free market economy and liberal democratic political system are forming. However, it has turned out gradually that western standards of social, economic and political life are being implemented slowly and with difficulties in the countries that have got rid of the communist regime. Problems of consolidation of the civic society and of the democratic political system are still unresolved and their further direction of political development raises more and more questions.

Undoubtedly, post-communist societies have many features of the mass society. Therefore, while analyzing them, it is worthwhile to refer to the scheme of emergence of the principal totalitarian socio-political order already discussed above: this order emerges in consistent transition from the civic society to the society of crowds and ultimately from the society of crowds to the society of masses. If the totalitarian order is considered as an abnormal species of the society of masses and of mass democracy, one is able to pose the problem in question more precisely and more efficiently:

How and with what resources is it possible to come back from such order to the “natural” state of the civil society and to the way of democratic development?

In the works analysing the post-communist transformation, a lambent description “post-modern post-communism” pops up sometimes. It should be treated as a heuristically valuable tip or a reference that the post-modern society is the same society of masses, which due to changed historical and political features experiences an increasing influence of Western post-modern society. Because of interaction of both societies, their convergence predicted already in times of the “cold war” is accelerating. Therefore, it is analytically efficient to view the post-communist society as a specific socio-political formation which operates in a “free” mode of post-modern society. Such approach is useful as part of the research strategy because it enables to treat the post-modern Western society as a specific mirror reflecting and making visible some peculiarities of the post-totalitarian post-communist society, which in another case are hardly noticeable. When overlooking the accomplished or still going changes of post-modern and post-communist societies, we will apply the scheme of the analysis already performed and will start with the individual.

In works of Z. Bauman, A. Giddens and other famous sociologists⁶⁴, it is maintained in unison that post-modernity has accomplished the work of “deconstruction” of the individual. As compared to modernity, the very basis and nature of identity and valuation of the individual change much in a “post” state. The subjective perception and construction of self predominates there. It is based on situational points of references. An individual is creating himself by comparing his situation with that of other individuals according to more or less liberally chosen criteria. Socially acknowledged valuation criteria of an individual are in turn relative, flexible and changing because under conditions of post-modernity they are constantly re-created and established by the continuous process of “linguistic games” and of “social communication” which is establishing all norms⁶⁵.

Sociality’s expansion into the sphere of public politics, which has started in the past century, is continuing. H. Arendt wrote half a century ago: “To gauge the extent of society’s victory in the modern age... and its eventual substitution of bureaucracy, the rule of nobody, it may be well to recall

that its initial science of economics... was finally followed by the all-comprehensive pretension of the social sciences... to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal... Since the rise of society... an irresistible tendency to grow, to devour the older realms of the political and private as well as the more recently established sphere of intimacy has been one of the outstanding characteristics of the new realm”⁶⁶. From the time when these words have been written, the process of “socialization” of the human world even accelerated. However paradoxical it would seem, this process does not strengthen society: it entrenches instead its “procedural” nature and thus destructs it. Speaking in terms of J. Baudrillard, this trend can be called the implosion of society, which is best reflected in the today’s sociology. For example, according to one of its most distinct spokesmen, Z. Bauman, the concept of “society” is meaningless. He encourages its repudiation: “Sociology adapting to the state of post-modernity should replace the concept of *society* by *sociality* – a category attempting to express the procedural modality of social reality”⁶⁷.

Authors⁶⁸ who differ much in many respects are not debating on the fact that consumerist attitudes have intensified even more in the “post” society. In fact, different schemes of “basic needs”, which originally included not only “interests”, but also “passions”⁶⁹, are the grounds for self-evaluation of an individual and for social stratification in modern society. Development of modernity and expansion of moral thinking “purified” those schemes and finally made meaningful and established the connection and interdependence of the “three” values – work, wealth, and consumption – as perhaps most important to a modern individual. It is these values that in the 19th century have already been the core of economics, social stratification, as well as of spiritual and moral ethos of the class society⁷⁰.

However, in the 20th century, their connection started breaking both in the West and in the East, although for different reasons. Totalitarian-communist experiments transformed the face of societies which became their proving grounds. Western societies were replaced by development of the “state of welfare”. Having paradoxically emerged in the “post” situation, the consequences of these changes, which have been going totally differently, largely coincide and some similar trends of social and political devel-

opment of both societies show up. After the breakage of the “natural” link of work, wealth and consumption, the nature of work is also changing. It ceases to be the most important source of accumulation of wealth and is no longer directly related with satisfaction of needs. Modernity, the first epoch of socially constructed needs, revealed their reflexive nature and their “openness” at the same time, *i.e.* their actually unlimited possibilities of expression and extension. As needs and consumerist attitudes have been growing and intensifying unrestrictedly, a shift from material to the so-called “post-material” values happened in Western societies⁷¹. One should not be misled by the notion “post-material”: this “post-materialist” moral orientation prevailing in the most prosperous countries is an even more radical expression of the consumerist attitude. During such change, valuation by an individual of his situation has almost totally lost touch with its objective material and social state, gained its situational nature, and in fact is becoming just an expression and derivative of his unlimitedly growing needs. These expectations are projected into the public sphere and destroy the last remainders of legitimacy of the national state.

Under the conditions of democracy of masses, factually unlimited expectations of an individual, when moved into the public sphere, turn without any more serious obstacles into principles of economical and social state policy. Satisfaction of these needs becomes the most important objective of politics of the modern state because it is the only way – “capability of re-forming” – for the modern state to justify its legitimacy⁷². Being less and less able to satisfy incessantly growing needs of individuals and thus to justify itself, the national state first loses the most important function performed by it earlier: it is no longer able to be the main agent of socialization of a post-modern individual. As Z. Bauman and other researches note, the conditions of socialization of an individual and agents ensuring it changed radically in the epoch of post-modernity⁷³. At the same time, it ceases to be the factor constituting the civic society, and this undoubtedly is one of the most important aspects and signs of its accelerating decay. As the state is declining, erosion of society is also increasing: the latter’s decay or failure to form is a sign of some returning to the post-modern “natural situation”, proving originally statement that post-modernity is returning to the “origins”, *i.e.* the ultimate dispersion of modernity’s potentials⁷⁴. When study-

ing the situation of public spirit in the West and in the East, A. B. Seligman notes that post-modern Western and post-communist Eastern countries assimilated in this respect as well: a huge task to re-establish almost totally decayed civic societies was raised to all of them⁷⁵. Thus, the civic society's institutions, being restored eagerly during the period of post-communist transformation, should be carefully valued because in many cases they are mere imitations lacking the real civic content and performing only the abovementioned function of a façade hiding the natural state.

The foundations of the conventional conception of politics and its very preconditions are inevitably weakened or even absolutely undermined in the conditions of post-modern return to the natural state. As politics has become a derivative of needs of the individual and their projection in the public sphere, there appears a tendency of the decay of the state, democracy, and of the rule of law as described by many authors. Its distinctive features are the narrowing of the public sphere and the decay of a public person. Although the modern state was increasingly rapidly turning into the most important factor of individual's socialization, its effect was limited and weakened for some time by the tradition of Western spiritual and political culture. It protected in part an individual against coercion of the state in a somewhat paradoxical way, *i.e.* by limiting the public expression of his needs by moral and cultural means. Consequently, weakening of the tradition became one of the most important factors that determined the post-modern shift towards the "pure" sociality. The general direction of this shift can be described as follows: not only the distinction between privacy and publicity, but also between privacy and intimacy is declining and the very intimacy is made public by its direct projection into the sphere of public life – it becomes the source of the totalized sociality. Therefore, all conditions for a highly dangerous inversion of the relationship between the individual and the state, which have been foretold or stated by many authors, occur in the "post" situation: a prior threat that the state can "efface" an individual is replaced by the danger of a different "convergence" of the an individual and the state, *i.e.* the state's dissolution in the individual and becoming merely a projection of his unlimited demands. As those poles have exchanged places, a deconstructed and fragmented individual or more specifically his shadow trace is finally "totalized" in a surro-

gate of the traditional political space – some quasi-public space. Having experienced that transformation, society shifts to the post-modern state of “post” sociality, which perhaps matches the characterization by F. Fukuyama: it is in fact the epoch of the “last human”. As such “economized” and “socialized” conception of man and of politics wins, the objectives of politics are narrowing radically. It becomes a kind of the public management and administration. The political importance of classical modern ideologies, which were the basis of the democratic multiparty system formed in the 19th century, decreases. For a long time the differences and struggle of ideological and political principles have been the driving force of modern politics and the precondition of differentiation and articulation of the field of parties. Therefore, “convergence” of ideologies as maintained by many researchers of West and East is one of the most important factors which destroy or prevent the multiparty political system and which at the same time is one of the most obvious signs of the deepening crisis in the contemporary post-modern world.

Final Remarks

While analysing the prospects of democracy in Lithuania under conditions of today’s globalization, we were referring to the assumption that the very globalization was a new and very radical stage of the process of modernisation, which had been lasting for several centuries. Such definition of the “essence” is useful and heuristically justifiable. If globalization is described only as an unprecedentedly rapid development of different human relationships, it becomes almost impossible to feel the specifics of this process, its deeper causes, drives, and the likely effect on the future of humanity. In the absence of a wider and deeper, more conceptual notion of globalization, it is difficult to analyse empirically certain problems posed by it, the issue of the future of democracy among them.

The empiric statement that the overextended “state of welfare” and the immeasurably increased power of trans-national corporations are destroying the foundations of liberal democracy and of the law of rule⁷⁶ is not sufficient. After comparative empirical researches of “political culture” of Lithuania, one can easily infer that this culture is lacking much

of the conditions and factors that ensure democracy and are considered almost inherent in classical works of R. D. Putnam⁷⁷ and in other similar works.

If to follow the assumption that globalization is a new stage of implementation and development of the project of modernization, one can analyze the issue of democracy in a much broader theoretical and historical context. In such a case, analysis of links of modernization and development of democracy becomes actually an explanation of the link between democracy and the course of globalization.

The research showed that the present problematic situation of democracy is far from being occasional: it is a logical and consistent result of implementation of the project of modernization and of its development. Although the “post” state is first the destiny of the post-modern societies, it is at least the prototype of the future global society. Therefore, when analysing this situation, it is possible to see the contours of future global democracy, whether Utopian or realistic.

It is also possible to draw some preliminary conclusions. If the project of modernization remains as it is, the perspectives of global democracy look poor because one cannot see any preconditions necessary for its creation. Even if such democracy were realized, its vision would not look attractive, at least for a while.

When analysing the economical, social, political, and spiritual aspects of modernization and globalization and their present spread, one may infer that preconditions for rebirth or emergence of new forms of totalitarian rule have not disappeared. They exist both in post-modern Western and in post-communist Eastern societies.

The above must be taken into account when the issue of the situation and perspectives of democracy in Lithuania is considered. The democratic Western world, into which the country has returned, is no longer the sphere of solid and reliable democracy. Powerful factors destructing democracy are operating there. Since totalitarianism is the most radical form of egalitarian democracy and an outbreak and spread of opportunities lying in the project of Western modernization, it is not clear how to make use of the experience of Western democracy to cure the diseases of Lithuanian democracy. Our analysis rather makes one to infer that interaction with post-

modern societies not only does not help to cure the diseases of young post-totalitarian democracies, but also sharpens them.

This presumption is not plucked out of the air. The question to *what* West Lithuania has returned is reasoned and justifiable. One need only to remember that the two revolutionary traditions, the symbols of which are the names of J. Locke and K. Marx, are the drives and satellites of the process of modernization started in the new ages⁷⁸. Nowadays they are still alive.

E. Voegelin, a prominent researcher of spiritual and political history of Western world, revealed in his works another very important and noteworthy aspect of the process of modernization, which had often been concealed. He relates the course of modernization, which started in the West, with the outbreak of the antichristian Gnostic spirit and points out three forms of expression of this spirit: teleological, axiological, and active Gnosticism⁷⁹. The intellectualistic teleological approach is based on the assumption of unceasing progress of society and is interested in the “technique” of unceasing progression, *i.e.* in the means and ways of achieving this progress. However, it is very short and in general avoids speaking about the ultimate objective of such progression. Although the axiological approach, based on feelings, provides for a certain perfect or desirable, *i.e.* final state of society, it does not specify in more detail any ways and means to achieve it. The voluntarist-activist approach stresses a conscious and purposive movement towards a freely and wilfully chosen final objective. It is not very difficult to recognize these orientations because their proponents are divided in quite distinct camps all over the world.

To be a bit simpler, it can be stated that the vision of the triumph of global democracy as cherished in the USA is most proximate to the teleological approach. A proponent of the axiological approach will probably sympathize with the project of social engineering as the greatest project of all times – construction of the EU. According to J. Monet, one of the architects of this project, it is the endless process of transformation of consciousness. Voluntarist activism is represented by perhaps somewhat old-fashioned but not outdated visions of the world’s order of the soviet communism and the Third Reich.

It is necessary to stress that all these orientations come from one source – the Gnostic spirit of modernity – and unfold in practice as three strategies

and directions of the same project of modernization. In order to evaluate properly the meaning of this circumstance, one needs to understand that the said spirit of modernization is not purely democratic – it is the further direction of implementation of the project, especially as its outcome is hidden in the mist of future history.

The path of Lithuanian society and state to stable democracy will be long and difficult. Sociological researches show that undemocratic attitudes are acceptable to many residents of the country. In this respect, Lithuania is closer to countries situated more eastwards than to those of Central Europe. One may assume that these characteristics are determined not only by global, but also by the local factors and first of all by the historical aspects of the cultural and political development of the country. On the one hand, the scope of destruction of the heritage of tradition, being one of the most important spiritual and moral sources maintaining the vitality of political democracy, was greater in Lithuania than in the countries of Central Europe. On the other hand, due to historical circumstances, the country experienced a weaker impact of modernization than the neighbouring Baltic states – Latvia and Estonia. Admittedly, moderate and timely modernization is like a kind of “vaccine” against its most serious forms. By necessity, it becomes a quite efficient antidote against the disease of totalitarianism as well. Therefore, it seems that the effect of the occupant-totalitarian regime on the societies of these countries was not so devastating and disrupting.

The foundations of Lithuanian democracy must be enforced. The first step in this direction should be refusal of the superficial pseudo-democratic rhetoric and of sociological empirics which is supposedly proving preconceived ideological attitudes. The situation of democracy in the country must be analyzed and evaluated critically and with common sense in the entire controversial context of dissemination of global democracy. Unfortunately, a fundamental discussion on the issue is still almost non-existent in our public sphere and even in the academic environment. Therefore, if the present analysis is though a little step towards laying theoretical and methodological milestones of more comprehensive Lithuanian researches of democracy, its first objective will be achieved, at least in part.

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POPULISM AS AN OUTCOME OF POST-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATIC PRIMITIVISM AND PRO-CAPITALISM

Vaidutis Laurénas

Abstract. In post-communist states, there inevitably develop pro-capitalist economic, social and political structures. Post-communism cannot avoid being pro-capitalist; otherwise it loses its sense as a denial of communism. Post-communism cannot avoid democratic primitivism, either; society which is denying authoritarianism is full of illusions about “nation’s rule”. But the crash of illusions about “our own state” and contradictions of pro-capitalism stimulate populism. A political regime then is trapped in it and finds it difficult to solve the problems of overall trust in democracy.

Introduction

Although populism is a universal phenomenon, post-communism provides it with some additional features¹. Here we will discuss the relation between post-communist democratic primitivism and post-communist pro-capitalism. We choose these “couples” not by accident – both democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism are interconnected attributes of post-communism. It is also worth revealing how coexistence of populism with democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism affects post-communist democracy.

Democratic primitivism (the term of G. Sartori)² or primitive democracy can be described as the ignorance of limits of political rights while seeking to give increasingly more power to a bigger number of people or trying to involve everybody in decision making. For a post-communist society, denying authoritarianism, it is hard not to believe in it. But it finally turns out to be only an illusion of democracy. On the one hand, when increasingly more power is given to a bigger number of people, the objectively asymmetric relationships of power when somebody controls somebody else are idealized. In that case democracy becomes, as R. Dahrendorf has called it, “the kettle of popular emotions”³, and the ability to govern the

state is lost. On the other hand, for most of those who enthusiastically call for democracy – in a full sense of the rule of people – democracy is needed only as a means to satisfy their desire to rule or to increase their importance in the world of politics and to diminish the power and authority of those who are in power at that time. Finally, an endless expansion of the limits of political rights in democracy is also an exaggerated idealization. And such idealization dooms this political system to unexpected coexistence with forces that are actually alien to democratic values. Problems of governmentability, caused by democratic primitivism, usually end in populist demands for a strongman. Democratic primitivism normally signals that society lacks democratic consolidation, that it is still involved in populist quest. Thus, one consequence of democratic primitivism is that populism is becoming the shadow of democracy⁴. Below, one particular case of post-communist democratic primitivism – construction of “our own state” – and the crash of its illusions will be discussed.

The post-communist pro-capitalism is described as the dominance of one-sided economism in state and society, the association of political democracy and capitalism, a lack of attention to values of equality and an exaggerated focus of the values of freedom. To be a forthright pro-capitalist means to admit that no equivalent counterbalance to market values can exist in society. Pro-capitalism stimulates populism as a response to concentration of wealth in only one part of society, growing social inequality and the feeling of social injustice when hopes of higher standards of living are unfulfilled.

Although democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism are natural attributes of post-communism and their contradictory outcomes stimulate populism, analysis of populism in Lithuania began quite late, mainly only in 2000⁵, while analysis of links between pro-capitalism and populism only now has shown up on the researchers' agenda⁶. Analysis of cases of democratic primitivism is more advanced than investigations of pro-capitalism. Generally speaking, researches of populism were catalyzed by the political situation in 2000–2004. Populism pushed this situation towards the state of political crisis⁷. The crisis began when R. Paksas and his team, mainly radical and unprofessional, decided to reallocate political powers on behalf of the institution of president. Doing this by unconstitutional

means and using populism, they hoped to cause the effect of anomy, whereas the opponents of R. Paksas, also radically impatient, began to seek to eliminate their rival from the political arena, using mainly populist means too.

So it seems reasonable to speak about the development of the institution of populism⁸ in Lithuania's social and political life. The first wave of populism rose with the euphoria of the restitution of independence. It really was an exclusive period of belief – society, the major part of it, believed in the “speeding-up of history” and “moral politics”. This belief cannot be named populism in its true sense. It was a period of exaggerated belief of society in its abilities to change itself. Whereas populism is finally established when the satisfaction of needs, far exceeding the possibilities of society, is committed by that society (or its part) to politicians who institutionalize this “mission”.

Here we present a research which was lead by the approach of disjuncture of economical, political and social development, constructed by D. Bell⁹. The so-called “pivotal principle” emphasizes that the immanent principles of economic, political and social spheres are not the same. D. Bell described the interaction of different spheres of society as a dissonance which causes various contradictions. We must add that this moment of dissonance, actually asynchrony of the development of society, particularly shows up during the cardinal post-communist transformation. It is this post-communist dissonance that inter alia evokes populism.

Here we will also emphasize the problems of political science. It will be done by describing the main questions of adaptability of a political regime to the social-economic development by using the approach of political sociology.

The main concepts of this analysis will be democratic primitivism, populism, pro-capitalism, “our own state”.

1. “Our own state” and its downfall

I would say that the biggest recent metamorphosis in the society of Lithuania was the striking outbreak of a hope for “our own state” or “nation's rule” during 1990–1992 and the likewise striking collapse of this hope in 2002–2004. The perspective of “our own state” was constructed in two senses: as an independence from the USSR (Russia) and as democratic governance.

In both cases it was the trust in one's own ability to change the unwanted and to institutionalize the new political social reality.

In political philosophy, "our own state" is described as an embodiment of the inherent striving of people to live together in welfare, happiness and security. Inherent striving means the elimination of cleavage between "you" and "me" and the elimination of "the third" in politics. This is the idealization of direct democracy – the democracy in which the boundaries between "we" and "them" or between state and society are blurred. But the similarity between "me" and "you" is not sufficient for the political (public) process. In fact, it means the phobia of public authority. The congruence of "me" and "you" (mutual accord) is not a sufficient condition for public life. "The third" is the third element of the public process. The complexity of public life unveils itself when relationships between "me" and "you" become the relationships between "us (me and you)" and "them". In that case "me" and "you" relationships double and become influenced (determined) by "the third".

How did Lithuanian people – "we" – describe themselves as being able to change their public life? The identity of those who were able to create their country developed in a tense context of social and ethnical revanchism. In Lithuania, the identity of "me" and "you" developed especially contrastingly. "I – who can change" looked at "you – who can change" with disbelief. Selection of "you – who can change" was done in an atmosphere of distrust. Seclusion of those who could not change was marked by such linguistic constructions as "communist – collaborator – occupant – traitor". The scope of those who could change was marked by another linguistic construction: "victim – anti-communist – Lithuanian – patriot". The new political social perspective was maintained by such communication at least until the end of 1992.

Although "striving to live together" was colored with contradictions or even antagonisms, the construct of "our own state" was created in the language of ethics. One's own state is seeking for moral objectives. Theology like that is possible if public life a priori means order, which can be established without coercion, without the dominance–obedience relationship. The seeking of good and happiness for everyone, responsibility for society, tolerance of all interests is characteristic of "our own state". In a state like

that there should be no universal institution of coercion. The place of the latter is occupied by an institution of obligation.

Thus, “our own state” is built on a primitive conception of mass participatory democracy, which emphasizes giving more power to a larger number of people or a political decision making in which everyone is engaged. But according to R. Dahl, who is highly admired in the field of democracy researches, participatory democracy is crossing the boundaries of human abilities. It is a vision of a state whose members believe to be politically equal, are collectively sovereign and have all the abilities, resources and institutes which are necessary for people to rule themselves. In the context of integration processes, it must be noted that R. Dahl, already some time ago, saw the danger that recent supranational processes would lead not to the expansion of the idea of democracy beyond the boundaries of the state, but to the supervision *de facto*. That is – to the politically qualified and organized meritocratic minority which can keep the principle of rule for the good of all people better than *demos* would if they ruled themselves. And this rule is not bound by any democratic principles. Although R. Dahl in all possible ways tries to base the advantages of the democratic process, he cannot escape accepting that the political mechanism of supervision is quite a strong historical alternative¹⁰.

Quite soon it became clear that “our own state” was a mere illusion of post-communist society. The processes of government rationalization and European integration destroyed “our own state”. It took not long to find out that the relationships of dominance–obedience are characteristic of “our own state” too; this state also needs bureaucrats, this state is also an institute of supervision. The state was forced to strengthen even its repressive structures. By the way, populism flourishes in the environment of professionalisation. Professionalisation of politics is related to its growing complexity. We began to understand the scope of democratic primitivism in Lithuania better when we more often started to face non-majoritarian decisions which didn’t meet the criteria of procedural democracy. The scope of non-majoritarian – technocratic in a broad sense – decisions is unstoppably growing. But in the context of “our own state” or mass democracy illusions, it is identified with the lack of democracy and the nation’s rule or at least the rule of its elected representatives is appealed. Meanwhile, the del-

egation of functions to non-majoritarian institutions is becoming a feature of stable political regimes¹¹. But the populist hostility towards professionals is growing as the latter in every turn subtly remind the society that its role in the political process is more passive and reactive. It is known that the political competencies of all citizens are not sufficient to make rational political decisions, whereas special skills and knowledge are the prerogative of professionals. It is also known that there is a lack of professionals in Lithuania. Relatively speaking, not only the ability of ruling elites to organize themselves is characteristic of the prevailing form of political democracy today. These elites can also disorganize those groups of society which, making the bigger part of it, see the satisfaction of their needs only through implementation of the interests the elites articulate. The segmentation and disorganization of society alongside the concentration of elites – this is the twofold mechanism of domination, which is characteristic of societies of today¹².

“Our own state” also felt the loss when it became clear that the state is closely related to capital. The establishment of democratic regime was associated with the state’s retreat from economy. This retreat during the establishment of capitalism makes politics difficult in a sense that the limits of maximal etatism in communist states were set in practice, however, even theoretically it was not clear what the limits of such retreat are. Post-communist times showed that the capital itself is blocking the state from retreat. The capital expected its interests to be protected by the state. And capital also tends to protect them through corruption.

Capitalism is a motor of society. Generally, a much stronger motor than political democracy. Political democracy is possible only when acceptability of political authority and its legitimate character is based on the individual approval of the people. The phenomenon of this individual approval emerges only during the development of capitalism, i.e. during the settlement of private property and free labor. Political democracy also encourages individual approval. But until recently, Lithuanian people have never distinguished themselves by a higher economic independence and preferences for democratic values. This is because the development of democracy and capitalism here always faced historical obstacles. In the economic sense, the freedom of the major part of Lithuanian people still remains very limited.

“Our own state” was finally denied by the growing social inequality which reached even the state of exclusion¹³. The “marginal class” is not only apolitical but even antisocial, i.e. it is losing (has lost) connection with society, its institutions and organizations. It is common to think that the social and political stability of society should be based on the “middle class” created by economic growth. As this middle class in Lithuania is developing very slowly, the bigger part of society still remains dependent on the institutes of the state. This part of society is truly concerned about its destiny, and economic backwardness is not the only reason for that. It can be noted that social concern and social movements in societies of today are related not actually to the economic losses, but rather to the lack of social transformations of the economic results, i.e. the lack of more gradual dispersion and greater accessibility.

As the greater part of people are being pushed outside the boundaries of society which is formulating increasingly higher knowledge and skill requirements for its members, it means that its potential is irreversibly lost. The features of this new stage of development of Lithuanian society are a dangerously high unemployment, part of school age children not attending school, expansion of violence against children, the growing number of suicides. In cities and in some rural areas of Lithuania something like social ghettos emerged. Another channel for the loss of potential is the rapidly growing emigration. The integration of migrants into a poor society is also hardly possible. Under such conditions, unforeseen outbursts of protest, which are deepening the segmentation of society, are possible.

Poll results show that Lithuanian people do not trust state institutes and political parties on a mass scale. At the beginning of transformation, state institutes, politicians and bureaucrats were expected to be completely different. So “our own state” is gone. In a situation like this, hope is usually appealed. Hope that in the course of time the functionality of the state will become more effective: politicians and bureaucrats will become more professional, structural state government reforms will be accomplished, positive impacts of EU institutions will be seen.

The disappointment with “our own state” partly explains why Lithuanians quite strongly trust in EU institutes, although this means that the loss of sovereignty of national state is admitted. In the meantime, not

only “our own European state” but also Europe, as an integral political formation, is just an entire problem. When the absence of alternatives for the unification and expansion of Europe is emphasized, the perspective of “our own state” is destroyed and populism is stimulated.

Thus, the state which would be more productive, more sensitive to the expectations of people couldn’t be invented for the second time. And the present state failed to satisfy these expectations. But the greatest danger lies in these revolutionary scenarios of the revival of “our own state”, which gather populists together¹⁴.

2. The character of post-communist pro-capitalism

Post-communism is essentially pro-capitalistic, i.e. it is a society of rapidly entrenching principles of capitalism. Pro-capitalism is not only an economic, as is often said, but also a social and a political datum. The most important aspect of post-communist development is that the rejection of failed communism means not the return to capitalism but creation of it. Of course, the historic environment in which capitalism is being created is not plain. But this creation becomes extremely contradictory, as not only the advantages but also the disadvantages are known from the experience of others. It becomes even more contradictory as it is expected that the present-day demerits of capitalism are temporal and the structures that are now being created will embody only the merits of it.

Liberalization of economy may not be the first step taken by post-communism, but the creation of effective economy cannot be bypassed or postponed for a longer time. We must agree with the point that communist regimes collapsed not because of the influence of the idea of democracy or any other noble idea, but simply because of the everyday privation and dissatisfaction with the reality that denied the common sense. Ordinary people do not need the democracy as such; they just want to live in wealth. And only when they live so, they uphold the democratic values. However, the point is that wealthy life is possible only in the system of market economy. Without the market, i.e. productive economy, the society has no escape from the grip of material necessities. However, during the first period of post-communist transition, one-sided economism has evolved. Its essence is a conviction that market is a satisfactory condition both for es-

tablishing both political democracy and social justice. In this way the market values, the power of money pervade the spheres of social life that should be pervaded by values of different kind. And this is starting to look like market fundamentalism or reliance not only upon the economic self-reliance of the market, but also upon its regulating role in all spheres of social life¹⁵.

It must be noted that analysts of social and political processes in Lithuania are not inclined to pay attention to the problems induced by capitalism. Only one case of such analysis can be mentioned¹⁶.

From the very beginning the market restructures society. It creates the strata of those who win and of those who lose. Of course, everybody wants to be a winner, but the market is unable to allow everybody to win. The market redistributes wealth by its economic power not only to those who seek efficiency and operate most effectively, but also to those who have the ability to regulate the market. In this way, new pro-capitalist strata of society are formed such as owners, business people. They, of course, try to entrench both politically and socially. This is how "economic society" develops. And this society can be characterized rather by the wants than by the needs. This means that in economic society accumulation simply becomes a race without a finish.

It is necessary again to come back to the question of pro-capitalist strata, considering the aspect of their way of origin. The fact that the creation (and self-creation) of these strata was initiated by political means is an old and rather exhausted theme¹⁷. A peculiar "revolutionary" creation of the owners' strata serves well the purposes of modernization which comes along. But those who won in the ring of the market made use not only of political means, but also of the unreadiness of about 3/4 of society to fight for private property. The process of privatization affirmed both the first and the second hypotheses.

Privatization determines essential attributes of pro-capitalism. Pro-capitalism is impossible without privatization. Under conditions of changing economy, privatization is not a simple handover of state property to private owners. It is a re-creation of the institute of private property. The latter is dangerous for the stability of a post-communist state. Privatization means redistribution of wealth and the change of social status in the competitive

environment. But privatization in Lithuania basically did not face the competition, which is the essence of the market.

While gathering support for market economy, privatization is a very strong argument for creation of social strata that would back capitalism. However, privatization creates opposition to capitalism too, and not only because not everyone is able to take part in privatization, not only because the new owners or the managers they have appointed have no sufficient experience to manage property effectively. Unjust privatization is the most important enemy of capitalism in Lithuania and the stimulator of populism.

Injustice existed during soviet nationalization (state, i.e. collective, property was formed neither by fair acquisition nor by fair disposal). Therefore a new important problem concerning fair property in post-communism arises, which is elimination of fair property violations and avoiding new violations. The soviet state property and social equalization shouldn't be identified with justice and solidarity. However, privatization was economically ineffective and socially unjust – not only because of the low qualification of the politicians. It was a direct effort of certain strata and separate individuals to line their own pockets quickly and easily. Privatization was started without strong juridical institutions and under a veil of the state “nobody's property” myth. When the myth of soviet “nobody's property” was created, it was easy simply to pocket that property. At first, property was being given by cheque privatization. However, the major part of society quickly felt that restitution of property, privatization of accommodation were only a cover to distract the attention from the most important process of capitalization. The latter was pursued without the necessary juridical basis, especially in the sphere of company management and responsibility of owners. This allowed, *inter alia*, new managers to cheat new shareholders and big shareholders to cheat small shareholders. The new owners tried to suck dry the enterprise during a few years and did not even think about investing or restructuring. All in all, such privatization led to the “gangsterization” and oligarchization of economy. R. Grigas, as far back as 1998, noted that entrenchment of oligarchy was not a fiction, not a prognosis but the reality of Lithuania¹⁸.

The restitution of property is indisputable. Disputable are only the forms and terms of restitution. The generations that grew up after the

soviet nationalization were the depositors or multipliers of collective, i.e. state property. These generations could not even use directly the constantly nationalized results of their job because of the mode of soviet modernization. Why had this property to be given only to separate members or groups of members of society? During the post-communist privatization the absolute majority of these “winners” lost their “ownership”. We also must reasonably answer the question why collective farms were not transformed into joint-stock companies in order to preserve their property. Now all kinds of motives are used to ground the usefulness of private property, but the feeling of unjust privatization survives in society. But, to tell the truth, the system which allowed to appropriate and own constant property while worsening the condition of those who could not appropriate (because of the lack of skills and/or information, of means and of useful objects which would belong to nobody) was created.

The fairness of privatization is more important than its scope. Redistribution of wealth and its loss became the main source of new social tensions during the time of independence. Social inequality and its transfer to next generations, which existed in soviet times, now increased and seems to become irreversibly constant. A more or less stabile post-communist society can survive only when the place of every man in the starting position of privatization is fair. In Lithuania this didn't happen and the results of privatization are very contradictory. There are enough arguments to support the proposition that at the beginning of transformation there was no institution of equal adoption of life resources. In the background of anti-sovietism, there are still not enough researches made to find out what level of disappointment of society was raised by the “disappearance” of the property created during soviet times. After all, this disappearance explains a lot when today words like “it was better to live in the soviet times” are heard¹⁹. It is the outcome of social comparison. The unsuccessful, unjust and ineffective privatization demoralized society, planting populism and even radicalism in it.

Broadly speaking, post-communist states quickly started to minimize the state sector, guided by the doubtful assumption that private property would withstand all the hardships. Lithuania here is not an exception. Meanwhile, as I. Matonytė has noted, even elites eventually become disap-

pointed with privatization and express less skepticism about the idea that the state's role in economy might be positive²⁰. This latter fact is especially noteworthy as it indirectly confirms that the economical and other problems of the post-communist transformation were (and still are) not realized completely by society. Of course, the International Monetary Fund and partly also other international institutes have imposed a model which is not adequate to the development abilities of post-communist states. This model practically is the same as the model of the "third world" countries. But in this particular place of analysis it isn't so important that countries like Lithuania have also internal resources of development. Here the most important thing is that Lithuanian people (and political elites too) accepted the changes and took part in them not self-consciously, but simply relying on "support". Dissatisfaction with the results of transformation teaches the lesson that an economic policy, as well as the others, has to be understood not only by policy-makers.

Pro-capitalism is not a socially oriented order. We know that in capitalist economies more welfare is given to those who are wealthier according to their spending power in the market – to those who can buy not only luxurious apartments and consumer goods, but also a better education, medical and juridical services. Capital in general, and weak capital even more, is not inclined to take care of social matters. There are lots of examples when capital remains indifferent both to social and national values. The conviction that the power lying in the market will create an overall surplus which will cover all strata of society has failed to be true. Surplus, although not overall, does exist, but there also exist social strata which have very different abilities to develop. More and more often talks about the measureless accumulation of wealth by separate persons, even about the corrupting plenty of their wealth, are heard. The proposition that nobody else but an individual is the best to take care of himself is also not proving out. If so, there isn't any respect paid to the fact that every individual is a product of social powers and that not only he is responsible for himself. The growth of the scope of social inequality is a severe problem of pro-capitalism. Unemployment is also associated with it. So the lack of social effect – social equality and social justice – becomes a curse of pro-capitalism and the problem of post-communist development in general.

Pro-capitalism as a political process is a case of expansion of the political role of the state which is oriented to the implementation of capitalist principles. This expansion is wanted by the major part of political elites and members of society. Finally, it means the efforts and success of pro-capitalist powers in a peculiarly colonizing state-administration. In Lithuania, the internal alternatives of market forms and capitalism itself are not considered in principle. Only three marginal parties stand for the social-democratic scenario of development, while seventeen are pro-neoconservative or have no clearly formulated position²¹.

It is problematic that a pro-capitalist political regime does not fit into the scheme of procedural democracy. Because of its one-sided economism, it makes a wider participatory democracy the populist “kettle of popular emotions”. You see, post-communist society began to develop under the influence of the myth of direct democracy. Representative democracy even now often raises a kind of suspicion. The goals of political democracy are determined by the desire of social development to be accessible to a bigger part of people, i.e. of social equality and justice to be more widely spread. In this way, very likely only the democratic instinct of a human being but not the democratic political culture is displayed.

The so-called “kettle of popular emotions” boils up even more when post-communist political democracy starts to lose control of the forces it encouraged. First of all – control of the capital that is becoming large²². “Economic society” does not want to obey the principles of solidarity and values promoted by political democracy. On the contrary, political democracy is influenced by the capital when rich sponsors of political parties influence elections, the setting of political agenda and political behavior in general. Other forces that are also seeking to gain influence, for example, trade-unions, cannot match up to capital. In such a way, attention here is paid also to the probable and existing saltatory social development. This development is partly “programmed” by politics and influenced by capital even in democratic political regimes. Capitalism has an infection of erosion in regard to political democracy. This tells us about contradictions between market and democracy. Political democratization and economical development are important but not sufficient conditions stimulating each other. Thus, there is no unambiguous answer to the question which – the

democratic or the authoritarian – regime is a stronger institution in such spheres as strict monetary politics, freezing of wages and other spheres necessary for an economic effect. We know that in several states capitalist economy and social guarantees were established by authoritarian regimes. Economic ineffectiveness and social political dissatisfaction as an expression of the growing social inequality are much more interrelated. However, the democratization of politics creates an illusion of an inevitable social effect – bigger mutual confidence.

Pro-capitalist democracy seems to be polycentric, however, its polycentrism is deceptive. Ch. Lindblom some time ago marked out the following political effects of market economy: 1) the deficit of participatory democracy; 2) uncontrolled centers of power; 3) involvement of separate large employers into the central process of democratic decision-making; 4) overall lack of legitimacy²³. While accepting that market economy is more advantageous – more various regarding the abilities to develop – than the administrative system of governance, we must note that market is avoiding democratic control in certain conditions and creates its own uncontrolled centers of power. Finally, it means that politicians and largest employers rule together. But there is no balance between the partners of this kind of alliance. Democratically elected politicians finally surrender to large employers. In this way the nimbus of democratic control is ripped down.

No big efforts are needed to show that in Lithuania only a small amount of funds is redistributed through the budget, that a small amount of them is allocated to the spheres of social welfare. In fact, these rates in Lithuania are smallest among the states of Middle and Eastern Europe. In spite of that, we have only several cases when a situation like this is an object of analysis. An exception is a long-term attention of A. Guogis and recent attention of K. Maniakas to this problem²⁴. It is evident that in Lithuania the development of social infrastructure does not correlate with the economic development. So the repeated question – why society should be satisfied with the democratic political regime – is not surprising, either.


Actually it is very difficult to reconcile all different trends of post-communist transformation – economic, political and social. Economy is based on competition for profit and wealth. In the social sphere, the goals of equal accessibility (consumption) of public goods to all members of society and the goal

of solidarity prevail, while the restriction of the possibility to be a real consumer makes the essence of politics. I stress these statements so that we could realize that in post-communist societies too much hopes are set on a direct dependence among the market, political democracy and social welfare.

The asynchrony of economic, social and political development has a constantly changing configuration of the autonomy and reductional interaction of these structures. Autonomy in this case means that every structure I have mentioned in a long run can influence another structure to the same degree as it feels the influence by that other structure itself. In a long run – because the abilities to make such influence emerge not straight away but during the reductional interaction. Economy starts developing at the moment when its political control is reduced. Attempts to relate political democracy to a particular degree of economic development are widely known. But the development of political democracy is taking part not only during the economic growth. The last example is the post-communist political democratization, which proceeds best when the world's economy is stagnated. We hope that economic growth and political democracy strengthen each other right away when at least one minor step is taken in its path of development. It seems that the prospects of a quick social and economic effect through a democratic political regime in post-communist states are receding. All in all – the perspectives of unlimited economic growth are receding. Each Western generation expected to ensure better life for their children than their own life had been, but nowadays it isn't so. In Western liberal democracies, new ideas of “new welfare” – the welfare in a situation of a certain decline of living standards – are voiced while hoping for a new balance between solidarity and individuality. In Lithuania, the fact that capitalism itself does stimulate neither freedom nor democracy, that it does not solve all social problems is more and more evident. At the same time, the assumption that the development of capitalism is based on unlimited expansion is also refuted²⁵. Departure from the strategy of Lisbon, one of the main components of which is the relation of stable economic growth with a more tight social cohesion is also seen. The social and not the economic part of the strategy is emphasized²⁶.

The complex mutual dependencies of economic, social and political developments are schemed in Graph 1.

Graph 1. Asynchrony of economic, political and social development



Pro-capitalism faces the biggest problems in combining not the market economy and political democracy (however, as we have noted, here are lots of problems too), but social and economic development. It is so partly because most people in post-communist states during the rule of communist regimes had stable social guarantees even when the rates of economic development were low. It is a paradox, but post-communist populism emerges in the sectors strivings for justice.

