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Editor

ALGIMANTAS JANKAUSKAS

VILNIUS 2004

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PREFACE

We are happy to present the fifth volume of the *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook*. The *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook* aims to present, first of all, to foreign readers the achievements of the Lithuanian political science as well as to reflect the tendencies of the development in the domestic and foreign policy of Lithuania.

The present volume of the *Yearbook* follows the previously employed structure and principles. The main topic of this volume is the Presidential Crisis in Lithuania.

The Presidential Crisis in 2003 – 2004 was a unique political phenomenon in the European political orbit. It was a challenge both for the political institutions and for the society. The authors of the *Yearbook* pursue to answer the questions of what were the main causes and lessons of this crisis; what impact the Presidential Crisis had for the democratic process in the country: was it strengthened or weakened by and after the Impeachment. We hope that this exceptional political experiment will be of interest for the reader.

In addition, the reader of this year's *Yearbook* is invited to ponder over considerations on aesthetic elements in politics and the assessment of the comparative qualitative analysis perspective in the comparative politics.

The *Yearbook* continues its analysis of the Lithuanian political parties. This time, the topics revolve around the role of parties in recruiting process of the elite and a rather understudied subject such as women participation in politics.

As usual, the part on International relations and the Euroatlantic integration is rich in its diversity of topics and academic insights. Here, the contributors to the *Yearbook* analyze the impact of the EU enlargement on the Transatlantic relations, possible scenarios of the Lithuanian European policy.

In this issue, the urgent themes of terrorism and Russia's role in global arms trade are once again revisited.

The editor of the *Yearbook* expresses his sincere gratitude to sponsors, whose financial support enabled this issue to reach the reader.

PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS IN LITHUANIA

SEVERAL CAUSES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS IN LITHUANIA *

Raimundas Lopata, Audrius Matonis

The impeachment proceedings against President Rolandas Paksas have been widely discussed by political analysts and political scientists in Lithuania and abroad. All of them have been primarily interested in the underlying causes of this crisis. Below are insights identifying the causes of this crisis.

We can once again emphasise the trends which were obvious even without a special knowledge of politics. In fact, no artistic-scientific speculation is necessary to see that, in terms of duration, the crisis lasted longer than any other previous jolts in internal politics. Moreover, it broke out in an institution which, by its nature and experience of more than a decade, should have been the most stable pillar of the political system.

We seemingly need no textbooks to know that the stability of the parliament and the government depends on the composition of the Seimas, which may be very fragmented and even fluctuating: due to changes in their interests (which often causes anger, but only an idiot has no interests and, therefore, is always happy) politicians often switch from one fraction to another and, therefore, there are no guarantees that the governing powers will survive the entire term of office of the parliament. However, even governmental crises wear down rather quickly as the parties which can form a government tend to consolidate their power as soon as possible. The Seimas procedure for a vote of no confidence in the government is rather simple and quick.

Before the autumn of 2003, few could have expected that a crisis would strike the institution of the President. We already know that the semi-presidential system in Lithuania, as in some other post-communist states, was chosen because of its potential to mitigate the risks of concentration of power. Now, after the institution of the President triggered a political crisis, we have changed our tune. In other words, we never thought that when everything was smooth as silk, it was high time to stop and think: maybe things are running a bit too smoothly. But we did not.

* Extract from the book *Prezidento suktukas (President's Spin)*. Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2004. P. 239–255. Translation from Lithuanian.

A directly elected president, it seems, should not be worrying about his five-year term of office. We, at the same time, are not worrying as well since he, contrary to the government, is free from the seesaw political interests of parties. Moreover, it seemed that the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania only provided for theoretical possibilities for the president to leave office prematurely.

In late 2003, these theoretical possibilities materialised. The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, having assessed the evidence collected, started impeachment proceedings against the president.

To be fair, we need to acknowledge that Lithuania has not been enjoying a high degree of political stability simply because of too many changes of governments. Thirteen years of independence saw twelve different governments, i.e. a government, on the average, lasted just one year. Only the last government of Algirdas Brazauskas, which came into office in 2001, could be regarded as relatively stable if it manages to stay in power until the Seimas election in 2004 (which is highly likely). In this case it can be crowned as the most stable government constituted after the restoration of independence.

The term political stability is usually used in reference to two spheres: (a) efficiency of adopting and enforcing political decisions, and (b) trust in state institutions and the climate they create for business and other social activities.

The first sphere marks the ability of state institutions to operate smoothly within the framework of democratic processes including the transfer of power to other political forces due to limited terms of office and changes in preferences of the electorate (reflected in the results of elections). The survival of the democratic regime often relies on the willingness of politicians and institutions to respect the established “rules of the game”, honour the choice made by the public and readiness to yield ground to their political opponents. This is why the first decades of young democracies are the test of democracy and the process of transfer of power receives as much attention as the election process itself.

Usually, political stability is understood as the ability of any regime to stay in power for a long time without resorting to radical or frequent changes in the political system. However, in addition to the duration of staying in power (as the factor of stability), it is necessary to bear in mind the criterion of efficiency of government. The efficiency of government, in its broadest sense, means that the authorities must be able to adopt decisions, whatever happens, according to changes, circumstances and needs. In other words, the purpose of government is to govern; otherwise, it is inefficient and redundant. Therefore, the assessment of the stability of one or another political system usually relies on two criteria which characterise stability: the frequency of government changes and the smoothness of the political decision-making process.

The decision-making process reflects whether government is able to implement its policies and meet the needs and expectations of the society. In recent years, the institutional capacity of Lithuania to adopt and implement decisions played a significant role in attaining the strategic goals of the state – membership in the EU and NATO. Negotiations with the European Commission and requirements to harmonise the legislation and executive and control institutions of Lithuania with the EU standards in a relatively short time was a major test for the political decision-making mechanism of Lithuania. We can state that the invitation to join the EU was the best recognition that the Lithuanian government passed this test of political stability. At the same time, it reinforced the confidence of external players in the political regime of Lithuania.

However, a number of questions still need to be answered.

Is it clear that profound processes being endured in the society are not synchronous with the achievements in the Euro-Atlantic integration of Lithuania? Have we realised that the dramatic mental gap between various social groups still remains? Would it be wrong to state that a positive image of Lithuania cemented in the international community and seemingly viable economic exterior of the state sent the political elite to sleep believing that the most difficult phase of the development of statehood is already a thing of the past? And last but not least, do we understand that the majority of achievements were the result of external factors rather than of natural internal causes, thus the political system of the state is not as stable as we would have liked it to be?

In our opinion, these external factors pushed Lithuania into the current crisis.

Once again: it is extremely difficult to assess the impact of external and internal factors on the development of Lithuanian politics after (during) the recent presidential election of 2002–2003 in a clear and unequivocal manner. Not only because of the burden of numerous studies or articles dealing with this topic, but also because of a widely-recognised fact that the correlation of these factors can hardly be separated at all.

Nevertheless, it seems that it has been already obvious that the very beginning of Lithuania's membership in the EU and NATO will require an immense resistance of the political system of Lithuania to external and internal factors. The Lithuanian political and administrative system will have to integrate into the political framework of the EU devoting a large share of administrative resources, and will have to improve the efficiency of political decision-making. Moreover, as Lithuania will be regularly involved in the decision-making process at the intergovernmental and supranational level of the EU, it will necessitate learning how to compromise between the interests of internal political powers

for quick agreement on the common position of Lithuania and ways to protect the interests of Lithuania in the EU institutions. This can only be achieved by setting up extremely close co-operation between different branches of government and following the precise rules of the political process, even though such rules are not official and are applied by convention. In this respect, any signs of political instability, even if they were merely the elements of tension between Lithuanian authorities or internal political differences, may slow down the pace of political decision-making and damage the interests of Lithuania.

In this context, the political crisis in Lithuania which started in late October is a clear factor of political instability simply because it may disrupt the rhythm of operation of three institutions of government – the early presidential election, the interim period until the inauguration of the new president and the formation of the new presidential team may play havoc among political powers as they will try to reshuffle their resources and take advantage of the situation to strengthen their political influence. Each election, in some sense, disrupts the usual mechanism of political decisions as each political force focuses on election campaigns at the expense of governance and decision-making.

In terms of political stability and efficiency of decision-making, each election is the evil which can only be justified by the supremacy of democratic principles. Therefore, proponents of political stability often try to maintain the term of office of government for as long as possible. The primary election in democratic political systems should serve as the last resort to save the situation when it reaches its critical moment, and not as usual accounting of government to the electorate (i.e. as some sort of “rebooting” of the political system when it “freezes”).

However, the malfunctioning of the political decision-making machine before the primary election is a more serious blow to political stability in Lithuania than the likelihood of a primary presidential election. Complex presidential impeachment proceedings set up a situation when the largest share of effort is required for the implementation of the likelihood of the primary election itself. This makes the political forces withdraw some of their resources from normal and potentially complex decisions necessary for the smooth running of the state and for the strengthening of national interests. The impeachment proceedings virtually isolate the Office of the President from political decision-making as the president just tries to keep his position and ceases to perform his direct administrative duties.

The presidential crisis has already had an impact on the political stability in terms of the efficiency of decision-making. Disruption in normal operation of one of the branches of political government and even the first signs that it might be ignored or isolated from other members of the political process created

the risk that decision-making will become considerably difficult in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the potential of the crisis to spread within the political system is a more serious threat to political stability. The relatively wide powers of the president allow him to approach the Seimas with a motion for a vote of no confidence in the government or, in certain situations, to dissolve the Seimas and announce an early election to the parliament. These powers of the president, even though relatively theoretical, increase the threat of potential political instability. Therefore, despite the fact that the institution of the president is not the most important arm of government in the legislative and enforcement process, the crisis in the Office of the President may destabilise the entire pyramid of government authority.

Such destabilisation may cause material damage to the interests of the state, especially when all arms of government must have a united stand in strategic decision-making or implementation of reforms of the political system. The pre-accession of Lithuania to the EU and NATO can be regarded as this type of period. One can only guess the consequences of this crisis for the membership of Lithuania in the EU or NATO had this scandal broken out before the completion of negotiations with the European Commission or before the North Atlantic Council adopted the decision to invite Lithuania to join the Alliance.

The current escalation of the crisis shows that the entire political process is under heavy influence of the crisis which also severely restricts the work of the parliament. The work of the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission of the Seimas, applications to the Constitutional Court and preparation for the presidential impeachment proceedings became the focus of parliamentary activity, even overshadowing the debates on the national budget. Presumably, the legislative processes related to Lithuania's membership in the EU would have been placed in the background in a similar fashion and that would have harmed Lithuania's abilities to negotiate efficiently with the European Commission.

A certain international marginalisation of the president, as the head of state, would have inflicted considerable damage on the representation of interests of Lithuania at the highest level both in the EU and NATO structures. Therefore, we can agree with the hints of partners and allies in the West that had the scandal and the threat of political instability started earlier, it could have firmly closed the door for Lithuania to join the EU and NATO.

In this context, it should hardly be necessary to mention the importance of trusting in the ability of the political government to make decisions and maintain political stability for the sake of national economic interests.