Pro-capitalism first of all seeks for the economic effect. The proponents of pro-capitalism claim that when the economic effect will be gained it will be possible to seek for the social effect more purposefully. In such a case it is expected that it will be possible to transform the results of economic growth into a social effect by using political and other means. But it is forgotten that some additional perspectives are unfolded by a long-term constant paramount seeking for the economic effect. These are the perspectives to institutionalize economy not only socially but also politically. The sustention of the privileged positions of economy leads to a saltatory accumulation of wealth. It leads to the profusion of wealth in one poll of society and the “marginal class” living below the poverty line in the other poll. Capital and its people make a strong impact on politics, government activity and in this way protect its privileged status in society. We know that

strict monetary politics has brought the biggest gain for new economic elites. So we shouldn't have illusions about a straight path leading from the economic to the social effect. No country succeeded in this endeavour, and only a few succeeded in implementing "tight belt" scenarios. We speak only about a few cases because more former or present "tight belt" scenarios ended both in economic and social failures. Thus, at the very beginning of market creation the tasks of getting rid from dependency in the market (tasks of decommmodification) should be considered. The more successful the market economy, the more obvious these tasks become. In other words, capitalism must be democratized from its very beginning. A. Guogis has calculated that Lithuania, according to the rates of decommmodification, followed the neoconservative scenario of development at the beginning of the year 2000²⁷. In Lithuania, attention to social development and the principles of its sponsorship cannot match up to the principles applied by the states either in continental Western Europe or in Northern Europe.

The advancing post-communism is pro-capitalistic. However, post-communist transformation becomes complicated when one-sided economism is entrenched or when market values are dominating society. Post-communist transformation actually gets stuck if the results of economic liberalization and political democratization are not transformed into a social effect – into preserving the human abilities of choosing and rebuilding health and the organic natural environment, achieving and continuing to achieve education and forming cultural orientations, provision of important materials for living (food, clothing, accommodation, means of communication). The social effect actually involves efforts to create conditions of a regime of choice for all members of society and in this way to consolidate social justice.

Thus, post-communist pro-capitalism itself is neither democratic nor social. Most likely it is a politically and socially irresponsible system of wealth accumulation, which is also lacking in justice. When a political regime cannot set up the claim for responsibility upon pro-capitalist powers, this mission is taken up by populists.

3. The marginality of populism: between anti-capitalism and pro-capitalism

Populism is in general syncretic, able to adapt to very different social movements and political regimes. In populist activity, the values of participatory mass democracy become destructive instruments. Populists pretend to speak for people and society, not for separate social groups. Thus, populism can hardly be put on a political scale of “right” and “left”. It is a phenomenon which goes all along the ideological spectrum. Populists can be both protectors of economic liberalism and proponents of state regulation. In post-communist states, populists declare both rightist and leftist ideas²⁸. However, some stronger shades of “right-left” remain: right-wing populists demand for “national democracy”, i.e. emphasize the national and not social identity, while left-wing populists demand for “people’s democracy”, i.e. to restrain capital.

Populism flourishes in an environment of social tension. It is also known that populism mostly appeals to the social strata that are called “lower” ones (whose standards of living are lower, who are less educated, easily manipulated, more subject to paternalism). These lower strata are a good but not necessarily the best ground for populism. The wave of populism nowadays in Lithuania aggregates social dissatisfaction and mistrust combined with expectations of catching up post-communist society, which have been unsatisfied for quite a long time already. Let’s admit that the society is dominated by expectations for economic growth and the rise of living standards. Meanwhile the result of the fifteen-year change is a poor capitalism with all its problems and outcomes: structural incompatibility; lack of knowledge economy, which also means non-creation of a new product; social segmentation and periferization; doubts about the prospect that life will get better; feeling of injustice; conviction that you can change nothing. Public debates go only about how many percent of people were affected by poor capitalism – 60 or 40. True, there are no public debates about whether or not the future of Lithuania fits the lagging “third world”. If this is the purpose of the transformation, was it worth starting? But more important now is another question: what the next step should be so that the first question would lose its sense?

By the way, the motive of exaggerated expectations can be “exploited” in order to justify the slow pace of positive shift and to divert attention from real problems. But we cannot deny a situation when the lower strata themselves start to reproduce inequality and poverty only because the social contacts of their families and their own are more limited. Populism became an instrument to escape the vicious circle of inequality and poverty.

It is relevant that populism is a companion not only of backwardness, promising the upsurge of development. Populism is, as I have already mentioned, an inescapable shadow of democracy. Populism in democracies is understood as an appeal to demos and is directed against the present pattern of government and the values and ideas that are dominant in society. Populism acts in the name of demos, it attacks traditional parties, it is pointed not only against political and economic elites, but also against intellectuals and the media. Populists usually are proud of voicing the opinion of people. Most often it means breaking the taboo – speaking on the themes that have been untouched because of shame or the lack of political will. The growth of poverty, the limits of democracy, extremities of capitalism, contradictions of the European Union, global inequality – these are just a few examples. Populists create a specific mood of renewal. In this way they involve the people who normally would remain politically indifferent. Emotions elevated by such a mood usually concentrate on a charismatic leader²⁹. Charismatic leadership takes a special place. A populist leader usually comes to power in a democratic way. No less relevant is that a populist leader comes to the scene when the ruling elite is facing crisis. By the word “crisis” here is meant not only the inability of separate elites to refuse their interests for the sake of public ones, but also the lack of capacity to rule. In this sense, the phenomena of R. Paksas or V. Uspasskich are not accidental in Lithuanian politics.

Populism undoubtedly pays attention to part of expectations of catching up society. Lithuania, like other post-communist states, is exactly one of the countries trying to catch up and not one of those hopelessly lagging behind. And this means that Lithuania has internal resources of development and the necessary external support the country can rationally use for the purposes of development (this ability is more and more often doubted

when the guidelines for the use of resources of the strategic structural funds are tried to be drawn), Lithuanian people still have not lost the hope to live in line with common European standards. This promotes a peculiar “speeding-up” of history.

However, in present-day populism we can see not only a groundless perspectivism but also the reaction to mistakes of transformation. Many great institutional alterations were made during the transformation in Lithuania. But while making great alterations it is difficult to avoid making big mistakes. Large-scale alterations are full of big dangers and contingencies. Mistakes during the transformation were not avoided. So finally, a populist search for the ones to blame emerges in society.

Large-scale and quick-pace change becomes a potential reason for populism in general. Capitalism and political democracy are really new institutions in Lithuania. Especially because the expected mass democracy is changing, the principle of majority is modified. R. Ališkauskienė notes that the popular trust of Lithuanian people in democracy and market is weakening, and the latter is trusted only by elites³⁰. M. Degutis states that the past-century society of Lithuania was not ready for self-dependent life in market conditions³¹. A big part of society in this case loses the sense of reality and acts under inertia. L. Bielinis properly remarks that a wide area of action greets populists, as everything that society does not realize or understand becomes the base of populist critique³².

Populism is related not only to inner processes in Lithuania, it has also connections with NATO and EU membership. Different social groups realize achievements of the Euroatlantic integration very contradictorily. Different strata of society face the ambiguity of integration and resist the changes forthrightly. Although “ambiguous changes” are identified with Euroatlantic integration since 2004, national or ethnocentric populism (politicized ethnicity) didn’t become a more important factor not by a bit. The processes of integration again and again rise the illusions of “our own state”, now combined not with ideas of social equalization but with ideas of nationalism. However, the content of anti-western attitudes is dominated not by ethnocentrism but by anti-capitalism.

A usual question is why the demand of unjustified, considering recent tendencies, perspectivism has grown so much. After all, now we face the

economic growth. The growth of GDP in Lithuania during 2003–2004 was the fastest in Europe. The answer has three aspects.

On one side, the economic growth in Lithuania is compared to a very low growth (the absence of growth) in 1992–1999. Thus, it is thought that “the Baltic tiger” is not yet born.

On a second side, the victory of democracy has its “price”. This price is the obligations undertaken by those who rule to the world of capital; it is the repay of rulers for their “public life difficulties”, or corruption. Politicians and political parties usually live according to the topicalities of their world and do not pay constant attention to the wants of society.

On a third side, although the standards of living, expressed by averages, are slowly rising, unfortunately, behind these “averages” lies an uneven distribution of the social burden among different groups of society, created by economic changes, the widening distance among the social groups, the relentless burden of poverty³³. Economic growth does not work on behalf of the poor ones. Thus, when at least a bit bigger growth of economy but not the growth of personal resources of life is experienced, the society is transfused not only by concern about the growing social inequality but also by the feeling of injustice.

We know that economic growth simply puts the line of poverty further. Economic growth is not enough; you must also have rights and possibilities to be a real consumer. We also know that economic growth, the bigger part of capital do not turn into a social capital, i.e. into a wider equality and solidarity and into civic confidence. It is this unfavorable pause of conversion of economic capital into social capital that now has emerged in Lithuania³⁴. As L. Donskis rightly notices, it stirs up social rage³⁵. And the latter is hardly distinguished from strivings for social revanchism. It should not be a surprise, although, according to A. Guogis, in Lithuania nobody even tried to examine more carefully or to calculate the level of exhaustion of labor force which is extremely low qualified³⁶. Social tension is used by separate populist forces when they suggest populist means. A specific way of life, created by poor standards of living, complicates the development of society in general. Although the “marginal class” in general can be characterized by alienation, the political importance of the lower stratum can be bigger than expected. Besides, it is related not only to radicalism.

B. Kuzmickas is right when he says that people in whose life and self-consciousness more or less all aspects of transitional post-communist identity are matched do not form the base of society³⁷. The dominant part of society consists of those “workpeople” whose way of life was formed during the years of authoritarian egalitarianism. The former way of life and income of those “workpeople” became impossible in the pro-capitalist environment. These “workpeople” are most suggestible to populism.

It is reasonable to suppose that in Lithuania not only the demand but also the supply of populism have increased. The supply of populism in Lithuania increased when a consistent political process became again impossible after the presidential election in 2002. The electoral populism of R. Paksas was a pretext to start the change of balance between the political powers. The traditional moderate political powers who lost the election realized that they would have to wait for “revenge” for five years. The processes of stabilization, which started in economy, also promised a consistent development of society. In the meanwhile both former populists – members of “Sąjūdis” (Lithuanian national movement for independence) – patriots – and the new strivers for change – center liberals and partly social liberals – found themselves on the margins of ruling. The direct reason for the change of balance between the political powers was the populist electoral undertakings of R. Paksas. Almost the same situation was created by V. Uspasskich and Labor Party.

The contribution – conscious or unconscious – of the political powers that call themselves moderate and fight populism (?) to the stimulation of this populism is still unclear. But the parties that claim to be traditional do not lack populism either. They also gave place to market fundamentalism, because they couldn’t avoid pro-capitalist politics. They also use populist elements in their activities, because they want to restore the social and value balance in society. Both center-right liberals, left social democrats and social liberals contributed to the upsurge of populism, because they couldn’t harmonize the necessities of competent governing and the seek of all social strata for social-economic equality. Liberals concentrated on competence and didn’t notice (?) how the entire strata of social exclusion evolved in Lithuania. Social democrats and similar political powers could not resist the temptation of liberal rational freedom and so forgot (?) the values of

democratic equality. In general, the contradictions between program attitudes of the parties combining the core of political regime and the mode of the social and economic development they carry provoke the emergence of populist powers and their support from separate strata of society.

In Lithuania the situation is unclear. Now we can see a kind of equilibrium between pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist powers. But even the proponents of these orientations sometimes cannot settle their identity. Different strata of society see different things in populism – some find anti-capitalist strivings, others hope that populism will help them enter the world of capital and stay in it. Pro-capitalism and anti-capitalism actually do not divide the society of Lithuania in halves, despite that it is often thought so. In fact, the part of society that holds the pro-capitalist position sometimes uses populism in order to strengthen their social and political positions.

4. The prospects of democracy in populist environment

The political process in Lithuania can be best described in terms of pro-capitalist democracy. Pro-capitalist democracy means the privileged situation of capital and therefore, basically, it is socially limited. Pro-capitalist democracy cannot yet limit capitalism, it rather serves it. The lack of adequate reaction of the political process to contradictions of pro-capitalism created a crisis in Lithuanian politics in 2003–2006. Political pluralism of pro-capitalist democracy is leveled by populism, its unavoidable companion. In this sense, pro-capitalist democracy is not mature. A big part of Lithuanians, although at heart applauded populist promises, did not en masse vote for them in elections. R. Paksas broke this barrier, and now a critical mass of voters has emerged in Lithuania, which can ensure the mandate for populist powers. The populist Labor Party prospers in an opportunistic environment. In parliamentary elections, powers like that were concentrated enough and were a match in the rivalry for old-timers of the political process³⁸. It is even less surprising, because about half of Lithuanian people hope for a political regime of the “strongmen”³⁹.


So the sallies of populism are a threat to pro-capitalist democracy, too. E. Vareikis notes that in 2000–2001 the political situation in the post-communist part of Europe in many places looked like in the beginning of

the 4th decade of the 20th century. Then many countries of the region faced “tiredness” of democracy, demoralization of government and internal political struggles that set the stage for authoritarian regimes⁴⁰. In the 21st century the rough authoritarianism is hardly possible, but the populist strongmen democracy would definitely be a regulated democracy. And democracy like that would inevitably limit those strata of society which are moving forward, it would limit the potential of society in general. No matter how contradictory the pro-capitalist democracy would be, replacing it with populist democracy for Lithuania would mean passing from the category of developing countries, countries that seek to catch up, to the category of countries that desperately lag behind.

What concerns the destiny of democracy, the most problematic is that Lithuania still remains one of the poorest European countries⁴¹. A poor society sooner or later stops identifying itself with political democracy. So the protectors of democracy can only be separate elites. At the very beginning of the transformation it was clear that in the destitute part of society the democratic values can only be implants, foreign bodies. You need only to forecast when a bigger part of society will turn away from political democracy, especially its liberal form. The disappointed already don't believe in the “magic” of political and especially liberal democracy and openly support populists. The formation of a difficult situation is confirmed by the recent researches on the values of Lithuanian people. Of course, the conviction that human rights are disregarded is characteristic of Lithuania on a mass scale, as well as an extreme mistrust in politicians and hopes for a strong leader. More than a half of the population are dissatisfied with how democracy is working in the country⁴².

Besides, populism in Lithuania reveals a real deficit of reforms, too. And this only shows the inertia of those who govern. Here is one example. At the end of July 2004, supporters of ex-president R. Paksas addressed the Central Electoral Committee asking to register the initiative referendum group which suggested making corrections in even six articles of the Constitution. Worth noting are the efforts to reduce the minimal number of signatures needed to call a referendum from 300 000 to 100 000 and to give people the right to apply to the Constitutional Court. It would be easy to say that this was another case of populist activity, were it not the

Graph 2. Trends pf populist efforts to change political regime in Lithuania



circumstance that Lithuania belongs to the small number of countries where civics have no right to apply to the Constitutional Court. After one year, in 2005, Chairman of the Constitutional Court E. Kūris gently began to speak about a correction of the Constitution to provide people with the possibility to apply to the Constitutional Court⁴³. Of course, we must admit that this also shows the reaction to a drastically widened gap between the governors and the governed.

However, the slip of political regime in Lithuania, which is promised by populists, can be described as an outcome of a primitive understanding of democracy. Populists try to pull down the “bridge” between pro-capitalist democracy and populist democracy and would like to build a “bridge” between populist democracy and pro-capital authoritarianism (Graph 2). Again, we should note that populism is not homogeneous. One part of populists expect populist democracy, another part search for a connection between populism and autocracy, and the third part want to relate pro-capitalism and autocracy.

So isn't it a situation when no moderate political power or a combination of powers can absorb populism? What is dangerous to pro-capitalist democracy is that while populists of various trends unite, moderate political powers still blame each other. R. Lopata has noted that the so-called

“united front” against populism is fictitious⁴⁴. It is worth to remember the disagreements between the proponents of liberalism and democracy. The contemporary division between the liberal and democratic values in Lithuania isn’t unique not by a bit. It is a worldwide tendency⁴⁵. A liberal tells a democrat: “If you represent the majority, then where is your competence?”. The democrat replies: “If you are so clever, then why can’t you persuade the majority to agree with your opinion?” But in the danger of populism liberals and democrats always try to unite – sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The present-day danger for the state and society of Lithuania is very clear: the threats are both incompetence and exclusiveness. It seems that liberals must trust democrats in order to stop the wave of incompetence and exclusiveness which is becoming more and more radical. In the case of Lithuania, liberals must decide whether they will keep receding from democratic values and in this way condemn themselves to the fate of “old leftists”, or whether they will set their face towards these values and revive the perspectives of the political “left”. Experience of the recent presidential election in France shows that the liberal center reacted to the danger of “Lepenisation” and joined the consolidated democratic majority. We know that in this case the democratic values have won: all people must be integrated into society. The purpose of leftists is to restrict privileges, exceptionality and similar tendencies whatever their kind – social-economic or intellectual. Everybody has to be an equal participant in the public process. Of course, nobody is going to ignore competence in place of work. The advantage of incorporation over competence is allowable only in politics.

Before the parliamentary election in 2004, center liberals and conservatives began to cooperate (unsuccessfully) on the right side of the political center, and on the left side of this center a coalition of now governing social democrats and social liberals was formed (prolonged). But after the parliamentary elections conservatives stimulated new disagreements among the traditional political parties. This prevented the perspective of the so-called “rainbow coalition” from being more thoroughly discussed. Internal contradictions of center liberals didn’t allow them to become an equal partner in the formation of government without populists. All in all, in the present situation the rightist political powers have little prospects to become a counter-balance to populism, because capitalists “got over the top” and

made the society of Lithuania more “left-handed”. Thus, the actions of the LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) office are worth of special attention. Leftist political powers are responsible for the destiny of pro-capitalist democracy, because these powers can become a pier for anti-capitalist populism⁴⁶.

In the meanwhile, we can see a growing indifference of LSDP leaders to some of the leftist political values, especially in the sphere of meeting the interests of capital. Social democrats moved towards the political center too much, leaving a considerable part of its electorate under the influence of populist parties. Leftism is formulated and maintained by carrying more and more social decisions which are unrelated to market. The cause of such decisions is the increasing number of problems which should be (and can only be) solved by the state, not by market. Building new roads, making city plans, organizing health service, sponsoring education, cleaning the polluted environment – all these are concerns of state institutions. Everywhere herein the technologies of state governance must be used. Leftism, *inter alia*, means the strengthening of state structures. But Lithuanian social democrats recently give more and more attention to the myth of liberalism that state is losing its modernizing potential. Yes, during post-communist transformation social democrats are forced to promote capitalism, but they also should know the limits beyond which a retreat from leftism begins. It is important what scope of state regulation of social economic development will be chosen by the LSDP. The problem is that the limits of etatism are known but the limits of de-etatisation are not. And crossing the limits of de-etatisation means that the retreat of the state from economy and social sphere may become inadequate to the interests of market potentialities and spread of social variety. In the meantime, social democracy has failed to achieve that the efforts of the state would be first felt by society, not by capital. The latter turned out to have more gain from leftist state governance technologies. Social democracy should be asked whether the present economic potential of Lithuania couldn't be more open to the solution of social problems. It is not yet clear whether the potential of leftist political powers in Lithuania is adequate to the people's expectations of democratic reformism. But it is obvious that in Lithuania social democracy is unable to integrate part of social strata into moderate political life.

The spirit of democratic reformism is akin to the socialdemocratic understanding of social economic development: the political regime must take care not only of civil rights but also of provision, accessibility of social and economic welfare to all strata of society; economic growth is promoted under conditions of social market, and this would mean that economic growth does not deepen social exclusion. Social economic development like this can be promoted by a political regime based on socialdemocratic political powers. But the complexity of this situation is that the left wing of Lithuanian politics is too much fragmented. In 2004–2006, there was a danger, and this danger is still here, that social democrats and social liberals might themselves step on the brink of populism, because they are forced to solve the dilemma: to give the ability to form the government to populist parties or to let them take part in a coalition government. And so it happened: social democrats and social liberals formed a coalition with the Labor Party and with the union of parties of Peasants and New Democracy. But the hinge of the conflict inside the coalition was exactly populism.

When the political left is so divided, the contradictions of capitalism may reach the critical level of social inequality and even evoke political powers of radical left⁴⁷.

The unity of Lithuanian society is in general the outcome of etatism. And this means that the natural consolidation of individuals for a collective action is weak. The society is consolidated and lead by various “leaders of nation”. Civil society in Lithuania faces the interventionism of the state, i.e. is more “top down” created. Natural consolidation of individuals for a collective action is possible only in an environment of trust⁴⁸. However, civic confidence among separate individuals and social groups, making such collective actions possible, is very low⁴⁹. Civic confidence is possible in small (local) and active associations which constitute the networks of political engagement, i.e. in a strong civil society⁵⁰. Lithuania is lacking such a strong civil society. Principles of capitalism, joining the Euroatlantic structures evoked some additional motives of mistrust, for example, the motive of different benefits for different social strata.

The establishment of market economy is doubtless in Lithuania, but the vast social problems force us to doubt seriously the irreversible estab-

lishment of political democracy, of its liberal form in particular. The market is not enough for political democracy. Social conditions and a proper mentality are also necessary.

There is a great distrust in those who govern in Lithuania; it is so wide that can be called anti-systemic. Generally, it has been noticed that anti-systemic features are more typical of the civil society of Lithuania than systemic ones⁵¹. The situation in 2002–2006 did not make it any more systemic, i.e. more tolerant in respect of the state. On the contrary – this situation evoked even a wider mistrust in “the ruling class”, which cannot resist the tension of inner quarrels, and so again and again new scandals are revealed. And in society itself the cleavage between supporters of the populist “order” and proponents of moderate development has deepened. This again messed up the stabilization process of political-party identity of the citizenry.

The destiny of political democracy now also depends on how the popular upswing of 1988–1992, which determined undue obligations, which “speeded up the history”, will come down. It is a solemn stage in the development of society and state, because undue expectations and fantasies might bring even revolutions. Generally, the weak society swallowed the story of futuristic projects. New political elites got in the structures of the state thanks to unreal promises. Trying to sustain power they remain in the area of these promises. But all reforms which were started by promises sooner or later end in a failure. The euphoria of society soon passes. The ones who govern must now (?) resolve to tell the society that their expectancies are groundless. But the dissatisfaction of society with those who govern is so great that every straight word may bring the end of their rule. The present regime in Lithuania is not prone to discuss the real situation of society and its perspectives. It can even be noticed that those who rule endue the political regime with even more features of populism. This situation is threatening not with critical elections, not with a widely spread negative voting, but with the crisis of state governance. Those who govern now – both the position and opposition – are in a vicious circle: they are friendly passing the authority to each other, however, the effectiveness of the authority is not growing; it even doesn’t become more impressive. The backwardness of Lithuania is not getting less. Therefore it is no surprise that society

identifies populist political powers with effective governance, effective authority. Of course, populists are defeated by their even more underestimated promises and incompetence. But the despair of the part of society which supports them is so big that again and again unreal promises are accepted, because they are based on the critics of those who rule unsuccessfully.

We should look for the solution of this problem in realistic politics, not in the politics of endless promises. Such politics is possible only as an outcome after the change of the order of state governance. The new regime formulating more realistic goals will not become less etatistic and at the same time more democratic. A political regime like that would not satisfy the requirements of liberal democracy, although by shortening the conflicts between those who rule and separate interest groups it would have the possibility to deny the perspective of Lithuania fitting into the “third world”. The latter is, of course, unacceptable. It would be too inconsiderate to expect the “downfall” of the state colonized by power after Lithuania has joined the EU. If the distinctions in the EU will not be diminished, they will stimulate populism, this time the rightist one.

Conclusions

Populism is not simply a social or political perversity. Populism, as actions of politicians, is based on argumentations, it is readjusted to the hopes or even fantasies dominating society. It is always a potential and often a real companion of the social and political process. Even if we find utopism in it, we must mention that utopias consolidate society. But an unexpectedly wide spread of populism in Lithuania in 2002–2006 forces to study further the reasons for it. Here two such reasons were found: democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism. The energy of populism rises from the contradictory and constant mutual restraint of the reasons mentioned. In fact, such restraint only stimulates populism, because it generates social tension. The coexistence of contradictions of democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism determines, to use the term of I. Matonytė, a “two-speed” society⁵². “They” and “we” separate from each other as two autonomous groups of society, as two parts of it. Populism is resolved to eliminate this cleavage, so it flourishes in the confrontation of these two segments.

In Lithuania, the pro-capitalist economic, social and political structure evolves unavoidably. Post-communism cannot escape being pro-capitalist; otherwise it loses its sense as a denial of communism. Post-communism cannot escape democratic primitivism, either; society which is denying authoritarianism is full of illusions about the “rule of people”. But the fall of illusions about “our own state” and contradictions of pro-capitalism raise populism. Whatever the scope of seeking for individual autonomy, it remains a social necessity. Cooperation into groups is typical of an individual – he simply feels insecure when he is not a member of a group.

Eventually, it is becoming clear that pro-capitalist politics based on one-sided economism, when accumulation dominates redistribution, when the more expeditious transformation of the growing economic capital to the rising standards of all society is delayed and the institutional interest groups of a political regime do not avoid using this economic growth selfishly, do not and cannot have sufficient support from society, the rulers lose their legitimacy. The biggest contradiction of pro-capitalism is the “cohesion” of market fundamentalism, which is encouraged by pro-capitalism, with the unsociability of weak capitalism. This unsociability of capitalism provides good grounds for democratic primitivism. After all, the major part of members of society looked at the prospects of post-communist transformation through the prism of egalitarianism. Meanwhile, the results of this transformation boosted social inequality. In the grumble of pragmatism-utilitarianism the ideas of egalitarianism (at least “-ism”) are unheard.

It would be too little to say that populism is backed by the social strata that are frightened by the ambiguity of the post-communist transformation. At the same time they are those who lost during the establishment of capitalism or even felt abused. Although ideologies are rarely typical of populism in post-communist countries, in the situation of 2002–2006 the anti-capitalist, i.e. leftist populism was best expressed. The only situation when the rightist populism emerges is when the role of separate persons – the leaders – is emphasized. Neither did the rightist, i.e. national, ethnocentric populism, which could spread more widely after joining the EU and NATO, disturb the growth of leftist populism. The problem is that not the moderate political powers but populists, paraphrasing market

fundamentalists, loudly voiced that things that are useful for capital are not necessarily useful for all society. So it is too little to say that populism is established and prospers only in the social strata that could not accommodate to the new environment – after all, not everybody can be the winners.

Populism is an inescapable aspect of life. But the growth of it can step on a dangerous line, and the ability to govern the state democratically can be lost. Populist politics, kindling the “kettle of popular emotions”, eventually creates weak states and weak institutions of society. Populism hides under the catchwords of primitivism, calling the masses to “rule the state”, “scatter the parliament”, “take the governance into your own hands” and so on. The newest problem of the development of Lithuania is that populists provoked those who rule to make new promises but not to create a new order of state governance. So the question what order of state governance could best absorb unavoidable contradictions of post-communist democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism and stop the outbursts of populism stimulated by them remains unsolved.

Thus, may we prognosticate that after the critical situation of 2002–2006 the curve of the Lithuanian political regime will still go towards democracy and society will be more in favor of democratic values? There are no obvious guarantees of that. The above study of the reasons for populism confirms the widely discussed hypothesis of the asynchrony of different spheres of post-communist society. The stability of political democracy is constantly threatened by the saltatory economic development and social tensions. Lithuanian people now cannot definitely say what they want: democracy or so-called “order”. Pro-capitalist democracy, which cannot satisfy popular, usually exaggerated, expectancies for welfare, finally faces the threat. Democratic orientations of society are now mostly sustained by those who need political democracy to criticize the rulers and seek for power. The massive support of populists shows that the “plebeian” orientations in society survive. In Lithuania, there are no efforts to eliminate democracy completely. But, in the atmosphere of contradictions between democratic primitivism and pro-capitalism, the danger is still here that populist democracy which would doom Lithuania to backwardness will overcome.

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- ⁹ Bell, D. (2003), *Kapitalizmo kultūriniai prieštaravimai (Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism)*. Translated from English by D. Valentinavičienė. Vilnius: ALK / Alma littera.
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- ¹¹ Maniokas, K. *Europos Sąjungos plėtra ir europeizacija: Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybių įsijungimas į Europos Sąjungą*. Vilnius, 2003.
- ¹² For more, see: A. Тупен. *Возвращение человека действующего*. Москва: Научный мир, 1998.
- ¹³ *Socialinis struktūrinimasis ir jo pažinimas*. Red. M. Taljūnaitė. Vilnius: Friskas, 1999.
- ¹⁴ It is worth to mention the scenario appealing to the so-called “coloured revolutions”, suggested by V. Radžvilas (V. Radžvilas. *Evoliucija ar revoliucija?* Veidas, 2005, No 48, p. 62).
- ¹⁵ Stiglitz, J. E. *Globalization and its Diskontents*. New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002.
- ¹⁶ Žr.: Gylys, P. Fundamentalizmas ekonomikoje ir jo pavojai. *Ekonomika*, 2002, No 57, p. 53–61; Rubavičius, V. *Rinka, visuomenės informavimo priemonės ir politika*. in *Politika kaip komunikacinis žaidimas*. Red. L. Bielinis. Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2004, p. 10–31.
- ¹⁷ Offe, C. *Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundungen der politischen Transformation im Neuen Osten*. Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus, 1994, S. 57–80.
- ¹⁸ Grigas, R. *Socialinių įtampų laikai Lietuvoje (kritinė sociologinė XX amžiaus panorama)*. Vilnius: VPU leidykla, 1998.
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- ²⁰ Matonytė, I. *Pokomunistinės Lietuvos elito vertybinių orientacijų kaita*. Kn.: *Politinė kultūra ir visuomenės kaita*. Red. A. Jankauskas. Vilnius, Kaunas: Naujasis lankas, 2002, p. 94–96.
- ²¹ Guogis, A., Bernotas, D., Ūselis, D. *Lietuvos politinių partijų samprata apie socialinę apsaugą*. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2000.
- ²² Post-communist democracy is unable to control even what might be called infinite admiration for its own tolerance, which inter alia means the possibility to express your opinion whatever it is. In this way populism becomes a participant of equal rights (and of equal worth?). The media also contribute to the development of populism. Would we know anything about V. Štusauskas and similar characters if the media didn't announce about every slap in the face they make? Even the most negative information is used for social advertising, which forms undoubtedly populist groups of “compassion”. The media need populist sensations (the media cannot live without sensations in general) and populists need the media. The media themselves admit that. A good example of the media “syndrome” could be publication “Viktoro valanda” (“Victor's hour”) (Veidas, 2005, No 48, p. 26–29) of L. Kučinskaitė. But the right to “know”

and to “make” slaps to the face means putting aside the content of real problems. That is how actual “background” plots get in the foreground of life.

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- ²⁴ Guogis, A. Dėl Lietuvos socialinės politikos modelio. *Politologija*, 2002, No 4, p. 76–95; Guogis, A. Apie kai kurias socialinės nelygybės formavimosi sąlygas Baltijos šalyse. *Filosofija. Sociologija*, 2004, No 2, p. 17–21; Maniokas, K. Pasitenkinimas demokratija, gerovė ir viešoji politika: gerovės valstybės kūrimo perspektyvos Lietuvoje. *Politologija*, 2005, No 2, p. 46–68.
- ²⁵ Rubavičius, V. Ibid, p. 12.
- ²⁶ Maniokas K. Ibid, p. 56.
- ²⁷ Guogis, A. *Socialinės politikos modeliai*. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2000.
- ²⁸ Canovan, M. Ibid.
- ²⁹ Taggart, P. *The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative Perspective*. London: Macmillan, 1996.
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- ³² Bielinis, L. Mieganti sąmonė gimdo populizmą. *Kultūros barai*, 2004, No 2, p. 2–5.
- ³³ Krupavičius, A., Lukošaitis, A. *Lietuvos politinė sistema: sąranga ir raida*. Kaunas: Poligrafija ir informatika, 2004; Šileika, A., Blažienė, I. Gyventojų pajamų diferenciacija ir skurdas Lietuvoje. *Pinigų studijos*, 2000, No 3, p. 32–44.
- ³⁴ Laurėnas, V. Lietuvos socialinės-ekonominės plėtotės deideologizacijos problemos. *Tiltai*, 2003, No 1, p. 1–14.
- ³⁵ Donskis, L. Imagologija, manipuliacijos ir viešoji erdvė postmodernioje politikoje. *Politologija*, 2004, No 1, p. 3–38.
- ³⁶ Guogis, A. Apie kai kurias socialinės nelygybės formavimosi sąlygas Baltijos šalyse. *Filosofija. Sociologija*, No 2, p. 17–21.
- ³⁷ Guogis, A. Ibid.
- ³⁸ In parliamentary elections, Labour party won 39 seats (27.66%) and the coalition of R. Paksas “For order and justice” 11 seats (7.8%) in the Parliament. Meanwhile the ruling parties of social democrats and social liberals together won only 31 seats (20.19%). Not more successful were their opponents – conservatives (25 seats) and liberals (18 seats).
- ³⁹ *Europa ir mes*. Red. A. Matulionis. Vilnius: Gervėlė, 2001.
- ⁴⁰ Vareikis, E. *Dinozaurėjanti Europa: emociniai-politiniai svarstymai*. Vilnius, 2002.
- ⁴¹ *Europa ir mes*. Ibid.
- ⁴² *Europa ir mes*. Ibid.
- ⁴³ Skundų kelias gali būti tiesesnis. *Lietuvos rytas*, 9 August 2005, No 183, p. 2.
- ⁴⁴ Bendras frontas prieš populizmą – dirbtinis. *Lietuvos rytas*, 10 November 2004, No 26, p. 4.
- ⁴⁵ Wallerstein, I. *The End of the World as we know it. Social Science for the Twenty-First Century*. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

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- ⁴⁷ Laurėnas, V. Pokomunistinė politinė „kairioji“ ir jos struktūra. *Tiltai*, Priedas, 2003, No 13, p. 256–268.
- ⁴⁸ Putnam, R. D. *Kad demokratija veiktų: pilietinės tradicijos šiuolaikinėje Italijoje (Making Democracy Work: Traditions in Modern Italy)*. Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2001.
- ⁴⁹ Kavolis, V. Pasitikėjimo problema. Pergalės ir atsitraukimai. *Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas*, 1997, No 1, p. 13–21; *Europa ir mes*. Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Fukuyama, F. *The Great Disruption. Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. New York: Free Press, 1999.
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PARLIAMENTARY ELITES AS A DEMOCRATIC THERMOMETER: THE LITHUANIAN AND MOLDOVAN CASES*

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Abstract. The study concentrates on three distinct themes related to the parliamentary elites: 1) the issue of pace and scope of change of the “old” elites by new people; 2) accessibility of the elite and its permeability by “outsiders” (ethnic minorities, women, and some socio-professional groups); and 3) the dynamics of elite turnover and professionalization.

In both of these cases numerous representatives of the old elite survived and managed to adapt to the new political conditions. Moldova, with a higher high level of representation of ex-communist elites in most of its transition political parties, experienced evident stagnation. The Lithuanian case is in the middle on the scale of former regime continuity. After the initial strong political polarization, the multiparty system evolved through increased and qualitatively renewed levels of elite change.

Introduction

Robert Putnam (1976:166) argues that “because elite composition is more easily observable than are the underlying patterns of social power, it can serve as kind of seismometer for detecting shifts in the foundation of polities and politics.”

In studying national parliamentary elites some fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we paraphrase Putnam, but prefer to use the more neutral term of *thermometer*. Our basic assumption is that a “healing” process of some sort has occurred in the post-Soviet societies, following the revolutionary, earth-shattering (at least, in the constitutional sense) pe-

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riod. Emerging patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment and action allow us to de-dramatize analysis of the democratic “convalescence”.

The research reported in this paper is based on an examination of two country cases: Lithuania and Moldova. The choice of cases is based on considerations of analytical comparability. The countries selected have several things in common. Lithuania and Moldova regained their post-Soviet independence on the same historic basis – they ceased being hostages of the Molotov–Ribbentrop secret protocols. Their national renaissance has been the major vector of political action, which has led to democratization. Lithuania and Moldova are ethnically diverse countries. In 2005, Lithuania has around 15% of non-titular inhabitants, while Moldova has a considerable (22%) minority, primarily made up of Ukrainians and Russians. Both countries are parliamentary democracies, in which the bulk of legislative power is invested in the parliament. Both are small, in terms of both their population and parliaments (141 MPs in Lithuania and 100 in Moldova).

There are also differences between the two countries. The intensity of national renaissance and organizational level of the anti-communist movements differed to a great extent. The nationalists of the *Sąjūdis* movement in Lithuania certainly had the most ardor, whereas in Moldova the anti-communist movement was rather weak. Their geopolitical situations differ as well. From the outset, Lithuania led Russophobic politics and quickly distanced itself as far as possible from the sphere of Russian political influence. Currently it is a member of the EU and the NATO. In Moldova, Russia has played a much stronger role. Much of the population is favorably oriented toward Moscow, and only recently has Moldova shown decisive signs of Europeanization due to its leaders’ problematic political relations with the Putin government.

Our focus on parliamentary elites, viewed as a specific social circle of individuals democratically enabled to perform legislative functions in the society, rather than on political party formations *per se*, is based on the widely corroborated fact that the post-communist political landscape does not exist along classical party lines (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, Toka 1999; Pettai, Kreuzer 1999; Berglund, Hellen, Aarebrot 2003; etc.).

The article concentrates on three distinct themes related to the parliamentary elites. We first address the issue of the pace and scope of change

(replacement) of the “old” elites (epitomized by democratically elected MPs with the communist political background) by new people who are politically un-tainted by previous regime.

Second, over time, with the mechanism of democratic elections in place, possible distortions that have taken place in representation of major social groups (in particular, ethnic minorities, women, and some socio-professional groups) have been addressed and remedied in the parliaments. The accessibility of the elite and its permeability by outsiders is one of the major differentiating characteristics of a democratic society (Eldersveld, 1982: 195–196).

Third, we examine the dynamics of elite turnover and professionalization. Due to the small size of these countries, the parliamentary elites should tend to experience a low turnover and become professional legislators more quickly than would otherwise be the case. Neither of these cases should have high levels of turnover, but the rate should be higher in Moldova than in Lithuania. Conversely, the consolidation of a professionalized legislative elite should be more advanced in Lithuania than in Moldova.

These parameters of democratic normalization will allow us to draw a picture of the state of the democratic health of three “patients” under electoral treatment.

1. Dinosaurs or lizards: ex-communists (ex-nomenklatura) in the parliaments of new democracies

In new democracies, ex-communists will either vanish from the democratically elected parliaments (as dinosaurs from the environment undergoing tremendous change) or accommodate to new conditions because of their special skills (as lizards able to grow back their tails).

For political and ideological as well as structural reasons it is important to scrutinize the political experience of the ex-communist MPs in the Soviet period. It is widely assumed that experience in the power structures of the former Soviet State influences the values, behavior and democratic potential of the post-communist parliamentarians or, at least, makes the post-communist parliamentarians different from their counterparts in the older democratic regimes. Such an experience is gained by one’s time in the local soviets, in the leadership of the communist party (membership in the Su-

preme Soviet), in the Soviet (Lithuanian, Moldovan or USSR) government, and communist party membership.

The argument is frequently made that the more former communists succeed in entering the post-communist parliament, the less careful the new representative body is inclined to be of democratic procedures, and the democratic political environment is less stable and secure. However, the existence of such a mechanical cause and effect is doubtful. Much depends on relations between previous Soviet elites and new authorities. Di Palma (1990) stresses the idea that new democracies might be secure if all segments of elites “sign on” to democracy and recognize electoral politics being “the only game in town”. Some researchers (Mink, Szurek 1999) go even further and claim that the members of the Soviet elite may become an essential resource for democratic and free market innovations, since these people have a rich cultural and social capital.

Prior to commenting on the data, we should underline that information about the personal adherence to the communist regime is sensitive and very often undergoes some sort of “voluntary amnesia” when a person (candidate to the parliament or the parliamentarian) is presenting himself/herself to the public. The same forgetfulness seems to exist when one is asked about one’s participation in the *nomenklatura*.

1.1. Lithuania

The compiled database tells a rather mixed story about the *nomenklatura* in the post-communist elite in Lithuania (Table 1). It appears neither to be destructive, nor to be vanishing from the parliamentary elite. In the first two parliaments, almost one third of members had recorded experience in *nomenklatura* (28% in 1990 and 29% in 1992), however, these parliaments are recognized as founding the democratic regime and drafting the democratic constitution which governs Lithuania. With every sixth (in 2004 – 14%) MP having *nomenklatura* experience and sitting in the democratic parliament more than a decade after the breakdown of communism, it is impossible to postulate the disappearance of the *nomenklatura* faction in the post-communist elite. Yet one cannot generalize that its contribution is positive or even least neutral in consolidation of the political elite. In the first term, 1990–1992, *nomenklatura* people (6 communists) from *Seimas* formed a hard core of ex-putschists. Their attempts were neutralized by

Table 1. Political experience of the Lithuanian parliamentary elite during non-democratic regime

Term	Local political background during non-democratic regime		Leading party position during non-democratic regime		Government position (cabinet, secret services) during non-democratic regime		Any parliamentary experience during non-democratic regime		Any leading nomenklatura position		Membership in communist party	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1990	28	21	20	15	9	7	6	5	37	28	55	41
1992	29	21	20	14	3	2	3	2	41	29	72	51
1996	15	11	9	7	5	4	3	2	19	14	27	20
2000	9	6	15	11	2	1	1	1	21	15	28	20
2004	11	8	8	6	4	3	2	1	19	14	25	18

mass mobilization, based on anti-communist and anti-*nomenklatura* sentiments and slogans. More moderate representatives of *nomenklatura* contributed significantly to this neutralization. With time passing by, experience in the *nomenklatura* as such is becoming rather irrelevant in one's political career and values.