However, it is also necessary to mention that the principle of division of power promoted by democracy and proven in practise has started to crack in

Lithuania. Primarily because an attempt to apply this principle in a specific manner resulted in the creation of an atmosphere ready to deny democracy. The paradox of the situation is that the illusion of democracy is nominally maintained: 86 signatures of members of the Seimas necessary to initiate the impeachment proceedings against the president were collected. President Paksas and several supporting political parties have found themselves on one side of the barricades of this direct confrontation while the majority of the Seimas and the government were on the other side. The problem was that the consensus between the Office of the President, the Seimas and the Government disappeared completely. It disappeared for one reason: the head of the state Paksas was reluctant to respond to any arguments of his opponents.

In general, political practice has two main sources of consolidating state power and ensuring stability. The first one relies on the supremacy of force, compulsory measures and control of public life, and it is personified by the prototype of the Orwellian society. The second one presupposes a voluntary recognition of the existing relations of power and subordination in the political community. The latter necessitates common agreement or assumption that the policy of political coexistence is lawful, justified, appropriate and efficient. Then the mechanisms of power enforcing this policy are deemed to be legitimate. In other words, legitimate and recognised power, which is trusted and voluntarily obeyed, acquires the authority. It would be wrong to assume that the requirement of legitimacy applies only in democratic regimes. In historic practice, the authority of power was being created and maintained in a number of ways: through a routine of customs and traditions, by appealing to transcendental rights, charismatic powers of individuals, etc. However, liberal Western democracy is different in that its legitimacy is a prerequisite for the loyalty of the political community and its submission to mechanisms of power, while the concept of legitimate power is much more complex.

It is possible to state that the presidential scandal, which had no precedents after the restoration of independent state, which triggered a major division of the nation and posed a threat to the hard-won international prestige of Lithuania shows that both the *crème de la crème* of politics and most of the public have difficulties in understanding the rules of democratic coexistence in general. The analysis of the presidential crisis allows us to identify three main fields of threats to legitimacy of government:

- Institutional interaction of powers. This is a problem of trust in Paksas and the status of the institution of the president in the system of powers.
- Trust of the public. This is a matter of the authority of the president and other state institutions in the society and the support of citizens for the political regime in general.

- International arena. This is the impact of the scandal on the international prestige of Lithuania and emerging threats to strategic goals of foreign policy.

A simple rhetorical question “Is Paksas guilty?” was at the core of the scandal which broke out in the public arena. On a broader scale: Is the President related to threats to the national security of Lithuania?

Officially declared doubts and suspicions of the public as regards the legitimacy of the actions of people surrounding the President first of all created the conflict of trust in the head of state. This conflict had a negative impact on the system of state institutions and the public. Basically, the disagreement over the basis for the legitimacy of the presidential power provided the medium for continuance and growth of tension between the President and his opponents. Is the office of the head of state lost only in the event of forfeit of *legal legitimacy*, i.e. when gross violation of norms of the national legal system has been proved? Is the institution of the president discredited by suspicions of such violations and the loss of *moral authority* in the eyes of the population and the international community or not?

The conflict was pushed to a deadlock for two main reasons. First of all, according to national legislation, the prerogative to decide on the confidence in the President has been vested in the Seimas which has the direct mandate of the nation rather than in the judicial power. The President had the same mandate. Secondly, the efforts of Paksas to mobilise his electorate and maintain or even strengthen the confidence of a part of the public were partially successful.

What was the impact of the scandal on the interaction between the Office of the President and other public authorities? How did the relationship between Paksas and the political elite change? First of all, it is necessary to mention that the evolving political drama was highly dependant on the inability of Paksas, in his presidential capacity, to adapt to the political elite and on display of his presidential powers by trying to strengthen the control of certain state institutions. The President was saved from imminent political isolation only by the hand of partnership offered by Brazauskas. However, at the beginning of the presidential scandal, it became apparent that Paksas failed to accumulate symbolic capital during his eight months in office and to improve the prestige of his power in the political system.

The alarm of special services that the activities of people surrounding the President may be incompatible with the national interests of Lithuania raised fears that the institution of the head of state was paralysed and incapable of proper fulfilment of its constitutional duties. At the same time, there was a problem of political responsibility to the public. The tactics of uncompromising and hostile denial chosen by President Paksas, as reflected by the metaphor of

“conspiracy”, suggested that the constructive dialogue between the two institutions directly elected by the people was not possible. The President did not make any effort to strengthen his authority at the top of the governing powers and to consolidate the political system. In fact, he acted in just the opposite way. He tried, as we already said, to demonstrate his presidential powers, interpreting them too broadly (to put it mildly) and, at the same time, to neutralise the pressure from the Seimas.

Naturally, a rather defiant challenge of Paksas to the parliament vested with the right to presidential impeachment was met with outrage. The President, through some kind of “cat-and-mouse” game with the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission of the Seimas into Possible Threats to National Security, showed, indirectly, that he treated the scandal as an artificial and staged crisis – a “political spectacle”. A similar assessment can be given to a purposeful declaration of the idea that unjustified attack was deliberately organised against the President (“continuation of the conspiracy”). This idea should have helped prepare for counterattack against the opponents. The President, by ridiculing the concern of the political elite and ignoring the efforts of public authorities to investigate the activities of persons surrounding him, has shown that he both disrespects the work of national institutions and disregards their authority. As the tension increased in the climate of complete lack of understanding, there were doubts if such actions violated the principles of control of power in a democratic regime or not, if the head of state could adequately understand the importance of his obligations and role in the political system or not.

Today, the promise of the would-be President, “I will apply the call for responsibility, as the supreme law of the country, first and foremost to myself and to the people around me” declared in the elections sounds rather ironic.