Concerning particular *nomenklatura* backgrounds, the parliamentary elite in Lithuania did not and does not have many representatives of high *nomenklatura* and is dominated by representatives from lower level *nomenklatura*, i.e. by those from its local branches (district, region, town, particular organization, etc.). Indeed, people who have served in the local councils during the Soviet time were rather frequently members of the two first *Seimas* (they composed 21% in 1990 and 1992). Later on they gradually departed from the parliamentary elite (to 8% in 2004). The local *nomenklatura* was active and important in the first democratic elections in that it allowed people from the Soviet sub-elite to enter the parliament. In the 1990 elections the anti-communist umbrella movement actively supported Soviet local councilors as a counterweight to the central *nomenklatura* establishment.

A somewhat different story comes from analysis of the high level *nomenklatura* with party leadership experience. They do not undergo any clear-cut decline. Rather, their proportion seems to be related to electoral

success of particular parties. Such people made up 15% in the founding parliament of 1990 and a similar 14% were elected in the 1992 Seimas which was dominated by the reformed ex-communist (social democratic) party. Their share was only 7% in 1996 when the conservatives and Christian democrats got the majority, and then again their share increased to 11% with the victory of social democrats and left liberals. It dropped as low as 6% in 2004. However, *ex-nomenklatura* MPs are not concentrated in any particular party and are scattered across all the political spectrum. Their frequency is somewhat higher among social democrats, but in terms of analysis of the electoral periods it is striking to observe that in 1992, when Lithuania famously was regained by the reformed ex-communist party, the number of *ex-nomenklaturists* did not increase at all.

MPs with a history of communist party membership are gradually vanishing from the parliamentary elite in post-communist Lithuania. Yet the percentage of the former CP members among the Lithuanian parliamentarians is permanently much higher (by ratio 10:1 in the first half of the 90s to 5:1 in the first half of 2000) than in the Lithuanian population in general (estimated to 4% in late 1980).

A considerable decrease in the number of former communists among the MPs occurred as a consequence of the 1996 elections (from 51% in 1992 to 20% in 1996). In the Seimas elected in 2004, every fifth MP was a former member of the CP. The generational factor seems to be the most important: in the 2004 Seimas, the age difference (mean) between former members of the communist party (52.3) and other, non-members (46.5), is significant.

The overall political experience of Lithuanian parliamentarians in the Soviet regime is becoming irrelevant, as it is becoming extraneous in all other social domains, such as economy, public administration, science and education, mass media, etc. However, several political observers attribute certain features of the existing political style to the *nomenklatura* experience, culture and tradition. Cynicism in electoral campaigns, making empty promises in the context of political discourse; certain "legalism" conducive to corruption in the MPs behavior, and inability to smoothly implement coalition politics are all attributable to this heritage.

1.2. *Moldova*

The Soviet legacy is much stronger in Moldova, whose politics is characterized rather by continuity than rapid regime change. Steven Fish (1998) has argued that the outcome of initial elections and the character of the first party in power during the transition play a critical role in determining the longer term course of reform in post-communist countries. Moldova clearly ranks as a “continuist” regime, in which elites from the former regime were able to exercise a great deal of influence over democratic institutions.

Unlike Lithuania, its 1990 parliament should not be seen as a founding legislature, but rather as a transition legislature which contained within its ranks very many communist party members and elites. The last republican Supreme Soviet, re-named the Parliament of Moldova on independence, in essence remained intact. 87% of MPs were communist party members, which indicates the relative strength of party institutions in Moldova compared to the Baltic region at the end of the Soviet period. *Nomenklatura* members, most of whom represented the rural apparatus, made up a full 37% of delegates (Table 2).

Like in Lithuania, the presence of former communist party members among Moldovan MPs declines over time, however, at a much slower rate. In part this is a consequence of the nature of party politics in Moldova. In the country's first election held under democratic circumstances (1994), victory went to the Agrarian Democratic Party which took 45% of the national vote and 54% of seats in parliament. The Agrarians, however, were comprised primarily of members of the rural power structure (village mayors, collective farm managers, and former raion CP officials). The sec-

Table 2. CPSU experience of Moldovan MPs: all terms

Term	High level nomenklatura		Low level nomenklatura		Membership in CP	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1990	18	5	113	32	321	87
1994	8	8	25	23	63	61
1998	15	15	23	23	65	64
2001	12	12	13	13	49	48
2005	10	10	13	13	33	33

ond placing party in these elections was socialist party Unity/*Edinstvo* bloc, which was, if anything, even more strongly affiliated with the former regime elements. This electoral outcome accurately reflected public attitudes in Moldova whose largely rural population was, in the early 1990s, highly skeptical regarding reform efforts, particularly in the domain of agriculture. Neither, for the most part, were Moldovans hostile either to the Soviet system or to Russia (Crowther, 1997).

The validity of this assessment is confirmed by the fact that the re-legalized Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (CPRM) won a strong plurality of 30% of votes and 40 out of 101 seats in the 1998 parliament. While a coalition of liberal opposition parties succeeded in forming a legislative majority to block the communists' return to power, these parties were themselves heavily representative of the Soviet elites. Following the 1998 elections the overall number of former party members increased, and the percentage of high level *nomenklatura* among the MPs doubled.

In post-2000 elections, trends in the Moldovan parliament track those seen elsewhere in the region: declining levels of former *nomenklatura* and communist party member presence in parliament. But overall percentages remain much higher in Moldova than in Lithuania, and certainly much higher than in Central Europe.

Clearly, not all MPs are equal. If one considers the leadership of Moldova's post communist legislature, the continued influence of the Soviet period elite is all the more evident (Table 3). By 2005, former *nomenklaturists* still retained 26% of all leadership positions, while party members accounted for nearly 4 out of 10. Throughout the post-Soviet period, former high-level members of the *nomenklatura* have consistently held 1/3 or more of

Table 3. CPSU experience of Moldovan legislative leadership: post-communist terms

Term	Total N of legislative leadership	High level <i>nomenklatura</i>		Low level <i>nomenklatura</i>		Membership in CP	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
1994	38	5	13	11	29	27	71
1998	43	12	28	8	17	31	72
2001	38	5	13	9	24	21	55
2005	37	5	14	6	16	17	46

positions in the Parliament's Permanent Bureau. Only in 2005 did the former communist party members' representation drop to slightly below 75% of that body.

Unlike the Lithuanian example, participation in the former regime simply does not de-legitimize Moldovan leaders. In the 2005 elections, the ruling party (the CPRM) was headed by Vladimir Voronin (president since 2001) who currently is far and away the most respected political leader in the country. Voronin previously served as an official of the Moldovan CP CC, as well as first secretary of the Bender city PC and minister of internal affairs.¹ Such a visible presence of the former regime elites is by no means limited to the successor communist party. The "anti-Communist" opposition leadership included Serifim Urechean (head of the republican department of industrial and construction development, a raicom second secretary, and city executive committee chair), Dumitru Braghis (last 1st secretary of the republican Komsomol), and Dumitru Diacov (Komsomol apparatus, foreign relations department of the CC CPSU, head of the TASS bureau in Romania).

2. Towards more adequate "politics of presence": ethnic, gender and occupational background of the MPs

Dual reasoning: In representative democracies with well-developed political party programs, the physical presence of members of the interested groups is not necessary, their interests are covered by parliamentary intermediaries. However, the democratically elected parliament may and has to include the broadest possible variety of the population, not only mirroring its own composition but enabling and manifesting openness of the recruitment system.

2.1. Lithuania

Concerning the "politics of presence," in the Lithuanian parliamentary elite there are not many signs of its social representation to be found. Political

¹ Moldova's previous two presidents, Mircea Snegur and Petru Luchischi, where respectively President of the Republican Supreme Soviet and Republican Communist Party First Secretary during the Soviet Period. Both served as politbureau members, and Luchinschi was a member of the CC CPSU.

suspicion still exists towards various artificial measures (such as quotas), which were widely used during the Soviet period with the intention of closely mirroring society in its façade representative bodies (Supreme Soviets). On the other hand, the parliamentary elite really is elitist in terms of its education.

Post-communist parliamentary representation of ethnicities in Lithuania underwent a specific track of changes after the end of Soviet rule. At no point in post-communist parliamentary history, ethnicities were proportionally represented among the Lithuanian parliamentary elite.

On the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Lithuania implemented an internationally applauded ethnic minority friendly legislation. In 1990, a “zero” option was chosen for citizenship (no further requirements, such as residency requirements, language tests, etc. for any inhabitant of the country to get Lithuanian citizenship). This principle hinders a more precise analysis of the ethnicity of the Lithuanian MPs (and people in general), since most indicate their titular (Lithuanian) nationality (expert guesses are made from individual family names, however, inter-ethnic marriages sometimes distort the picture). In the Electoral Law adopted in 1992, a special lower threshold provision was introduced to favor formation and parliamentary representation of the Russian and Polish nationality based political parties: in proportional elections. The general threshold was 4%, for ethnic parties it was reduced to 2%. In the revised electoral law (1996), the thresholds were increased to 5% for parties, 7% for electoral alliances, and abolished for the ethnic parties.

However, the positive discrimination towards ethnic parties did not produce significant results: the Polish electoral alliance was the only nationality-based party to have any success, and it only got a small and a decreasing small number of seats in the period from 1992 to 2004 (declining from 6 to 2). In all other cases, representatives of ethnic minorities succeeded either running in districts where they had a majority, joining a national party (mostly social-democrats and social-liberals), or forming electoral coalitions with the major national party (the Russian union in 2000 with the social-democrats).

With the passage of time, the representation of the Russians seems to be improving. This follows in the wake of the “national sin” that MPs of Rus-

sian nationality committed in 1990 when they formed the backbone of the counter-independence movement and fomented the pro-Moscow putsch in January 1991 in Lithuania. Russians were dramatically underrepresented in the 1992 and 1996 elected Seimas. Russian representation recovered to 5% in 2000, but dropped down to 3% in 2004. However, the star of these elections was the Russian-born Lithuanian businessman and politician Viktoras Uspaskich, leader of a newly created populist Labor party, which scored highest in the elections. In the autumn of 2004, MP Uspaskich was appointed minister of economics (he resigned from parliament and his ministerial position, following some scandals about a conflict between his private and public interests in June 2005).

Representation of Poles in Lithuania follows a different pattern: they gradually depart from the Seimas (from 6% in 1990 to around 3% in following elections, to 2% in 2004) and the ethnic Polish political party developed into a typical regional party performing well in local elections in the Vilnius region.

Gender representation has fluctuated: the revolutionary period of 1990–1992 produced a remarkable decrease in the number of women in parliament, compared to the decorative and substantial female representation in the Soviet parliament (counting for roughly one third of members). The democratic process later on recovered some of the earlier numbers, then flattened again to a low 11% in 2000. It reached a satisfactory 22% in 2004. On the macro level of analysis, a qualitative leap from the façade Soviet representation to more authentic women's participation through democratic election has occurred in the post-communist Lithuanian parliament (Krupavicius, Matonyte 2003: 81–106; Matonyte, Novelskaite 2004).

From the angle of professional background (Table 4), we first of all observe the post-communist trend of increasing the presence of managers and businessmen in the parliamentary elite: from 13% in 1990 to 18% in 1992 to 11% in 1996 to a high 43% in 2000 and 38% in 2004. Post-communist change is also apparent in the decrease of the number of party bureaucrats. In 1990, paid party employees accounted for 10% of the parliamentary elite, in 2000 they represented 6%, and in 2004 a mere 5%. On the one hand, this shows that ex-communist party officials are losing their *sinecure* (which used to be provided by the nomenklatura system).

Table 4. Occupation of the parliamentary elite prior to entering Seimas

<i>Term</i>	<i>Teachers, professors</i>		<i>Writers, journalists</i>		<i>Full-time paid party employees</i>		<i>Higher administrative level servants</i>		<i>Liberal professions (not law)</i>		<i>Lawyers</i>		<i>Agriculture, fishermen</i>		<i>Blue-collar workers</i>		<i>Managers, businessmen</i>		<i>Not stated</i>		<i>Total</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
1990	44	33	14	11	14	11	10	8	18	14	10	8	1	1	3	2	17	13	2	2	133
1992	52	37	12	9	14	10	9	6	14	10	4	3	1	1	7	1	26	18	2	1	141
1996	41	30	9	7	6	4	32	23	23	17	5	4	0	0	4	3	15	11	2	2	137
2000	24	17	6	4	9	6	26	18	10	7	2	1	0	0	2	1	61	43	1	1	141
2004	17	12	3	2	7	5	38	27	15	11	3	2	0	0	2	1	54	38	2	1	141

On the other hand, it indicates trends of professionalism in new political parties, which employ party officials to assure good management.

A relative increase of the higher administrative level civil servants occurs among Lithuanian MPs. Although this number fluctuates, it is in general going up, from 8% in 1990 to 24% in 1996, 18% in 2000, and a high 27% in 2004. This increase indicates that professional experience in public affairs is becoming more and more of an asset for a parliamentary career. This trend reveals also an increase of expert administrative qualifications among the MPs.

The Lithuanian parliament has a rather constant number of MPs from various liberal occupations. They compose around one sixth of the parliament: 14% in 1990, 10% in 1992, 17% in 1996 and 7% in 2000 and 11% in 2004. The presence of the most vocal occupations, such as journalists and writers, is going down, from 11% in 1990 to 4% in the year 2000, to only 2% in 2004, which again shows the strengthening independent mass media and a certain normalization along the Western lines. Finally, concomitantly to the Western parliaments, people from lower social layers (blue-collar workers, workers in agriculture, fishermen) are gradually departing from the Seimas.

Analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of the parliamentary elite shows, in Sartori's terms, a tendency of a growing disproportion between the representatives and the represented. The MPs do not match the population in terms of any "hard" measurement: education, gender, ethnicity, occupation, etc. The fact that the parliamentary elite might and should be better educated and derived from highly skilled and socially responsible (well remunerated) occupations is widely accepted by the public opinion and enforced by the elite itself. Early in the transition, inadequate representation of the ethnicities was the subject of political consideration. Later on, however, political discourse moved to underline the deviation between the MPs' previous sector of employment and the growing engagement of the Lithuanian population in private business. These divergences, however, fail to capture the public debate for any amount of time in a substantial manner. Only the gender mismatch between the MPs and the population seems to receive a growing and more intense political attention.

2.2. *Moldova*

Inter-ethnic relations have played a central role in Moldova's post-communist politics. It was a site of an outright civil war at the beginning of the 1990s, which led to the formation of an independent separatist regime, the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. Since that time, efforts to resolve the Transnistrian dispute, relations between Moldova and Russia, and the character of the Moldovans' identity and relations with the other nationalities that make up the population have remained unresolved. Despite these tensions, citizenship was extended to all nationalities inhabiting the territory of the new state, and inter-ethnic relations have, in general, been positive.

The representation of minorities in the legislature has varied substantially since independence, depending in large part on shifts in party control. At no time, however, have non-Moldovans been conspicuously underrepresented. When examining this issue, consideration should also be given to the fact that the underlying population structure of the republic has also evolved substantially during the period in question. In 1990, Moldovans (the Romanian-speaking population, some of whom self-identify as ethnic Moldovans and others as ethnic Romanians) made up approximately 64% of the population of the entire region, while minorities comprised 36%. In 2004 the majority population had increased to 78% (excluding Transnistria), while the proportion of minorities declined to 22%. This having been said, it is evident that the majority population was consistently somewhat overrepresented through the 1990s and has been somewhat under-represented since (Table 5).

There is clearly a strong but not absolute relationship between party membership and ethnicity in the Moldova context (Table 6). The communist successor parties have obviously been minority friendly, representing russophones (Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauz) at substantially higher levels than the population average in their MP ranks. Throughout the post-communist period, the nationalist right has been represented in parliament by the Christian Democratic Peoples Party (*PPCD*), the most direct successor of the Moldovan Popular Front. Hostile to Russia and committed to the Romanian as opposed to Moldovan national enterprise, the *PPCD* understandably does not welcome minorities within its ranks. The *PCRM*,

Table 5. Ethnic composition of the Moldovan Parliament*

<i>Term</i>	<i>Moldovan</i>		<i>Russian</i>		<i>Ukrainian</i>		<i>Gagauz</i>		<i>Other</i>		<i>Unknown</i>		<i>Total</i>
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
1994	75	75	15	15	8	8	2	2	0	0	4	4	104
1998	79	78	4	4	7	7	2	2	4	4	5	5	101
2001	52	57	11	11	17	19	4	4	7	7	10	10	101
2005	62	69	12	14	10	11	1	1	4	4	12	12	101

* The percentages of ethnic groups reflect the proportion of a particular ethnic group to the total number of MPs for whom information on ethnicity is available.

Table 6. Minority representation in Moldovan political parties, 1994–2005*

<i>Parties</i>	<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2001</i>		<i>2005</i>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>PCRM</i>	NA	NA	13	41	30	54	21	51
Socialist Unity Bloc	16	59	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Centrists	9	16	1	6	3	30	3	14
<i>CDPP</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parliamentary average	25	25	17	18	39	43	27	30

* The percentages of ethnic groups reflect the proportion of a particular ethnic group to the total number of MPs for whom information on ethnicity is available.

on the other hand, has been openly suspicious of Romanian intentions and, until recently, positively inclined toward the Russian Federation. It emerged as an active proponent of minority rights and linguistic equality in public life. There is, consequently, a clear correlation between the electoral fates of the parties and the representation of minorities in the national parliament.

Women's representation in Moldova largely mirrors that of females in other post communist legislatures (4–5% in 1990–1994, 8% in 1998, 16% in 2001 and 22% in 2005). The tendency of female access to leadership in all sectors to suffer in the immediate wake of the post-communist transitions has been widely noted. No female members of the transition legislature survived the first post-communist electoral contest. As noted in the Lithuanian example, this reflects the symbolic rather than substantive

role that women played in the republican Supreme Soviets. In Moldova, representing the conservative wing of the communist party and less individually competitive, they were unable to negotiate the shift to a competitive electoral environment.

The return of women to the legislative arena in more recent years has been striking. Initially this was clearly a consequence of their high levels of representation in the *PCRM*, which dominated the 2001 elections. In the most recent legislative session, female representation remained strong among the Communists (21%), but women benefited from a marked increase in representation among the opposition parties as well – *PPCD* (45%) and the “Our Moldova” alliance (15%). Strikingly, in comparison to most other post-communist regimes, in the two most recently elected parliaments Moldovan women MPs are more heavily represented in legislative leadership positions than they are in the body as a whole (respectively, in the 2001 elected parliament women held 18% of the parliamentary leadership positions and in 2005 – 27%).

Economic reform has been slow to take hold in Moldova. But the structural changes that have occurred in the economy during the fifteen years since the fall of communism are being reflected in the structure of legislative representation as well. The number of businessmen among MPs has increased from 6 to 18. The ranks of agronomists, largely holdovers from the Soviet era rural power structure, have been depleted by more than two-thirds, as has the number of academics and teachers. By 2005, approximately one-third of legislators could be considered to be full-time politi-

Table 7. Occupational background of Moldovan MPs: post-communist terms

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2001</i>		<i>2005</i>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Agronomists/agriculture managers	14	13	6	6	13	13	6	6
Lawyers	15	14	7	7	5	5	5	5
Academics/teachers	31	30	18	18	16	16	12	12
Business/private sector managers	2	2	7	7	10	10	14	14
Politicians	16	15	24	24	23	23	32	32
Journalists	4	4	9	9	0	0	3	3
Civil servants	3	3	5	5	5	5	9	9

cians. Finally, while at lower overall levels than politicians, civil servants and managers are also increasing their role in the parliament (Table 7).

3. Parliament as a professional board of directors in thriving 'limited liability' democracies: old hands and newcomer MPs

Clearly, a certain degree of tension exists between professionalization of the legislative elite and elite renewal. On the one hand, the higher the degree of elite turnover, the lower the level of elite experience, expertise and effectiveness. Experienced leaders may be wiser in terms of getting ideas implemented. On the other hand, the higher the degree of elite turnover, the greater the number of persons who can potentially attain elite status. From this mathematical probability it is sometimes inferred that high elite turnover is the guarantee of democracy. Pareto, Mosca and others believed that high turnover of elites prevents accumulation of frustration arising from political challengers of the regime, because it allows them to be absorbed into positions of leadership (Putnam 1976: 66–67).

Keeping these theoretical points in mind, it seems likely that an optimum turnover is about a 30–40 % change in every electoral term, as is the case in many European states. This level of renovation would both facilitate legislative professionalism and provide an adequate level of representation. If this is so, in Lithuania and Moldova fifteen years after the post-communist revolution legislative professionalism is not yet in place by any means.

3.1. Lithuania

High turnover of MPs is an enduring feature of the Seimas between 1990 and 2004, when in regular democratic elections up to 50% of incumbents were replaced by newcomer MPs (Table 8), while the Western rule is that democratic elections dismiss only one third, or even less, of the incumbent MPs. The question is the following: are the numerous newcomer MPs periodically bringing something genuinely new into the Seimas in terms of its social and political characteristics or are they simply new people reproducing existing features of the parliamentary body?

Newcomers might be new in national legislative positions, but have wide portfolios of experience in other politically relevant fields, such as

Table 8. Newcomers in the Seimas 1992–2004

<i>Term</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
1992	101	726
1996	75	55
2000	96	68
2004	70	50

leadership of political parties, leadership in the executive branch, responsibilities in local government. Pure newcomer MPs would then tend to decrease over consecutive parliamentary terms. The data show that this trend is ambiguous: MPs with no prior political experience counted for two-thirds of newcomers in 1992, for one-half in 1996, and for only one-third in 2000. However, one half of newcomers without any prior political experience were elected in 2004, reversing the downward trend.

When the first full-fledged multi-party elections were held in post-communist Lithuania in 1992, 14% of newcomer MPs were recognized leaders of political parties. Subsequent elections did not bring many newcomer MPs with a record of party leadership (they count only for 4–7% of newcomers). It is rather rare to create a successful political party, or to be invited to join its leadership, without having had experience in a national or local legislative job. Party leaders usually are incumbent MPs (or incumbent MPs launch new parties).

Being in party leadership is an evidently absolute and comparative advantage of the incumbent MPs. After the first full multi-party elections in 1992, the ratio of newcomer MPs to party leaders and incumbent MPs to party leaders stood at approximately 3 to 1 (38% of incumbent MPs with experience in party leadership vs. 14% of such newcomers). The gap between the number of party leaders among incumbent and newcomer MPs increased following the elections in 1996 to a ratio of 10 to 1 (respectively, 40% vs. 4%). The pattern of the party leadership from within the Seimas was confirmed in the elections 2000 when the ratio of 9 to 1 was achieved with 56% of incumbent MPs having experience in party leadership vs. 6% of newcomer MPs with a party leadership record. However, the 2004 elections opened up the Seimas for newcomers with experience in party leader-

Table 9. Socio-demographic characteristics of the Lithuanian newcomer MPs

Term	Women		Non-Lithuanian		Private sector		Managers, businessmen	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1992	7	7	5	6	7	7	21	21
1996	14	19	1	1	14	19	12	16
2000	9	9	10	10	51	53	54	56
2004	21	30	6	6	25	36	27	39

ship and reduced the scope of the party leadership from within the parliament. The ratio between incumbent and newcomer MPs with prior experience in party leadership was narrowed to 4 to 1 (28% vs. 7%). Symptomatically (although for different reasons), several former MPs with remarkable skills in party leadership did not run in the 2004 Seimas elections.

Apart from being typically younger than the incumbents, the newcomers only slightly distinguish themselves in terms of their social characteristics (Table 9). Newcomers are equally highly educated. Newcomers are predominantly Lithuanian, and their level of ethnic diversity is below that of incumbents (except for year 2000). In absolute terms, newcomers in all elections included more women than the incumbents. The biggest leap forward in terms of female representation occurred in 2004 when among newcomers 21 (30 percent) were women. These women joined a mere 10 incumbent female MPs. Newcomers are drawn from the private sector at a much greater rate than are the incumbent MPs.

Strikingly, even if there are some political professionals serving their 3rd or more mandates in the Seimas, their role does not appear to be in any way exceptional, pivotal or core. Their function (as that of all the other MPs) depends primarily on their party's electoral success and on the decisions of the party leadership for which parliamentary seniority of the aspirant does not seem to present any asset.

The newcomers in all post-communist Seimas sessions constitute the majority of MPs. However, the trend is away from this group having an absolute majority toward a simple majority among MPs. Meanwhile, the intermediate layer of MPs serving their 2nd mandate does not expand pro-

gressively, but fluctuates depending on the electoral success of the major incumbent parties. The number of MPs reelected for a 2nd mandate has never reached one third of the MPs. The number of experienced politicians is increasing, but at a rather slow pace, and it stands at 30 MPs (20%) in 2004.

The attrition rate among transition period legislators has been substantial. Only 9 founding members were elected to the Seimas in 2004. Of these, only a single MP survived continuously through all five democratic elections.

Some social-demographic features of the experienced MPs are worth commenting upon. First of all, the pattern of “no Russians allowed” is observable among the experienced MPs: the two representatives of the ethnic minorities were Poles in 2000, and in 2004 the only non-Lithuanian among the parliamentary professionals is of Jewish origin. Experienced MPs are markedly older than the rest of the parliamentarians. The mean age difference between the experienced MPs and the rest of the Seimas was 9 years in 2000 (55.3 versus 48.2) and is 6 years in 2004 (53.3 versus 47.8). However, the experienced Lithuanian parliamentarians are still far below retirement age (65).

In 2004, 83% of the experienced MPs were male, and parliamentary professionalism seems to be male driven. Public sector bias appears to be built-in and perennial. The former managers (and businessmen) who in 2004 stood among experienced MPs are from the public, and not the private sector. Teachers and professors dominated the group of experienced MPs until 2004, but they gradually departed from it (their numbers decreased from 41% in 1996 to 23% in 2004). This tendency shows a surprising level of alienation among teachers and professors from legislative jobs in Lithuania.

Interestingly, the experienced MPs count among their members several blue-collar workers (7% in 2000 and 9% in 2004 of the total group), while there are no blue-collar workers among the newcomers. One MP in 2000 and two in 2004 who did not have a university degree found their way into the group of experienced MPs. These two testify that some rare MPs may be able to successfully employ their lower social status and modest education as a political asset (Table 10).

Table 10. Socio-demographic characteristics of the experienced group in Seimas

Term	Total		Higher education		Teachers, professors		Managers, businessmen		Women		Private sector		Non-Lithuanian	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1996	22	16	21	96	10	46	1	5	2	9	1	5	2	9
2000	22	16	21	96	9	41	0	0	4	18	2	9	2	9
2004	29	21	27	93	7	24	5	17	5	17	1	3	1	3

Table 11. Level of parliamentary experience in the leadership of the Seimas, 2004

Structure	Available positions	Occupied by newcomers		Occupied by 2 term MPs		Occupied by experienced politicians		Occupied by opposition MPs	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Board of the Seimas	5	2	50	1	25	2	25	1	20
Standing committees*	15	7	47	5	33	3	20	0	0
Parliamentary commissions**	14	7	54	5	31	2	15	1	8
Assembly of elders	15***	5	33	6	40	4	27	6	40

* Except for the Committee on European affairs, according to the Seimas statutes an MP cannot belong to more than one standing committee and one parliamentary commission.

** There are 15 commissions. We did not count the Commission for the cooperation of the Seimas and the Lithuanian community in the USA, which is headed not by an MP but by a representative from the USA.

*** There are 19 members in the assembly, 4 are the board of the Seimas members. Every 10 members in the parliamentary party group get one representative. The party group of less than 10 still has 1 representative in the assembly.

In order to better assess the professionalism of the experienced politicians, we checked for their positions in parliamentary structures (leadership of the Seimas, committees, commissions, assembly of elders) and the spheres of their political responsibility (types of committees and commissions) (Table 11). If the experienced parliamentarians really play a key role in shaping parliamentary activities, then they are expected to chair and control the parliamentary structures.

The single most important explanatory variable concerning the distribution of the decision-making positions in parliament is the electoral success of different parties and the composition of the ruling coalition. MPs from the coalition parties take the lion's share of available power positions. The top positions in the parliament are divided among the ruling coalition (except for positions which under the Statute of the Seimas are intended for opposition, such as one out of five positions of the Seimas vice-speakers, or elders' of the party factions which do not enter the ruling coalition). Leadership of all the standing committees is assumed by MPs from the ruling coalition, and the same is true of the leadership of parliamentary commissions, with one symbolic exception – the Commission on the rights and affairs of participants of resistance to occupation regimes and victims of occupation is led by an MP from the opposition, conservative, party.

In the 2004 parliamentary term, two positions in the board of the Seimas were occupied by experienced MPs, and newcomers occupied two places. The speaker himself, Paulauskas, was serving his 2nd mandate (in April 2006 he was replaced by a newcomer MP). Only 3 out of 15 committees are chaired by experienced politicians, and 7 committees are led by newcomer MPs. Experienced politicians chair important committees on Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and Labor, and the Development of Information Society. However, newcomer MPs chair the most prestigious committee (the Committee on European Affairs) and the two most requested committees (the Committee on Budget and Finance and the Committee on Economy). Only four experienced politicians are in the assembly of elders (they represent the two most entrenched Lithuanian parties, social-democrats and conservatives).

To summarize, the distribution of the top positions in the Seimas is mostly affected by electoral party success and the composition of the ruling coalition. Previous parliamentary experience is not an important asset of the leaders of the parliamentary structures. On the contrary, the newcomer MPs seem to have advantage over more experienced MPs in acquiring chairs of the most important (most prestigious and most vocal) parliamentary committees and parliamentary positions.

The experienced MPs of Lithuania in 2004, contrary to the “healthy” parliamentary tradition, avoid (or do not have a chance to sit on) the practical

and down-to-earth committees and commissions. These observations testify to the fact that experienced Lithuanian MPs cannot be termed core parliamentarians. They seem to pass for important parliamentarians only in the eyes of foreign partners, politicians and commentators. As a rule, in Lithuania they are perceived as dull and self-interested politicians, much the same as all the others.

3.2. *Moldova*

To suggest that the Moldovan parliament has been characterized by membership instability in the course of its first fifteen years would be an understatement at best. Table 12 examines overall reelection rates for the Parliament. The numbers presented reflect the numbers of incumbents in the legislature following the intervening election. The pattern of the first three elections is clear. Reelection rates are extremely low, even in the initial transition election. Then, unlike the prevailing pattern in post-communist legislatures, reelection decreases even further, from a little over 30% in the transition from the last republican Supreme Soviet to the first democratically elected parliament, to less than a quarter of deputies in the 2001 legislature. Only eight members of the parliament elected in 2001 had served in two previous legislative sessions. While an upward trend reasserted itself in the most recent election, which saw the ruling party retaining legislative control, MP turnover remains closer to two-thirds than to 30% to 40% range discussed above as healthy. This magnitude of membership turnover in Moldova is unique in the region. Thus, rather than stabilizing, legislative membership has remained highly volatile throughout the transition period. It reflects the general fragility of the Moldovan

Table 12. Incumbency rate in the Moldovan Parliament

<i>Term</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1990–1994	31	31
1994–1998	27	27
1998–2001	24	24
2001–2005	37	37
Average	29%	

transition, which has been fraught with weak party development, elite in-fighting, and marginal progress in establishing the rule of law.

Given membership turnover averaging over 70% for the post-communist period, it is difficult to discuss the emergence of a core of experience legislators in Moldova until the most recent parliamentary term. In each previous two terms, well less than 10% of MPs had experience in more than two sessions, qualifying them as “core” legislators. The number of continuous survivors from the transition legislature dropped dramatically from more than a fourth of deputies in the first democratic parliament to about one in ten in the following session, and only one in 2001. No continuous survivors from the transition serve in the current term, although four 1990 MPs have resurfaced after spending periods outside of legislative politics (Table 13).

High rates of membership turnover have until recently impeded the formation of a group of experienced legislative leaders. The initial transition, in particular, was devastating to legislative elites. Leaders were re-elected at higher rates than non-leaders in the first post-communist election, but this must be taken in the context of the downsizing of the larger Soviet period institution to the smaller current parliament. In absolute terms, relatively few actually survived the transition. Not only did a mere 14% retain their parliamentary positions; only two leaders in the 1990 institution number assumed leadership positions in the 1994 parliament (Table 14). The second transition represents a significant shift in the impact of leadership, in which the debacle of the agrarian period is evident.

Table 13. Seniority of Moldovan MPs 1994–2005

<i>Term</i>	<i>Newcomers</i>		<i>2nd term</i>		<i>Experienced</i>		<i>Survivors from 1990</i>		<i>Founding members*</i>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1994	73	70	31	31	NA	NA	28	27	28	27
1998	75	74	19	19	7	7	11	11	8	8
2001	76	76	17	17	8	8	1	1	5	5
2005	59	58	21	21	21	21	0	0	4	4

* With interruptions in the Parliament.

Table 14. Moldovan leadership reelection: all terms

<i>Term</i>	<i>Non-Leaders</i>			<i>Legislative Leaders</i>		
	N	N Reelected	% Reelected	N	N Reelected	% Reelected
1990–1994	314	24	8	51	7	14
1994–1998	56	19	34	45	8	18
1998–2001	48	10	21	53	15	28
2001–2005	63	20	32	38	17	45

While the reelection rate of those holding leadership positions improved slightly (from 14% to 18%), ordinary MPs were returned to parliament at double the rate of the legislative leaders. On the other hand, all of those who survived the electoral hurdle retained leadership positions in the succeeding legislative secession. Only in the 2001 does leadership appear to confer substantial electoral advantage, with those holding leadership returning to parliament both in larger numbers than in previous years, and at higher rates than normal MPs. Leadership advantage increased again in the 2005 election, reaching 45%. More significantly, eleven of those assumed leadership positions are once again retained in the new term.

One can perceive that a turning point may have been reached in the 2005 election with respect to leadership professionalization. A further indication of the same trend is evident in the tripling of number of experienced deputies in the 2005 term. In Moldova this group of deputies clearly does represent an emerging core and plays a central role in the management of the institution. The higher one moves in the parliament, the larger the number of experienced MPs (Table 15). Approximately one-half of Permanent Bureau positions and one-third of committee chairs are experienced deputies. Unlike the Lithuanian example, few experienced members (four out of twenty-one) are without any leadership position. In comparison, newcomers, with approximately two-thirds of total membership, hold one-third of the permanent bureau positions. Only when one includes all leadership positions (including committee vice-chairs), do newcomers attain a level of representation relatively equal to their overall numbers.

Not everything having to do with the development of a core of experienced deputies in Moldova is a cause for celebration. The single most striking characteristic of this group is its very strong association with the pre-

Table 15. Experience of the leadership of the Moldovan 2005 Parliament

Structure	N of available positions	Positions occupied by newcomers		Positions occupied by 2 nd term MPs		Positions occupied by experienced politicians		Positions occupied by opposition MPs	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Permanent Bureau of the Parliament	11	2	18	3	28	6	55	6	45
Committee chair	9	5	56	1	11	3	33	4	45
Committee chair or vice-chair	28	12	43	7	32	9	22	14	50
Total	37	14	38	10	27	14	38	20	51

* 1 President, 2 vice-presidents, 8 additional members.

Table 16. Demographic characteristics of differently experienced groups in 2005 Moldovan Parliament

	N	Age (average)	Leadership position		Minority		Female		Nomenklatura (all levels)		CPSU member	
			N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Core	20	55.7	13	65	7	35	3	15	16	75	17	86
2 nd term	25	55.6	9	36	11	46	4	16	5	20	10	40
Newcomers	56	45.9	1	27	9	20	15	27	3	5	6	11
Total	101	50.3	37	37	29	29	22	22	23	23	33	33

democratic regime. The former *nomenklatura* status is shared by fully three-fourths of this group (Table 16). 86% are former Communist Party members. The core group includes fewer females than the legislature as a whole, and in terms of profession heavily overrepresents politicians (72%).

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the characteristics of newcomers to the 2005 parliament indicate a clear generational shift. New MPs are on average a decade younger than the core or their 2nd term colleagues. Women are represented at nearly twice the rate of either of the other experience groups. Perhaps most significantly, the newcomers' association with the old regime is becoming tenuous. Only a little more than one in ten were communist party members, and only 5% had any *nomenklatura* experience.

Interpretation and conclusions

Parliamentary elites are central to democratic political processes. The two cases examined here show both similarities and clear national differences with respect to elite transformation, representation, and professionalization.

The initial large-scale mobilization, which occurred at the end of the Soviet period, did not generate an equal increase in political participation (Agh 2004: 232–236; 242). Ever since then the parties, as intermediaries of parliamentary recruitment, have not only radically changed the parliamentary structures and organization but, somewhat paradoxically, they also have lost their monopoly (enjoyed by the CP in Soviet times) as being the only intermediary of parliament recruitment. Interest and pressure groups, along with individual personalities, now supplement the parties in this role (Best, Cotta, 2000:15, 21). New leadership emerged in many cases, and induced changes in both party structure and party identities. Elite organizational abilities mattered more than the elites' own ideological and programmatic commitments.

In both of these cases, numerous representatives of the old elite survived and managed to adapt to the new political conditions. However, there are qualitative differences in the role that they currently play because of the various fates of the ex-communist parties. Moldova, with a higher high level of representation of ex-communist elites in most of its transition political parties, experienced evident stagnation. The Lithuanian case is in the middle on the scale of former regime continuity. After the initial strong political polarization, the multiparty system evolved through increased and qualitatively renewed levels of elite change. While former communists remained active in political life, they were drawn disproportionately from the lower ranks of the Soviet regime.

On the other side of the coin, regime change usually leads to significant increases in the rate of personnel replacement. This can be demonstrated by the share of those who acquire political positions for the first time after the system changed, and by the level of new entrants into the parliament. One would expect, though, that in the post-transition environment, legislative elites should stabilize and professionalization should set in. In that respect, regime change is still incomplete in our cases. High levels of MP replacement are persistent in both countries. One would expect the highest elite circulation

process to take place in the first electoral term and then decline. The continued high level of MP replacement in Moldova requires further explanation.

“Professional” means a relatively high-status occupational grade. A professional community is characterized by, and to a large extent defined in terms of, a set of certain self-imposed standards and norms. Electoral experience is one of the key aspects of political professionalization. As Juan Linz put it, “Professionalization of politics means that men and women enter politics and seek elective office or party office not as temporary and/or part-time activity, but as a longer term and almost full-time activity” (Linz 2002: 306). Thus, professional MPs are those who have relatively long political careers. This implies the existence of a sizeable core group of senior parliamentarians and a relatively low influx of newcomers into the legislature. In the two countries examined here, initially more political amateurs and revolutionaries were elected. The rate of newcomers remained high even in the most recent electoral terms (2004–2005) in which from around 50–60% were newcomers.

Despite the relatively high levels of discontinuity in parliamentary membership, Lithuanian, and in the most recent term the Moldovan, MPs seem to be on the way to becoming professional politicians, even if future electoral results might yet bring some surprises. In Moldova, high levels of electoral and party volatility retarded progress toward professionalization throughout the 1990s. That having been said, it appears that in the most recent terms a core group of influential and experienced deputies is beginning to form.

To what extent are MPs representative of their populations? Parliamentarians are generally highly educated and of middle or elder age, but still far from their retirement age. This is possibly accounted for by some sort of continuing East-European emphasis (dating to mythical intelligentsia?) on the cultural capital of the political elites, which makes entry of people who are not university educated into legislative politics very difficult. Higher education among political elites is not only the result of social selection among the power elite, but may also be seen as a mechanism beneficial to legitimacy and consensual decision-making processes, and specifically to newly established regimes striving for stable democracy.

A disproportionately low percentage of female MPs is found in both parliaments. However, a cumulative trend towards a more gender-inclusive

elite recruitment is visible. In this domain, Moldova stands out in that women are present at higher rates in leadership positions than in the legislature as a whole.

Increasing ethnic inclusiveness is clearly not the trend in Lithuania. A sharp contrast is evident in Moldova. Despite contention regarding national identity and an ongoing territorial dispute, its post-communist governments have been remarkably ethnically inclusive. Minority representation in its parliament has fluctuated, but in general one could hardly contend that minorities have been denied access to the legislature.

These parameters of democratic normalization show that fifteen years after the post-communist revolution, as one would expect, Lithuania is a "healthier" democracy than Moldova, at least as measured by legislative elite transformation. This supports our main thesis that the type and intensity of anti-communist mobilization is of primary importance in shaping longer-term political outcomes.

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**POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
AND THEORY**

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ART AND POLITICS

Alvydas Jokubaitis

Abstract. This article is an attempt to launch a discussion on the postmodernist concept of relationship between art and politics. At first glance postmodernism strikes us as a phenomenon both safeguarding and promoting diversity. The inclination of postmodernists to aesthetise political phenomena could be interpreted as a form of cultural imperialism, explained by a decreasing wish to see other perspectives of conceiving reality, the perspectives which are based on non-aesthetic principles. The article pursues to elaborate the concept of Michael Oakeshott's experience modulus with the aim of adjusting it to the discussions on the relationship between art and politics.

Beauty as such is an inseparable part of human experience. One could say that beauty is embedded in human nature. The human beings, representing different nations, cultures and historical periods, could not exist without music, dance, painting or theatrical performances. One can only marvel at how many efforts people of various cultures and epochs put into creating art. We experience aesthetic satisfaction not merely looking at pieces of work but also being close to objects of nature and daily surroundings. The most important feature distinguishing art as a separate mode of human experience is the fact that artists use images in a different way than practitioners and scientists do.

Artistic creation expands our perception of the world. What human beings need is not merely skills of managing practical matters and scientific knowledge. They need to establish a relationship with the world, based on artistic imagination which is as powerful a tool of cognizing our reality as science or practical experience is. Neither our daily life nor scientific cognition can do without the factors predetermining the uniqueness of art, namely intuition, imagination and feelings. Politicians cannot dispense with aesthetic perception; it means getting the feel of the circumstances, symbols

and prevailing moods of social life. The decisions they make, like those made by artists, are often based on imagination, insight and intuition rather than on the requirements posed by the rigid scientific method. Isaiah Berlin has claimed that politics is influenced by a certain aesthetic element:

“We speak of, say, an exceptional sensitiveness to certain kinds of fact, we resort to metaphors. We speak of some people as possessing antennae, as it were, that communicate to them the specific contours and texture of a particular political or social situation. We speak of the possession of a good political eye, or nose, or ear, of a political sense which love or ambition or hate may bring into play, of sense that crisis and danger sharpen (or alternitatively blunt), to which experience is crucial, a particular gift, possibly not altogether unlike that of artists or creative writers”¹.

It is a talent to be able to perceive the uniqueness of a specific situation, the development trends which the given circumstances might lead to, as well as the combinations of most diverse economic, political and personal factors that are often of crucial importance in politics. Moreover, an almost sensual rather than logically reasoned relationship with reality becomes a determining factor in politics.

Hannah Arendt tried to prove the *Critique of Judgment* by Immanuel Kant to be a treatise on political philosophy, apart from being merely a treatise on aesthetics, as is usually held.² According to her, both politics and art are structured on the same basis of *sensus communis*. The paradox of aesthetic judgment – simultaneously subjective and objective – is characteristic not only of art, but of politics as well. A political decision is subjective since individuals tend to seek different solutions for the same problem. However, these solutions can be regarded as objective at the same time in that they go beyond the coincidence of individual choices and implicitly mean an important consensus on common norms jointly reached by a number of human beings. In the event of aesthetic judgment, human beings agree on the concept of beauty, whereas political decisions are based on certain common behavioral rules.

Art can very likely be regarded as the most powerful means of escaping from reality, by far surpassing science in this respect. Scientists are just as willing to venture beyond the boundaries of the daily world. However, they do not have at their disposal the same freedom to be as subjective and unpredictable as artists do. It is due to this particular reason that art

has since the Greek period been regarded as a politically dangerous pre-occupation: too wild working of poetic imagination might result in an irretrievably distorted perception of practical things. A touch of artistic imagination makes reality lose its daily rhythm of seriousness, dependence on pragmatic interests and logic of systematic scientific research. Art destroys all barriers set by the world of practice and science; it also eliminates the rules of conventional life and often releases the instincts pent up inside.

Political activity abounds in many elements characteristic of artistic thinking, such as intuition, imagination, feelings, metaphors and symbols. And yet it is a domain of managing practical affairs. As Aristotel said, arts cannot be written down in a precise manner. However, there is not even the slightest doubt that politics is not a poetic activity or a performance. Managing political affairs is based on a different kind of imagination than the one which comes into play in the works of poetry, painting or music.

Art requires practical skills. However, even if regarded as a practical field, it remains a most unpractical domain, constantly eluding any binding commitments to the world governed by pragmatic interests. As the most unpractical field, art can exert great influence on the comprehension of practical affairs. This paradox was noted by Theodor Adorno: "Art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position as autonomous art".³ Paradoxically, art being asocial is at the same time its most significant social feature. In their pursuit of autonomy and independence from the world of practical interests, artists exert influence on the perception of political issues by teaching us how to handle political affairs from a different vantage point, namely that of unusual concepts, images and metaphors.

Works of art carry out a certain social function by coordinating the feelings of those human beings who are able to perceive art. Pieces of art create common emotions, sentiments and images, the basis on which joint social, cultural and political actions can be built. Arts unify societies and serve as a gluing force to work on the solidarity among them. The world of artistic creation, be it music, theatre or literature, enables human beings to be together, to share certain common feelings, sentiments and experiences. In all probability, it is a most powerful form of human sympathy ever

developed. Art is a means of creating jointly shared human emotions, images and experiences, something that could never be created by any other means.

Any efforts to derive artistic phenomena from social circumstances are most questionable. Art is a sufficiently autonomous phenomenon, hardly to be enclosed within the framework of social determinism. On the other hand, one can readily see the existence of artistic equivalents to politically significant orientations. It is not only in politics but in art as well that liberals and conservatives are met. Vytautas Kavolis notes that “the popularization of certain artistic patterns may contribute to the survival of a political order or to its restoration after a crisis.”⁴ We can see a very close relationship between a public way of life and artistic imagination.

If compared to scientific activity, art fascinates us by its freedom, most unusual associations of images, spontaneity and wild imagination. Scientists tend to simplify reality by reducing it to an object of rational schemes and concepts. Artists take a radically different approach – they aim at intensifying reality by converting it into unique experiences, impressions and metaphors. Science and art are separated by a deep abyss which can be bridged at times. In the works of both scientific and artistic philosophers we can find the identical principle of *anything goes*. In the first instance it is advocated by Paul Feyerabend and in the second by Arthur Danto. The latter claims that in art “today there is no longer any pale of history. Everything is permitted”.⁵ Feyerabend has expressed the same idea attributing it to the development of natural sciences.⁶

At times political life turns into a spectacle that bears an aesthetic meaning. “What liberation is not a festival?”⁷ was the question raised by Michel de Certeau. Participants of significant political events often feel they have undertaken the role of an actor in a huge spectacle. They come to understand that political concepts and images depend on their ability to create metaphors and change the meanings of established vocabularies and symbols. Within this context, it is the style of experience that becomes of paramount importance, and this type of experience becomes a semi-aesthetic issue. This is what Certeau wrote about the Paris events in 1968: “The poet has lit the fuse of speech”, stated a flyer at the Sorbonne. It is a fact that we can attest to for having seen and been participants: a throng became poetic.”⁸

Clifford Geertz described a 19th century state Negara, defining it as a “theatre state”. This state used to unify a number of different societies existed as a theatrical performance. Negara was built on common ritual, myths, symbols, iconography and architecture: “Court ceremonialism was the driving force of court politics: and mass ritual was not a device to shore up the state, but rather the state, even in its final gasp, was a device for the enactment of mass ritual. Power served pomp, not pomp power.”⁹ “Theatre state” was consolidated on artistic imagination rather than on public administration, army or bureaucracy. Theatre served as the basis of political experience.

Practitioners are concerned with the pragmatic images, scientists are interested in the images suitable for systemic research, whereas the singularity of artistic creation is determined by its contemplative nature. Artists create images which are supposed to impress by the very fact of their appearance. Kant described it as a disinterested pleasure. Artists should not be concerned with the practical benefit of their creation; the way they relate to the objects of the world creates a value in itself. Artistic creation develops a contemplative attitude towards the objects of the world, when one derives pleasure from works of art merely due to their outward appearance or form. For this reason art is a complicated object of theoretical analysis: interpretation of artistic phenomena by sociological or psychological concepts might easily distort the singularity of aesthetic perception. Kant was right in this respect claiming that art alone has an inherent characteristic to arouse aesthetic satisfaction which can never be attributed to any other social or mental factors.

Artists should not be interested in bettering the conditions of practical life (with the possible exception of applied arts) or in systemic research of reality, the way scientists should. Poetry can influence our practical desires; however, practical life itself is managed not according to the standards of poetic imagination. One can derive disinterested pleasure from science, but science entails other images than art. For artistic contemplation a mere form of images suffices, without any additional justification, verification or falsification. When confronted with a work of art, one should not start questioning whether the images proposed in it conform to objective reality, which is essential in science. Artists dispense with portraying a

different, fictitious reality which can give rise to aesthetic emotions. Artistic contemplation teaches us to take pleasure in images which are not supposed to give us anything more than the aesthetic satisfaction related to them.

Scientists have to prove things, whereas artists do with showing them. They are not concerned with drawing conclusions; neither do they have to provide any solutions related to the practical problems of public life. Scientific research is governed by a rigid discipline of scientific investigation, whereas the success of a work of art is predetermined by subjective factors of imagination, such as unusual images, sounds, symbols, metaphors, allegories and stylistic innovations. It is for this reason that the relationship between artists and scientists is marked by a certain tension. "Dreams of our poets and prophets [...] cannot be discussed, only proclaimed from housetops. They do not call for the rational attitude of the impartial judge, but for the emotional attitude of the impassioned preacher"¹⁰, said Karl Raimund Popper.

Artists can afford distancing from real facts and resort to the power of artistic fancy. According to the famous statement by Friedrich Schiller, human beings become real human beings only when they are able to play. A number of distortions of political facts met in various works of art could be illustrated to prove the point. The world of art is run by other laws than those valid in a historic and political treatise. A work of art does not have to reflect facts. A piece of art opens the way to a new world – a world of fiction and imagination. Art professes its own truth which is different from the scientific and practical truth.

Artists can ignore the established conventions of political life. This accounts for the failure of conventional people to perceive the singularity of art. Artists can bring forth political changes only by transforming the imagination of citizens and the ways of perceiving the world. Works of literature, painting, theatre, or film art do not have to end with certain specific advice or conclusions. Too open manifestation of political affiliation is often a factor destroying the singularity of art.

The relationship between moral and aesthetic values is always a sufficiently complicated problem. The two mentioned fields are governed by different principles: the moral strengths of a work of art do not necessarily

have to become its aesthetic advantages, and, conversely, moral defects in a work of art do not have to be treated as an aesthetic failure. There can be no unambiguous answers in dealing with this problem. Even the works of art that serve unworthy political aims can expand our aesthetic imagination. "However morally abhorrent we might consider fascism in general, I think, that Riefenstahl's work is morally imaginative for the connections it makes between fascism and beauty"¹¹, says Amy Mullin.

The ability of a work of art to influence our imagination regardless of all discrepancies with real facts is a unique phenomenon which has an impact on the relationship between art and politics. Since Plato's politicians have been scared of artists' withdrawal from reality, whereas poets avoid using the same language as participants of everyday political life. A certain understanding of political things hardly suffices for artists. They pursue a much more complicated aim of creating beauty, an object of aesthetic emotions. It was only following such an aesthetic transformation of political events that *Guernica* by Pablo Picasso or *Der gute Mensch von Sezuan* by Bertolt Brecht came into being. Political convictions have to be transformed into the language of art. To achieve that, a poetic talent is needed, a talent which makes it possible to interpret reality from another perspective, namely via the experience which has been artistically transformed and brings forth aesthetic satisfaction.

Artists rule the works of art which are built on their own imagination and which can influence the mood of a number of people. The events that happened during Hamlet's, son of a Danish King, lifetime, as invented by William Shakespeare, are much better known to an educated person than the real historic facts of the country in question. Fyodor Dostoyevski wrote a number of political articles; however, it is his novels that are an object of admiration for a number of people. From the point of view of the talent, Dostoyevski the writer by far surpasses Dostoyevski the political observer. His novel *Demons* is an impressive aesthetic transformation of political events. Inbetween a revolutionary organization headed by Sergei Nechayev and *Demons* by Dostoyevski as its artistic counterpart stands a literary genius. It is only due to Dostoyevski's poetic talent that real political events acquired an aesthetic shape with a far more powerful influence on human souls than the deeds of Nechayev's organization..

A person experiencing aesthetic satisfaction is eager to break loose from the limitations of routine and scientific outlook. He has to follow the strategy proposed by Schiller, namely to play with images, as well as with the unpredictable associations and impressions. Art gives us the freedom not to adhere to the conventional norms of life. Poetically transformed images of political life transfer us to a different world, that of aesthetic meanings and values. This is something Plato disliked – he suggested artists should never be allowed to interfere with political affairs. He claimed that artists could only play with images, basically being imitators rather than the real professionals of practical affairs.

Those taking the same stance as Plato with regard to politics have undertaken stick to the opinion that serious things can never be regarded as playful. Theoreticians find it much easier to understand artists' wish to escape from reality than practitioners do. Artists are continuously reproached by practitioners for their disregard of reality and preference to live in the world of illusions. Even though aware of the significance of artistic creation, practitioners are afraid lest an artistically transformed politics should become a spectacle, performance or a play with images that could demolish the existing norms. This is an integral part of professional ethics – politicians cannot afford escaping from their daily commitments.

One might tend to disagree with Plato, though one has to admit that there is significant truth in what he said. Artists are known to disregard the conventions of daily life. Their vocation is to pursue and suggest other conventions, those conforming to the standards of beauty and formal aesthetics. Just as any other activity, politics can become an object of artistic imagination. However, it would be a gross misunderstanding to think that politics is a work of art of mere poetic imagination. Politics is related to practical world. Plato and other classical philosophers tried to prevent human beings from what today is referred to as "political romanticism". Intrusion of certain forms of aesthetic thinking into politics might lead to a dangerous outcome. According to Arthur Lovejoy, German fascism and romanticism were bound by a close inner relationship.¹²

Intrusion of poetic imagination into the spheres not belonging to it is undesirable from the point of view of both daily practice and science. Aesthetic imagination has to give way to daily practice and scientific research.

Postmodernists often make the same mistake as Plato did. The latter was afraid of artists' moral irresponsibility and therefore utterly distrusted them. Postmodernists take a radically different approach – they have total trust in art and as a result fail to see any differences between aesthetic experiences and requirements of practical life.

Art, just as modern politics, is undergoing the crisis of legitimacy. We talk today about the conflict between the old "aesthetical" and the new "conceptual" art. Proponents of the old art profess the Kantian concept of art as a sensual experience of beauty. Those who tend to prefer conceptual art see their creation from a much broader perspective, attributing to it a number of social, political and cultural meanings. They believe that the meaning of aestheticism should be evaluated within the context of historically changing cognitive, semantic, social, political and ideological aspects.¹³ Artistic play with political meanings is taken for granted by them.

Postmodernists want to prove that social reality reminds of a work of art the authors of which no longer cherish any hope to come to terms with reality. "It is no longer possible to fabricate the unreal from the real, the imaginary from the givens of the real"¹⁴, – says Jean Baudrillard. Proceeding with the same thought, Slavoj Žižek claims that too great a desire for the real becomes a politically dangerous thing: "...when phantasmic frame disintegrates, the subject undergoes a "loss of reality" and starts to perceive reality as an "unreal" nightmarish universe with no firm ontological foundation."¹⁵ Classical authors were often seduced by scepticism but they never doubted the ability of our mind to tell the difference between the real and the unreal. Postmodernists overestimate the possibilities of reality being transformed into a work of art. Even provided they were right in claiming that we live in a hyperreal world, it would make little difference – practical images would go on functioning in a different way from artistic images.

In the absence of established traditions of political life, easy footing is gained by the images coming from the two other modes of experience – science and art. Edmund Burke was the first to have stated that. His political philosophy is based on the necessity to differentiate among the worlds of theory, art and practice. He interpreted the Great French Revolution as an outcome of an improper approach towards political ideas. Behind the alleged scientific ideas advocated by revolutionaries he saw political roman-

ticism which dislikes the established traditions of practical life. Being the author of a well-known in Europe treatise on aesthetics, Burke defied any direct claims made by artists to take over the role of reformers of political life.

Too big claims made by artists towards practical disinterestedness might also lead to certain political dangers. Oscar Wilde claimed that “All the arts are immoral except those baser forms of sensual or didactic art that seek to excite to action of evil or good”.¹⁶ Such separation of artistic imagination from morality influences the perception of political issues. An intensive pursuit of the autonomy of art goes hand in hand with challenging the union between morality and politics. As of today, there is a growing tendency to perceive political life as an arena for applying morally neutral technologies, a manipulation with images and new vocabularies.

Even the works of artistic imagination that are most withdrawn from daily life exert influence on the citizen's conduct. Murray Edelman remarked that “works of art and literature construct models of action, which are then attributed to personal or collective planning or plotting, to psychopathology, or to emotion.”¹⁷ The images borrowed from artistic creation can readily be adopted as models of a daily political action, thus uniting the worlds of artistic imagination and reality into one whole. Art makes it possible to resist the triviality of political forms, which can be regarded as its political merit.

There is no agreement among artists (most probably there can never be) on the political role of art. Part of artists and theoreticians are for the idea of pure art, whereas the rest stand for the idea of politically engaged art. We need to admit that art is inevitably influenced by politics. Even the most liberal states support museums, theatres, galleries, orchestras or individual performers. Modern political philosophy of liberalism has the discussion on whether the state should give preferences to any group of taste. This is by far the mildest scenario of discussing the relationship between art and politics. The standpoint non-liberal political regimes take towards art is much harder. Those regimes attempt to regulate the themes, plots and the language of artistic expression.

Similarly like law, which most frequently loses the battle against deep-rooted morality, authoritarian states fail to control all the undesirable phe-

nomena of artistic life. Art thrives on polysemantic concepts, the fact that causes quite a few problems to any authoritarian power attempting to restrain the imagination of its citizens. Romanas Vitkauskas, a Lithuanian painter, tried to display a painting in one of the Soviet exhibitions, showing a red garage door with a huge door lock. The meaning of the painting caused many a headache to ideological workers at the time.¹⁸ Soviet art abounded in various phenomena bearing a polysemantic load and devoid of any Soviet origin, which challenged the ideological monolith of the political system.

Real events of political life often surpass even the most vivid imagination. Ancient Rome could serve as a good illustration to prove the point. Aleksey Losev, a Russian historian of philosophy and culture, thinks that the Rome emperors' actions were one of the most distinct features of aesthetic consciousness of the epoch: "Deriving satisfaction from somebody's suffering, a bloody lechery and sadism of the tormentor-murderer, sodomy and incest – this is a certain type of aesthetics. However, against the background of such aesthetics even the most hardened nihilists become puritans and moralists".¹⁹

Poetically disposed artists find it difficult to live in the routine of political life. Politicians are known to use a commonplace and trivial language, the aim of which is not to arouse imagination but to maintain civil peace: "Political activity involves mental vulgarity, not merely because it entails the concurrence and support of those who are mentally vulgar, but because of the false simplification of human life implied in even the best of its purposes."²⁰ Artists do not agree with such simplification of human nature, and this is one of the reasons underlying their controversy with politicians.

In modern Western culture, art is perceived as a most distinct symbol of political freedom. Poetic images can show us the things which are invisible by practical and scientific experience. The advocates of the so-called pure art claim to be creating the world run by merely aesthetic principles. This statement, however, does not sound too convincing. Even the most contemplative art can hardly be fathomed without any links with the world of practical interests, such as a desire to please the audience, to be established among the other artistic trends and to get grants. The artistic world is full

of bitter inner fights similar to disagreements among different political parties and ideologies.

Researchers often exaggerate the non-utilitarian nature of art. It goes without saying that one could create art based on the principle of pure contemplation. However, it does not exclude the existence of arts displaying higher practical claims. This is not something totally incompatible with the nature of art. Strive as they could, artists can hardly totally escape the contact with the world of practice and politics. Thomas Elliot can hardly be perceived without his conservatism, Pablo Neruda without socialism, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn without anticommunism, and Adam Mickiewicz without his national ideals.

To quote Ronald Dworkin, a close relationship exists between art and politics: "It may be a sensible project, at least, to inquire whether there are not particular philosophical bases shared by particular aesthetic and particular political theories so that we can properly speak of a liberal or perfectionist or totalitarian aesthetics, for example, in that sense."²¹ Those with a disposition towards certain political ideologies are more inclined towards certain artistic trends, styles or means of expression. The perception of a work of art is inevitably influenced by one's political attitudes. Both art and politics have their own liberals, conservatives and anarchists.

There is no predetermined order of how the relationship between art and politics must be structured. It depends on the ever changing circumstances of cultural and political life. Provided the political rights and freedoms of citizens are guaranteed, the significance of artists' political deeds lessens significantly. The latter deeds are much more meaningful in the societies which are torn by bitter social and political conflicts. The Brazilian playwright Augusto Boal proposes "theatre as politics". This is not a usual theatre providing comments on the events of political life. The participants of this particular theatre are common citizens trying to formulate their daily political requirements via the language of art.²²

It is not only the artists who are interested in the happenings of political life. There is also other dependence – politicians react sensitively towards the events occurring in the world of artistic imagination. After the novel *Corrections* by Jonathan Frenzen was published, the Lithuanian ambassador to the US reacted by suggesting that the author of the novel should

go to the country represented by him and gain first-hand experience of the country, so as to be aware of the differences between the fictitious events shown by him and the real Lithuania. *Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie became an unprecedented pretext for persecuting the author of a work of literature. A number of Soviet artists were constantly blamed for "blackening Soviet reality". Politicians often react towards works of art as a blackmailing campaign, oblivious of the fact that they are confronted with a world of artistic imagination. Poetic imagination becomes no less serious than the territorial claims made by the enemy country, governmental crisis or approval of a new budget.

Artistic imagination strives for a different reality, far more perfect, noble and challenging. A similar longing is characteristic of politicians who are also known to create utopian projects. However, there is a basic difference between artistic imagination and political utopianism. Poets can merely throw up a vision of another society. Politicians are down-to-earth people, and they have to pursue the realization of their vision. Politics cannot be based on instigating passions, a feature is characteristic of a work of art. It is the activity which is based on common sense, experience and self-control: "The business of government is not to inflame passion and give it new objects to feed upon, but to inject into the activities of already too passionate men an ingredient of moderation."²³ Because of this, moderation politics loses its attraction to those of unusual artistic imagination. Politicians create their own utopias which differ from the ones created by artists. The main distinguishing feature between the two is a much closer relationship between political utopias and moral distinctions. Politicians cannot afford following the principle "art for art's sake"; they have to be concerned with the moral aspect.

There is no art that could not be made to take over the side of politics. It is not only theatre, cinema, painting or poetry, but also architecture, music or ceramics that can serve political goals. A work of art with a political touch is easy to create. It is much more difficult to turn political phenomena into the objects of aesthetic satisfaction. Shakespeare, Dostoyevsky, Diego Rivera and Bertolt Brecht succeeded in accomplishing this task, but a number of other authors failed. Politicians are jealous of the artists' talent to influence people's thoughts and feelings. They often pursue the same goal, namely to possess people's souls.

Artists tend to be very suspicious of politicians' speeches and actions. The experience gained in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes shows that artists were among the most ardent opponents of political power. Mikhail Bulgakov, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn or Josif Brodsky constituted as serious a problem to Soviet authorities as a chronic shortage of consumer goods. The most prominent Soviet artists were more than people with artistic imagination – they suggested a political alternative via their works of art. For this reason the authorities tried to handle them following Plato's "recipe": some of the artists had to simply be eliminated from the arena of political life.

Poets are as valuable a guarantee of our political freedom as practitioners and theoreticians are. Artistic imagination is able to highlight such threats to freedom and equality that are invisible to politicians and scientists. The greatest paradox within this context is that artistic people can play a significant political role, having no formulated political programs at their disposal. Nobody has been as consistent in implementing the famous calls by John Stuart Mill to protect an individual's right to excentricism and life experiments as the poets, painters, composers, designers and theatre producers of the last two centuries were.

Artists often disregard the spheres of interest between the modes of experiences and an attempt to transfer their authority into the other spheres which are beyond their scope of competence. Richard Rorty thinks that science, practice and art function according to the same principles of poetic creation: "old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness and then serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors."²⁴ Rorty's philosophy can be described as a certain "poetic imperialism". He tries to convince that poetic experience could be treated as the basis for any other type of experience: "an ideally liberal polity would be one whose culture hero is Bloom's "strong poet" rather than the warrior, the priest, the sage, or the truth seeking, logical, "objective" scientist."²⁵

Postmodernism cannot be separated from the conviction that we have as much share of the world as we have the language. At the beginning philosophers tried to convince that the human being is a creature interpreting its own existence. Later on postmodernists started to claim that we are constantly confronted not with things but their signs. That is, it is only due to convention and habit that we claim there is something we call real-

ity beyond the representations of the world created by us; actually what we are confronted with is its simulation. Such a philosophical conviction is particularly good to aesthetisation of politics.

Never before had there been so much talk about the political significance of art and artistic imagination as during the last two decades. Even without any substantial research one can claim that the old controversy between the representatives of Romanticism and Enlightenment was won by the former. As of today, we have a qualitatively new situation – we no longer have to convince anybody of a political significance of art. On the contrary, we have to protect the other two modes of human experience – practice and theory – from too pretentious claims raised by those who aesthetise politics.

Postmodernism is a phenomenon based on paradox. Talking about the significance of differences and variety, postmodernists are unwilling to consider the most important difference among practice, theory and art. Pascal stated that some have right understanding of a certain order of things, and not of others where they go astray. Postmodernists disregard this important warning. They tend to interpret culture and politics on the basis of fine arts. This is related to quite significant threats of a practical nature. After a transfer to an aesthetic perspective has been made, politics could readily be transformed into a play with images and symbols resembling those of artistic creation.

Postmodernists love to be introduced as advocates of various differences. The *différance* proposed by Jacques Derrida could be regarded as their symbol. This particular author popularized the idea that a sign has some meaning just because it is integrated into the system of other signs. However, the fascination held by postmodernists over the *différance* comes as a paradox, considering their indifference towards certain essential differences of human experience. They do see a number of insignificant differences, and yet they are oblivious of the main difference among the three different modes of human experience – practice, theory and art. It hardly suffices to say that one text makes a reference to another text; one has to be aware of the main differences among practical, scientific and artistic experience. It should not be difficult to understand that the works of poetry are based on another type of imagination than the management of practical affairs.

All philosophies of aestheticising politics are based on drawing a false conclusion. A sufficiently justified assumption on certain aesthetic elements of politics is elaborated into a false conclusion on the aesthetic nature of this activity. Politics indeed is inseparable from certain aesthetic elements. However, this does not mean that this particular sphere of activity can be treated following the standards of artistic activity. With the recognition of the assumptions held by Rorty, Frank Ankersmit²⁶ or Baudrillard, art has inevitably gained superiority over practical political activity. Postmodernists view the world from the vantage point taken by Arthur Schopenhauer – as a will and an image. They do not have faith in the ability of theoreticians to say anything more or less significant about the affairs of political life; neither do they have trust in any accomplishments by practitioners, since the latter are not similar to artists.

When postmodernists talk about the similarities between an aesthetic and political decision, they tend to regard just the superficial layer. If a deeper approach is taken, it becomes obvious that politics and art are based on different logics of constructing images, vocabularies and metaphors. Art can help us establish certain political principles, yet art is not the real driving force of political life. Good as they are at influencing people's emotions, artists have to regard the requirements of daily political life. Politics can be interpreted as a spectacle only in the narrowest sense of the word. Even though having elements of a spectacle, political life cannot be reduced to something we hope to experience from watching *Cabale und Liebe* by Friedrich Schiller or *A Streetcar Named Desire* by Tennessee Williams.

Hardly any other author analysed the relationship among the theory, practice and art than more significantly did Michael Oakeshott. While talking about the three modes of human experience, he did not directly analyse politics. However, it is not difficult to specify his attitude towards the relationship between politics and art. What is not explicitly said in *The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind* can be easily found in *On Human Conduct*, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* or *Experience and its Modes*.

Having adapted the concept of the three modes of experience proposed by Oakeshott, we can state that politicians need not argue with artists. They have their own truth, just like theoreticians and practitioners do. The

three modes of human experience can coexist without wanting to destroy each other. Practitioners', theoreticians' and artists' approach towards politics is different. According to Oakeshott, they regard the same things from a different perspective:

“...the French Revolution” for Blake was a poetic image, for de Tocqueville it represented an historical image, for Napoleon a practical image; the word “democracy” for some people represents a quasi-scientific image, for many it signifies a practical image (the symbol of a condition desired and to be approved), for de Tocqueville it stood for an historical image, but for Walt Whitman it was a poetic image.”²⁷

Every single mode of human experience is significant in its own way and cannot be regarded as the only perspective of viewing the world. Science, art and practice seek the images that are significant just to them. What is good for practice often does not suit science and art. Likewise, what seems to be appropriate to science and art can be questionable from the point of view of practical experience. The same image can be put into the context of practical, theoretical and aesthetic perception. The way political life is interpreted by practitioners is different from the way it is analysed by theoreticians or portrayed by artists. Politics and art are supported by different ways of handling images.

Politics comes into being as part of satisfying practical needs. Practical life encompasses not only handling things, but also regulating human relations. People pursue certain types of social cooperation. They value freedom, equality, justice and join various social and political organizations; they also create hierarchies of values and routines of daily life. Their mentality and comprehension of things serves as the basis on which moral, legal and political institutions are created. Politics is often defined as art. However, this happens for the mere reason that this particular activity deals with excellence standards and the virtuosity of pursuing these standards. Politics cannot be regarded as art from the point of view of its relationship with images. Politicians are concerned with totally different aspects of images than those appealing to poets, painters or film directors. Artists play with images, not bothering about the practical consequences of the game.

Politics constitutes part of the practical world. The order established in practical life determines the nature of other practices. We can be indifferent to arts and sciences, but we can hardly escape the contact with political institu-

tions. Political practice sets the main parameters of public life. Even art and religion, the spheres regarded as the most remote from politics, bear the influence of political decisions. Compared to sciences and arts, politics is often described as a trivial and morally faulty activity. Notwithstanding this, in the absence of this “trivial” and “primitive” activity, the other activities – much more creative and noble – would hardly be possible at all.

Artists and representatives of social sciences can come up with the most unusual and unpredictable descriptions of political reality. However, the perspectives of political life devised by them do not become guidelines of practical activity on their own. Theory and art have to undergo the practical test of validating the images proposed. Practitioners have *liberum veto* when a decision has to be made on the practical relevance of certain images. Political life is hardly conceived without a cautious approach towards the images coming from the world of art. Oakeshott was right in this respect, recognizing the singularity of the three modes of human experience. However, even he underestimated the impact of the artistic world on politics and established too deep an abyss between the worlds of politics and art. There exists a much more complicated mechanism of images migrating from one mode of experience to another than he thought. Artistic images exert an inevitable influence on the comprehension of political things.

After World War II a lot was written about the threats of political rationalism. Philosophers tried to prove that the transposition of the methods used in natural sciences into politics resulted in a number of threats, e.g., preconditioned a belief in rigid laws of history, defiance of citizens’ convictions (since the priority is on the process), as well as a longing for perfect technical social solutions. Today we are confronted with a new phenomenon – the aesthetisation of politics. Political life is conceived as a spectacle, performance or as a manipulation with images. It is not only artists who talk about aesthetic, but also professionals of political sciences and practitioners. The old controversy between poets and philosophers is acquiring a new meaning: today poets feel like taking revenge on the practitioners and theoreticians for having been ousted from the arena for a long time. Most contemporary politicians act being aware of the fact that the citizens’ consciousness is oriented not only towards the content of political programs but towards the characteristics of images and the slogans easy to remember.

Postmodernists regard politics as similar to a spectacle, a performance or a play with images. From the theoretical point of view this approach has little benefit, and from the practical point of view it is dangerous. If one adheres to such an approach, a clear comprehension of the moral meaning of political events becomes blurred. Since Plato's times, political philosophy has been regarded as related to ethics rather than to aesthetics. The contemporary proponents of "aesthetic politics" treat the differences of moral standpoints as the differences among various groups of artistic taste. This is a definitely erroneous attitude. Morality is not the only source of people's actions, and yet regardless all the diversity of modes of human experience, we inevitably have to raise the question: "what is important from the point of view of morality?"

The idea of "aesthetic politics" is based on defiance of the limits between three modes of human experience, namely practice, theory and art. Politics requires another type of imagination than fine arts do. An aesthetic decision can hardly be fathomed without contemplation based on whether certain images appeal to us or not. Political decision is a practical matter demanding a recognition of certain norms and rules of social communication. The proponents of "aesthetic politics" misunderstand the nature of politics. Dealing with vocabularies and metaphors, they forget that the political vocabularies and metaphors are well backed by an institutionally established order of political life, which is not easily subject to the challenges of poetic imagination. It is not only the vocabulary which changes political institutions; on the contrary, the latter exert an influence on the perception of political matters.

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EUROPEAN SOCIETIES *VERSUS* MUSLIM MINORITIES: BETWEEN 'CULTURAL AWARENESS' AND ORIENTALISM

Egdūnas Račius

Abstract. Though Muslims are not a novelty in Europe, it is the post-WWII period when they started coming in great numbers to the 'old' continent. Most European states then designed and launched integration programs falling into one of the two broad categories, the assimilationist and multiculturalist. However, with time it became obvious that European liberal values, freedoms, social and economic welfare do not impress many Muslims in Europe: physically living on the European continent they are mentally living in another dimension – in resignation permeated by dismay, resignation which more and more often spills into violence against wider society. The uneasy coexistence nurtured policies of isolation and isolationism, which ensued in a new kind of ghettoization in the urban conglomerates of Europe.

The images of Islam and Muslims entertained by most Europeans throughout the centuries have been far from positive. Though by now many of those images and bogus stereotypes and have already been cast off, others, however, are still clung to with xenophobia and racism at play. It is therefore worth addressing the issue of the perceived failure of integration of Muslims in Europe in the light of two opposing (in inverse proportionality) perspectives – '*cultural awareness*' and '*Orientalism*'. The article argues for the need of 'cultural awareness' and concludes that, so far, 'cultural awareness' has been one of the most neglected elements in cross-cultural communication between Europeans and immigrant (especially Muslim) communities. Its lack might be seen as one of the major obstacles to integration of Muslims in Europe. Moreover, without 'cultural awareness' one can hardly hope for any sort of a new, wider and inclusivist, European identity, the part of which Islam and Muslims would be. The recent events ('Submission' and 'cartoons' scandals), sadly, point to the majority of Europeans considering a contrary direction, the trend that might revive and strengthen Orientalist feelings in Europe.

Though Muslims are not a novelty in Europe, it is the post-WWII period when they started coming in great numbers to the 'old' continent. At first, indigenous European societies did not feel any challenge to their ways of

living, for those early arrivals from Turkey, North Africa and several other predominantly Muslim countries were seen and indeed saw themselves as temporary residents (mainly contract workers, *Gastarbeiter*) in Europe. As such, they hardly ever openly raised issues of specific requirements related to their religious practice and way of living. However, the situation started changing around the 1970s, when it was realized that immigrant workers and (increasingly) asylum seekers chose Europe as their destination and anticipated permanent home. Since then the numbers of Muslims in Europe have been steadily growing and as of 2006 in the EU alone there were as many as 16 million of them.¹ It is estimated that in the entire continent (excluding Russia) there might be as many as 25 million Muslims.² Though most of them are recent arrivals and / or descendants of naturalized immigrants, there is an ever-increasing number of converts to Islam from among indigenous Europeans. Unfortunately, there is virtually no reliable data on European converts to Islam either, only crude guesses, though the trend is becoming more and more visible. By any rate, their number all around Europe has to be in hundreds of thousands.

Notwithstanding, most attention both by politicians and media is being paid to immigrant and naturalized Muslims. Though the background of these Muslims is very diverse and they do not make a single unified community, to most Europeans, however, all Muslims (and especially the immigrants) constitute a monolithic threatening entity, presumably at odds with European values and the European way of living. To most uninformed Europeans it is the European identity that is at stake. Possible accession of Turkey to the EU is yet another aspect of this widely assumed threat to the European identity.³

1. Integration of Muslim immigrants into European societies: the sour experience

Looking retrospectively, one might argue that European states (both governments and societies) in the 1970s and 80s were taken aback – they were totally unprepared to take in the immigrant communities.⁴ With the ever-expanding immigration, both legal and illegal, European governments embarked on a double-approach policy. On the one hand, they proceeded to limit possibilities for legal immigration, at the same time tightening

legislature aimed at curtailing illegal immigration. On the other hand, they started actively deliberating the possible ways of dealing with the already existing Muslim communities. Most European states then designed and launched integration programs. Roy puts the approach of European countries toward immigrants into two perspectives: he argues that “Europe historically used two models to deal with immigration: assimilationism (France) and multiculturalism (Northern Europe).”⁵

In the assimilationist perspective, Muslims were looked upon as a kind of *tabula rasa* which had to be inscribed with respective (Western) patterns of thinking and behavior, which in their turn would be compatible, if not identical, with the assumed (idealistically perceived) patterns of thinking and behavior of the indigenous populations. At that time (1970s and 80s), it was widely hoped that by providing adequate conditions to Muslim communities these would gradually become an integral part of European societies and be able to adequately take part in social and political life of the respective host societies. In other words, it was expected that Muslims could be molded into Europeans – through educating them in local languages, providing professional training to instill in them value orientation along the European lines. Such an attitude is well captured by Lang who, though in a different context, aptly observes that ‘we believe we understand how these people ought to be and that we can organize them with minimal effort because they really want to be like us’.⁶ Duffey puts it even more succinctly: ‘this approach assumes a prescriptive stance: “we know what’s best for them”’.⁷

However, such an approach in a big part proved to be untoward – large communities of Muslims in Europe have not been successfully integrated into the European societies. On the contrary, in many instances they turned into semi-closed islands of alternative culture, practically ghettos. Upon looking closer, it becomes evident that through social integration programs aimed at Muslims European governments sought assimilation rather than integration. Many of the applied programs were essentially ill-constructed for they had been based upon the principles of human coexistence that had formed exclusively in the European societies. Those principles, unfortunately, did not correspond to those held by a significant segment of Muslim arrivals in Europe. Notwithstanding, local governments at that time

made little effort to acquaint themselves with the cultural backgrounds of Muslim immigrants. This proved to be grave.

Probably the greatest shortcoming of the integration programs was that they were so to say “godless”, bereft of religious dimension – a secular individual and his / her personal rights, freedoms and responsibilities were promoted at the expense of one’s relation with the divine. As Nielsen points out, “well into the 1970s there seemed to be an expectation that communities of immigrant origin would quickly follow a course characterised by the privatisation of religion.”⁸ Many Muslims, however, view their life through a religious prism, using as a yardstick “submission to God’s will, His law” (however understood and practiced) to measure and judge themselves and the entire world. Secularized Europeans could not perceive this. Therefore, integration programs by seeking to assimilate Muslims into European societies were in effect destroying Muslims’ *Islamicity* – their semi-conscious all-embracing commitment to Islam. What those programs were offering was not what most of Muslims could stomach. In addition, those programs raised hopes of advancement on the social ladder only to be dashed later in individual’s life. Apparently, the hastily prepared integration programs in too many cases turned out to be more harmful than beneficial: many among immigrants found these programs robbing them of their nature and culture, while indigenous populations were not being prepared by their governments to overcome any prejudiced feelings they might have had toward Muslims.

The multiculturalist approach, presumably advocating the maxim “live and let live”, did nor fare any better either. Though ideally multiculturalism is to be based on horizontal tolerance of the ‘other’, in Europe at most it amounted to vertical toleration of the ‘other’ and only in as much as that ‘other’ fitted the conventional, albeit wide, frame. Instead of becoming a conglomeration of equal cultures, Europe turned into a composition with a dominant (indigenous) culture and affiliate subcultures (ethnic and otherwise) on the one side and a number of (immigrant) subcultures, which too often have been seen as anti-cultures and therefore as a threat, on the other side. In other words, the “multiculturalist” approach backfired, as the European population in effect went fragmented. Moreover, as it turned out, under the shell of the publicly propagated European multiculturalism there

abound racism, xenophobia and chauvinism, all brought along from the past.