Political forces demanding the responsibility of Paksas soon declared that the President acted irresponsibly and, instead of following national interests, was protecting his personal ambitions. Calls for Paksas to resign were the most obvious expression of “institutional alienation” and lack of political confidence. After the Prime Minister turned his back and only pro-presidential liberal-democrats and marginals of national political life were left on the “right” side of the barricades, Paksas became a “lonely soldier” in the context of institutional interaction. Lost confidence, animosity by ruling political forces and a display of persistence to keep the office of the head of state not only discredited Paksas as a politician in the eyes of the public, but was also a major blow to the prestige of the institution of the president, which traditionally has enjoyed very high approval ratings. The political crisis which sent shockwaves through the country raised the question of how the system of government would be able to continue its successful and efficient operation if it had to “get along”

with the same President. It also provoked the constitutional initiatives to improve the “rules of the game of politics” which were hardly necessary for such a transitional period experienced in Lithuania.

It would be wrong to deny that the conflict between the President and the majority of the Seimas turned into a political competition. However, both opposing sides of the dispute held at the highest level of state institutions and public policy were forced to look for legal arguments. The set up of the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission of the Seimas and the presidential impeachment proceedings showed that, to begin with, the issue of the actions of President Paksas and, at the same time, further *legal legitimacy* of his power had been raised. A motion drawn up by a group of Seimas members, which technically started the impeachment proceedings, stated six violations of the national Constitution and the oath of office. The President was charged with links to individuals of suspect reputation inappropriate for the head of state, failure to comply with the requirements for protection of a state secret, conflict of public and private interests, interference with the harmonious functioning of state institutions, discrediting the authority of government and negligent fulfilment of duties entrusted under the law. The system of constitutional provisions was also used by the President and liberaldemocrats for solid defence arguments. First of all, they demanded respecting the presumption of innocence and the judgement of courts, as the only power specified in the Constitution for enforcement of justice, regarding the guilt of the President. The Seimas was accused of lack of legal competence, politicisation of the problem and failure to observe the principle of equity. The charges brought against Paksas gave rise to a dispute over the degree of existing or possible threat to Lithuania.

Admittedly, the question of the degree of threat is of extreme importance in this context. However, it is necessary to emphasise that the level of presidential responsibility is increased by the special role of this institution in the constitutional structure of Lithuania and the role of the president in domestic and foreign policy of the state. Moreover, the question is: do the suspicions of a possible threat to the country give sufficient grounds to prevent such a threat or not? However, this requires a shift from the domain of formal legal procedures to the sphere of ethics and requires an answer to another question: how was the problem of the vulnerability of the President perceived by the public?

Probably no other political process in the history of Lithuania received as much publicity and was followed as widely as the scandal of President Paksas and his team. It was probably the first time that the decision to ensure maximum “transparency” of the process, publicly broadcast the hearings of the Seimas Commission and the Constitutional Court and maintain regular information contacts with the public was made so quickly. This prompts the conclusion

that public opinion played a very special role in this conflict. Officially, the fate of the president is to be decided by the Seimas. However, democratic principles suggest that the issue of political non-confidence is always not only a legal matter but also a matter of values. It is, as many political scientists would say, a problem of *normative* legitimacy.

As the scandal was growing, the conservatives were probably the first to declare that the President lost his “moral authority”. However, this declaration had to be accepted by the nation. The interest of the Lithuanian people in the scandal and the initiatives of protest actions proved that the issue of the forced resignation of Paksas could not have been dealt with without the factor of public opinion. Formally, both the Seimas and the president have a direct mandate to represent the nation. Therefore, at least theoretically, the initiative of impeachment by the parliament could be disputed if the president had strong support of the people. In such a case, the mood and loyalty of people acquire even more weight.

The involvement of the public in the scandal again confirmed the idea of French president Charles de Gaulle that politics is too big and too important to be left to the politicians. On the other hand, the publicity of the scandal and the opportunity for politicians to appeal to the will of people posed bigger threats.

The question was: is the public well-prepared to participate in the settlement of such serious problems of public coexistence? Basically, the never-ending flow of scandal-related information in the media had the effect of wearing people down rather than helping them understand or enabling them to objectively measure the actions of President Paksas and his opponents. Moreover, the President used the argument of the “will of the nation” and turned public opinion into the main tool for his defence. The fact that the president elected to start a direct fight with the majority of political forces in the country despite a catastrophic image among the political elite can only be explained by one tactic. Wasn't it an attempt to repeat the scenario of the presidential election? In other words, Paksas was probably expecting to ruin a massive opposition of political forces by mobilising the support of the part of public which favoured him. There is also reason to believe that this was an attempt to hit two targets at once.

Firstly, not only to exert pressure on the Seimas, which was initiating the impeachment, but also on those members of the parliament who were yet undecided on the issue. Secondly, to forestall the events and start careful preparation for an early presidential election should the impeachment proceedings result in the removal of the head of state from office. As the confrontation increased and the wave of criticism in the media strengthened, the necessity of

a defensive backing became even stronger so Paksas decided to avoid the ill-disposed “fourth power” and to benefit from the tactics of direct contact with population, which had been so successful during his election campaign.

How did publicity and these political developments change public opinion on government and politics? The results of public polls show that the popularity of the president was gradually decreasing in December. Even in rural areas, there were more people opposing Paksas than supporting him. The decline of the authority of the head of state was also manifest in the increase of the ratings of Prime Minister Brazauskas, who encouraged the President to resign, A. Sakalas who was the chair of the Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission of the Seimas as well as the increased confidence in the Constitutional Court, which had heard the case on the citizenship of Y. Borisov (if you will excuse me for failing to keep chronological distance). The fact that the scandal had virtually no impact on the approval ratings of the Seimas and the Government allows us to conclude that people associated the conflict with personalities rather than institutions, with those political leaders who were most proactive and commentating the scandal in the media.

General results of polls show that, despite the decreasing number of those who approve of the actions of the President, the number of those who are disoriented, lost and undecided about the situation is increasing. In December, the latter comprised one fifth of the population. The phenomenal popularity of business tycoon V. Uspaskich and the drastic jump of his new-born Labour Party to the top of ratings of political parties show that people in Lithuania tend to plunge from one leader to another, continuously seek for new favourites and trust in individuals who are generous in their populist promises.