With time it became obvious that European liberal values, freedoms, social and economic welfare do not impress many Muslims in Europe: physically living on the European continent they are mentally living in another dimension – in resignation permeated by dismay, resignation which more and more often spills into violence against wider society. The uneasy coexistence nurtured policies of isolation and isolationism, which ensued in a new kind of ghettoization in the urban conglomerates of Europe. Even worse, most (even naturalized) immigrants felt to be second class citizens with less rights and civil liberties and even less opportunities to exercise them. The recent riots in France, deliberations and moves to ban *hijab* in such supposedly liberal countries as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany – all this illustrates that even now, after having understood that Muslims in Europe have been treated unfairly for long decades, no or very little measures are being taken by European governments to draw Muslims into the process of creating a new, more universal European identity and value system. The need for such new identity has arisen sharply in the last decade or so, for as Nielsen argues, “across Europe, the consequences of immigration (multicultural societies, ethnic and religious pluralism, etc.) and the relativisation of the nation state (supranational sovereignty in the EU and NATO, and sub-national claims to autonomy) mean that everyone is having to negotiate new understandings of individual and collective self. The relationship between state, nation / *Volk*, citizenship, religion, community, transnational loyalties are no longer what we had thought they were.”⁹ For a change to happen, however, one needs the will which, as arguably the latest developments to be dealt with below reveal, is lacking.

2. ‘Cultural awareness’ and ‘cultural literacy’

The images of Islam and Muslims entertained by most Europeans throughout the centuries have been far from positive (think of the Catholic Church’s position and role in medieval Europe and its attitude toward Islam and Muslims, in particular in the times of the Crusades, then the European imperialism and the Colonial era, the image of Turks / Ottomans held among Europeans in the 19th century). To make sure, many of those im-

ages were bogus stereotypes and have already been cast off. Others, however, are still clung to with xenophobia and racism at play. As Nonneman argues, “in the specific case of mainly Christian (if secularised) Europe, and Islam, the historical ‘baggage’, or ‘collective memory’ of the ‘other’ has remained an important factor. This has stayed alive through various elements of folklore, among other factors, becoming increasingly mythologised and stereotyped in the process.”¹⁰ It is therefore worth addressing the issue of the perceived failure of integration of Muslims in Europe in the light of two opposing (in inverse proportionality) perspectives – *‘cultural awareness’* and *‘Orientalism’*.

By ‘cultural awareness’ here is meant the basic acquaintance with the history and languages of people coming from distant societies and whom one encounters. The term has recently become a routine one in American and British military terminology, with special ‘Cultural Awareness’ courses and texts offered to military personnel to be posted to missions abroad, and especially in Muslim countries. ‘Cultural awareness’ is increasingly becoming a kind of obsession among U.S. military, for it is argued that “a combat brigade would not be deployed into hostile territory without maps. The beliefs of a culture are as critical as terrain features. The unit should have those coordinates as well”¹¹ and that “it is cultural awareness that helps determine whether a host population supports long-term American military presence – and may determine the outcome of the mission”.¹² As experiences of the years of Iraq occupation show, the occupational forces next to being skilled in handling machinery have also to have been initiated into the local cultures, for as Scales argues, “the military possess the technological means in Iraq to conduct net-centric warfare to proficiency unparalleled in the history of warfare. But it lacked the intellectual acumen and cultural awareness and knowledge of the art of war to conduct culture-centric warfare”.¹³

It might be maintained that ‘cultural awareness’ is an essential prerequisite in any trans-ethnic situations, as much in military as in peace-time encounters; this would facilitate understanding between the sides and help save human and material resources. But it might also be argued that for clerks (like social workers, municipal officials, lawyers and similar) in their job situations directly dealing with people of different cultural backgrounds

‘cultural literacy’ would be even more desirable. This includes not only a superficial familiarity with basic aspects of alien culture(s), but undergoing some more profound ‘culture training’ like courses on history, language, religion, and society of countries to gain deeper knowledge of intellectual currents and undercurrents, stratification of society under question, pressure groups, informal authorities, and religion, all this supported by study of appropriate local language.¹⁴ Some private enterprises have already started this practice. Certain governmental agencies do this also, but the results so far, unfortunately, are not up to the expectations.

Of course, one cannot expect every single government official or employee in the private sector, charged with specific duties related to immigrants, to be well versed in the intricacies of the cultures they come from. Yet, one is to expect (or even to demand) that those who make decisions, either themselves possess knowledge of cultures their decisions are to affect or have expert-assistants who do so to advise them, for only ‘culturally literate’ decisions have a propensity to be welcome by those they are aimed at.

‘Cultural awareness / literacy’ serves in general as a tool to nurture trust between people of different cultural backgrounds. The issue here evolves around enlightened relationships based on mutual trust built on understanding, tolerance, and respect. The biggest risk and mistake that has been permeating trans-cultural communication (especially the assimilationist, but also multiculturalist) until now is the ignorant (and often arrogant) behavior of both officials and general society, which alienates the target group (Muslim immigrants in this case) and so unwillingly even pushes them into rejectionism and self-isolation. Thus, because of cultural ignorance (on both sides, one has to admit) ‘integration’ unwillingly and unconsciously tends to turn into cultural conflict, or as some call it ‘clash’.

3. The trap of Orientalism

‘Cultural awareness / literacy’ should ideally be a counterbalance to what has been termed ‘*Orientalism*’. Orientalism, a broad notion denoting a unique European view of (or gaze at) non-European cultures, implies a dichotomy and binary opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where ‘they’ are perceived to be of lesser (civilizational) status. Orientalism, in its critics’ view, is a vice which has been crippling relations between Europeans and ‘Orientals’,

especially since its virtual institutionalization in the colonial era. As Said has passionately argued in his *Orientalism*¹⁵, too often imperial European decision- and policy-makers assumed to have grasped the essence of respective non-European societies (their cultures) and acted upon that perception, while in fact they were acting upon wrong assumptions and misjudgments. Arguably, the assimilationist approach of the past decades toward Muslim immigrants in Europe is but an extension and implementation of the very same Orientalist perspective, even though in a new context.

Said would further argue that Europeans in general have been captives of their own stereotypes of the 'Orientals', in many cases unconsciously taking phantom images of 'Orientals' for real-time non-Europeans. This image recreation and perpetuation arguably precludes gaining any pristine and un-biased acquaintance with the 'other', in this case Muslim immigrants to Europe. Indeed, failure to understand and appreciate differences among cultures is one of the core aspects of that continued often latent Orientalism of today. Suffice it to remind of former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's remarks on Islam as inferior to Western civilization.¹⁶ Berlusconi has merely said what is on the lips of many if not most of Europeans who perceive their civilization (understood as either Christian or post-Christian liberal) to be the benchmark of civilizations. However, by far the most informative cases of abundance of Orientalism and lack of 'cultural awareness' among even multiculturalist European societies perhaps are the provocative movie "Submission" shot in 2004 by the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh and the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in 2005 by the Danish newspaper "Jyllands Posten".

In the case of the movie "Submission", immediately after the murder of the controversial Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in the fall of 2004 by a Dutch Moroccan Muslim extremist, the entire Netherlands went awe – his cold-blooded killing in a broad daylight drew an anti-Muslim reaction unprecedented in the history of the country which had until then been hailed as an exemplary multicultural and tolerant society.¹⁷ Multiple arsons followed.¹⁸

The pretext for van Gogh's murder was his film "Submission" released earlier that year, portraying female Muslim's life in Muslim environment as unbearable and implicitly accusing male Muslims of ingrained abusive

and criminal inclinations, if not bestiality, all this supposedly sanctioned by their religion, Islam. The film is an example of how non-Muslims too often take what some Muslims do for what Islam supposedly requires them to do. In other words, mixing up of what might be found in reality (culture) with what is ideal (normative level, the law). And this is but a feature of Orientalism. As Annelies Moors argues in her article on the movie, "the film is first and foremost striking in its unimaginative resonance with the visual imagery of Orientalism" and that "the film has all the characteristics of hard core Orientalism. If, in its visual language, women's bodies are eroticized through a discourse of seduction and pain, the spoken texts refer to a more academic form of Orientalism that sees people's everyday lives as determined by Islam, providing a direct link between specific Quranic verses and the behaviour of Muslim men who abuse women."¹⁹ If cultural awareness is about getting people to understand and respect each other, the movie does just the opposite, for as Moors pointedly remarks, "*Submission* builds on and contributes to further polarization along the lines of the simplistic contrast scheme of Muslims versus non-Muslims."²⁰

The film director's personal cultural ignorance saturated with latent Orientalism echoed in the reaction by many, if not the majority, of Dutch who failed to grasp what the whole issue was about. To most, it was about the perceived freedom of speech which is hailed as a sacrosanct. In the days after van Gogh's murder such "friends of Van Gogh" and others made a passionate plea for the right of freedom of opinion, translated in terms of an absolute right to say "whatever we want."²¹ They were content with the plot of the movie which many found to simply show what had been known yet unspoken. Moreover, it must have been assumed that the scriptwriter Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee who managed to become not only a Dutch citizen but also an MP, herself a renegade Muslim, should know what Islam and Muslims really are.²² Though her personal story reveals Hirsi Ali's deep hatred of Islam and Muslim cultures which she perceives to be unfair to women²³, this must have not bothered many.

The repercussions of the "van Gogh case" were manifold but unfortunately mainly negative. For example, soon after van Gogh's murder, European Union justice and interior ministers in November 2004 agreed on nonbinding guidelines calling for immigrants to learn the language of their

host country and to adopt “European values.” Over the next year, the Netherlands designed a “new” approach toward Muslim immigrants with a kind of inverted cultural awareness approach. It now “requires new immigrants to pass a language test, and would-be newcomers must pass a cultural-awareness test before they even apply for immigration.”²⁴ Such measures are a give-in to the assimilationist approach which instead of casting away vertical relations between Europeans and immigrants, intrinsic to Orientalism, rather reinforce them. In this case, cultural awareness on the side of Europeans and enlightened multiculturalism are but victims.

The other much revealing case is that of the Muhammad caricatures.

Political caricature has become an integral part of mass media not only in the West but very much so in the Muslim world. To tell the truth, caricatures published in the Arab media often are very sharp toward both own and foreign politicians. The Al-Jazeera media network on its English language website (<http://english.aljazeera.net/HomePage>) also maintains a permanent political caricatures’ section. Political caricature is employed even by Islamists.

On the other hand, conservatively inclined Muslims even today are not comfortable with the visual depicting of humans. They, however, base their disgust at visual art not on their personal stance or esthetic grounds but rather on the primary texts, the Quran and Sunna, which unequivocally condemn creating images of creatures with souls.²⁵ To many (especially Sunni) Muslims, depicting prophet Muhammad is blasphemous, and making fun or insulting his personality is tantamount to crime. In the end of 2005, the Danish newspaper “Jyllands Posten”²⁶, and later newspapers of some forty countries, just did that—they published a dozen cartoons portraying prophet Muhammad. Several of the drawings imply that Muhammad was (and therefore his followers Muslims are too) a blood-thirsty oppressor of women. Knowing the position in which Muslims hold their prophet, it is not surprising they strongly protested at the publishing and republishing of the drawings. Incited (some imply, orchestrated) anger of Muslims spilled over into violence which caused loss of lives and property.

Though arson and violence cannot be justified, the lion’s share of blame for the subsequent reaction on the part of Muslims falls not only on the

editors who allowed publishing the cartoons, but also on all those who, like in the case of Theo van Gogh a year and a half earlier, stubbornly argued for freedom of speech and expression which once again demonstrated itself in the form of ignorance and lack of cultural sensitivity. In the entire 'cartoon crisis', Europe, which had been claiming to be the upholder of tolerance, revealed itself as extremely intolerant. Practically all European newspapers which republished caricatures, and an array of politicians who supported them (the most notorious among them the then Italian minister Roberto Calderoli) argued that the free word in Europe cannot be muzzled by anyone while it might bite anyone and anything. In other words, there are not to be any taboos, not even in the religious sphere. This is very evident in the same Hirsi Ali's reply to a "Spiegel" journalist's question whether "apologizing for the cartoons was the wrong thing to do?" to which she said: "Once again, the West pursued the principle of turning first one cheek, then the other. In fact, it's already a tradition. ... We are constantly apologizing, and we don't notice how much abuse we're taking. Meanwhile, the other side doesn't give an inch." The journalist then asked: "What should the appropriate European response look like?" Ali's answer was blunt: "There should be solidarity. The cartoons should be displayed everywhere."²⁷

Sadly, however, most of the advocates of the cartoons once again 'failed' to notice that the "free word" has become an openly insulting word. And as long as Europeans will fall short of realizing that mocking "others" feelings does not do good to cross-cultural communication, one can hardly hope for either a truly multiculturalist society or a new, more universal, European identity and value system. In Joffe's words, "the cartoons episode illustrated a European failure to tolerate its minority communities' difficulties in adjusting to secular society. The two countries who deem themselves the most tolerant, Denmark and the Netherlands, were the most intolerant of Muslim intolerance."²⁸

Concluding Remarks

A complex problem is that the 'knowledge' generated in the process of the study of alien (Oriental) cultures too often represents not the actual reality of those cultures but rather our perception of that reality. In other words,

there is a gap between ‘what is out there’ and ‘what we think there is out there’. Therefore, there is a major difference between unprejudiced inquiry into remote cultures in order to get to know them better, on the one hand, and searching for proofs of preconceived stereotypes about those cultures, which merely confirm our in-advance-held ‘knowledge’ and expectations about those cultures, on the other hand. In the latter case, the whole process of study does not lead to genuine ‘culture awareness / literacy’ but rather to becoming a vessel and transmitter of the very Orientalist notions. Thus, one has to guard against manifest or even latent Orientalism which is prone to preclude one from grasping the realities of culture under question. It is essential that all efforts to improve ‘cultural awareness/ literacy’ be as free as possible from biases, prejudices, and stereotypes. Only Orientalism-free ‘culture training’ would eventually pay off. Thus, among the short- (but also long-) term objectives should be setting up of structures for diffusing ‘Orientalism-free cultural awareness’.

A note on academic “Area Studies” might be in place here. When speaking about the role the “Area Studies” should play in society, three layers of it should be distinguished. The first one is politicians, the second being scholars and the third – common population. The scholars would stand atop the society for their knowledge and expertise in the issues pertaining to remote cultures. As was argued above, they are to be advisers to politicians, who make decisions (especially those affecting immigrant communities and cross-cultural encounters). Here the role of scholar-experts is crucial, for they may warrant politicians of pitfalls and shortcomings of one or the other decision by bringing to their attention needs and expectations of the communities concerned. As for the role of scholars on the popular level, they have to double their efforts in purging their own societies of prejudices, stereotypes and misconceptions about remote cultures through all possible means, first of all educational. Though there seems to be plenty of literature on non-European cultures, it is quite often superficial and contaminated with the persisting Orientalizing gaze that the scholars themselves have not yet fully gotten rid off.

Unfortunately, so far, ‘cultural awareness’, not to mention ‘cultural literacy’, has been one of the most neglected elements in cross-cultural communication between Europeans and immigrant (especially Muslim) com-

munities. Its lack might be seen as one of the major obstacles to integration of Muslims in Europe. Moreover, without 'cultural awareness' one can hardly hope for any sort of a new, wider and inclusivist, European identity, the part of which Islam and Muslims would be. The recent events ('Submission' and 'cartoons' scandals), sadly, point to most of Europeans considering a contrary direction, the trend that might revive and strengthen Orientalist feelings in Europe. This one has to guard against.

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**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS**

EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION: TOWARDS CHANGING THE ROLE OF THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL?

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Abstract. This paper deals with the process of interests' representation of the subnational level actors in the European Union (EU) governance system. The drafting of European Constitution at the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent EU Intergovernmental conference (IGC) are the items that this paper draws heavily upon. Authors present the study on how the representatives of the Committee of the Regions and subnational level institutions define and defend their interests and aims that have emerged from the Maastricht "regional agenda".

The research discusses in depth the factors that were vital to the relative success of subnational level interests' representation during the drafting of the European Constitution: firstly, the favourable political environment and the openness of EU Member States to the subnational level question, secondly, the high level of mobilisation, which defined the representation of subnational level interests, and thirdly, the leadership of the Committee of the Regions, which with varying success served as a vehicle for subnational interests' representation at the IGC intergovernmental bargaining table and Convention. The article also argues that it is too early to speak about the effect of "hollowing the state", used when discussing the EU policy-making from multilevel governance or neo-functional approaches. The inability of subnational level actors to influence the member states' position during the EU IGC suggests that intergovernmental explanations of the outcomes of negotiations are still very much valid to the EU decision-making process.

Introduction

In the recent years, the role of the European Union (EU) institutions in the fast-changing governance process within and beyond the Member States borders became a subject of thrilling academic agendas. The works of B. Kohler-Koch on the modes of governance in the EU, two multilevel governance concepts developed by L. Hooghe and G. Marks, as well as the

attempts to analyse and explain the functioning of the EU governance system by other researchers like G. Stoker, M. A. Pollack, D. Dinan, A. Moravcsik, S. Bulmer, D. Scott and others can be noted as the prime examples. The pattern of these discussions was also influenced by a set of important questions which were put on the EU's agenda, ranging from EU enlargement and growing ambitions of the EU to become a global player, to the future of Europe, drafting of Constitution and, last but not least, the administrative reform of the European Commission. Many of these issues are directly related to the changing roles and functions of the different governance levels: supranational (EU), national (Member States), and subnational. Therefore, tracking the real changes in the governance system and evaluating their significance to and influence on the actors and their relationships is of utmost interest to the authors.

It is worth mentioning that the near-identical appearance of the issues on EU governance system architecture at the agenda of intergovernmentalist, neo-functionalist, and multilevel governance approaches gives us an opportunity not only to look at different explanations of the shifts in the balances of the EU governance system, but also present a chance to compare them. Each of the above-mentioned approaches quite differently explains the governance of policy-making in the EU. The starting point for such differences is a different approach to the role and powers of the national state. Neofunctionalists stress the importance of the EU institutions and the "hollowing out of the state". Intergovernmentalists look into the system from the realists' position – nevertheless all the transformations in the EU, the main decision powers and veto rights are in the hands of the national governments, while yet fragmented, but rich in explanatory power policy-making approaches on multilevel governance argue that the EU governance system is functioning according to the new rules. Here the national states remain a major player but are gradually losing their decision-making monopoly and look rather like *primus inter pares* or, to be more exact, an intermediary between the governance system players, which participates and coordinates the activities of various networks. It is increasingly "becoming squeezed between regional players and EU regulatory powers"¹.

In such theoretical climate, we ask the question: *what are the possibilities for the subnational level institutions to influence the political processes and public policy on the EU level?* By doing this, we also expect to verify some of the key statements of the above-mentioned approaches to the regional level. The basis of this research is a case study of the preparation of the Treaty establishing the European Constitution, which allows us to analyse how the representatives of the Committee of the Regions, who had the observer status in the Convention, and the representatives of subnational level institutions defined and defended their interests and aims which emerged already from the Maastricht “regional agenda”. The latter case by many researchers (Ch. Jeffery, 2002; G. Memminger, 1992; U. Hoppe, G. Shultz, 1992, etc.) is considered as a first attempt to strengthen the regional level in the EU governance system and so “to involve to a greater extent the regions of the EU Member States in the EU governance system”².

1. Subnational level interests’ representation: arenas, mechanisms, strategy and practice

The ‘orthodox’ public administration theory (J.M. Ferris, Ch.O. Jones, etc.) considers the public policy cycle to comprise several steps: a) problem definition (or policy initiation); b) agenda setting; c) policy adoption; d) policy implementation; e) policy evaluation, and f) the feedback³. Having in mind that our case is not a traditional case of public policy formation and implementation, only the first three of the above-mentioned six public policy cycle phases are relevant:

- *policy initiation*: at this stage, policy issues are introduced to the political stage by different governmental institutions, public institutions and organisations, individuals, interest groups, or specific events;
- *agenda setting*: at this stage, an item on the agenda is articulated into language for a bill (going before the Legislature) or a policy statement. For any item on the agenda there are likely to be several competing formulations working through the system;
- *policy adoption (decision-making)*: the decision makers, according to the existing procedures and norms, make formal decisions on the concrete public policy questions that are on the political agenda.

In the EU governance system, it is possible to identify several legislative procedures: common EU decision-making procedures (consultation, assent, co-decision, and cooperation), EU Founding Treaties amendment procedure and some modification of the latter – the European Convention which was used for the preparation of European Constitution. The possibilities to influence EU public policy initiation and making for a subnational level in each of these procedures obviously present different challenges. However, we will argue that the European Convention procedure probably is the most “open” as it presents the largest number of access points and influence channels for subnational level interests’ representation. This is one of the main reasons for choosing this case for research, as the efforts of subnational level institutions to influence the policy processes on EU level are quite easily identifiable and visible. For a better understanding of the functioning of the system it is necessary to start with a deeper presentation of the European Convention procedure.

1.1. Arenas and mechanisms: the European Convention

In the Laeken Declaration (2001), the Council of the European Union, specifying the reasons for the convocation of the European Convention emphasized that the EU should be better prepared to meet both internal and external challenges and “to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient”⁴. One of the main issues was that European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens, as the growing criticism of “democratic deficit” was mounting from both public and political circles. In such context, the main task for the European Convention was to prepare recommendations on the three main issues:

- a better division and definition of competence in the European Union;
- simplification of the Union’s instruments;
- more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union⁵.

The Convention had to act as a special discussion forum in which a broad range and variety of opinions had to be heard, evaluated and taken into consideration. For the first time the convention mechanism in the EU practice was used in the year 2000 when the Charter of Fundamental Rights was discussed. However, the European Convention became an exceptional case because of its mandate and the broad scope of participants⁶. Differently from the common EU practice, the Convention turned to be not just

intergovernmental negotiations where all the questions are negotiated and decided in official meetings of governmental delegations. Neither was it an academic discussion forum where participants present their own opinion and disband with divergent views.

The Convention working procedures opened the possibility (especially in the hearing phase) for various institutions, including the subnational level, business, society, and interests groups to be well heard. The work of the Convention itself can be divided into three main phases:

- *the hearing phase*, which lasted until July 2002, was devoted to the identification of the EU countries' and citizens' expectations;
- *the analysis phase*, which lasted till the end of 2002 and where the main questions and suggestions were discussed. Most of these questions first were discussed in the working groups and later in the Convention plenary session;
- and the last phase – *"formulation of conclusions"* – covered the drafting of the European Constitution.

All the conclusions, including the draft of the European Constitution, were presented to the Council of the European Union in Thessaloniki on the 20th June 2003. It concluded that the draft was "a good basis" (R. Prodi, President of the European Commission) to call the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which would make a final decision on the proposed recommendations for the reforming of the EU. The final draft of European Constitution in the European Convention was approved on the 18th July 2003.

Generally, the European Constitution preparation procedure equals the amendment of the EU Founding Treaties: according to both mechanisms, the final decision is made in IGC and later should be ratified by all EU Member States. However, the Convention working methods make the decision-making procedure a two-stage affair – first, formulation of recommendations (initiation, deliberation, and adoption by common assent) in the Convention and, second, their deliberation and final decision-making in the IGC.

Trying to identify the possible access points for the subnational level institutions in the Convention, it would make sense to describe briefly its composition and working methods. Chairman of the Convention was the former President of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Beside his rich political experience, it is important to note that he is also the Honorary Presi-

dent of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions⁷. The Convention itself consisted of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States and candidate countries (one from each country); representatives of the National Parliaments of the Member States and candidate countries (two from each country); 16 representatives from European Parliament; two representatives from the European Commission. Each member of the Convention had a deputy member. Also, there were representatives who had the status of observers⁸:

- *six representatives of the Committee of the Regions*;
- three representatives of Economic and Social Committee;
- three representatives of European social partners;
- one representative of the European Ombudsman⁹.

The main workflow of the Convention was in eleven working groups formed from the members of the Convention and arranged by different topics. For the subnational level institutions, the most important was Working Group 1 devoted to *subsidiarity* issue in the EU. This group agreed on a series of proposals intended to improve the application and monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity allowing a more effective functioning of the EU multi-level governance system. All recommendations of the working groups were presented to the Convention plenary sessions, where they were further deliberated and agreed upon. As already mentioned, the work of the Convention was based on the common assent – the Convention working documents did not foresee any voting procedure (and there were no majority foreseen for the approval of the decisions). All decisions were made when a clear majority of the Convention members were in favour of it. It was a kind of political summation: not very transparent or easily definable, but nevertheless very effective in reaching the final goals of the Convention. Differently from all the other decision making procedures in the EU, the European Convention employs the most open procedures, with a wide variety of access points and influence channels for the subnational level institutions and other non-governmental actors.

1.2. Interests' representation strategies

Subnational level institutions have wide options when trying to influence

decision-making on the EU (supranational) level. They can try to influence national governments, European Commission, and in special cases the Council or European Parliament. Access to these institutions can be achieved through various channels and access points: interregional organisations, Committee of the Regions, regional representation offices in Brussels, etc. A systemic approach to this process can be found in a research done by T. Boucke, H. Vos and E. Baillieul who suggested that the participation of subnational level institutions in the EU policy initiation “may be direct (direct relationship with EU) or indirect (relationship with EU via the central state) and formal or informal”¹⁰. According to them, there are four main influence channels (or strategies) used by subnational level institutions in the EU public policy initiation:

- *direct and informal* (through subnational level institutions’ representation offices in Brussels, interregional organisations like Council of European Municipalities and Regions, Eurocities, Assembly of European Regions, etc.);
- *indirect and formal* (through national governments taking an active part in the formulation of national positions);
- *indirect and informal* (informally influencing the national governments, for example, through political parties);
- *direct and formal* (through the Committee of the Regions, representatives of federal Member States (Austria, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany) in the Council).

One conclusion which can be drawn from the last chapter is that the Convention mechanism remains the most open possibility for subnational level institutions to influence the processes on the EU level. However, the participation of subnational level institutions in and their impact on the drafting of European Constitution are equivocal. On the one side, the share quantity of subnational level institutions exceeds the number of national and supranational institutions many times; the biggest part (about 75%) of EU legislation and implementation measures are implemented at the subnational level. The EU institutions and Member States unanimously recognise the importance of the subnational level in the EU multi-level governance system; the Committee of the Regions was established in 1994;


more than 30 various interregional organisations are acting in the governance system, etc. Nevertheless, on the other side, a large amount of access points and interests' representation channels for subnational level institutions on the national and EU level do not convert to a direct influence. The real opportunities are very often restricted to a simple exchange of information, rather than real interests' representation and placing relevant "regional" issues on the EU public policy agenda.

Looking at the European Convention process, it is possible to identify efforts of subnational actors to influence the content of the European Constitution by trying to include provisions which are important for them and would strengthen their status in the EU multi-level governance system. Schematically, all the strategies and influence channels are presented in *Scheme*.

In this case, subnational level institutions for the representation of their interests use not only the members of the Convention – representatives of the Member States, European Parliament, European Commission, but also other channels. The first and probably one of the most important of these channels is the observer status for six members of the Committee of the Regions in the Convention. This allowed these representatives to present their own (or Committee's of the Regions as an institution *in corpore*) opinion at the plenary sessions and / or working groups. Secondly, during the so-called "hearing" stage in the Convention the latter was open to all suggestions and recommendations. It means that not only official institutions and Member States, but also the other actors of the EU governance system, including the subnational level institutions, their associations, interregional organizations, etc. could present their opinion and recommendations to the Convention.

In the opinion of the public officials who took part in this process, as well as academic observers, such as P. Lynch, this "channel" was not very important. Because of the information overload during the hearings, all these opinions and recommendations were treated as issues of peripheral interest, unless they were supported by an official from the Member States or members of the Convention. Priority was given to the issues raised by representatives of the member states. And thirdly, the very important instrument in the Convention process was working groups, first of all Work-

Scheme. European Convention: interests representation strategies of subnational level institutions



ing Group 1 devoted to the *Subsidiarity* issue, whose main task was to agree on a series of proposals intended to improve the application and monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity, allowing a more effective functioning of the EU multi-level governance system.

We have to mention that identification of the exact scope of impact of the subnational level institutions on the EU public policy is a very complicated task, especially when talking about the indirect and formal channels when the subnational level institutions' impact on the content of the national positions should be analysed. Empirical analysis of this issue should take into account the national policy formation characteristic of each mem-

ber state. This in turn would make the research an extremely complex if not infinitive affair. This is the reason why this case study treats the process of national positions presented in IGC as a kind of “black box” – there is no doubt that such impact did exist, however, its scope and effect in each member state are not the topic of this study.

The Convention mechanism was a kind of a pilot project which probably would be further developed, modified and used by the EU in the future. According to the European Constitution (which has not been ratified yet), its amendments will be done using the Convention procedure. However, according to the legal formulations in the text of the latter document (Article IV-443), there are not foreseen any additional powers for subnational level institutions where the fundamental principles (formation, composition, decision-making) remain the same as they are now. Thus, even if we are talking about the most open procedure for the subnational level interests’ representation in the EU history, we still have to find out whether and to what extent the subnational level disposes of real powers for influencing the policy initiation.

2. The effectiveness of subnational level interests’ representation: a case study of the European Constitution

In this article, *interests’ representation* is defined following the A. Warleight and J. Fairbrass (2002) suggestion: “it ranges across lobbying, the exchange of information, alliance building, formal and informal contacts, planned and unplanned relationships. In other words, all forms of interaction that are designed to advocate particular ideas, persuade the decision-takers to adopt different positions or perspectives, and ultimately to influence policy”¹¹. Meanwhile, the evaluation of the effectiveness of interests’ representation would cover a comparison of the initial plans (initiated suggestions, issues) and the achieved results, i.e. what was really included in the text of European Constitution¹². This is done by using the methodology of E. Vedung goal-oriented models, first of all the goal-attainment and side-effects models¹³.

2.1. Subnational level: interests and goals

of drafting the European Constitution

In 2001, during the preparation of the White Paper on European Governance, the European Commission initiated a consultation process regarding the reform of the European governance system¹⁴. This resulted in identifying three main goals which are pursued by subnational level institutions on the EU level and are the basis for their increased status in the whole EU governance system. These three goals are:

- possibility for subnational level institutions directly participate in EU policy initiation and decision-making through various mechanisms such as dialogue, consultation, tripartite agreements, networks, etc.;
- embedding the subsidiarity principle as one of the fundamental principles of the EU governance system (in this case, important is not only the principle itself, but also its content and ways of application);
- the establishment and strengthening of the Committee of the Regions as an independent and vocal actor in the EU institutional framework.

On one side, these goals speak about the possibilities of subnational level institutions to take an active role in the EU public policy formation; on a second side, they allow us to measure how successful subnational level institutions were achieving these goals and “wrestling” the place of the subnational level in the EU multi-level governance system.

2.2. Preparation of the European Constitution

The need for a common European Constitution and its drafting issues came on the political agenda almost immediately after the Nice IGC. The initial point for starting the discussions was the need to have a more democratic, transparent and efficient EU and, last but not least, to cope with the growth of “democratic deficit”¹⁵. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, in his speech in the Committee of the Regions noted: “There is a problem that is common to all the European institutions and bodies: the lack of communication and the loss of confidence that have affected the European Union for the last ten years”.

Such evaluation of the situation and instigation for the governance sys-

tem reforms by top officials (calling for a more democratic, transparent and efficient EU and the institutions that should be closer to common European citizens) raised the expectations of subnational level institutions that this time (differently from the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs!) their voice would be heard. The Committee of the Regions, assessing its previous failures during the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties preparation and adoption, started to encourage the subnational level institutions to be more active when “pressing” their national governments and initiated the cooperation with the constitutional (legislative) regions. The efforts of the Committee of the Regions to coordinate the activities of interregional organisations and associations representing the interests of subnational level institutions can be mentioned here as well¹⁶. The political context (favourable political situation, Convention procedure, more coordinated activities of the subnational level institutions, etc.) was also favourable for the strengthening of the role of subnational level in the EU governance system in the last ten years.

As mentioned before, the adoption of European Constitution was implemented in a two-stage process (see Scheme): first, the Convention where the draft of the European Constitution was prepared, second, the IGC where Member States further deliberated on the proposed draft, presenting their own positions and opinions on the raised issues. Therefore, all subnational level initiatives should be evaluated accordingly: firstly, going through the proposals for the European Convention and evaluating how many of them were taken into consideration; secondly, doing the same process for the IGC stage.

Subnational level proposals for the European Convention. The main source of the proposals from subnational level at the Convention stage was the Committee of the Regions. This institution presented several official opinions *in corpore*¹⁷, also 44 additional contributions were made by six observers from the Committee in the Regions in the Convention. However, the latter usually simply repeated the proposals (presented in Opinions and Resolutions) already formulated by the Committee of the Regions. Below (see Table) we present a summary list of all proposals suggested by the Committee of the Regions and its representatives. According to their content they can be grouped into three main groups – proposals regarding the status of the

Table. Proposals of the Committee of the Regions to the European Convention

<i>Status of the Committee of the Regions</i>	<i>Principle of the Subsidiarity</i>	<i>Status and powers of the subnational level in the EU governance system</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional status of the Committee of the Regions • Minimum obligation to explain to the CoR why other EU institutions have decided to reject its proposals¹⁸, and especially in the fields where consultations with this body are compulsory • The list of subjects on which consultation of the Committee of the Regions is mandatory should be extended • The Committee of the Regions should have the right to address written and oral questions to the European Commission • Members of the Committee of the Regions should be elected for the same period as members of European Parliament (5 years) • The Committee of the Regions should play a full part in any mechanism established to enforce the principle of subsidiarity • The Committee of the Regions should gain the power to bring actions before the Court of Justice in defence of its prerogatives and the subsidiarity principle • To strengthen the functions of the Committee of the Regions going beyond its current purely consultative functions. In some cases the Committee of the Regions should thus be granted the right to a “suspensive veto” • The Committee of the Regions should to be able to attend the dialogue between the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear definition of the principle of subsidiarity and its application limits on the supranational, national and sub-national levels • In case of the establishment of the new institution (body) responsible for the monitoring of the subsidiarity principle implementation, it must include representatives of regional and local authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European institutions, Member states should act respecting the national, regional and local cultural identities • The subnational level institutions should have a higher accessibility to the EU legislature and decision making • All (!) subnational level institutions should gain the power to bring actions before the European Court of Justice if the EU Member States violate their prerogatives and rights • Incorporate the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the Charter of Fundamental Rights as part of the <i>aquis communautaire</i>. • To institute suitable national mechanisms enabling local and regional authorities to engage in the preparation of “national” positions with a view to discuss in the EU Council of Ministers, IGC

Source: reference No. 17.

Committee of the Regions, regarding the principles of subsidiarity, and the status of subnational level in the EU governance system in general.

Comparing this list of proposals with the proposals initiated during the preparation of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, we see that the majority and major ones, like giving the institutional status to the Committee of the Regions and expanding its powers accordingly, clarification of the principle of subsidiarity, possibility to bring the actions before the European Court of Justice and the others, remained the same. Some of them are liberalized (for example, the right of the Committee of the Regions to bring actions before the Court of Justice), some of them are new, like proposals regarding the “suspensive veto”, a more powerful decision-making phase, the right to address written and oral questions to the European Commission, etc. In this case, not only the quantity, but also the quality (i.e. content) of the proposals by the Committee of the Regions is important.

Although, as was mentioned, the Committee of the Regions was the main source of the proposals for the European Convention, the other system players representing the interests of the subnational level were also active, allowing us to think that subnational level institutions were relatively successful in mobilizing their efforts and supporting the same proposals through the other channels of influence. Below, a few examples of the initiatives worth mentioning are presented.

Firstly, as could be expected, the regions with legislative powers were most active players during the Convention stage. The Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE – Brussels Declaration¹⁹, Madeira Declaration²⁰), the Regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG) (Florence Declaration²¹) proposed a number of various requirements. In most cases they duplicated the proposals of the Committee of the Regions; however, the main focus was on the achieving *a special status for legislative regions in the EU governance system*. At the same time, it is necessary to mention the initiative of the most influential interregional organisations such as Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR acting as a coordinator of this initiative), Assembly of European Regions (AER), Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), *Eurocities* – to formulate a common position

and present proposals as a platform of associations representing local and regional authorities²². In the latter case, the quantity of the proposals was not big and generally repeated what was suggested by the Committee of the Regions²³, so it does require further clarification. In this case, the fact of agreeing on a common position and support to the opinions of the Committee of the Regions seems to be more important, because it proves the high activity of the interregional organisations and associations during the Convention. The reason could be the previous failures in the Amsterdam and Nice and also – the openness of the Convention during the “hearing” stage, which provided an opportunity for various organisations to express the interests of the subnational level on the supranational level and create (or keep) the image of active and vocal institutions.

Now, let's turn to the national positions of the member states on the issues raised by the subnational level. They were not too distinctive from the general flow of the information. The reason could be very simple – the influence of the national governments should radically increase during high-level IGC when the final decisions should be made by the member states. Nevertheless, an interesting turnabout from the traditional position of the United Kingdom on these questions could be mentioned. The United Kingdom government, represented by Peter Hain, Secretary of State for Wales, presented a policy paper at the Convention plenary session asking for: a) Treaty reference acknowledging the role of regions in the EU; b) specific endorsement of the role of regions in relation to subsidiarity; c) mandatory consultation by the Commission; d) early warning systems on proposals; e) reform (strengthening) of the Committee of the Regions²⁴. This was quite an interesting shift in favour of the subnational level question, because usually the UK was not a country to show support of subnational level initiatives. Traditionally, this was done by the federal member states – Germany, Belgium and sometimes Austria.

Concluding about the subnational level interests' representation (see Scheme), it should be noted that during the Convention stage some of the access points were used by subnational level institutions very intensively. This is especially the case with the Committee of the Regions (formal and direct channel) and interregional organisations (direct and informal channel). Also, some empirical evidence (mainly from declarations of the

subnational level institutions) shows that subnational level institutions of several EU member states (like United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium) were quite active influencing their representatives in the Convention (formal and indirect). At the same time, no obvious evidence of a more intensive use of the regional representation offices in Brussels and / or European Parliament as the access points to the Convention was identified.

Results of the Convention. The results of subnational level interests' representation during the Convention stage can be summarised as follows:

- six proposals were taken into consideration (two of them relating to the principle of subsidiarity, three to the Committee of the Regions status (however, the minor ones, like the term of cadence extended to 5 years, gained right to bring actions before the European Court of Justices, some functions in monitoring the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity), and one – recognising the importance of regional and local cultural identities);
- two proposals were taken into consideration partly (some additional powers for subnational level institutions to the EU legislature and decision-making and incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights as part of the *aquis communautaire*, but not the European Charter of Local Self-Government);
- ten proposals were not taken into consideration.

The biggest failure in this stage was unsuccessful attempts to strengthen the status of the Committee of the Regions. The proposals to give the institutional status to this body, the right of the “suspensive veto”, the obligation to explain to the Committee of the Regions why its proposals were rejected, etc. were not taken into consideration. It seems that national governments of the member states were and are very likely to keep the *status quo* and not to allow the gin out of the bottle: the regional and local level are understood as important, but only as belonging to the member states layer of governance and not as an independent subject of the governance system. Changing this balance can have a huge impact on the EU governance architecture and lead to radical changes inside the EU and even member states, which is against the political line of the incremental EU governance system reforms kept for the last two decades.

Nevertheless, if to compare the current Treaty procedures with the ones

in the European Constitution, it is clear that the powers of the Committee of the Regions would increase in case of a successful ratification of the European Constitution. This body would gain the right to bring actions before the European Court of Justice (in case of violation of its prerogatives, subsidiarity principle), its term will be extended to five years. Also, clarification of the subsidiarity principle can be mentioned as very important for the subnational level where a clear distinction between all three main levels (supranational, national and subnational) was made. The analysis of the working documents of the European Convention Working Group on Subsidiarity shows that the achieved results took a very long process. In the first stages, discussions were limited to the relations between supranational and national levels, and only after the contributions from the representatives (observers) of the Committee of the Regions the subnational level issue returned to the agenda.

The redefinition of the subsidiarity principle was one of the main reasons foreseeing additional functions for subnational level institutions: while monitoring the implementation of the subsidiarity principle, each national Parliament or each chamber of a national Parliament should consult, *where appropriate*²⁵, regional parliaments with legislative powers²⁶, the Committee of the Regions can bring the actions before the European Court of Justice in case of subsidiarity principle violation (*ex-post* control). However, at the same time the legislative regions of the EU Member States have no special status which they were seeking so intensively, and they reluctantly recognise this fact in their Reggio Calabria Declaration (2003)²⁷.

The deliberation of European Constitution in IGC. The European Convention completed its work on 10 July 2003 by approving and publishing the final draft of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe. After the draft was presented for the IGC²⁸, it was further discussed and modified in 2003 and 2004. In parallel, Committee of the Regions²⁹ and its observers in the Convention³⁰, most of the interregional organisations (AER³¹, Eurocities³², CPMR, CEMR, Union of Baltic Cities³³, etc.) and associations representing subnational level institutions presented their own evaluation on the final document prepared by the European Convention.

All these positions fit one template: at the beginning, appreciation of a

stronger recognition of subnational level in EU governance system, a clearer definition of the subsidiarity principle expanding its application to the subnational level. On the other hand, regrets that not all proposals were taken into consideration, and encouragement to change this situation in the IGC or future drafts of the European Constitution. On the other side, the national governments of Member States and Candidate Countries did not pay any significant attention to the subnational level issue³⁴: Belgium congratulated the established control system of the subsidiarity principle application and implementation; Austria expressed its support of the subsidiarity, while Slovak Republic gratified for the strengthened subsidiarity principle. All the other countries in their national positions in general ignored the subnational level and subsidiarity issues. The reasons for such ignorance can be several: firstly, there were many more important topics on the agenda (e.g., EU institutional reform and balance of power), and the subnational level issues were treated as of secondary importance; secondly, the time pressure to agree on many different issues, and, last but not least, the national governments (especially of the unitary states) were reluctant to strengthen the subnational level, and concessions for regions were treated as sufficient.

It does not make sense to repeat all the proposals initiated by the subnational level institutions and organisations, associations representing their interests at the IGC. In practice, they were identical to the ones proposed during the European Convention. It is enough just to compare the content of the Draft of the European Constitution (including its annexes and protocols) proposed by European Convention and the final documents (European Constitution³⁵, its Protocols³⁶, Declarations and Final Act³⁷) adopted by the IGC on the 29th October 2004 in Rome. After a systemic analysis of all the norms related to subnational level proposals it should be concluded that none of the norms were amended (significantly)³⁸ or added during the IGC stage. Accordingly, all the efforts of subnational level institutions to influence the content of the European Constitution during the IGC stage should be treated as null effects³⁹, using / judged by E. Vedung's side-effects model. The basis for such an outcome can be the reasons mentioned above when speaking why the subnational level question was not important for Member States at the IGC negotiations.

Nevertheless, the whole process of subnational level interests' represen-

tation during the preparation of the European Constitution can be treated as relatively successful. Firstly, in the text of the Constitution we find more extensive references to the existence of local, regional and national levels, especially if to bear in mind a very limited attention to them in the existing EU Treaties. On the other hand, even if the Constitution will be ratified, it is far away from the “Europe of the Regions” vision that originated during the deliberation of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 90s. The regional and local levels are still understood as important, but only as belonging to the Member States layer of governance and not as an independent subject of the governance system. Such Member States’ (and European Commission’s to some degree too) position has been formulated in the middle of the last decade of the previous century and sustained through all attempts of reforming the EU governance system.

For example, even the subsidiarity principle which is treated as one of the biggest successes of the subnational level interests’ representation, firstly should be applied when deciding the relationships between supranational and national levels, and only after this each of the member states can decide regarding its application internally, on the subnational level. The formulation in the text of the Constitution (Article I–11) does not allow an unambiguous statement that the subnational level has a full and independent power of discretion. The decision-making powers remain in the hands of the national government and so the power at the subnational level directly depends on the constitutional order of a concrete member state. Even more, according the new *Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality*⁴⁰ it is obvious that subnational level institutions do not have an independent right to give their opinion on European laws and proposed initiatives – it has to be done through the national parliaments, according to the internal procedures of the national state.

One of the quite significant differences from the current experience is the scope of the subsidiarity principle which is established in the Constitution. According to the latter, it obliges (although indirectly) the member states to take the subnational level factor into consideration⁴¹. This can be considered as a kind of political guarantee for the subnational level actors and one step forward strengthening the subnational powers in the EU

multilevel governance system. The newly gained right of the Committee of Regions to bring the actions before the European Court of Justice when the subsidiarity principle is at stake is also an additional guarantee that the voice of subnational level institutions will not be ignored by the Member States.

To summarize, though some of the politically sensitive proposals initiated by the subnational level actors were not taken into consideration, the proposals that were accepted by the Member States and became part of the main legal document of the EU show more respect to the regional and local levels, even if it comes with a safeguard attached that the key interests and prerogatives of the Member States would not be infringed in the process.

Conclusions

Defining the place of the subnational level in the EU multilevel governance system, one has to see that the effectiveness of their interests' representation depends on the issue and a favourable synergy of various factors, and not only on the activities and strategies employed by the subnational level institutions. The relative success⁴² of subnational level interests' representation during the preparation of the European Constitution was determined by several key factors. Firstly, the process was marked by a very favourable political situation which virtually opened the doors of the EU institutions to the expression of interests. Both supranational and national actors, in the light of the aims formulated in the Laeken Declaration, felt the imperative to take the subnational level proposals into consideration and did allow passing some of them during IGC as already pre-agreed during the European Convention stage. Secondly, as compared with the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs, the representation of subnational level interests was much better mobilised – the 'regional' initiatives were supported and 'pushed' through various influence channels and access points. In this case, the subnational level associations and interregional organisations acted as a dynamic, rather unanimous and cohesive lobby. And thirdly, Committee of the Regions emerged as the clear leader in the interests' representation process during the drafting of the European Constitution at the Convention.

On the other hand, the case shows that talking about the “hollowing of the state”, as the multilevel governance approach would suggest, is too early. The EU member states dispose of a very concrete and strong “gate keeping” power – they are virtually influence-free at the IGC negotiations and do not feel any pressure from the subnational level institutions. At the same time it is obvious that member states with different territorial systems would have very different positions regarding the subnational level issues. Therefore, a success of the proposal depends on the intergovernmental negotiations which will most likely advocate for a solution that is close to the lowest common denominator.

Another conclusion that could be drawn has to do with insights of multilevel governance theory. It does provide a good theoretical basis for understanding and explaining the functioning of the EU governance system and the growing importance of the subnational level. On the other hand, looking at the representation of interests in drafting the Constitution, the powers of subnational level are a hostage to the intergovernmental bargaining and member states’ preferences which seem to be in favour of the views of liberal intergovernmentalists.

Finalising, we can conclude that in many respects the initial idea of the “Europe of Regions” in which the subnational level is the basis for the whole governance system has not yet been materialised. As the case of representation of regional interests during the Convention illustrates, the EU remains a governance system with the main powers concentrated in the hands of the member states. The vision whereby the role of subnational and supranational levels of governance would be enhanced at the expense of nation state remains more of Utopia than an incremental and steady process. On the other hand, subnational level actors enjoy considerably more of authority, autonomy and certain advisory capacities, especially if compared to the earlier historic precedents. Maybe one day this will make us to speak about a new powerful source of influence on the EU policy-making process.

NOTES

- ¹ Hueglin, T. O. Government, governance, governmentality: Understanding the EU as a Project of Universalism. *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union*, Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds. London: Routledge, 1999, 249–266.
- ² Scott D. ‘Constitutional’ regions and the European Union. 2002 // <http://les1.man.ac.uk/devolution/docs/Aberystwyth.pdf> [2006-09-04]
- ³ Public Policy Grantmaking Toolkit. Definitions // <http://www.ncg.org/toolkit/html/gettingstarted/definitions/definitions2.htm>
- ⁴ Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union // <http://www.euconvention.be/static/LaekenDeclaration.asp>
- ⁵ The fourth issue was the preparation of a constitution for European citizens.
- ⁶ The possibility that this mechanism will be used by the EU in the future is very high, especially during the preparation of important strategic documents, changing the EU Treaties (Constitution).
- ⁷ Members of this organisation are national associations of cities, municipalities and regions from 30 European countries, which cover more than 100 000 local and regional institutions.
- ⁸ Observers had the right to take part in the discussions, initiate various issues, but had no right to take part in the decision-making.
- ⁹ *The European Convention* // <http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN>
- ¹⁰ Boucke T., Baillieul E., Vos H. “Europeisation” of subnational politics: regional governments and the European Union. 2002. 19 p. // <http://web.uvic.ca/ecsac/toronto/papers/on/line/pdf/4D-tboucke-ebaillieul-hvos.pdf>
- ¹¹ Op. cit. from Charrad K. *Lobbying the European Union*. P. 4.
- ¹² In a public policy evaluation one can also give priority to the non-goal-oriented models. This time it is not the case – due to the specificity of the selected case it is much more useful to apply the goal-oriented models.
- ¹³ E. Vedung in his book “Public Policy and Program Evaluation” (1997) uses these models for the evaluation of the concrete public programs’ implementation. However, the main principles of both models can be used for the evaluation of the effectiveness of interests’ representation (just applying them with small modifications).
- ¹⁴ *European Governance: A White Paper*. Commission of the European Communities, 2001. 35 p.
- ¹⁵ Lane J. E. *Democracy in the European Union: What is the Democratic Deficit?* // <http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/wp/wp20.pdf> [2006-09-04]
- ¹⁶ *Cooperation with European associations representing local and regional authorities*. Memo For Cor Bureau Members. 14 May 2002, Brussels // <http://www.cor.europa.eu/document/en/asso106.pdf>
- ¹⁷ *Opinion of the Committee of the Regions* of 21 November 2002 “More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union”; *Opinion of the Committee of the Regions* of 10 October 2002 on “Towards a constitution for citizens”; *Resolution of the Committee of the Regions* “Recommendations of the European Convention”, etc.
- ¹⁸ At the moment, such commitment exists only for the European Commission and is based not on the norms in the fundamental EU Treaties, but on the co-operation agreement between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions, signed in 2001.

- ¹⁹ *Declaration of Brussels*. Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE). 29 October 2002, Brussels // <http://www.calre.eu/documents/bxl/DECLARATION%20OF%20BRUSSELS.htm>
- ²⁰ *Declaration of Madeira*. Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE). 30 October 2001, Brussels // <http://www.calre.eu/documents/Madeira/decl%20CALRE%20Madeira%20en.htm>
- ²¹ *Florence Declaration*. The Regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG). 16 November 2002, Florence // <http://www.regleg.org/sadd/cumbres/docs/3.zip>
- ²² *Proposed Amendments to the Articles of the European Constitution*. Platform of associations respecting local and regional authorities // http://www.a-e-r.org/PDF/CA_Main_Texts/GB-amendments-Const-02-03.pdf
- ²³ Regarding the subsidiarity principle, recognition of the identities of subnational level units, regional cooperation.
- ²⁴ Loughlin J. *The Regional Question, Subsidiarity and the Future of Europe* (2003) // http://como.vub.ac.be/bnaic2005/proceedings_bnaic.doc
- ²⁵ This norm was not what was expected by CALRE, REGLEG – the right (and power) to initiate consultations was in the hands of national parliaments.
- ²⁶ *Protokolai, pridedami prie Sutarties dėl Konstitucijos Europai, ir jos I ir II priedai*. Valstybių narių vyriausybės atstovų konferencija. 2004 m. spalio 13 d., Briuselis. CIG 87/04, ADD 1 REV 1.
- ²⁷ *Declaration of Reggio Calabria*. Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALRE). 28 October 2003, Reggio Calabria // <http://www.calre.eu/documents/Reggio%20Calabria/Reggio%20Decl/Dich%20Reggio%20Calabria%20definitiva%20EN.htm>
- ²⁸ It has to be noted that in this particular IGC participated only the representatives of Member States national governments and their ministers of foreign affairs. The representatives of European Convention, national parliaments were not invited, with a motivation to avoid broad and long discussions.
- ²⁹ *Resolution of the Committee of the Regions* “Recommendations of the European Convention”. 7 July 2003, Brussels; *Opinion of the Committee of the Regions* of 9 October 2003 on “CoR proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference”. 9 October 2003, Brussels.
- ³⁰ *Resolution on the Recommendations of the European Convention*. Contribution from the six observers to the Convention. 9 July 2003, Brussels // <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00827en03.pdf>
- ³¹ *Constitutional Treaty. The AER Amendment Proposals and the Constitutional Outcome*. October 2003, Azores // http://www.a-e-r.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MainIssues/Constitution/GB-Amendments-Const.doc
- ³² *EUROCITIES' Response to the Proposed Constitution of the European Union*. 13 June 2003, Leipzig // http://www.eurocities.org/include/lib/sql_document_card.php?id=2515
- ³³ *Resolution on EU Constitutional Treaty. Union of Baltic Cities*. 2003 // <http://www.ubc.net/today/resolution.html>

- ³⁴ *Valstybių pozicijos Salonikuose 2003 m. birželio 20 d.* Lietuvos Respublikos užsienio reikalų ministerijos parengta medžiaga. 2003.
- ³⁵ *Sutartis dėl Konstitucijos Europai.* Valstybių narių vyriausybių atstovų konferencija. 2004 m. spalio 29 d., Briuselis. CIG 87/2/04, REV 2. 349 p.
- ³⁶ *Protokolai, pridedami prie Sutarties dėl Konstitucijos Europai, ir jos I ir II priedai.* Valstybių narių vyriausybių atstovų konferencija. 2004 m. spalio 13 d., Briuselis. CIG 87/04, ADD 1 REV 1. 382 p.
- ³⁷ *Prie Tarpvyriausybinių konferencijos baigiamojo akto pridedamos deklaracijos ir Baigiamasis aktas.* Valstybių narių vyriausybių atstovų konferencija. 2004 m. spalio 25 d., Briuselis. CIG 87/04, ADD 2 REV 2. 121 p.
- ³⁸ Some of the norms were reformulated, but these amendments did not affect the essence of the content.
- ³⁹ "Null effects means that [activities, interests' representation]... earnestly and fully expected to have certain effects wholly fail to spawn any such effects. ...produce no impact on the target areas" (A. Vedung Public policy and program evaluation, p. 51).
- ⁴⁰ *Protokolai, pridedami prie Sutarties dėl Konstitucijos Europai, ir jos I ir II priedai.* Valstybių narių vyriausybių atstovų konferencija. 2004 m. spalio 13 d., Briuselis. CIG 87/04, ADD 1 REV 1.
- ⁴¹ Currently only Germany, Austria and Belgium are committed to apply the subsidiarity principle to their subnational level.
- ⁴² The interests' representation of the subnational level institutions can be treated only as relative success, because the critical break-through was not achieved. The system which is established in the Constitution is still very far away from the vision of regionalists, representatives of the multilevel governance.

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**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION PROCESS**

CONSTRUCTIVIST TRADITION IN LITHUANIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISCIPLINE?

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Abstract. The article tries to answer the question whether there is a constructivist tradition in Lithuanian International Relations discipline. Noting the short period during which quite a few researches in constructivist tradition were done, it reviews and evaluates current studies and identifies the main influences on the local analyses. There are three main broad areas where constructivist ideas are applied. The first one is analysis of the relationship between security and foreign policy and identity processes, the second studying of securitization processes in Lithuanian decision making and the third dealing with the efforts to apply constructivism as a policy tool. The article concludes that the constructivist tradition in Lithuania is still in its forming years trying to synthesize its own methodology and still has at least two challenges to overcome – to expand the empirical case basis beyond Lithuania or Baltic countries and to improve its analytical apparatus.

Lithuania has a very short tradition of academic research in international relations and political science. Its development started just several years after the restoration of Lithuanian independence and was stimulated by the establishment of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University in 1992. Now the discipline analyzing international and domestic political life is still in the teenage years, still lacking quite a few years till its twentieth birthday which would maybe mark a grown-up status of Lithuanian political science. So far it is struggling with its own insecurities, concentrating mainly on the problems of Lithuania and trying to prove and justify to the local policy makers the reason for its existence (and, frankly speaking, financing).

The discipline of International Relations is even in the trickier position. In general, it has not only the same title as the reality it analyzes¹, but also tends to be closely connected with the contemporary situation in the international politics and the policy makers of one's own country – the persons

whose decision it analyzes. In a small country these two communities of academia and policy worlds are inevitably very closely connected. Because of that, a lot of academic research in Lithuania tends to be very practical and policy-oriented and mostly atheoretical, usually justifying and motivating the importance of the membership in the EU or NATO or describing the development of bilateral relations².

However, in recent years two broad theoretical positions have clearly started to develop in Lithuanian international relations. These two are geopolitical realism and constructivism. Maybe it would be too bold to call them schools because they are still forming and bringing up their followers and still starting to present their empirical and theoretical studies. This situation in Lithuania is unusual compared to the other countries, e.g., in Western Europe. One can hardly find any liberal tradition or pluralistic approach and its variations.³ Apart from some review articles, there is almost no post-modern international relations research.⁴ All these traditions compose a broad picture of international relations, and this is still lacking in Lithuanian International Relations tradition.

This article does not have a goal to complain about the current situation. Besides, it is still too short a time to regret for a slow development of any approach. Instead, the goal is to evaluate the current development of the already existing trend – of the constructivism in Lithuanian International Relations theory. The second bigger trend – geopolitical – is not reviewed here. It is possible to get properly acquainted with it elsewhere.⁵

It is interesting to review and analyze the constructivist tradition in Lithuania for several reasons. First, constructivism is marginal as compared to the dominant realist tradition. This situation is disproportional first of all in terms of quantity: a small group of researchers, and they are mostly ignored by their colleagues working in another paradigm. This article is one of the ways to attract attention and encourage the inter- as well as intra-theoretical discussions. Second, constructivism is critical regarding the dominant position and so creates a potential discussion and dialogue in the otherwise monologous environment of International Relations in Lithuania. Third, it asserts in bringing new insights and ideas into the local discipline, important though overlooked by those holding realist assumptions. So, it is appropriate to evaluate what these ideas are and how

they can contribute to developing a vivid and livelier discipline of International Relations in Lithuania.

The coming of constructivism into this discipline in Lithuania was not quick and did not attract a lot of new researchers immediately. Nevertheless, now it has already formed its group of scholars who have started demonstrating their research results; students started writing bachelor and master theses analysing and applying the constructivist paradigm.⁶ The initial difficulties were connected with the absolutely new, unusual, sometimes called “philosophical” way of talking. The new language was introduced which not many wanted to learn, as well as new arguments which were not so easy to accept.

The problems were also partly connected with the overall confusion by constructivists themselves about the possible input of constructivism into the International Relations discipline.⁷ Besides, this theoretical framework questioned many events and decisions in Lithuanian foreign policy. Keeping in mind this and also the overall lack of the theoretical self-reflection in Lithuanian International Relations, constructivism potentially creates a challenge for the local discipline and might be one of the reasons why it was accepted quite sceptically and cautiously.

An opponent could ask a very probable question: if some researchers use another approach, does it necessarily mean that some new tradition, or even school, is developing a tradition that can substantially influence the features of the Lithuanian International Relations discipline? Of course, one cannot answer the question with an automatic “yes”.

In this article, I would like to answer whether it is possible to speak about the formation of the constructivist tradition in the Lithuanian International Relations discipline. The answer is far from clear, hence the question mark at the end of the title of this article. The article discusses the current situation of constructivism in the Lithuanian International Relations discipline. First, it presents the main ideas of constructivist paradigm in general and the ideas that are mostly used in Lithuania. Second, the main ideas and positions of Lithuanian researchers using this theory are presented, trying to distinguish the most important topics, influences and methodologies applied to the empirical research discussing the problems encountered. At the end of the article, the challenges and perspectives of constructivism in Lithuania are discussed.

1. Constructivism: main influences

It would not be too daring to say that the constructivism to Lithuania came, first of all, with an intention to give new ideas to the discussions on Lithuanian foreign policy. Second, it sought to provide a sounder theoretical framework of talking about international politics and critically reconsider some of the concepts used in Lithuanian political and academic discourse, especially the concepts of security and national interests. The constructivist “movement” in the Western International Relations discipline started in early 1990s, providing a new language and the tools to do exactly that.⁸

The general idea of constructivism – that the social world is not given or natural, it is a kind of artefact, i.e. it is constructed through the actions of the actors that live in that world – is understandable and easy to grasp.⁹ Without going into details about the constructivist debates, one can summarize the main propositions of constructivism into five theses:

1. The world of international relations is socially constructed.
2. The knowledge about the world is intersubjective and socially constructed.
3. Action and structure are mutually constitutive.
4. Both the ideal and material factors are important in explaining the world of international politics.
5. Identity politics must be analysed in order to understand the world politics.¹⁰

As Gražina Miniotaitė has laconically generalized, “constructivists analyse international society as an intersubjectively constructed structure of identities”¹¹. All these statements, however, do not help much to say something meaningful about international politics. They serve only as guidelines and also as the initial premises for the criticism of the dominant international relations paradigm in Lithuania as well as anywhere else – realism, sometimes jointly with liberalism, calling them rationalism.

Usually accepting these constructivist assumptions, two theoretical positions were mainly used for the analysis of international politics by Lithuanian researchers. The first one was the securitization theory developed by representatives of the Copenhagen school, the second one being Alexander Wendt’s theoretical framework of the state identity.

Instead of trying to identify and analyse the objective threats to the national security, the Copenhagen school proposed an elegant and attractive idea – security threats are not given, they do not exist automatically, they are constructed through the speech acts of the actors, actors tell what the security issues are. Therefore, the goal of the researcher is to analyse how it happens. The process through which the problems become security problems was called securitization.¹² The authors of the conception were trying to find the way out of the impasse of the security studies when more and more security threats were found and every problem started to look existential. The solution was to look at the process and the action of the policy actors: how they define the problem, who acts, what the consequences are.

This analytical framework was simple, consistent and allowed looking differently at security problems. In Lithuania, where traditional threats to security were the most relevant after the independence was gained, the idea of securitization gave a fresh look at its own policy and an opportunity to question, e.g., how the relations with Poland, historically the closest neighbour, became a matter of national importance in early 1990s and Poland started to be treated as a threat, or how it happened that economic decisions started to be treated as security issues (the case of privatisation of the Lithuanian oil refinery).¹³

Alexander Wendt's already famous saying that „anarchy is what states make of it” became almost the constructivist manifesto and actually introduced the whole constructivist talking into the mainstream of the International Relations discipline.¹⁴ He gave attention to the attempts to build a bridge between the positivist and the radical approaches. Constructivism seemed to be perfect for that – in Wendt's version it kept the positivist methodology, but spoke about the construction processes of knowledge and the social world. Constructivists emphasize the identity analysis, but there is not much of identity theory to propose. Wendt was the one who did it.¹⁵ Although his four-type state identity structure looks too much artificial and three collective identity types (friend, enemy, rival) are too static descriptions of the behaviour and identity processes of the states, they seem to be a very convenient starting point in presenting constructivist ideas to the new audience.¹⁶

It might seem simplifying to condense the influences to the two positions. It is not so straightforward, however. Till now, these two not easily compatible positions were mostly visible in the Lithuanian constructivist writings.¹⁷ An analysis of the Lithuanian constructivist writings (and of their critics) will demonstrate it in the next section.

Before proceeding further, there is one point left to explicate – how can we speak about the tradition of some theoretical paradigm in a certain place? The understanding of the school might help there. According to Huysmans, a label of School may warrant “a rich body of work with a sufficient degree of coherence and continuity” that relies on “minimal continuity of people involved”, and an explicit development of the “successive pieces of research through a critical engagement with the previous work of the group.”¹⁸ So, the most relevant here is the creative and consistent development of the original idea. The school label describes the local and unique development of the theory. However, before any movement in this direction, there must be a proper environment where the ideas could be formulated, discussed, applied and criticised. This is what I call here to have a theoretical tradition at a certain place.

2. Constructivism in Lithuania

Gražina Miniotaitė was the first to introduce a constructivist framework for the International Relations discipline in Lithuania. Her first attempt to apply the constructivist methodology was made in 1998, and she continues to write in this tradition now.¹⁹ She was also the one who introduced the concept of securitization and analysed a relationship between the identity politics and security and foreign policies of the Baltic countries and presented the initial research directions.

There are three broad topics on which constructivist researchers are concentrating: identity issues and Lithuanian foreign policy, security policy and its securitization process and implications of constructivism for policy making. All these problems are connected and emerge more or less in most studies. For the clarity purposes they are analysed separately.

In one of the first articles there was stated that “[f]oreign and security policy of Lithuania, like that of other Baltic states, is closely related to the development of her political identity”²⁰. This thesis was repeated through

many articles and was proved by various case studies. In one of her later articles Miniotaitė focuses on how the idea of Europe is integrated into the discourses on national identity in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and shows how their ideas of the nation-state depend on the East–West opposition:

“The Baltic States [...] have been creating narratives of belonging to the West, with the East as their threatening ‘other’. The West is being associated with prosperity, security and democracy, whereas the East is linked with poverty, unpredictability and insecurity. Positive identification with Europe is accompanied by dissociation from non-Europe, with the emphasis on Russia’s threats.”²¹

She attempts to prove that integration into the EU and NATO reconstructs the identities of these countries and shows how they are reflected in their domestic and foreign policies. The idea and presence of Europe is an inevitable factor here. All identity processes since Lithuania has gained independence in 1990 are connected to thoughts and discussions of Lithuanians about the country’s relation to Europe and to Russia as its permanent Other. This discourse of being between the West and the East dominated public thinking, and only after the two enlargements in 2004 the official argumentations shifted to a new discourse – Lithuania as a regional centre trying to dissociate from the long developed narrative of Lithuania as a wanna-to-be a true European (this goal is “accomplished”) and to create new one – Lithuania as a leader and pathfinder for the Eastern European countries to the democracy and better well-being.²²

Miniotaitė notices the artificiality of this process: there are no viable narratives to support this policy. Instead, a more logical and “natural” way is to associate with the Nordic dimension. So, the main line of the argument stays the same – it is impossible to change the foreign policy of the country without changing the identity discourse.²³

Thus, analysis of the identity politics and foreign policy mainly note the Lithuania being between East and West and trying to make its own identity construction from two categories. The first one is mostly used negatively – as something “we are not”, the second one – absolutely positive – is what “we” want to be or already are. Another aspect, which is always noted, is about tension between the discourses of the identity and sovereignty. This tension moves the identity politics as it forces to redefine,

review existing concepts. So, on one side, foreign policy creates challenges to the existing identity structures of Lithuania; on a second side, identity politics forces to be more responsible about the foreign policy strategies.

The securitization idea attracted even more attention. After the initial presentation of the idea and its application analysing the Lithuanian–Polish relations and conceptions of national security²⁴, it was applied to the analysis of the information security (Lithuanian–Russian relations)²⁵, public discussions regarding the President’s visit to Moscow to celebrate the anniversary of the Victory Day in 2005.²⁶

One of the indications that the alternative theoretical position is getting to be regarded more seriously is when the criticism begins. One could even say that when something is ignored or disregarded, it does not exist. Tomas Janeliūnas was the one who tried to evaluate critically the securitization theory.²⁷ He did it by analyzing the same case from two different positions – securitization and the position called by him “communicative security”. The case was the discussions in late 2004 and early 2005 whether Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus should go to Moscow to celebrate the anniversary of the victory in the Second World War against Germany.

Janeliūnas has concluded that the securitization theory is useful, because it helps to reveal how a problem becomes a security problem, what arguments are used, what actors are acting, but it does not help to find the best ways to solve the existing problems, so the best is to combine two methodologies – constructivist and positivist.²⁸ It was something what Wendt tried to propagate, although he didn’t use his ideas or made very elaborate methodological discussions. He also formulated the alternative “objectivist model for security analysis” trying to show the possibility to have a model which allows evaluating and calculating the threats.²⁹ His conclusion was also that constructivist analysis couldn’t contribute to the policy prescriptions. The question of the practical use of constructivism is the main counter-argument of realists. The need to justify the use of a new theory is frequently grounded on the possibility to extract a practical use from it.

Recently two Lithuanian academicians, Nortautas Statkus and Kęstutis Paulauskas, have noticed quite an obvious fact that there is a lot of discussion on both sides of the camps (constructivists and realists), but these two

do not talk to each other. Without just stating that and moving in one's own direction they decided to make an experiment and to discuss Lithuanian foreign policy in one article from two theoretical points of view – realism and constructivism – trying to show the value of both approaches.³⁰ Besides, they wanted to prove that both theories have a practical aspect and can be used as foreign policy tools, which is not a surprising conclusion for realism but not much expected from a constructivist researcher. So, it was a step in a new direction – to deliberate openly the possibility of using constructivism as a practical instrument for Lithuanian foreign policy. Keeping in mind all the initial assumptions of the constructivist paradigm, it is a very unusual though not unimaginable step.

One of the surprising conclusions of their article is the acknowledgement that “realist theory does not give answers to many practical problems.”³¹ Not putting it so radically – at least it cannot give as much as it supposedly promises. In their view, the realist position has become too static and does not react quickly enough to the changing realities of the external environment of Lithuania. Critically evaluating the current pro-US and harsh anti-Russian foreign policy of Lithuania, they try to find arguments for a change of the foreign policy strategy using the constructivist framework.

Constructivism as a tool presents itself in recommendations to foreign policy makers. These recommendations are quite radical if to keep in mind the current position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which concentrates almost exclusively on building and influencing the Eastern neighbourhood and promoting its interests to the main international players – the EU, US and, sometimes, Russia. On the other hand, they are not so unexpected if to review how the alternatives are discussed in a public discourse.

They recommend that, first of all, Lithuania needs to reassess its European policy. This means paying more attention to what is going on in the EU and trying to participate actively in the community's decision-making process. Their second recommendation sounds very ambitious – to integrate the EU into Lithuanian identity descriptions, i.e. Lithuania has finally to begin living “in the EU”, not “with the EU”. Statkus and Paulauskas urge the political elite to regard Europe not as an object. They advise to consider Europe and Lithuania as the subjects that are interacting and reaching goals inside the European system. Europe is not a stable structure

which has to be conquered or considered as a constant coffer from where you get money. Finally, they propose a more active participation of Lithuania in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and advocate the desecuritization of the relations with Russia. This all will allow finally becoming a “normal European country” without being a “bridge” or a “buffer zone” – the descriptions that imply a constant insecurity of the country.³²

The recommendations are trying to change the course of Lithuanian foreign policy and in essence are very interesting to discuss. For the purpose of this article, they are interesting from a different angle: how they are connected to and derived from the constructivist propositions. Presenting constructivist analysis of international relations, they use the same two inspirations – the securitization school and Wendt’s ideas about identity. They mix them interchangeably – without considering their different roots and assumptions as well as different conclusions. Theoretical inconsistency is quite obvious, but it is not the methodological and argumentative problems that are most interesting. The most surprising are the recommendation points that authors derive from the constructivist framework. They make an assumption that there is such a foreign policy strategy which may be called constructivist: “It is rather impossible to rapidly turn Lithuania’s foreign policy from a realist, geopolitical path towards a constructivist one”.³³ That “constructivism implies transnational integration, the end of the national policy, and the beginning of the supranational one.”³⁴

However, apart from the statement about the necessity to desecuritize foreign relations with Russia, it is impossible to regard the other proposed changes of Lithuanian foreign policy as constructivist. They might be called pro-European or liberal institutionalist. Constructivism is a position which does not give concrete policy recommendations. Its goal is to understand how the international political processes work, how foreign policies of the states function. Although the securitization school sometimes states that the goal is to desecuritize as many questions as possible, it does not recommend to do this automatically. First of all it concerns analysis: it is necessary to demonstrate how the foreign policy works, how it depends on the words used or on the identity discourses in the country; the second part – recommendations – becomes a totally different endeavour. You cannot automatically say that constructivism

deals with transnational integration. You have to show how contemporary processes tend to a certain direction.

So, why all the proposals were called constructivist? Constructivism became the means to justify the new foreign policy strategy. And the proposed strategy is quite a huge alternative to the current one, so, what but the theoretical alternative to the dominant theoretical position, realism, can validate it? This in itself is neither good nor bad; just methodologically incorrect. But it induces more reflexivity and creation of alternative scenarios. So, constructivism becomes a policy tool not only because it offers a different approach to policy, but also because being an alternative thinking itself it allows an easier presentation and justification of different ideas.

The explicit or implicit idea to justify constructivism by showing its practical use is constant in constructivist writings in Lithuania. The uncertainty rises from here also because mainly according to this criterion the theories are valued. This environment does not create proper conditions for appreciating theoretical thinking.

3. So what? Challenges and perspectives

Is it possible to make any conclusions about the state of the constructivist theoretical tradition of International Relations in Lithuania? The time span of six or seven years, of course, does not allow any final statements. Clearly, the quantitative development is already visible: younger researchers start to get into this framework of analysis and apply theoretical knowledge for the case studies and more bachelor and master theses are written in this tradition. It means that people are looking for some new insights and new ideas that can be developed and applied more creatively. And the domination of one research tradition is not even useful for the hegemony itself, at least for one simple reason – it starts to get boring and rigid.

However, it is very difficult to speak about the tradition yet. And this is not only the problem of the small academic community. The question is about the existence, or more exactly non-existence, of internal discussions and the absence of almost any visible Lithuanian constructivism at the international level. Almost all related works are published inside the country. This way not only the reactions and criticism are confined, but also the authority of some of the statements loses its worth. We may like or not the

fact, but academic community has its own hierarchical system which researchers have to take into account. This system makes its own requirements, and if you are not seen you do not exist.

Clearly, there are a few challenges for the academics who are doing constructivist research in Lithuania. First, the main and almost only topic where constructivist insights are applied is exclusively foreign and security policy of one country – Lithuania. On the one hand, there should be no surprises here. For a very long time since its independence all Lithuanian domestic and foreign policy has been concentrated along two goals – the EU and NATO memberships. And who but not Lithuanian academics themselves should have known the situation better? But the expertise in one field is not enough.

The relevance of the topic and the easily accessible and comprehensible empirical material allowed making great use of the new theoretical insights. Specializing in one topic can help to get some expert niche in the epistemic community; the development, however, cannot stop there. So, the challenge is to introduce new research objects and questions into the analysis trying to demonstrate not only the local knowledge of a local topic. This only can help to integrate into the wider, first of all, European, academic community. It is not too daring to say that the Lithuanian International Relations research community has this goal.

The second challenge consists in a still small amount of tools used in constructivist analysis. The weakest link in all constructivist enterprise is the understanding of methodology and the methods used. There is no consistency in what methodology is exercised and why a certain methodological approach is used. From there stems the tendency to mix many constructivist theoretical writings into one quintessence using arguments from one or another theoretician, without considering different roots and assumptions of their statements. This problem, of course, is connected with the general lack of methodological training in the Lithuanian political science discipline. Nevertheless, this challenge must be overcome if we want to talk about building any tradition of International Relations theory in Lithuania.

Although being sceptical and cautious about the current status of constructivism in Lithuania and finding no arguments enough to put a full stop instead of the question mark at the end of the title of this article, we

cannot deny quite a fast development from a zero point during the last seven years. The community of scholars has hardly been formed, and it is the basis for the tradition to develop. We can hope that in Lithuania not only the tradition of constructivism, but also the constructivist school might emerge one day.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹ Traditionally, to distinguish between the discipline and the object it analyzes, the discipline is written International Relations and the reality the discipline tries to understand and analyze is written in small letters – international relations. This tradition is used in this article.
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- ³ A more liberal view is represented in European studies and not surprisingly so – the nature of the EU does not allow to use strict realist approaches.
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ENERGY SECURITY OF LITHUANIA: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

Tomas Janeliūnas, Arūnas Molis

Abstract. The article states that energy dependence on Russia is one of the most problematic threats for the economical security of Lithuania. This statement is supported by a comprehensive analysis of the Lithuanian energy sector: the authors examine trends in Lithuanian energy consumption, possible changes in energy structure and energy infrastructure, which determine a few possibilities to get energy resources from other suppliers but Russia. The authors assert that construction of the North European Gas Pipeline will diminish Lithuanian energy security even more and Lithuania may remain only a final consumer of energy resources. However, in the article an assumption is made that positive structural changes in Lithuania's energy security could take place if the EU would formulate its Common Energy Policy.

Energy dependence on Russia for a long time has been one of the most actual topics in Lithuanian policy. This problem is constantly named as a matter of serious economic insecurity, influencing Lithuanian foreign policy goals and domestic political processes. The energy security became even urgent in 2005 when it turned out that Russia and Germany have agreed on the construction of a gas pipeline which will cross the Baltic Sea bypassing the Baltic countries and Poland (North European Gas Pipeline, NEGP). The agreement raised fears about the purposive aim of Russia to dismiss Lithuania (as well as other Baltic states and Poland) from energy transition routes. Such perspectives may diminish Lithuanian energy security in the way that Lithuania remains only a consumer of energy resources, with no possibilities to influence energy suppliers.

Until the 70s the USA, Western European and Asian countries did not suffer serious disruptions of energy resources. However, the oil embargo in 1973 impelled to realize that dependency on foreign energy suppliers (mainly on the Persian Gulf region countries) may be disastrous for a national

economy as well as national security in a wider sense. Therefore, the impact of energy crises raised a wave of academic researches in economic and energy security. The very concept of “energy security” was linked with protection of national interests. National energy security was mostly defined as adequate energy supply for a nation and its economy¹.

Daniel Yergin, President of CERA (Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Inc), one of the most famous think-thanks in energy politics, gives the following definition of energy security: “The aim of energy security is to ensure adequate, reliable energy supplies at reasonable prices and so as not to jeopardize the main national values and objectives”².

In a similar way, the International Energy Agency defines energy security as access to a sufficient amount of reliable energy at an acceptable price³. The World Energy Council in 1992 defined a national energy security as “a state of protection of individual citizens, society, economy and nation from threats to reliable fuel and energy supply.”⁴

The particular definitions of energy security may depend on specific interests of national states. There could be specified several groups of countries to which different interpretations of energy security (in respect of demand and access to energy resources) should apply:

1. Industrialized states, net importers of energy (e.g., USA, Germany, Japan)
2. Largest sovereign hydrocarbon exporters (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Norway)
3. Largest emerging markets with a fast-growing energy demand (e.g., China, India, Mexico).
4. Net importers of energy with medium incomes (GDP per capita).
5. Net importers of energy with low incomes (GDP per capita).

Characteristics of the Lithuanian economy and energy sector suggest that Lithuania should be ranked among the countries of the first or fourth group: GDP per capita is under \$10,000 (according to the methodology of World Bank, in 2004 GDP per capita in Lithuania was \$5,284)⁵, energy consumption in 2001 was 2300 kg of fuel equivalent per capita annually, i.e. below 3000 kg.⁶ However, Lithuania has a highly developed domestic energy infrastructure (i.e. almost all population is supplied with electricity) and measures are taken to decrease energy intensity – i.e. the aims of energy security are similar to those of highly developed countries.

Table 1. Approaches to energy security in different groups of countries

	<i>Defining characteristics</i>	<i>Energy security priorities</i>
Industrialized nations, net importers of energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Per capita GDP is above \$10,065 (1) ▪ High level of per capita energy consumption: above 3,000 kg of fuel equivalent annually (2) ▪ Trend to reduce energy consumption (3) ▪ The gap between domestic energy supply and demand is increasing: the demand growth rate is lower than the world's estimated annual average (1.7%) till 2030 ▪ Developed energy infrastructure (i.e. almost all population is supplied with electricity) (4) ▪ Fluctuations of energy prices have a relatively weak influence on the economy and households (e.g., a \$10 price hike of a ton of oil will reduce GDP by just 0.5%) (5) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensuring reliable energy supply ▪ Diversification of energy supply sources ▪ Ensuring security of energy infrastructure ▪ Introduction of new technologies to reduce dependence on energy imports
Largest sovereign hydrocarbon exporters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Per capita GDP varies from \$260 in Chad to \$52,000 in Norway ▪ A huge difference in per capita energy consumption, from 262 kg of fuel equivalent annually in Congo to 6,888 kg in Qatar ▪ Different trends of energy consumption ▪ Sufficient reserves of energy resources (usually hydrocarbons) for the foreseeable future ▪ Usually, energy export infrastructure requires development ▪ The economy is susceptible to cycles of wanton growth and decline depending on global energy prices (e.g., a \$10 price hike on a ton of oil pushed Angola's GDP up by 30%) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Securing positions on strategic markets with reasonable prices ▪ Diversification of energy export market; ▪ Ensuring capital and investments in infrastructure and field development ▪ For less developed nations in the group: meeting the population's basic energy needs, creating active demand for the energy sector's services
Largest emerging markets with a fast-growing energy demand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Different per capita GDP, from \$620 in India to \$6,770 in Mexico ▪ A difference in per capita energy consumption from 514 kg of fuel equivalent annually in India to 2,425 kg in South Africa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ability to meet the growing demand for imported energy ▪ Diversification of energy supply sources ▪ Ensuring capital and

Table 1 continued

	<i>Defining characteristics</i>	<i>Energy security priorities</i>
Largest emerging markets with a fast-growing energy demand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Different trends of energy consumption ▪ The demand growth rate is higher than the world's estimated annual average (1.7%) till 2030 (e.g., in 2003 demand in China grew by 14%) ▪ A sweeping growth of domestic energy infrastructure, although it is still underdeveloped (e.g., 57% of the population in India and 34% in South Africa do not have electricity) ▪ Fluctuations of energy prices have a fairly significant influence on the economy and households (e.g., a \$10 price hike of a ton of oil will reduce GDP by more than 0.5% depending on the country's size and energy consumption) 	<p>investments in infrastructure and field development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Introduction of new technologies to reduce dependence on energy imports ▪ Meeting the population's basic energy needs, creating active demand for the energy sector's services
Net importers of energy with medium incomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Different per capita GDP, from \$826 to \$10,065 ▪ In most countries, per capita energy consumption is close to the world's average of 1,631 kg of fuel equivalent annually ▪ Different trends of energy consumption ▪ The demand growth rate is higher than the world's estimated annual average (1.7%) till 2030 ▪ Underdeveloped energy infrastructure (over 10% of the population do not have electricity) ▪ Fluctuations of energy prices have a fairly significant influence on the economy and households (e.g., a \$10 price hike of a ton of oil will reduce GDP by more than 0.5% depending on the country's size and energy consumption) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ability to meet the growing demand for imported energy ▪ Ensuring capital and investments in infrastructure and field development ▪ Meeting the population's basic energy needs, creating active demand for the energy sector's services
Net importers of energy with low incomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Per capita GDP is below \$826 ▪ Per capita energy consumption is about or below 500 kg of fuel equivalent annually 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ability to meet the growing demand for imported energy

Table 1 continued

	<i>Defining characteristics</i>	<i>Energy security priorities</i>
Net importers of energy with low incomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy consumption tends to grow ▪ The demand growth rate is higher than the world's estimated annual average (1.7%) till 2030 ▪ Poorly developed energy infrastructure (e.g., about 30% of the population do not have electricity) ▪ Fluctuations of energy prices have a fairly significant influence on the economy and households (e.g., a \$10 price hike on a ton of oil will reduce GDP by more than 0.75% on the average) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ensuring capital and investments in infrastructure and field development ▪ Meeting the population's basic energy needs, creating active demand for the energy sector's services

Source: the World Bank (cited from Tatyana A. Mitrova, *Global Energy Security*. Moscow, 2006).