How can these trends be explained and which factors determine the confidence of people in their government and the cult of personalities? It is quite possible that the loyalty of people is primarily dependent on the efficient operation of public authorities and their leadership. In other words, the likelihood of support increases if undertaken policies yield concrete measurable results of public welfare. The second factor can be related to political culture – the entirety of views and approaches to politics of individuals of the political community defining the competence of these individuals as citizens. Since, in the meantime, the majority of the population can hardly feel the consequences of the gradual growth of the Lithuanian economy, the opinion about government largely relies on political culture and its values which were formed in the climate of the Soviet authoritarian regime. Changes of political regime, democratic developments in the country and transition to market economy drastically changed the rules of public coexistence. However, despite our preferences, the culture of “subordinate” is still viable. Even nowadays, the dependency of the

individual on the state as well as the restraint of initiative and activity forced upon people during the totalitarian rule drive the public to have unreasonable expectations for political power. This is exactly why the so-called political elite are constantly blamed for all economic failures and social woes. The signs of apolitical views and disinterest in political process are still vivid as well as the belief that an ordinary man has no say in politics. These features of political culture unfolded in meetings of Paksas with people in urban and rural areas. The metaphor of the gap between the elite and the masses as well as simple, unsophisticated and abstract speeches were used to try to show that the President felt at home among ordinary people and uncongenial to the government, which shows little interest in their well-being. The strict tone of Paksas during the meetings and his remarks about striking at the opponents who “provoked the scandal and even the conspiracy” as well as hiding under the criticism of political opponents is still tolerated in the society, which is even fostering the expectations of authoritarian “hard-hand” politics. The rather wide political activity of the society and massive involvement in protest actions does not give sufficient ground to state that the scandal has shown the maturity of civil society. It is more evident of rudiments of civil society. Instead of being based on the critical assessment of promises, the competence of leaders themselves and their long-term keynote programmes, the actions of the supporters of Uspaskich or Paksas are based on irrational and emotional belief based on like and poor civil competence. Aristotle once said that a good man does not make a good citizen. Therefore, populist tactics are efficient because the majority of the population has absolutely no interest in the political and economic life of the country. It seems that this fact was instrumental for the President in creating an image of a leader who is active, exuberant and fighting to restore the truth. The authority of Paksas was strengthened by emphasising his role, alleged or genuine, in smuggling, illegal distribution of land and diplomatic service scandals unravelled during the summer. Similarly, approval was sought by showing involvement in the field of foreign policy (visits to Iraq, Germany and institutions of the European Union). The constant pressure of the political elite and direct contact with the electorate inspired an even stronger emotional basis of loyalty of Paksas supporters. With the spread of the idea that the President was a recklessly attacked “martyr of the nation” and “defender of democracy and human rights”, his authority even acquired some charismatic touch and his visits increasingly looked like a pilgrimage around Lithuania.

However, the division of the society and stimulation of civil confrontation, open conflict with national media and disrespect to hierarchs of the Catholic Church triggered the dissatisfaction of a large portion of the population which suggests arriving at different conclusions.

The head of state fails to follow the rules of democratic play, ignores the principle of accountability and dialogue fundamental in a liberal state system and puts at risk the stability of the society, which is one of the main values of public coexistence. Relying on only one third of population, Paksas ignores the lack of trust of others. The division of the citizenry disagreeing on the confidence in the President into three fronts (for the President, against him and undecided) proved once again that fundamental norms of public coexistence have not yet been established in Lithuanian society and that we suffer from a chaos of values. If the crisis does not result in the outbreak of social unrest, its prolonged duration may have a reverse, although also negative, effect. There is a threat of a growing wave of overall disillusionment, cynicism and scepticism about political processes and political regimes.

The presidential crisis revealed the danger of lack of stability in fundamental values of the society. This should lead to understanding that the system of democratic institutes of our country remains very young and vulnerable. It can only be strengthened by a strong effort to develop civil society.

PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS IN LITHUANIA: THE TWO MAJORITIES AND THE ADVENT OF MACHIAVELLIANISM

Vladimiras Laučius

The political crisis in Lithuania, which began in the autumn of 2003 and lasted almost 6 months, ended with the impeachment of President Rolandas Paksas, who failed to hold office for even a quarter of his term. The end of the crisis brought abundant praise from politicians and experts for the country's democracy, for it seemingly passed the test of maturity. This praise, bearing in mind the observation and proven efficiency of democratic procedures, was well-earned. The Presidential crisis convincingly showed that procedural democracy is functioning in Lithuania and is not secondary to Western practices. However, the existence and observation of democratic procedures better illustrates the country's legal than political maturity and stability. The supremacy of law and legitimacy of political actions is in itself not a guarantee of the supremacy of democratic values and justice in the political life of the society.

Since the very beginning of the presidential scandal, Paksas and those around him demanded only legal proof of his guilt from opponents and ignored all political and moral arguments for the resignation of the President. They repeatedly insisted that justice would finally prevail. However, for them justice meant just a legal opinion which would decisively declare the innocence of Paksas. Some of the public, in turn, were firmly convinced that the innocent President was about to be disposed of, and the authors and advocates of this version of conspiracy engaged in political agitation throwing accusations at the "corrupt clan" comprising the Chairman of the Seimas, political parties, the Seimas and law and order authorities. As soon as the parliamentary Commission for Inquiry into Possible Threats to National security Due to the vulnerability of the President was set up, supporters of Paksas started a massive political campaign against the Seimas blaming it and threatening to rip it apart during their meetings. In the autumn of 2003, they established the movement For Justice and a Democratic Lithuania. The title, according to them, reflected two principles violated by the Seimas: justice and democracy. Justice, as mentioned above, was understood rather narrowly and subjectively by the

supporters of Paksas but their idea of democracy was based on the tangible results of the presidential election. The essential question was gradually emerging: who is representing the majority of the electorate in a better and more adequate way – the democratically elected President or the equally democratically elected Seimas?