Note: (1) In 2004, using the Atlas method, the World Bank; (2) In 2001, according to the World Resources Institute; (3) The World Energy Outlook 2004, the International Energy Agency; (4) In 2000, according to the World Resources Institute; (5) estimated by the World Bank.

The priorities of Lithuanian energy security in general do not differ from those of Western European countries. There may be emphasized three main tasks for ensuring energy security of Lithuania:


1. Ensuring reliable energy supply and functionality of energy infrastructure.
2. Diversification of energy supply sources.
3. Reduction of dependence on energy resource import (by reducing energy intensity and switching to alternative or renewable energy resources).

1. The problem of energy dependence of Lithuania

1.1. Energy consumption in Lithuania

The energy produced at the Ignalina nuclear power plant covers the main share of Lithuanian energy needs. On the other hand, fuel for this plant is imported exclusively from Russia. All natural gas and almost all amounts of consumed oil are also imported from Russia. The risk for Lithuania's

Figure 1. Consumption of primary energy sources in Lithuania, 2004



Source: Lithuanian Energy Institute.

Table 2. Oil and natural gas consumption in Lithuania

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 (forecast)	2007 (forecast)
Consumed gas (billion m ³)	2.68	2.71	2.94	2.93	3.05	3.4	3.7
Consumed oil (mln.t)	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.49	2.56	n.d.	n.d.

economy is intensified by the fact that Lithuania has no considerable internal or renewable energy resources: domestic and renewable sources meet only 10 percent of its energy demands (see Figure 1). In this context, Russian companies (or government) can act in a way which could disturb the supply of energy resources. This is a real threat for Lithuania's economic stability.

1.2. Dependence in the oil sector

Dependence on Russia's oil and gas has been a sensitive question since the restoration of Lithuanian independence. Immediately after 1990 Lithuania underwent an energy blockade from Russia. Lithuania has learned this lesson and today in the oil sector participates not only as a final consumer but

Figure 2. Oil supply and refining in Lithuania



Source: http://www.lei.lt/_img/_up/File/atvir/leidiniai/energ.pdf

Table 3. Balance of oil extraction, refining and production in Lithuania

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Extracted (mln.t)	0.32	0.48	0.44	0.39	0.31	0.22
Refined (mln.t)	4.96	6.85	6.61	7.17	8.69	9.32
Produced (mln.t)	4.5	6.24	6.04	6.6	8.05	8.59

also as a mediator in the refining and transportation processes (Table 3): Russian oil from Polotsk to Būtingė is transported by two oil pipelines to Biržai, from where one pipeline turns to the Mažeikiai refinery and then goes to the Būtingė oil terminal (see Figure 2). Oil and its products from Mažeikiai and Russian oil refineries by railway go to the Klaipėda oil terminal which can serve also as a strategic point of oil import to Lithuania.

The strategic decision to build the Būtingė oil terminal was taken after the oil blockade in 1990⁷. It was decided to import oil by alternative ways, and the Būtingė terminal was considered to be the main instrument for preventing energy blockade. The decision to build the terminal cost Lithuania 350 million USD, but it has paid off already. The terminal became an important element of the oil export system (Table 3). If a blockade repeats, Lithuania would have a physical capability to import oil by tankers. On the

Table 4. Oil loading in Būtingė terminal, 2001–2005

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Oil loaded (mln.t)	5.1	6.1	10.7	7.2	6.1

Table 5. Oil refining and production at the “Mažeikių nafta” oil refinery

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Refinery intake (mln.t)	6.8	6.6	7.2	8.7	9.3
Oil products produced (mln.t)	6.2	6	6.6	8	8.6

Table 6. Oil loading at Klaipėda oil terminal

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Oil products loaded (mln.t)	5.2	6.7	6.6	6.5	5.8

other hand, though after the breakdown of the Soviet Union the oil supply was not always stable, Lithuania has not experienced oil embargo any more.

As already mentioned, besides the Būtingė oil terminal, the other two crucial objects of the Lithuanian oil sector are the Mažeikiai oil refinery and the Klaipėda oil terminal. The designed capacity of the only refinery in the Baltic states is 15 million tons of crude oil per year. The primary feedstock processed by the Mažeikiai oil refinery is Russian crude oil shipped by the oil pipeline system “Druzhba”. These supplies are supplemented by crude oil and other feedstock delivered by railway.

“Klaipėdos nafta”, which owns the Klaipėda oil terminal, is located at the Klaipėda State Seaport at the harbour gate. It has light and heavy oil product storage tank farms and railway trestles. Oil products from the oil refineries of Mažeikiai, Moscow, Mozyr, Novopolotsk, Riazan, Nizhniy Novgorod, and others as well as Russian and Kazakhstan crude oil are exported via this terminal. Oil is delivered to the terminal by railway, unloaded into storage facilities and after accumulation of the required cargo batch is loaded into tankers.


The development of the oil sector in Lithuania has proved one simple principle: mediation in the energy sector (participation in transit and refining) strengthens security and economically is more useful than being

just a consumer. The dependence of Lithuania on Russia's oil has not decreased (because the import from other countries is too expensive). However, mediation has helped to seize and use the advantages that were available. The Būtingė oil terminal became an important source of revenue for Lithuania's state budget and economy and at the same time enhanced the attraction of the Lithuania's oil system. The involvement in Russia's oil transit made the Lithuanian oil sector attractive for foreign investors.

1.3. Dependence in the gas sector

Lithuania's politicians, economists and national security experts underline that gas is the most vulnerable field in the energy sector. The main reason is that Lithuania does not participate considerably in the process of gas transit and acts only as a consumer of the "Gazprom" gas (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Existing and proposed gas pipelines to and through Lithuania



Source: www.inogate.org

Lithuania's dependence on "Gazprom" policy is determined by the following factors:

- *"Gazprom" is the only gas supplier to Lithuania.* As a consequence, Lithuania does not have any chances to countervail "Gazprom's" demand to pay 125 USD for 1000 cubic meters of gas as from 2006⁸.
- *Natural gas is transported to Lithuania via the only Minsk–Vilnius–Kaliningrad, pipeline which is controlled by "Gazprom".* The system of Lithuania's gas pipelines is not integrated into the European network or other alternative extraction zones. Therefore, there is no possibility to supply Lithuania with gas from alternative sources.
- *"Gazprom" is one of the biggest stockholders of the main Lithuanian gas operator "Lietuvos dujos"*⁹. This means that Lithuania does not have any chances to implement any policy that would contradict the interests of "Gazprom" (e.g., to raise transit tariffs or block gas supply to Kaliningrad).
- *There are no gas storage facilities in Lithuania.* Lithuania does not have capacities to store natural gas and use the reserves in case of necessity. On the other hand, if such a gas storage facility would be built, the main shareholders would be "Gazprom" and its partner "E.ON Ruhrgas International".
- *Lithuania does not have chances to deliver, recast or store large quantities of liquid natural gas (LNG).* So, Lithuania cannot cover any perturbation of gas supply.

2. Lithuanian view on the NEGP deal between Germany and Russia

Having in mind the facts mentioned above, there is no surprise that Lithuania's reaction to the deal between Germany and Russia to build a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea was turbulent. For Lithuania, the most wanted was the "Amber" project, which would go through the Lithuanian territory (see Figure 8). However, the project was nearly blocked by V. Putin's and G. Schroeder's agreement. The NEGP will have links to deliver gas to Kaliningrad, Finland, Sweden. There is a possibility that through this pipeline gas will reach the United Kingdom and other Western European countries (see Figure 3). Without feeling any direct danger

from Russia, these countries will have an extra opportunity to get the needed quantity of gas without any mediators. However, for the bypassed countries the NEGP means that they will lose income from gas transit and a strong argument in the negotiations for gas supply. Of course, there is a possibility for Lithuania to join the project. However, this could diminish only Lithuania's energy dependence on good relations with Russia and Belarus, but not on Russia's energy policy toward the Baltic States and Poland.

Eliminating the opportunity for CEE states to become transit countries, the NEGP may also have more negative consequences in the future. First of all, the gas pipeline has created a clash between the CEE and Western European countries. Energy minister of the United Kingdom M. Wicks has claimed that the United Kingdom is interested in the supply of Russian gas through the NEGP. Berlin started to celebrate "wider opportunities for actions in the energy market and an alternative for Arab oil and gas". At the same time heads of Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and other states answered them with harsh criticism. Lithuanian Economy minister K. Daukšys has declared that NEGP will diminish Lithuania's energy security. Both speaker of Parliament A. Paulauskas and member of the European Parliament V. Landsbergis expressed their hope that the project of an alternative pipeline by land would be recovered. According to V. Landsbergis, the NEGP blocks even the possibility to import gas from Nordic countries, because by manipulating prices in the market it is very easy to influence the politics of neighbouring countries. Latvian President V. Vyke-Freiberga also called the NEGP a political but economically useless project.

The other negative aspects of NEGP building are related to ecological issues. Lithuanian Greens were the first to raise concerns that gas pipeline might turn into an ecological disaster. This could happen in the case if the pipeline would affect chemical weapons and explosives left from World War II in the Baltic Sea. These fears are grounded for several reasons. Firstly, the Baltic Sea is shoal, the average depth being about 71 m. The biologically active stratum of the sea is about 100–150 m deep. Therefore, in case of crash there is a huge danger for the whole ecosystem of the Baltic Sea. Secondly, giant amounts of chemical weapons were sunk in the Baltic Sea. Entire mine-fields are lying on the ground of the sea¹⁰. The problem is

even bigger if we consider the fact that the Baltic is an inland sea and the full fluctuation may last 30 years. "Gazprom" claims that the pipeline will bypass the dangerous zones and chemical weapons will not be touched. However, the exact route of the pipeline is not known and the evaluation of environmental impacts is not completed yet. It is obvious that the pipeline must cross the Gulf of Finland where the concentration of mines is highest. So, there is a big danger that the gas pipeline may touch old tanks of chemical weapons¹¹. If poisons spread all around the sea, the deadly effect on the ecosystem would be inevitable. The ecological catastrophe would influence not only Germany and Russia, but also Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Poland. So it is understandable that Lithuania tries to clarify the possible threats and harmonize the treaties that would settle the compensation of the possible harm.

Ecological threats constitute a real risk for the countries that do not support construction of the NEGP. However, the project is a political problem. So, there is no much hope to alter the Russian–German plans by environmental arguments. After "Gazprom" reduced the supply of gas to Ukraine, some CEE countries started to act more actively trying to find alternative routes and sources. Poland began to think about an LNG terminal in the Baltic Sea, gas supply from Norway and Iran. Lithuanian government renewed discussions of the possibilities to build a gas terminal in Lithuania or join the project of a common terminal construction in Latvia. Talks about a more effective usage of the Kaliningrad factor, consolidation of regional cooperation in the energy field and the creation of the common EU energy policy were resumed.

3. Lithuania's response: strengthening cooperation and search for alternatives

3.1. Perspectives of exploiting the Kaliningrad factor

The frequent argument is that Lithuania's opposition to the NEGP is caused by the fact that the pipeline will be a spur to Kaliningrad. It is thought that while now a days Kaliningrad receives gas through Lithuania, Russia will not try to use a gas embargo for Lithuania. After building the NEGP, Lithuania would not have this advantage. Another widespread opinion is

Table 7. Natural gas transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006 (forecast)
Transported gas (billion m ³)	0.52	0.56	0.57	0.64	0.72	1

that Lithuania does not want to lose large incomes from Russian gas transit to Kaliningrad.

Of course, some kind of truth does exist in these considerations. The needs of Kaliningrad for gas are growing steadily (see Table 7). So, a pipeline to Kaliningrad is a source of income and also provides psychological security to Vilnius. After losing the status of a transit state Lithuania's sensibility to Russian politics may increase.


On the other hand, the Kaliningrad factor is more like a psychological self-trick but not a real instrument for Lithuania. First of all, the cost of transit is 2.5 USD/1000 m³/100 km¹². So, it does not bring huge income to the state budget. Furthermore, after "Gazprom" has become an instrument of Russian foreign policy, this company may not only reject the economic motives, but also sacrifice Russian companies and citizens. That "Gazprom" can leave Kaliningrad without any gas was proven in February 2004 when "Gazprom" punished "Beltransgas" and simultaneously suspended gas supply to Lithuania and Kaliningrad. Finally, the main Lithuanian gas operator "Lietuvos dujos" is owned by "Gazprom" and "E.ON Ruhrgas International AG". So it is hard to imagine its activities directed against the interests of "Gazprom". Furthermore, turning off gas for Kaliningrad in Lithuania technically would be hardly possible. So, gas transit to Kaliningrad has never been a reliable instrument of Lithuanian energy security.

3.2. Deepening the regional cooperation

After the three Baltic states and Poland have realized that they cannot reach energy security acting alone, countermeasures were started to be planned together. First of all, regional cooperation among the Baltic and Nordic countries was strengthened. Parliaments, governments and energy companies started to coordinate their actions and discuss important questions of

energy security. A result of such cooperation should be adoption of Energy Strategy of the Baltic states, preparation for a feasibility study of the common nuclear power plant, and start of the integration of the Baltic Sea electricity systems. The main projects in this sphere are the electricity bridge between Lithuania and Poland (the so-called “Powerbridge” project), the Great Baltic Ring (which includes Scandinavian countries, Germany, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus and Russia) and the Small Baltic Ring (which includes the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden) (see Figure 4)¹³.

Figure 4. The Baltic electricity system and possible connections



Source: presentation of Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania A. Ignotas “Guidelines for Updated National Energy Strategy”. <<http://www.urm.lt/index.php?-985502806>>

Regional bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of oil is another great possibility for Lithuania. The possible cooperation between Baltic, Nordic, CEE and Caspian Sea basin states may be exercised into two directions. Firstly, this may be a cooperation aimed at securing the supply of a necessary amount of oil for a reasonable price. In this context, Lithuanian interests are best answered by developing cooperation with Poland (concerning the Odessa–Brody pipeline prolongation to Gdansk and a possible supply to Lithuania through the Gdansk terminal), Ukraine (concerning oil transportation through the Odessa–Brody–Plotsk–Gdansk pipeline in the projected direction), South Caucasus states (Azerbaijan and Georgia concerning oil supply and transportation through Odessa–Brody–Plotsk–Gdansk pipeline) and Kazakhstan (concerning oil supply to “Mažeikių nafta”). Nordic states (Norway first of all) may be important for Lithuania as regards a possible oil supply from the North Sea. Another direction is cooperation among the CEE companies, seeking to create an alliance of oil refining and transporting companies. It can be a joint project of the Polish “PKN Orlen”, Hungarian MOL and Austrian OMV companies. The new joint company would have a strong position in purchasing the shares of other oil companies in the CEE as well as negotiating with Russia concerning oil supply and implementing energy infrastructure projects. By joining this concern with “Mažeikių nafta” and both the Būtingė and Klaipėda terminals, Lithuania can expect to become part of a corporation protected from the direct influence of Russia.

Attempting to feel more secure in the gas sector, as it stands for today, Lithuania cooperates only with Latvia. Yet this cooperation is more technical than strategic – in case of disturbance of gas supply from Russia Lithuania can compensate the lack of gas by buying gas from Latvia¹⁴. However, the bilateral cooperation is planned to be widened considerably. The main examined projects are a common Baltic states’ gas storage and an LNG import terminal common with the Polish LNG import terminal, and interconnection of Lithuanian and Polish gas pipelines, which would allow to import gas from Poland¹⁵. Many of these projects are still discussed only by experts, however, projects to extend the Incukalns (Latvia) underground gas storage facility or to build a storage in Dobeles (Latvia) were discussed by high-ranking officials. From these storages all Baltic states could get gas

in case of a temporal cut of supply. No less important for Lithuania is developing a regional cooperation by seeking to influence the routes of Russian gas export to Western Europe. The “Amber” project would be the best example in this case.


3.3. Creation of the EU common energy policy

Without having much freedom for manoeuvring in bilateral relations with Russia, most of the hopes in Lithuania and Central Europe are related to the EU Common Energy Policy. Coordinated policy may be much more effective than 25 separate policies – heads of European states recognized in their summits in October and December 2005. Three main aspects of EU Common Energy Policy may include: 1) control of energy demand; 2) creation of the common compatible energy market inside the EU; 3) diversification of energy sources and routes. All these aspects and their implications for Lithuania may be overviewed in more detail.

If Lithuania employs all the possibilities to use energy more efficiently, it can save huge amounts of energy. Energy intensity, which shows the (un)effectiveness of energy use, in Lithuania is six times higher than the average of the EU (see Figure 5). It has been calculated that without considerable efforts Lithuania could save 20–50 percent of currently consumed energy.

On the other hand, Lithuania faces many difficulties implementing the EU directives, asks for transition periods and has even opposed the pro-

Figure 5. EU energy intensity in 2003 (toe/GDP mln. euro in 1995 prices)



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/doc/2005_06_green_paper_book_lt.pdf

posal to make saving requirements compulsory. That is why the EU energy policy in this context may not exert a considerable influence on Lithuania's energy intensity if the national tools are not fixed and used properly.

The idea of creating the common EU market in the energy sector is not new, but the results in this context are miserable. The main goal of the single EU energy market is to increase the safety and efficiency of energy supply and to decrease the costs of energy resources. This would be possible by cutting down the expenses of energy transportation enabling consumers to choose the supplier, and storing common energy reserves. Besides, the common EU energy market would serve as a framework for creating "an energy alliance" – a mechanism to assist the countries that experience crises in energy supply. For Lithuania, this problem is very sensitive as conditions for competition in the electricity and gas sectors are still not in place. The small Lithuanian energy market determines that there will be no competition until Lithuania becomes part of a wider EU market. Integration into the common EU market would create an opportunity to diversify the supply of energy and reduce the dependence on a single supplier. The investor's interest in the new nuclear plant project in Lithuania also depends on conditions for competition in the energy market. However, the common EU market may not guarantee the desired outcomes or even may result in negative ones. For example, if Lithuania's market becomes part of the EU market, possibilities to buy cheaper energy will be also reduced. Though the average prices in the EU most probably would drop. But it means that for the states that pay less than the average, prices may increase¹⁶. As a result, energy prices in Lithuania would most likely increase.

Substantial Lithuanian hopes concerning the EU Common Energy Policy are related to the EU efforts to diversify energy sources and routes of supply. One of the main EU priorities in this context is to enhance the consumption of renewable energy resources. The EU proposes to increase state's support to different kinds of renewables, eliminate energy standard-related restraints, etc. On the other hand, despite the EU has agreed and Lithuania has accepted many renewable energy-related provisions, the achievements of both the EU and Lithuania are only modest. This is determined by many factors, most important of them being the lack of renewable resources, high costs, absence of a common market and a slow

return of investments. This allows to predict that as long as the costs of renewable sources do not become equal to the costs of traditional energy, the EU efforts to solve the problems of energy security will not bring much benefit for Lithuania.

Significant for Lithuania may be the EU efforts to increase the consumption of not only renewable but also alternative energy sources. This may be applied first of all to the consumption of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy in the EU for a long time has been associated with the problems of nuclear waste and the safety of nuclear reactors, huge investments, large amounts of energy which create problems of its storage and transportation. The EU attitude towards nuclear energy has changed after the gas supply crisis in the end of 2005. Now the EU is not so categorical and regards nuclear energy as a means adequate to other energy sources. Legal norms started to be revised, constraints have been softened. The effect of EU Common Energy Policy towards nuclear energy for Lithuania may be important for two reasons. Foremost, Lithuania seeks recognition that the closure of the nuclear power plant is not a purely Lithuanian but also a European problem. In this context, Vilnius tries to get as much financial assistance as possible and to initiate the decisions of the EU that would help to compensate a possible shortfall of energy after the power plant is closed¹⁷. Besides, Lithuania asks the EU to compensate at least part of the costs related to the building of a new nuclear plant. However, the EU calls for private investments of energy consumers into this project. Consequently, hopes of a considerable support from the EU in this sphere may remain groundless.

Diversification of energy supply and routes of supply is a question which probably raises hottest discussions. The reason is existence of energy asymmetry – the EU countries import oil and gas from different parts of the world, some having diversified their import and others depending on a single supplier. This condition is a source of different interests towards supplier and sources of diversification among the EU states. Countries that depend on Russia are interested in decreasing such dependence. The EU Common Energy Policy would guarantee better negotiating positions for its members while dealing with Russia as the main energy supplier. By conducting a common policy the member states may force Russia to sign

the European Energy Charter and provide the possibility to transport energy resources from alternative sources through Russia's pipelines. The EU Common Energy Policy may help to liberalize Russia's internal market and decrease the governmental influence on resource transportation. This would increase the security of energy supply and reduce the domination of Russian companies in the EU oil and gas market.

Besides that, the EU Common Energy Policy and actions offer a real possibility to develop supply from alternative places: the Caspian Sea region, Iran, North Africa. Neither the Baltic States nor Poland have financial possibilities to support financially the oil and gas infrastructure building in Southern Caucasus countries. However, the EU Common Energy Policy and investments can be a good measure. In this context, Lithuania is interested in the EU support of building the Odessa–Brody–Plotsk–Gdansk oil pipeline which provides an opportunity to transport oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to Poland (and probably Lithuania in the future) avoiding the influence of Russia.

Though according to some analysts this project financially is not reasonable, the European Commission (EC) has agreed to co-finance a feasibility study of building a pipeline to Plotsk. If the pipeline is built, during the first phase of its work (2007–2009) up to 15 million tons of crude oil per year may be transported through this pipeline. Later on the amount may increase up to 25 million tons.

In case of natural gas supply, Lithuania's interests would be best represented if a pipeline from Iran to Ukraine is built. This pipeline, which would run through Armenia, Georgia (port of Supsa), the Black Sea (port of Feodosia in Ukraine) and further through the "Sojuz" pipeline to Western Europe, would transport Iranian gas. However, because of economic risks and Russian influence this project has very little chances to be implemented. Much more feasible is the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline project¹⁸.


The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline will supply gas to Georgia and Turkey, but the further transportation to Europe may be complicated, first of all because of the limited capacity of the Turkish gas pipeline system¹⁹. The current capabilities would allow to transport gas to Turkey's southern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, but then a pipeline under the

Mediterranean Sea is needed. At the moment the construction of this pipeline seems not possible. That is why it is planned to use the current capacity of the Turkish pipelines and to transport a relatively small volume of gas to Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline is important for Europe indirectly as it may accelerate the construction of the Transcaspian gas pipeline. This pipeline may give an opportunity for Europe, and Lithuania in particular, to import gas from Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) avoiding transportation through Russia²⁰. On the other hand, all these plans would scatter if Georgia transfers the management of its gas sector to the Russian “Gazprom”²¹. In this case, the new operator of the Georgian gas system may simply refuse to transport gas from Azerbaijan’s gas fields.

Lithuania expects the EU support not only in diversifying gas suppliers, but also in diversifying the routes of Russian gas export. The current Yamal 1 gas pipeline may be added by Yamal 2 or NEGP, but the Lithuanian interest is to implement the “Amber” project (see Figure 6).

“Amber” is the only project that would allow Lithuania to become a significant transit state for Russian gas export and strengthen its energy security at the same time. The “Amber” pipeline, as a northern link of

Figure 6. Possible gas pipelines from Russia to Europe



Source: presentation by amb. Č. Stankevičius “Lietuvos interesai ir politikos uždaviniai globalioje energetikos aplinkoje” <<http://www.urm.lt/index.php?-985502806>>

Yamal 1, would go from Russia to Germany via the Baltic States and Poland. This project is 30 percent cheaper as compared with the NEGP, besides, it would be technically much safer as it does not go under the Baltic Sea. However, this project is not listed among the EU priority projects. The feasibility study of this project is not started yet. So, the Lithuanian task in this context is to work with EU institutions and interested EU member states to show that “Amber” is, if not the main, then at least an additional route of transporting Russian gas to Europe.

Conclusions: the future of Lithuania’s energy security

The problem of Lithuania’s dependence on Russia has been acute since the restoration of the independence. The problem is not solved yet. Moreover, after Russian government started to use energy companies as tools of its foreign policy, threats to Lithuania’s energy security have grown.

The NEGP is only one of the projects that indicate Russia’s desire to create favourable conditions for resource supply, to decrease dependence on transit countries and to make a considerable influence on energy importing countries. After launching the NEGP project, “Gazprom” will avoid mediators and gain the total control of gas supply. From extraction to consumption, no third country will be able to influence the prices and policy of “Gazprom”.

In this context, several conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, the NEGP project is disadvantageous for Lithuania. The NEGP, as compared with the more favourable “Amber” pipeline, will increase Lithuania’s energy insecurity. Furthermore, the state budget will not get extra money from gas transit.

On the other hand, after the Putin–Schroeder deal and Russian–Ukrainian gas conflict, the question of energy security became one of the main topics in the global agenda. The Baltic and Central European countries have got a chance to strengthen regional cooperation in the energy sector. Besides that, they have attracted the attention of the EU member states to the threats that may arise from dependence on one energy supplier. There are already actions taken while trying to build an alternative pipeline of gas and oil supply. Even the NATO joined the discussions on safe energy supply. The “Amber” project has got a new approach. Now it is considered as

working in parallel with the NEGP and satisfying the growing demand for gas in Western Europe. Therefore, even though the NEGP reduces the possibilities of the Baltic States and Poland to resist the one-sided Russian energy policy, it also gives a new impulse for solving the energy security problems by common efforts.

Essential structural changes in Lithuania's energy security sector could take place only if the EU consolidates its Common Energy Policy. This task is very complicated, keeping in mind that EU members have different energy security priorities because of different energy sources and energy import routes. Diversification of energy supply sources for biggest EU countries is a secondary or even third-order task in energy policy. Most of the old EU countries (except France) give priority to a dialog with energy suppliers and stand for a more effective usage of the existing tools. The EU Common Energy Policy at best is regarded as one of the possibilities to feel secure in the supply of energy sources. A particularly negative approach towards the EU Common Energy Policy is being shown by Germany. The Nordic countries are concerned with the declining resources in the North Sea, so they look for bilateral treaties to secure energy supply. Southern European countries act similarly – they are solving problems of limited possibilities to buy resources from North Africa and Middle East. For these countries, Russian resources are a wanted and secure alternative. Such different interests may imply a slow progress in the EU Common Energy Policy.

Consolidation of interests is most probable in the Baltic and CEE countries. Such perspectives could provide an impetus for integration of the EU Common Energy Policy at different paces – the minimal level of adopting strategies for EU countries in the field of effectiveness in energy consumption and the specific level of common efforts to ensure more security in energy supply and diversification.

In either way, it is clear that Lithuania needs to take a very proactive position in its EU policy to ensure the security interest in its energy sector. With some help from the other new members of the EU it is possible to avoid deals beneficial only for separate states but not for the whole EU.

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- ⁵ Development Data Group, The World Bank. 2004. *World Development Indicators 2004*.
- ⁶ World Resources Institute. *Energy Consumption: Consumption per capita. 2001 data*. <<http://earthtrends.wri.org/>>
- ⁷ The reversible export and import oil terminal on the Baltic seacoast is a yearlong working port that can export 14 million tons of oil per year. The Būtingė import capabilities are 6 million tons of oil per year.
- ⁸ In 2005, the price was 85 USD for 1000 cubic meters.
- ⁹ "Gazprom" has 37%, his main partner in Western Europe "E.ON Ruhrgas International AG" shares 39%, and 18% is left for Lithuanian government.
- ¹⁰ According to "New York Times" (20 June 2003), 300,000 tons of military ammunition was sunk in the Baltic Sea: during World War II, 60,000 mines were drowned in the Gulf of Finland and after the war 267,000 more tons were drowned. The Navy of the USA drowned 42 ships with 130,000 tons of chemical weapons in the straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak. Brits drowned 8,000 tons of chemical weapons in the East and 15,000 more tons in the South East from Bornholm, while Soviets drowned 35,000 more tons to the East of Bornholm. Graveyards of chemical weapons are near Liepoja, in the Small Belt (South of the Baltic Sea) and to the East of Gotland Island (Sweden).
- ¹¹ Pravda.ru. "Russian marine biologist says North European Gas Pipeline is environmentally safe", 2005, < <http://newsfromrussia.com/science/2005/09/22/63422.html> > [25 09 2005]
- ¹² The length of the pipeline to Kaliningrad through Lithuania is about 200 km.
- ¹³ ESTLINK, SwindLit and "Powerbridge" are the projects that, if implemented, would help Lithuania and other Baltic states to disengage from the integral electricity system together with CIS countries and integrate into the common electricity system with the western and northern countries of Europe.
- ¹⁴ It became possible in 2000 when "Lietuvos dujos" and "Latvijas gaze" concluded a deal of supplying gas in both directions in the case of emergency.
- ¹⁵ Poland plans to increase the production of domestic natural gas up to 5,5 bln. cubic meters in 2008. Besides, Poland imports natural gas not only from Russia, but also from Norway. It has also plans to increase the import from Norway and start to import gas from Denmark.

- ¹⁶ Šilėnas, Ž. „Europos energetikos strategija siūlo bendrą rinką“. 2006. <http://www.freema.org/index.php/meniu/spaudai/straipsniai_ir_komentariai/europos_energetikos_strategija_siulo_bendra_rinka/3229> [21 03 2006]
- ¹⁷ For example, Lithuania may seek the permit to finance the LNG terminal or the natural gas storage facility building from the Ignalina plant shutdown fund. Another direction is to seek the recognition of electricity connection with Poland and Sweden as EU priority projects.
- ¹⁸ The planned initial capacity of this pipeline is 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Later on the capacity may be increased up to 60 billion cubic meters. Natural gas should be transported from the Shah Deniz gas field which is in the Caspian Sea and belongs to Azerbaijan.
- ¹⁹ By the time, up to 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year may be transported through the East-West direction of Turkey. Accordingly, three different suppliers would like to transport gas in this direction: the Russian Blue stream with 16 billion cubic meters a year capacity comes to the Turkish port of Samsun, Iran through the Nabucco pipeline wants to transport 30 billion cubic meters, and Azerbaijan, as already mentioned, up to 60 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.
- ²⁰ As it stands for today, Russia effectively uses the factor of the non-agreed status of the Caspian Sea and blocks all the initiatives to build the Transcaspian oil and gas pipelines.
- ²¹ Such a possibility is foreseen in a secret agreement between Georgia and “Gazprom”, which was signed in 2003.

TRAJECTORIES OF REGIONAL IDENTITIES IN LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA

Mindaugas Jurkynas

Abstract. The author examines the construction of political regions in the Baltic states. The main aim of the study is to analyse the trajectories of regional identities among the political elite of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and the extent of discursive compatibility and sustainability, employing the adjusted constructivist reasoning and discourse analysis. The author considers two main statements: 1. Construction of political regions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was dominated by Soviet legacies and the subsequent sovereignty and security concerns whose derivatives – Transatlantic integration vs. Russia – were the most relevant categories for regional identities in the Baltics; 2. The trilateral Baltic sub-regional identity has been the most important for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, compared with other regional affiliations.¹

Introduction

“The location of the Baltic is in fact more a question of awareness than of geography, but that awareness has to be guided and educated. [O]ld legacies continue to dog the states formerly under Soviet domination, whilst new opportunities may undermine the fragile sense of regional community. There is much to be done. Defining the Baltic at the beginning of a new millennium is thus an exciting challenge for all who study the region”

(Kirby 1999).

The problem of the research hinges upon the ambivalence of political regional identities and the extent of political affiliation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the Baltic sub-region after the Cold War. The external world

¹ This study is based on the research presented in my doctoral dissertation “Construction of Political Regions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia”. I am grateful to Erik Albæk, Vytautas Radžvilas, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Gražina Miniotaitė and Nortautas Statkus for their comments on different arguments of the article.

has largely viewed the Baltics as one trilateral region, whereas the media in the Baltic countries have created negative images of the “Baltic unity”, and even a number of scholars tended to subscribe under those constructs. Regional identities remain underinvestigated in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and all three countries have not yet been placed under coherent and elaborated theoretical and methodological perspectives. Therefore, it is important to know which regional interstate identities are the most important in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and whether the political Baltic sub-region does exist in the mind-mapping of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian key policy makers.

The construction of political regions is first of all to be studied in terms of regional identities (ideational dimension). This analysis introduces less examined ideational aspects in the multidimensional processes of region formation. The Baltic case calls for a modelled academic approach to formation of the regional identities that could be influenced by postmodern and modern ideas of cooperation. A moot question remains which one of them and with what contents prevailed in regional identities among the Baltic countries.

The object of the research is the construction of political regions in the Baltic states.² The main aim is to analyse the construction of regional identities among the political elite of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The study deliberately aims at the *political* dimension of region creation (regional identity).³ The investigation assumes that regions can be *politically* invented and reinvented in the ideational dimension. The construction of a political region does not necessarily have to be compatible with, e.g., economic and other transactions and, therefore, economic, societal, cultural regions can differ from political ones. The research tries to reconstruct political regional identities in the three Baltic states and analyses the trajectories of these collective identities in the Baltics. The study argues that, first, Soviet legacies and the subsequent sovereignty and security concerns whose de-

² The terms “Baltic states” and “Baltics” refer to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

³ Regional identity is a feeling of belonging, which is constructed in political and cultural processes by means of language, emotions and symbols (Stråth 2000, 22, in Miniutaitė 2003, 1).

rivative – Transatlantic (EU and NATO) integration vs. Russia – stood in the centre of the political regional identities; second, the trilateral Baltic sub-regional identity has been the most important for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, thus confirming existence of the trilateral political Baltic sub-region.

These arguments are based on empirical and theoretical assumptions. Empirically, the political milieu in the Baltic states was sovereignty-sensitive, since the break-away from the USSR and the consolidation of statehood against Soviet / Russian claims have been the top priority on political agendas in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Security concerns were foremost stressed in Baltic foreign policy objectives. The slogan “back to the West together” was clearly evident in the early 1990s. A lack of partners for international cooperation induced the Baltic clustering. The stationing of the Soviet / Russian military troops in Lithuania till August 1993 and in Estonia and Latvia until August 1994 precluded a closer foreign involvement in the Baltics and made Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia devise new forms and mechanisms of regional cooperation.

Since the examination of regional identities focuses on political narratives, it is worth checking to what extent narratives about regions are mutually compatible. The study will trace the extent of change of regional meanings in narratives before and after the Transatlantic enlargement in 2004 and the relation between each state’s perception of itself and of other countries. Regional attachments in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia can be exclusive (against someone) or inclusive (with someone) and modern or postmodern, depending on how region-builders construct discursive structures of dominant and repetitive meanings of regional identities, in which the leading Baltic politicians incorporate internal (social, cultural, political and other) and external (great and regional powers) factors.

Meanings about the world are constructed in the discourses of the dominant meanings about regional affiliations existing within the narratives. Political regional identities appear in narratives of key foreign policy makers, namely presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers. They develop discursive structures of dominant meanings about regional affiliations and patterns of amity or / and enmity. Regions are constructed by the region-builders “who as part of some political project, imagine a spatial

and chronological identity for a region, and disseminate this imagined identity to others" (Neumann 1994, 59). Regional narratives (theme-oriented speeches, statements, interviews) construct and remake regional attachments in the countries under study.

In order to increase the validity and reliability of interpretation of narratives, the research introduces two analytical dimensions – neutral and biased (context and audience-oriented). Texts as acts of communication and construction need an understanding of what their author and his audience are (Skinner 1969, 48–49 in Moisio 2003, 76). The neutral environment includes narratives produced at forums far from the neighbourhood of the Baltic states or / and where governmental messages were not anticipated to be neighbouring-region-friendly. The biased milieu refers to the venues to which Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia can geographically and politically belong, and messages sent across this environment are anticipated to be venue- and audience-oriented. The study will examine regional narratives in the neutral environment which is more representative and occupies a larger share of official statements than does the biased milieu. The study employs the discourse analysis with quantitative and qualitative features. Discourse analysis as an interpretative approach assumes texts to disclose the discursive structures of the basic meanings in regional narratives created during social interaction of the actors.

The study examines the trajectories and relevance of regional identities in the Baltics from the early 1990 till autumn 2006. The analysis is also relevant for geopolitical studies, as the examination of a country's geopolitical code (Statkus et al. 2003, 15) is connected with the regional self-identification of political actors outlined by constructivist research.

Quantification of the contents of governmental narratives (official statements) is a methodological novelty in the study of Lithuanian, Latvia and Estonian regional identities. Earlier examinations of the consistency of regional meanings of collective identities in the Baltics are scanty, and the majority of investigations on regional identities drew conclusions based on several political utterances, without methodologically establishing to what extent they are representative. The article will first discuss the theoretical and methodological premises and then will examine the construction of political regions via emergence of discursive structures of regional meanings, which disclose regional identities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

2. Theoretical premises for the construction of regions

2.1 Constructivism and Studies of Regions

The end of the Cold War seriously challenged the well-established principles of theories on international relations and brought on the agenda re-conceptualisation of regional research. The inability of established theories of the International Relations with (Neo)Realism in the lead to adequately explain and predict the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the USSR and the subsequent events paved the way for the emergence of the Social constructivism and reflectivism in the discipline of international relations.⁴ Debates among the rationalists, constructivists and reflectivists in the 1990s replaced the theoretical race of the 1980s among realism, pluralism (liberalism) and globalism (Marxism) and their “neos”. Neorealism and neoliberalism became similar on the ontological and epistemological grounds and formed a core of the rationalist paradigm which treats reality as given and material. According to the rationalists, material factors are far more important than ideas, and the structure affects the behaviour of actors. The reflectivist paradigm embraces postmodernism, feminism, critical and normative theories, historical sociology, radical constructivism and some more trends, whose uniting basis is an extensive criticism of theoretical assumptions of the rationalist paradigm. Reflectivists deny the possibility to investigate social reality subjectively and scientifically, because it is social and intersubjective, and its value-laden interpretation is inseparably attached to the factors under analysis.

Constructivism has been trying to establish a middle ground between the rationalist and the reflectivist (interpretative) paradigms, while being able to talk to and be criticised by both poles (Adler 1997b). For example, in terms of epistemology, reflectivist critics of constructivists argue that the focus on the state is made at the expense of race, class, gender, ethnicity, etc., and acceptance of anarchy in international relations turn constructivism into another positivist theory. Positivists, in turn, claim that constructivism underestimates the importance of material factors. In general, constructivism embodies a vast variety of approaches, such as social, radical, cultural, cog-

⁴ Robert Keohane was the first to admit an input of reflectivists into the analysis of international relations in 1988 (Keohane 1988 in Miniotaite 2000, 196).

nitive, critical, postmodern, etc. The “middle ground” of the constructivists, called “social” or “soft”, shares the ontological basis with the reflectivists (reality is intersubjective and social) and the epistemological one with rationalists (reality can be objectively analysed): individuals socially construct the structures that limit choice of actors in foreign policy making (Statkus and Paulauskas 2006, 16–18). The present study, however, from the epistemological point of view, shifts towards the reflectivists and benefits from the methodological employment of the post-positivistic discourse analysis of language in the study of collective identities in the Baltic states. Collective identity is perceived as a self-perception of an actor in the social interaction on the basis of the community of “we” as different from “them”. Constructivism agrees that identity is not a natural or given but rather socially invented and re-invented phenomenon, yet does not ignore state preferences and investigates the basis state preferences are constructed on (Christiansen et al. 2001, 5, 9, 12). According to this approach, the behaviour of human beings is determined by their identity.