Both camps of the political conflict interpreted this question, raised as a problem of representation of the majority, in their favour. The opponents of Paksas emphasised that Lithuania was a parliamentary and not a presidential republic. The supporters of the President who was under the harrow of a parliamentary inquiry and impeachment, replied that public trust in the Seimas was much lower than that in the President. They also claimed that the Seimas was a diverse unit with its electorate having different political beliefs, some of them opposing the impeachment, while the majority of those who elected the President were united. The advocates of the parliamentary democracy, in turn, reasonably claimed that more than 40 per cent of the Lithuanian population who voted for Valdas Adamkus in the second round of the election emphatically rejected Paksas and that the Seimas represented a wider majority of the electorate.

Thus the political crisis in Lithuania revealed a certain dichotomy of democratic representation. A somewhat similar phenomenon in the USA was once called the “two majorities”: parliamentary (represented by Congress) and presidential. Political theoreticians who discussed this phenomenon noted that the attitudes of executive-presidential power are more open to changes and beautifully-sounding goals of social progress, abstract, emphasising the objective of equality, and more favourable to the direct-plebiscite democracy model. The priorities of Congressional power, in turn, are more concrete and realistic as this power is more conservative and closed but, at the same time, it is a reliable safeguard against possible authoritarian tendencies¹.

Some scholars studying the American political system raised the alarm as they noticed the latter after World War II when, during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the prerogatives and objectives of the US executive arm of government had been significantly extended. In their opinion, the “presidential majority”, which sought equality, rights and social guarantees, tied their expectations to the extension of presidential powers which, in turn, could have meant the development of the political system in the USA towards an authoritarian regime. Political scientists who were not at ease with the changes in the ratio of representative and executive arms of government warned that such political developments in the second half of the 20th century may be happening in other Western countries. James Burnham investigated the topic which today, after the presidential crisis in Lithuania, associates with the criticism of admirers of the impeached President directed at the parliamentary commissions.

In his article *The Attack on Investigations* Burnham shows the degree of discontent of the US Administration with the parliamentary inquiries of Congress². To be fair, the words of the Prime Minister of Lithuania describing the work of the ad hoc inquiry commission as “a show” probably have more bite than the reactions described by Burnham.

In the article on a potentially imminent era of new Caesars in the West, Amoury de Riencourt notes that contemporary tendencies of egalitarianism and the subservience of politicians resembles the atmosphere of the coming into power of the Caesarism in ancient Rome and, quite democratically, leads to authoritarianism. “Our Western world, America and Europe, are threatened with Caesarism on a scale unknown since the dawn of the Roman Empire <...> Expanding democracy leads unintentionally to imperialism <...> The greater the social equality, the dimmer the prospects of liberty, and as society becomes more equalitarian, it tends increasingly to concentrate absolute power in the hands of one single man <...> Caesarism is not dictatorship, not a result of one man’s overriding ambition, not a brutal seizure of power through revolution. It is not based on a specific doctrine or philosophy. It is essentially pragmatic and untheoretical. It is a slow <...> unconscious development that ends in a voluntary surrender free people escaping from freedom to one autocratic master <...> It is the growing ‘father complex’, the willingness to follow in any emergency, economic or military, the leadership of one man. It is the growing distrust of parliaments, congresses and other representative assemblies <...> The public wants to personalize issues and responsibilities <...> Historical evidence now pointed to the inevitable trend toward presidential Caesarism as being the natural counterpart of the trend toward democratic equality”³.

Riencourt maintains that the election of Roosevelt, a “national tribune” inclined to one-man governing, as president of the United States was an ostensive step towards Caesarism. According to Riencourt, in the very first year of his presidency, Roosevelt tried to consolidate more and more power in his hands overcoming the resistance of a discontent Congress. “The spirit of the Roman *panem et circenses* (bread and circuses) was slowly pervading the atmosphere <...> The mainstay of American freedom — freedom *from* authority — began to give way now that a large majority of the people were willing to barter freedom for security”⁴.

The abovementioned political outline of Caesarism and the two majorities, parliamentarian and presidential, gradually became evident in 2002–2004 in Lithuania, even though their roots should be looked for in the last decade. Roman slogan of “bread and circuses” was included by Paksas in his keystone speech, given in the spring of 1997. The future head of state then made an open invitation to follow this slogan to make politics efficient and attractive to

people. The presidential election campaign was in the same year when something similar to the “second” (presidential) majority in indirect opposition to the “first” (parliamentarian) majority started to crystallise. Artūras Paulauskas and Valdas Adamkus, two election favourites in the second round, tried to emphasise their independence from the Seimas and parliamentary parties as well as their independence from the governing majority. Both candidates were hinting that they would be implementing their own policies and would make the Seimas and the Government give them more respect than previously given to President Algirdas Brazauskas. Promotional comparisons drawn between Paulauskas and John F. Kennedy can be assessed as a symbolic example that quoted insights into the political tendencies in the US in the 50s and 60s apply to Lithuania. A practical example was the obvious opposition of Paulauskas to everything that had been achieved by the then Right majority and the previous Left majority of the Seimas. This opposition was reflected in his slogan “we deserve to live better”, showing a political reproof to previous governing parliamentary majorities and governments. On the other hand, Paulauskas, as political “successor” to Brazauskas, was some sort of an “heir” of presidential power determined to mobilise the “second” majority of the society against the Seimas.