When it comes to studies of regions, the rationalist paradigm examines regions from geographical, economic, military, environmental, cultural politics, etc. points of view. Rationalists and some of social constructivists do not believe in the power of language, referring to it as “merely symbolic discourses” or rhetoric. With the rise of the constructivist insights in the 1990s and onwards, studies of regions focused upon the ways regions arise, that is, from redefinition of norms and identities by the key region-builders, first of all governments. Constructivists assume regions to be shaped by a collective perception of identities, shared values and trust (Väyrynen 2003, 26–27, 37). Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel H. Nexon admit in their recent study that identities must be taken into consideration as they complement neorealist insights (Goddard and Nexon 2005).

Constructivists, who are close to the reflectivist paradigm, assume that human agents construct and reproduce social reality via their daily practices, first of all the distribution of meanings through the language. This idea is derived from the social ontology that human agents are interconnected in their social environment and collectively share a system of meanings or “culture” in a broader sense. Constructivism does not treat political

phenomena as material factors, whose attributes are permanently fixed, and stress the importance of perceptions of the surrounding reality. The rationalist paradigm assumes that there is a natural economic, cultural, security, religious basis for a region formed by a number of links among states and peoples. Constructivists, on the other hand, see a region as anything but natural, since regions can be politically invented and reinvented.

If identity is considered as a social construct, then anything can become common denominators for the basis of self-perception. As historian Benedict Andersen has pinpointed, groups (e.g., nations, regions, societies, minorities, etc.) are “imagined communities” (Andersen 1983), and collective identity builders can integrate, relevant to their mind, aspects of collective affinities such as religion, territory, past, future, language, interests, norms, values and so forth. Political elites select, invent, mythologise and sustain the common features for a target group in order to get those affinities accepted as a core of “togetherness”. Regional similarities, according to constructivists, are not as important as perceptions and decisions of the leading policy makers who decide which similarities must be discursively relevant. The whole region-building affair is perceived as political, since regions as imagined communities lie where politicians want them to lie.

2.2 Regions and Security

Security issues and the related concept of “securitisation” play an important role in the examination of Baltic regional identities and related cooperative practices. The idea of securitisation was introduced by the so-called Copenhagen school representatives Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Their ideas are frequently ascribed to constructivist thinking. Securitisation occurs when political actors push the area of “normal politics” into the security realm by using the rhetoric of threat in order to justify the adoption of “emergency” measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics (Buzan et al. 1998). Every issue, including construction of regions on security terms, can be *non-politicised*, *politicised* or *securitised*. Non-politicisation refers to a situation when an issue is not on political agenda or public discourse. Politicisation means inclusion of issues in narratives, and securitisation, as a radical version of politicisation, portrays an issue as an existential threat whose elimination calls for extraor-

dinary measures. The study holds that issues of Transatlantic integration for the Baltics fall within increased politicisation, i.e. securitisation. Therefore, a securitisation discourse as the ultimate and only way to the security of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has been seen through NATO and EU lens. Securitisation is distinguished from the act of securitisation. The latter is viewed as a speech act with a rhetoric of threat. Although authors think that a securitised issue must be accepted by the auditorium (Buzan et al. 1998, 25–26), the present study does not share this idea. Taking into account the realist premise of state position as a final and only expression of national interests, we can see that turning an issue into a securitised one is securitisation *per se*, since it is an act of construction. If this construction is dominant and sustained, i.e. forms a discourse within narratives on the topic, we have a securitised issue, as it is automatically accepted and distributed by the key policy makers by silencing the alternative meanings. If the main politicians possess the only power of expression of state interests to sustain construction of a securitised issue, then an act of securitisation finally turns into securitisation.

Besides, the study introduces an affiliated concept of “sovereignitisation”. Sovereignitisation is a construct of modern Westphalian-type states or countries with recently re-established statehood prioritise sovereignty as a ruling principle in international politics. It would hardly come as a surprise that sovereignty issues for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were anchored to security issues due to Soviet past and its legacies. Yet, it is relevant to establish to what extent security and sovereignty issues are related to the construction of political regions in the Baltics before and after the Transatlantic enlargement.

Securitisation is often linked to three identity discourses on security and cooperation: realist, liberalist and postmodern (Browning and Joenniemi 2004). They render a different outlook to security in the trajectories of regional identities. According to the realistic approach, “all are against all” and state sovereignty must be preserved. Cooperation is an alliance building and balancing against other states, which are seen as a bigger or smaller threat. Othering and exclusion drive regional affiliation by encouraging cooperation with some states and at the same time making impossible collaboration with the others.

The Liberalist approach disagrees to exalt hard security and instead emphasises soft security aspects: environmental, civic, economic, etc. These issues cannot solely be solved by states, as their nature can go on transnational, regional and even global scale every now and then. Cooperation takes place not only among states, but also among societies and sub-state actors. Security is a uniting element and cooperation, which is developed by inclusion and enhances comprehensive security.

Finally, postmodern insights rest heavily upon the concepts of asecurity, networking, post-sovereignty and fuzzy borders. Liberalism and postmodernism share pluralism of actors in international politics and soft security *problematique*. Regions are built in a bottom-up manner, i.e. not by states, but by grassroots and sub-state actors as NGOs, cross-border regions, universities, municipalities, counties and so forth. After the Cold War the Baltic states fell between modern securitisation and sovereignty driven approaches, whereas the EU governance increasingly included liberal and postmodern principles.

2.3 Talking Regions into Existence

The study applies theoretical insights of constructivism and a related discourse analysis of speech acts. Discourse analysis as an interpretative hermeneutic approach is an interpretative endeavour to ascertain the structure of repetitive meanings of social reality in the language. Interpretation provides a clearer view than the texts analysed, since the discourse analysis assists in finding the dominant meanings, which construct and represent social reality. Discourses are a societal dimension where meanings acquire structures and form a system of knowledge which consists of key concepts central to the discourse in the language (Wæver 1998, 109).

The language of invention of regions is political, as the political world is linguistically and communicatively constituted, and any politics without language would be not only indescribable, but also impossible (Moisio 2003, 76). Regional actors might be discrepant on meanings of identities, but they construct a certain vocabulary of belonging (Christiansen et al. 2001, 15). Although Alexander Wendt ignores the relevance of language in his structural (holistic) idealism by ascribing to language only a function of representation best not construction of reality (Wendt 1999), words,

language and communicative utterances are the key to understanding of the political behaviour, as actors attribute meanings to their activities in discourses (Risse 2004, 165). When a group of policy makers develops sentiments of solidarity by constructing discourses about a collective space and time, they forge collective identities.

The language occupies a central notion in discourses. Michael Foucault stressed an importance of language in written and spoken forms (Foucault 1991). Discourses via the language give a structure to our thinking and behaviour and (re)construct meanings and identities in a real world around us. Discourse analysis ascertains which perceptions are mostly accentuated. Dominant discourses structure key concepts and connect them with political practices. Discursive structures of dominant and repetitive meanings unveil subjects authorised to speak and to act – they are oft foreign policy officials who usually possess narrative authority (Milliken 1999, 229). Intellectuals, policy makers, bureaucracy, the media, etc. produce different and frequently competing narratives. For example, historians or the media can picture various regional images of a country and its neighbours. However, narratives of political elite matter a lot more, as politicians envisage and conduct policies, and their collective identities inscribed in the discursive structures of speech acts have the highest probability of turning into political practices. The dominant governmental narratives disclose the patterns of amity and enmity in regional identities and foreign policy-making in general. Political behaviour is not only a result of rational calculations of material powers and given interests, but it is also shaped by the way politicians perceive the political and social milieu around them (Adler 1997b, 329). It is hard to agree with Ole Wæver's idea that it is not important whether narratives mean what they say. Narratives do mean something, since politicians are prone to send a message to electorate, colleagues, allies, foes and so on.

Construction of regions falls into the realm of speech acts, as regions are talked about and inscribed into existence (Neumann 1992, 15): a state's collective identities are not given and pre-existent. In this case, region-building can be analysed as part of a permanent construction and reconstruction of identity via interaction (Wendt 1994). The region is defined in and off the discourse itself. An overriding concern is to investigate how and

why redefinitions of regions take place, and not to take the existence of a certain region as given (Neumann 1992, 3).

Arguably, construction of identity has to be accepted by the others in order to be valid. Coining a self-image is the first step towards defining or re-defining a country's position in the international milieu. A number of rationalist insights on regions and regional cooperation focus on the process of change and disagree which ones are the most relevant. Rationalist approaches, as a rule, treat regions as given: nature and development of a region and which region is taken *a priori* (Neumann 1992, 12). However, a region is a process in change, whose contents and borders can alter by expansion or dissolution. Regions become understood as discursively made and remade. Region-builders consider similarities and dissimilarities and decide what is politically relevant for a region. Region building is a set of cognitive practices shaped by language and political discourse, which through the creation of concepts, metaphors, analogies determine how the region is defined; these serve to define the actors who are included (and excluded) within the region and thereby enable the emergence of a regional entity and identity (Jayasuriya 1994, 12 in Katzenstein 2002, 105–106).

The analysis will address the self-affiliation of countries with different regional identities ranging from “low” to “high” and then will trace the compatibility of regional identities among Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian political narratives, the common denominator of regional identities and its relation to modern / postmodern dichotomy in construction of political regions. As Reinhard Koselleck once put it: “without common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political field of action” (Koselleck 1985, 74 in Moisio 2003, 77). The analysis of official discourses enables to observe inclusion of new, never used before categories or trace changes in the existing meanings about regional affiliations. Regional identities are contested ideas, yet they cannot be considered solely in zero-sum game terms, since identities can be overlapping to a large degree.

Examination of political statements exhibits two problems: speech-writing and political correctness. The first one refers to people, usually desk officers or advisors, producing statements for policy makers. The study considers

that leading politicians identify themselves with statements which become a position of a state. Second, representatives of government tend to pass politically correct messages. Policy makers are inclined to stress the relevance of meetings audience, milieu, in which they participate. In order to avoid a problem of interpretation, the study divides political narratives into two analytical categories: neutral and biased (context or audience oriented) environments. The neutral milieu embodies political statements made outside Baltic, Nordic, Central (and Eastern) European or the Baltic Sea trans-regions or where the audience does not originate from a country's bordering regions. The analysis will focus on the neutral milieu which is considered as more representative and occupying a larger share of regional narratives.

The share of speeches with regional references made in neutral context was 65% in Estonia, 53% in Latvia and 71% in Lithuania in the period 1992 – April 30, 2004, and the figures for April 30, 2004 – May 28, 2005 were 78%, 82% and 93% respectively. The study employs the reasoning from the content analysis with quantification of regional affiliations in governmental narratives. The study will examine reference frequencies in the statements, i.e. how often regional notions like “Baltic”, “Nordic”, “Northern”, “Scandinavian”, “Baltoscandian”, “Baltic Sea”, “Central (and Eastern) Europe”, etc. were used. This will shed light on the dispersal of regional sentiments across two periods: 1992– April 30, 2004 and the post-enlargement phase. Later the dispersion of regional references in the narratives will undergo a qualitative examination of the dominant regional meanings, their compatibility and relation to the Modern / Postmodern dichotomy.

Figure 1 portrays a hypothetical model of the distribution of governmental narratives in different milieus. The dotted vertical line separates all political statements (drawn as little beads) into a domestic and foreign environment / audience. The grey side in the right part of the figure represents the biased context of narratives, the bright side showing the left one – the neutral environment. Four areas represent the most important regional narratives. The coloured lines portray discursive structures with dominant meanings of regional references. These dominant meanings can be similar across different regional narratives and form discursive structures of key meanings about regional affiliations.




Figure 1. Narratives and discourses in domestic-foreign and neutral-biased environments

3. Trajectories of regional identities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

3.1 Regional Identities until the EU and NATO Membership

The Baltic sub-region, consisting of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, started taking shape in the interwar years, but was established as a sub-region with the Soviet occupation and annexation, which dominated the regional identities in the Baltics in the early 1990s (Jurkynas 2004). Yet it remains unclear which regional attachments and with what contents were the most important in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and how they were related across the countries.

Examination of governmental narratives in 1992 – April 30, 2004 shows that trilateral “Baltic” regional references were the most “popular” in all three countries, followed closely by “Northern” references (see Figure 2).

The qualitative analysis of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian governmental narratives in the neutral context also highlighted the hegemony of




Figure 2. Frequencies of regional references in the neutral context, 1992–April 30, 2004*

* 1992–2004 for Estonia, 1996–2004 for Latvia and 1993–2004 for Lithuania

Source: Author's calculation

the trilateral Baltic sub-regional attachments in all three countries, whereas the images of Central (and Eastern) Europe scored relatively low. Central (and Eastern) Europe and the Baltic Sea trans-region were least associated with political partnership. The latter trans-region served rather as an area built on stability and cooperation in low politics than regular partnership in foreign policy making. “Northern” regional images came second to the Baltic ones and mostly focused on Nordic–Baltic cooperation: though Estonia’s attempts to label herself as a Northern and Nordic country was the most conspicuous among the Baltics, yet it was only the second to and far from the dominant “Baltic”. In terms of patterns of amity, the Baltic and Northern dimensions come to the fore. Moreover, discursive structures were coloured with the language of securitisation in all regional affiliations except the Baltic Sea area. Concerns of security were dominant and related to Transatlantic integration. Constructions of regional images in Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian narratives can be summarised in Table 1.

After establishing a self-affiliation to the aforementioned regional categories, it is a turn to ascertain the compatibility of regional meanings and their enmity / amity patterns. If governmental narratives on regions coincide, the construction of regions exhibits similar values and interests.

The compatibility of regional meanings was in general high. The images of Central (and Eastern) Europe embraced securitisation discourse with references to the Soviet occupation, freedom from the brutal regime

Table 1. State self-affiliation to the region, 1992 – April 30, 2004

	<i>Lithuania</i>	<i>Latvia</i>	<i>Estonia</i>
Central (and Eastern) Europe	Medium	Low	Low
Baltic Sea	Medium	Medium	Medium
Nordic, North, Scandinavian	High	High	High
Baltic	High	High	High

and Transatlantic “membership”. Patterns of amity are visible only in terms of “the common fate and related reestablishment of justice”. Only Lithuanian narratives embraced the partnership dimension (Vilnius Ten), and Estonian and Latvian images referred to this region for portraying their economic achievements. The concepts of all three countries concerning the Baltic Sea area are similarly embedded in the soft security *problematique* as are energy, environment, transport, communication, trade and the like. The language is desecuritized, *i.e.* hard security issues are deliberately avoided, and this region has a certain postmodern accent based on hybridism, diversity, post-Westphalian considerations and comprehensive security. Sovereignty and fixed state borders are not challenged, and states are considered as the main actors, though one can seldom spot the ideas of cross-border regions and the relevance of people-to-people contacts. The pattern of amity is unclear and, again, the Baltic Sea trans-region serves rather as an area of common activity or a forum of discussions than partnership. Enhancing the political and economic partnership in terms of 5+3 and later Nordic–Baltic 8 (NB8) among the Baltic and the Nordic states was the common denominator in “Northern” references for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. However, Latvian and especially Estonian policy makers did politicise “Northern” images, relating them to culture, traditions, old history and geography. Besides, reflections on “North” were modern and state- and security-oriented. Finally, analysis of the qualitative dimensions of narratives confirms the hegemonic discursive structures of the political trilateral Baltic sub-region. Indeed, images of this sub-region were the most compatible among Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and rest on “the Communist past, joint liberation and strategic foreign policy goals of NATO and EU membership and the related increasing political and economic cooperation”. The very modern concepts of “defending sovereignty”, “hard

Table 2. Compatibility of region images 1992 – April 30, 2004

	<i>Compatibility</i>	<i>Common denominator</i>	<i>Modern / Postmodern</i>
Central (and Eastern) Europe	Medium	Communist past, liberation, NATO and EU	Modern
Baltic Sea	High	Soft security	Modern / Postmodern
Nordic, North, Scandinavian	Medium	Political and economic partnership Location in Northern Europe	Modern
Baltic	High	Communist past Strategic goals Political and economic partnership	Modern

security”, “state-centrism” “border control” and the like prevail. In terms of amity patterns, the Nordic and Baltic regions are the most compatible as the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian narratives do speak of the emerging Baltoscandian region.

The aforementioned narratives unveiled both the inclusive (“us”) and exclusive (“them”) regional identities. “Othering” was clear-cut especially until 1999. The political space eastwards from the Baltics – Russia and CIS – was considered as a source of political instability, which threatened security and sovereignty of the recently re-born states. The othering discourse consolidated the inclusiveness of “Baltic”, “Central (and Eastern) European” and to some extent “Northern” regional identities in the language of securitisation, whereas “the Baltic Sea trans-region” was inclusive towards Russia, too, in the dimension of low politics. After 1999 and especially when the Baltic membership in the NATO and EU was approaching, the discourse on othering slightly declined. Political statements dropped the direct pinpointing to Russia as a threat and the “other”. Instead, Baltic political narratives did focus on the problems that arose due to Russian political behaviour. Estonian and Latvian narratives, as a rule, were more prone to othering than Lithuanian. Overall, neorealist and modern discourses were hegemonic and congruent, whereas alternative liberal discourses manifested only in the case of the Baltic Sea trans-region and did not offer new openings in foreign policy thinking till 2004.

3.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Outlooks of Post-Enlargement Narratives

Figure 3 shows a continuous prevalence of the trilateral Baltic affiliation among regional references in all three countries. The least spread regional affiliation in all three countries is the one of “Central (and Eastern) Europe”.

Comparing these figures with the pre-2004 period, it is clear that the share of Baltic references increased in Lithuania (from 51% to 63%) and Latvia (from 26% to 28%), whereas the trend in Estonia was reverse (from 58% to 44%), but still remained the most popular sub-regional image in all three countries.

The quantification does not automatically unveil a country's attachment to specific regions or forms of partnership and cooperation. It is important to ascertain to what extent Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia ascribed themselves to the aforementioned regions and how the regional meanings were constructed in the governmental narratives. Their examination will focus upon the neutral environment, as they comprise a significant and representative share which has been earlier established.

3.2.1. Picture of Central (and Eastern) Europe

The image of “Central (and Eastern) Europe” was the least popular in all three Baltic states. Lithuania showed a low propensity for this regional format and did not identify herself with “Central Europe”. Four Visegrad countries were viewed as Central European. The image of “Eastern Eu-




Figure 3. Distribution of regional references in the neutral environment, April 30, 2004 – July 28, 2005

Source: Calculation of the author

rope” came usually along with Poland and partly covered Lithuania which saw herself in expanding a good practice of cooperation and democratic reforms eastwards. This, according to Lithuanian narratives, would strengthen the Eastern European dimension in the EU. It emphasises the Polish link and expansion values of democracy and freedom. Lithuanian officials see their country and Poland as a bridge between the neighbouring regions rather than a part of this particular region:

[w]e have to initiate and consolidate new formats of regional cooperation, which connect Northern, Central and Eastern European states. This would expand regional identity and enable us to escape from the geographical frame that was constructed during the interwar period (Speech of Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis at the meeting with heads of Lithuanian diplomatic missions abroad, July 7, 2004).

In general, the Lithuanian concept of “bridge” has gradually been transforming into “regional centre” of initiatives, especially after 2004 (Nekrašas 2004). The ambition to become a regional centre of initiatives and transcend the trilateral Baltic sub-region is well summed up in the following statement:

Lithuania has so far, without reserve, been ascribed only to a small Baltic sub-region. After once having distinguished Northern and Central Europe, we do not possess a wider geographical identity. Therefore we must expand the interaction of the Baltic sub-region with northern, southern and eastern neighbours, so that active mutual relations would enhance Lithuania’s strategic importance (Speech of Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis at the meeting with heads of Lithuanian diplomatic missions abroad, July 7, 2004.)

Apart from several references to Latvia as an advanced country in this region between East and West, the absolute majority of images referred to historical injustice and Soviet occupation. So, by the way, did the “Baltic” references.

I will be extending a conciliatory gesture of friendship to Russia, while encouraging it to denounce the injustices and excesses committed by the Stalinist regime in my country and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe (Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, to the Members of the States General of the Netherlands, the Hague, 18.01.2005).

Images of “Central and Eastern Europe” in Estonia were least spread and usually served as a background for the country’s economic achieve-

ments, especially in IT and financial sectors. Common historical experiences, differently from Latvia, were left aside.

According to an assessment by The Economist, in 2004 Estonia was the 26th in the world when it comes to information technology, and holds a leading position among Central and Eastern European countries (Address by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Estonia Kristiina Ojuland to the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, Egypt, Cairo, 25.01.2005).

3.2.2. Baltic Sea Area in Regional Identities

Quantitatively, the “Baltic Sea trans-region” was the second most popular image in Estonia and Latvia, whereas in Lithuania it occupied the third place. Lithuanian key policy makers never called Lithuania as a Baltic Sea trans-regional country. This area by Lithuanian region-builders is seen as a wider format of the trilateral Baltic and Nordic partnership and an area linking Lithuania and Poland with other regions. Again, the Baltic sea trans-region is regarded as a forum of strengthening Lithuanian positions as a centre of regional initiatives with experience of European integration.

[we] can find new friends in neighbouring countries, include them into mutually beneficial European cooperation, strengthen their democracy and Lithuanian positions in our neighbourhood and the whole Baltic Sea region (Address of Acting President Artūras Paulauskas at the Parliament, 01.05.2004).

Latvian narratives talked the Baltic Sea area into a place with intensive transactions, where Riga is a potential regional centre. Key words like “economy”, “transport” and “communication” depict the region best, and Latvian affiliation to the area is sometimes straightforward, yet there are clear patterns of amity rather than partnership.

One of my country’s principal advantages lies in its strategic location at the cross-roads between Eastern and Western Europe and at the heart of the Baltic Sea region (Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, at the Portuguese–Latvian Business Forum New Cooperation Opportunities within an Enlarged Europe, Lisbon, Feira Internacional de Lisboa, 15.09.2004).

Latvia is located at a strategic location in northern Europe, on the east coast of the Baltic Sea. (Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of the Republic of Latvia, at the joint Turkish–Latvian and Latvian–Turkish Business Councils Meeting, Conrad Hotel, Istanbul, 20.04.2005).

When it comes to the “Baltic Sea trans-region”, we have to bear in mind that Estonia was the presiding country in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 2003–2004, thus a frequent number of references to the area should not come as a surprise after the EU and NATO membership. Estonian policy makers see the Baltic Sea trans-region as an area of increasing a soft security cooperation focusing upon environmental, transport and economic issues.

[E]stonia dealt mostly with the need to increase the environmental protection of the Baltic Sea and maritime safety. It is extremely important that the Baltic Sea be designated as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (Main Guidelines of Estonia’s Foreign Policy, Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia Kristina Ojuland to the Riigikogu, 08.06.2004).

3.2.3. Nordic Swans and Baltic Cygnets

In terms of “northern” regional identities Lithuania showed surprisingly high results. Lithuanian attachments mostly included “Nordic” images furnished with ideas about the Nordic states as traditional partners and intense Nordic / Baltic cooperation for defence of interests. The picture of “Nordic” goes often along with Lithuanian aims to connect Northern European region and Central Europe and export values of democracy and cooperation eastwards. The Baltoscandian region is frequently envisioned as the core of the Baltic Sea area. Lithuanian references also speak of the importance of orientation towards the North due to heavy Nordic economic involvement in the Baltics. Lithuania has never affiliated herself as a “northern” country but rather as an active player of the wider Baltoscandian region and as the “dynamic Northern European economy”.

[t]he Baltic–Nordic solidarity. We have to strengthen and exploit it more actively in order to build a larger and deeper-integrated Baltic Sea region (Speech by Artūras Paulauskas, Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania, at Vilnius University, Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy, May 24, 2004).

Our experience of neighbourly cooperation – trilateral Baltic, Nordic–Baltic or Vilnius Ten – will help the democratising states in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU to more efficiently implement required reforms and enable them to faster disgorge into European and Transatlantic structures (Speech of Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis at the Seimas, 28.04.2005).

“Northern” references were least popular compared to other regional images in Latvian governmental statements. No speech has ever mentioned “Nordic” or “Scandinavian” reference. Instead, images of “North” did surface, and Nordic and Baltic cooperation was taken into consideration. Almost all of them described the geographical place of Latvia and came often along with references to the Baltic Sea area.

Riga, with its potential of becoming a significant commercial, financial and transportation centre in northern Europe, is a great place for doing business (Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, President of Latvia, at the conclusion of the Latvian–Bulgarian Business Forum, Hotel Rīdzene, Riga, 21.03.2005).

Estonia used “Nordic” references more often than Lithuania and Latvia. Besides, Estonian narratives included all images of “North”, “Nordic” and “Scandinavian”. “Scandinavian” references came up in relation to Nordic–Baltic cooperation or part of the Baltic Sea area. Statements of “Estonia as a Scandinavian country” vanished from regional meanings. Instead, images of “North” emerged, usually referring to “Estonia as Northern country” and “Estonians as a Northern or Nordic people”. The belonging of the nation to their “North” has never been mentioned in Lithuanian and Latvian discourses. Nonetheless, Estonian speeches of “Nordic” disclosed a very close relation to the Nordic–Baltic partnership.

Estonia is a small country in Northern Europe (Address by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Estonia Kristiina Ojuland to the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, Egypt, Cairo, 25.01.2005).

[t]he common interests of various countries should also be achieved in Nordic–Baltic or NB8 Cooperation. [S]everal Nordic cooperative institutions are ready for partnership with the Baltic states, which is definitely of interest to and would be useful for Estonia as well as Latvia and Lithuania (Address by Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet to the Riigikogu, 07.06.2005).

3.2.4. “Baltic” by Default?

The Baltic references remained on the top in all three countries. The transatlantic integration and European profile have revised the most popular trilateral Baltic sub-regional affiliation in Lithuania. Images of the “Baltic Way” slightly faded away, and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were frequently presented as a “success story” in post-communist transformation which has

to tackle with Soviet legacies. Now the Baltic states with the Nordic countries are presented as traditional partners which can share and expand good practices of neighbourly relations and democratic changes. Strengthening the Baltic dimension in the EU is important in Lithuanian governmental narratives which reiterate a new Lithuania's role as a centre of regional initiatives. Lithuania's narratives clearly distinguish between the Baltic and the Central European regions and see herself as a Baltic country.

Membership of the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Central European (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary) and Mediterranean (Malta, Cyprus) states for the first time connects East and West of the old continent into one harmonious formation. Good neighbourly relations became the highest value of the Baltic sub-region and the symbol of democratic changes (Speech of Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis at the Seimas, 01.05.2004).

During the first year of EU membership Lithuania has become one of the most active Baltic states which connects the European Union with its new eastern neighbours and shapes effective neighbourhood policies of the EU. Our initiatives are supported and appreciated (Speech of Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis at the Seimas, 28.04.2005).

A priori considered the most "Baltic" state, Latvia did not extensively employ the trilateral regional image in her narratives. The Baltic image was the most popular, but to a lesser extent than in Lithuania. Apart from several aspects of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian cooperation, all narratives concerned "common loss", i.e. issues of Baltic occupation by and liberation from the Soviet regime.

Instead, the three Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were subject to another brutal occupation by another foreign, totalitarian empire, that of the Soviet Union (Address by H.E. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of the Republic of Latvia, to the foreign diplomatic corps in Riga, 14.01.2005).

Fifteen years ago, hundreds of thousands of people joined hands from Tallinn to Riga and from Riga to Vilnius. They were united by the same aspiration that unites us today – the desire for freedom (Address of Latvia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Baltic Way, Riga, 23.08.2004).

Estonian politicians also anchored the greatest importance to the trilateral "Baltic" regional images. A lot of statements were devoted to the common historical experiences. Estonian policy makers successfully denied the stereotype of the "dying Baltic unity".

Maybe somewhere it is really thought or even hoped that the political cooperation among the Baltic states is history. But in reality it is not so. The situation today requires from the Baltic states the same kind of determination and support of each other as we had 10–15 years ago (The President of the Republic at the 87th Anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, February 24, 2005, Estonia Theatre, 24.02.2005).

The quantitative and qualitative analysis confirmed the dominant discourse of the trilateral Baltic sub-regional identity. The Baltic sub-regional self identification was the strongest and based on securitised Soviet legacies and the related Baltic partnership. Lithuanian references regarding Central (and Eastern) Europe spoke mainly of Poland and virtually nothing else – it is hard to blame Lithuania as a Central European country, as region-builders did not construct such meanings. Regional images of the “North” became the “second best” on the scale of regional preferences bearing in mind the principles of amity. Table 3 depicts the level of self-affiliation in the relation between state and a region.

The compatibility of regional images among the Baltics differed from country to country. References to Central (and Eastern Europe) were almost incongruent. Only the meaning of historical injustices throughout the last 50 years and emphasis on best achievements in this region link Latvian and Estonian narratives. The concept of the region exhibits the modern concepts of “states”, “security”, “occupation”, “East–West” divide” and the like. However, the Lithuanian discourses are built upon “expansion of freedom and democracy”. The ideas of the “Baltic sea area” rest on the common images of “economic growth and cooperation”, “investments”, “growing markets”, “trade” and “environment”, i.e. soft security as mentioned above. Lithuanian and Estonian statements have the Nordic–Baltic axis in common, and Latvian and Estonian speeches share economy-centred images. So far, the narratives about this region have also focused upon the

Table 3. State self-affiliation to the region, April 30, 2004 – July 28, 2005

	<i>Lithuania</i>	<i>Latvia</i>	<i>Estonia</i>
Central (and Eastern) Europe	Medium	Low	Low
Baltic sea	Low	Medium	Medium
Nordic, North, Scandinavian	High	Low	High
Baltic	High	High	High

states as the key actors in regional and international politics. However, the meanings of the Baltic Sea trans-region slightly shift toward postmodern thinking which tries to coin new categories in foreign policy ideas. Concepts of security acquire comprehensiveness with economic, societal and environmental aspects. Although state borders and sovereignty are not challenged, Russia is seen as an inseparable part of the region for the dialogue. Transformation and diversity are acknowledged as a feature on the Baltic Sea area which needs a “new philosophy”. However, discourses of the Baltic Sea trans-region are still far from postmodern in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The analysis of narratives arrives at the same conclusion of Marko Lehti (1999): re-established statehood and sovereignty focus on the modern attributes of state and clash with postmodern principles in the Baltic Sea area.

Images of the “North” disclosed the political, economic and geographical aspects of partnership and collaboration. Lithuanian and Estonian narratives, and Latvian ones to a lesser extent, embraced similar discursive structures with a stress on the Nordic–Baltic political and economic cooperation. The geographical location in the north became the common denominator for Estonian and Latvian politicians, whereas Lithuania envisioned herself as a “link” to Northern Europe or a “North European economy”. The discursive structures of the “north” do not suffer from postmodernism, as nobody speaks of asecurity, networking, fuzzy borders, relevance of sub-state actors, hybridism, diversity and the like.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses confirmed the hegemonic tri-lateral Baltic sub-regional image, even after Transatlantic integration. As Raimundas Lopata puts it: “The main geopolitical basis of the Baltics is not material but ideational, namely a spirit of civil and free self-determination, which affects the balance of powers” (Lopata 1997, 53). The compatibility of Baltic sub-regional representations in the narratives is the highest compared with other regional reflections and heavily builds upon legacies of the Soviet history as “occupation”, “loss of sovereignty”, “liberation”, the “Baltic Way”, traditional political and military cooperation and security issues. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia adhere to the idea of the Baltic states which experienced a successful transformation to democracy. The regional identities remain preoccupied with very modern concerns such as hard

Table 4. Compatibility of region images among countries, April 30, 2004 – July 28, 2005

	<i>Compatibility</i>	<i>Common denominator</i>	<i>Modern / Postmodern</i>
Central (and Eastern) Europe	Low	Soviet heritage	Modern
Baltic sea	Medium	Low politics	Modern/ Postmodern
Nordic, North, Scandinavian	Medium	Political and economic partnership Northern location	Modern
Baltic	High	Soviet legacy Security issues Political partnership Success of post-communist transformation	Modern

security, border control and state-oriented approach. The Baltic and Nordic regional images are the most congruent narratives and produced a potential for the political Baltoscandian region in the future. Table 4 sums up the aforementioned aspects of the compatibility of regional attachments.

Post-enlargement narratives in the three Baltic states do not frequently employ othering or “Us” / “Them” distinction which, as a rule, should be the basis of regional constellations organising the “order among Us” against “chaos among Them”. The discursive structures inscribe a high degree of inclusiveness of regional identities; the othering prevails mostly in references connected with notorious Soviet experiences and legacies, that is “Baltic” and “Central (and Eastern) European” cases. The “Other” usually refers to the USSR / Russia and signals about insecurity which can be diminished by democracy exports eastwards. The most inclusive and deliberately avoiding discourses of othering are the references on the Baltic Sea trans-region where Russia is considered as an important player and inseparable part. However, this region does not address the most important, so-called modern concerns of the countries, and Russia is not included in the circle of partners in other regional trajectories. Overall, the modern and neorealist discourses are hegemonic and compatible among themselves across regional identities in Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian governmental narratives. Liberal approaches are more cooperation-friendly,




Figure 4. Regional references in the neutral milieu

yet they are visible only in eastward-oriented foreign policies in terms of democracy exports.

The collection of empirical data on regional narratives was completed by July 28, 2005 and described after a month. Fortunately, due to an ongoing research on the Baltic Assembly, under the auspices of the Centre of Strategic Studies at the Foreign Ministry, the collection of data on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of narratives was extended till July 20, 2006. The quantitative distribution of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian regional references (Figure 4) in the period July 29 2005 – July 20, 2006 indicates the prevalence of the trilateral Baltic sub-region in governmental political narratives.

Comparing the latest data with the empirical evidence on the governmental narratives from April 30, 2004 to July 28, 2005, the current pattern of the distribution of regional references does not change: the trilateral Baltic sub-region prevails with very similar numbers.

In qualitative terms, the concept of the Baltic sub-region is highly compatible, since it hinges upon common recent historical experiences from the Soviet times and various forms of cooperation, especially in the sphere of energy, which “moved” from low politics to high politics and became an important part of independence due to Russian pressure on new democracies via energy resources. Realist and modern discourses of securitisation are still dominant, although liberal ideas of cooperation receive more attention. As for the Central (and Eastern) Europe, the only common denominator is common Soviet legacies, experiences and the related Transatlantic integration. Latvia and especially Lithuania stress assistance for democra-

cies eastwards from the eastern borders, whereas Estonia focuses on economic performance and cooperation. “Northern” images in Lithuania are not widespread in the period examined and, as previously mentioned, Lithuania is “a link between European regions”. Latvia emphasises the economic cooperation with the Nordic countries, and Estonia mostly speaks of NB8 in foreign policies and success of the Nordic states. All in all, the common denominator is hard to find and “Northern” images are coloured with liberal discourses. Finally, the images of the Baltic Sea trans-region differ between Lithuania, which adheres to the idea of “bridging” and underlines cooperation with the Black Sea trans-region, and Latvia and Estonia which focus on various cooperation patterns in low politics. Postmodern thinking in regional identities does not emerge; instead liberal discourses on cooperation have lately been visible.

A comparison of the latest data with the empirical evidence from a relatively short period of April 30, 2004 – July 28, 2005 reveals a rather stable pattern of meanings of collective identities and does not distort the general findings. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia adhere to the trilateral Baltic sub-regional affiliation most, and the compatibility of regional images is the highest in the case of “Baltic” too. Modern principles in regional identities, especially in the Baltic case, remain dominant. Baltic political elite seems to show rather a consensus on than indifference to the trilateral issues, since security concerns are embedded in the minds of policy makers and there is a ground for those concerns in Russia. As mentioned above, energy issues gradually grow into high politics because of their connection to security. As the Estonian foreign minister aptly pinpointed:

In matters concerning energy, the Baltic states are all in a very similar situation and need to cooperate. All three states have similar basic concerns – rising energy costs, the excessive connectedness of our power grids with monopolistic Russian firms, the isolation of Baltic power grids from those of the European Union Member States, the fact that energy is becoming a means for applying international political pressure... (Main Guidelines of Estonia’s Foreign Policy, Address by Urmas Paet, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, to the *Riigikogu* on behalf of the Government of Estonia, 6 June 2006).

One must admit that the latest period for updating the data is relatively short and not much water has gone under the bridge since the Transatlan-

tic integration. Therefore, foreign policy in the Baltics is in search of the new opportunities and roles, including regional affiliations. However, the legacies of earlier identities are very much alive.

Conclusions

Analysis of regional identities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia revealed that the trilateral Baltic sub-region exists in the discursive structures of regional meanings. Old legacies dogged regional mind-mapping in the Baltic states. Construction of political regions in terms of regional identities confirmed the dominant trilateral Baltic sub-regional identity in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which was constructed around the categories of the common Soviet experiences and legacies and subsequent sovereignty, security and its derivative, Transatlantic integration vs. Russia. Patterns of amity in discursive structures disclosed an increasing Baltic and Baltic–Nordic partnership. Desecuritisation in the narratives was virtually absent, whereas othering and exclusionary regional identities against the “Other” (Russia) and inward-oriented among the Baltics were abundant, though they slightly reduced after the Transatlantic enlargement. The Baltic sub-regional identity and even *ad hoc* detachments from it have mainly been constructed in the West / Russia division. The discursive structures of meanings showed that construction of political regions via collective identities owed to historical memories and external factors a lot. They permeated almost all but the Baltic Sea trans-regional identities.

Taking into account the realist, liberalist and postmodern standpoints on security and cooperation, post-enlargement discourses in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were *a priori* anticipated to relax the dominant modern and realist discourses, since the Baltic membership in the NATO and EU was supposed to make Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia feel secure. However, the majority of regional identities in the Baltics are still anchored in the realist domain with securitisation and sovereigntisation in mind. Regional identities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia may be not carved in stone, but have revealed a relative stability and surprising resilience for more than two years after Transatlantic integration.

Construction of the dominant Baltic sub-region came largely about and was sustained due to the prevalent post-Soviet Baltic identity of “common

fate” against the Russian “Other”. On the other hand, socio-cultural, religious and linguistic differences, discrepant historical past and different problems of nation building in the post-communist transition have been discarded from political narratives and did not form dominant meanings in the discursive structures of collective identities. The most popular Baltic and Northern regional attachments in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as the discursive structures of regional meanings reveal, are close in terms of amity patterns and can serve as a favourable background for more intensive cooperative practices and perhaps emergence of the open Nordic–Baltic or Baltoscandian region in the future.

Abbreviations

BSR – Baltic Sea trans-region

CEE – Central and Eastern Europe

EU – European Union

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NB6 – Nordic–Baltic Six

NB8 – Nordic–Baltic Eight

USSR – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

SPEECHES OF LITHUANIAN, LATVIAN AND ESTONIAN OFFICIALS

1. Address by Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet to the Riigikogu, 07.06.2005
2. Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, at the conclusion of the Latvian – Bulgarian Business Forum, Hotel Rīdzene, Riga, 21.03.2005
3. Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, at the Portuguese–Latvian Business Forum New Cooperation Opportunities within an Enlarged Europe Lisbon, Feira Internacional de Lisboa, 15.09.2004
4. Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, to the Members of the States General of the Netherlands, the Hague, 18.01.2005
5. Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of the Republic of Latvia, at the joint Turkish–Latvian and Latvian–Turkish Business Councils Meeting, Conrad Hotel, Istanbul, 20.04.2005
6. Address by H. E. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of the Republic of Latvia, to the foreign diplomatic corps in Riga 14.01.2005
7. Address by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Estonia Kristiina Ojuland to the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, Egypt, Cairo, 25.01.2005
8. Address of Acting President Artūras Paulauskas at the Parliament, 01.05.2004

9. Address of Latvia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Baltic Way, Riga 23.08.2004
10. Main Guidelines of Estonia's Foreign Policy, Address by Mr. Urmas Paet, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia to the Riigikogu on behalf of the Government of Estonia 06.06.2006
11. Main Guidelines of Estonia's Foreign Policy, Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia Kristina Ojula to the Riigikogu, 08.06.2004
12. Speech by Artūras Paulauskas, Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania, at Vilnius University, Lithuania's New Foreign Policy, 24.05.2004
13. Speech of Foreign minister Antanas Valionis at the meeting with heads of Lithuanian diplomatic missions abroad, 07.07.2004
14. Speech of Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis at the Seimas, 01.05.2004.
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