After the presidential election, the presidential majority was being mobilised by Adamkus. The Seimas, which was constantly losing public trust, became a frequent target for his criticism. The same applies to parliamentary parties towards which the head of state, in speeches, was generous in both constructive criticism and remarks which discredited them further in the eyes of the public. It is no accident that it was the presidency of Adamkus which saw the first major confrontation of arms of government representing the two majorities which resulted in the resignation of the Government of Gediminas Vagnorius. After all, frequent use of the term “House of the President” to describe a political institution not provided for in the Constitution was finally adopted during the presidency of Adamkus, and this, by and large, reflected the tendency of expansion of presidential powers through an increase of the role of the advisory body. Thus the reality of the presidential, or the “second”, majority which sent shockwaves through Lithuania in 2002–2004 as some unexpected novelty could have been seen as far back as in 1997–1998 and became almost obvious in 1999–2000. During the Seimas election in 2000, this majority was represented by a block of “new politics” blessed by Adamkus and led by Paulauskas and Paksas, both of whom in 2002 proved that they had presidential ambitions.

When the enterprise of the “new politics” collapsed, Paksas made a step towards the radicalisation of presidential powers, moving towards Caesarism, recruiting, on a new basis, the “second” majority against the Seimas which allegedly had ceased to represent the nation. The presidential election campaign

of 2002 and certain peculiarities in the thinking and behaviour of Paksas and his teammates show certain tendencies described by Riencourt in the political reality of Lithuania, namely in the entourage of the impeached President and his electorate. These are the personalisation of power, political accountability and political problems; a harsh egalitarian campaign hiding the pursuit of one-man power under the slogans of democratic development; running away from freedom (promises of order in terms of dictatorship) and “father complex” (paternalism); mistrust in the parliament and hostility towards existing principles of parliamentary representation; no doctrine – lack of political ideology and the following of purely pragmatic considerations⁵. Riencourt’s remark that Caesarism is pragmatic and essentially “untheoretic” precisely defines the political and intellectual feature of Paksas and his team, which they proved to possess on numerous occasions in their public speeches and actions⁶. In this respect, it does not seem just a trifle of accidental rhetoric that the political credo of Paksas was once declared by the motto of “bread and circuses”.

Today, the divide between the two majorities deepened by Paksas is often depicted as the divide between “two Lithuanias”, or between the new “populistic” and the so-called “traditional” political parties and their electorate. These three dyads, in fact, have rather evident similarities; however, they also have quite significant discrepancies and fundamental differences not allowing putting the equal sign between them or grouping them into the same category. Because, when we talk about “two Lithuanias”, we primarily refer to the economic and social divide rather than to the political *par excellence* divide. The “second Lithuania” is not the same as the “second” majority, even though these two terms may overlap to a certain degree. When we talk about “two Lithuanias”, we usually mean that the political choice of the “second Lithuania” relies on the factors related to material difficulties, lack of public spirit and education and inability to adapt to market conditions. “Two Lithuanias” comprise the educated elite bathing in their material well-being and the majority of “ordinary people” radically dissatisfied with their economic and social status and demanding radical changes. Such an interpretation of the political situation and developments closely resembles the Marxist teaching about economic basis, political superstructure and battle of classes. Here the focus quite narrowly falls on material motives of political orientation and underlying economic conditions. The dichotomy of two majorities, in turn, is based more on the divide between political values, choices and arguments reflected in two models of democracy and visions of political development than on differences in material conditions and incentives. The two majorities should never as well be equalised to the alleged confrontation between “populistic” and “traditional” parties simply because there are no traditional or non-populist political forces in Lithuania in

strict senses of these two terms. Populism is inherent in all of them and they have no essential respect for traditions – simply do not have any, or misinterpret them⁷.

Today the presidential majority in Lithuania gather around the parties representing the main objectives of this majority: primarily around the Liberal-democratic Party and the Labour Party. Among their main goals is the personalisation of power and limitation of the parliamentary and multiparty system (changes to the parliamentary election system abandoning the party lists), strengthening of presidential powers, replacement of political activity with virtually non-ideological, “untheoretical” activity such as state entrepreneurship and administration⁸, paternalism of power, social egalitarianism, the fight against political literacy presented as the fight against the elite and finally, the order understood as “justice” epitomising these objectives as victory against corruption and “dictatorship against mafia”. The “second” majority in a certain respect creates premises for such a concept of politics which states that the ultimate goal of politics is power and not justice, the main objective of government is order, and the right measure to enforce order is “a hard hand” of a directly elected leader controlling the system of law and order which submits to every swing of this hand.

According to public opinion polls, the longing for a hard hand in Lithuania is as strong, and sometimes even stronger, as in neighbouring Eastern states. A couple of years ago, Paksas tried to offer his hard hand to the electorate but he failed to keep his promise. In general, in Lithuania there are probably plenty of social premises for the emergence of “hard-handed” national leaders. However, there is lack of sufficiently solid political basis for their order to prevail. Contrary to Russia, it is only possible to pretend to be a “hard-hander” in Lithuania by moulding appropriate images. Such moulding and pretending requires solid funding and, therefore, the “hard-handers” in Lithuania are not able to fight local oligarchs the way President Vladimir Putin does in Russian and have to be in friendly terms with them to ensure their support. This is how, during the 1997 presidential election, the tandem of the leader promising a better life, the former prosecutor general, and an oligarch from Kėdainiai was born, later followed by the concord of a politician from Telšiai, who promised order, and a helicopter dealer.

Recently, the situation that emerged in 1997–2003 has changed: the steward and the oligarch is one and the same person now. The party of Uspaskich, in a spirit similar to that of the International, promises to create a “new world” on the ruins of the “old world”. Uspaskich describes the latter with a frequently repeated phrase: “Corruption and protectionism has been flourishing in Lithuania for 14 years.” At the same time he claims to be the “creator of the civilised

state.” This claim implies that Lithuania has not been a civilised state before. How is Uspaskich going to civilise a country which has been impoverished by such evils as corruption and protectionism for 14 years? The image of order and hard hand comes to mind immediately as an answer stemming from public statements of the Labour Party leader. It is obvious that the revolutionary role of the creator of a “new world” allows for the anticipation of radical steps of the Labour Party and the latter raise serious misgivings about the stability of the existing political system. Even if the Labour Party, should it come to power, quietly fails to keep some of their promises, the extreme ideals of the party which mobilised the electorate will not have been in vain as the “second majority” will gain decisive weight in the Seimas. There is no use in trying to find comfort in the naïve thought that the ideas of the Labour Party will have no serious consequences for multiparty parliamentary democracy. Maybe they will not be able to ruin the system but they savour its degradation when formal democratic procedures serve as a veil for authoritarian egalitarianism and deliberately maintained political illiteracy of the society.

The demand of the Labour Party to change the parliamentary election system abandoning the principle of proportional representation of parties shows that these misgivings are justified. Political scientists unequivocally condemn this idea emphasising its damage to the stability of the national political system. However, it is quite popular among the public: people expect that they can impair the influence of parties they do not like if they do not vote for the lists of their candidates at election time. The hostility of the “second” majority towards the parties is clearly related to animosity or indifference to the values of parliamentarism such as thorough and deliberate hearings, following procedures, the importance of public debate and rational agreement, and precedence of arguments over emotional whiffs. It is an old contempt on the part of the society inclined to authoritarianism and egalitarianism for politicians who, according to the tirades of the author of *Mein Kampf*, are only able to set up a parliamentary committee and argue for ever when faced with a problem. Those who despise multiparty and parliamentary systems usually associate pluralism, the battle between political parties and ideas, gradual decision-making and safeguards to ensure their appropriateness, and due consideration of the view of the political and intellectual minority with disorder, turmoil and neglect of the will of the nation. The “second” majority often presumes that politicians lack political will, but they rarely question whether these heralds of change promising strong will and hard hand have any political wisdom. In this respect, both Paksas and Uspaskich rely on the part of the society longing for so-called “order” and the will to introduce that order. But why is it order and not justice? In other words, why only the kind of justice which is perceived as order?

The notion of justice is complex and, in this case, we can distinguish three types of it. The first type is compliance with the laws and equivalent sanctions to those who violate them. The second type is so-called social justice providing state support or maintenance to those who are not self-sufficient, social guarantees and taxes favourable to people with low incomes, etc. The third type of justice is normative search for the best possible political regime and selection of government based on both wisdom (authority) and consent⁹.

The first two types are mostly associated with legal or economic order or disorder in the country and not with the features of the political regime. For instance, corruption is a sign of disorder; law and order institutions must fight corruption; politicians, in turn, as the sun shines promise to ensure order. Lack of social justice is also often associated with disorder. This is how the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) treated destroyed collective farms and other imaginary horrors pointing the finger at the Right. Later the conservative government was actively fighting disorder by declaring “cruel campaigns”, persecuting “disorderly” entrepreneurs and marketers and fostering bureaucratic rigour. They even meditated on prohibiting people from carrying or possessing more than a few kilograms of sugar. One can only wonder who would have checked the bags of passers-by had this idea been implemented. People were constantly pushed to view order as a cure-all by periodic public scandals and the regular use of the word “scandal” by the media in their reports on political life. It is no wonder that one politician took notice of this pulse of public mood and expressed the promise of the two justices in one word: order.

The understanding of justice as order, which was inherited from the past and frustratingly overused in the 2002 presidential election, remained viable even after the impeachment of Paksas. The presidential crisis did not raise significant doubts in the stereotypical perception of justice as order. For instance, during the impeachment of Paksas, the strive for justice essentially meant legal and procedural issues; during the early presidential election campaign it was widely used in the form of social issues, while during the scandal of possible corruption of members of the Seimas it returned to the trail of law and order and legislation. Thus there is still the tendency to limit the understanding of justice as procedural or criminal (legal) and economic (social) issues despite a clear political crisis which, having started during the 2002 presidential election, continues to evolve and has been obvious to the naked eye during the 2004 parliamentary election¹⁰. The third type of justice in question, i.e. political justice, which is based on a responsible and authoritative approach to the political regime and implies civil duty to prevent its degeneration, still remains *terra incognita* of the political life.

As soon as the election demagogues emerge promising people order and

goldmines, politicians of sound parties, with reflex regularity, start talking about “two Lithuanias”, reduction of poverty and elimination of the gap between rural and urban areas. When the country is being shaken by the scandals of corruption and misuse of office, the same sound politicians jump to amend the laws. However, justice relies not only on laws but also on the people who adopt these laws. A purely legal-procedural concept of justice, in turn, does not provide any criteria which would allow selecting the best politicians to the parliament. The same can be said about the promises of material well-being and social justice. Well-being may be promised by demagogues as well as by virtuous politicians. Then how to comb out those who are really just and virtuous?

The political concept of justice is based on the fundamental question: who should rule and represent the nation? What skills and virtues should they possess? This question is not being raised at all or is being politically marginalised in the public arena in Lithuania. More clarity in this respect is required both from the politicians and the electorate. Is there any hope that this much-welcomed clarity in Lithuania can fit, at least to a degree, the words of the President of the United States Thomas Jefferson, written in a letter to John Adams on 28 October 1813: “May we not even say that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?” It seems quite obvious that neither the politics of recent years nor the elections and the results of public polls can provide us much of this hope.

At the break of the presidential scandal, Prof. Leonidas Donskis ironically noted: “Unfortunately, the Office of the President and their image-makers did not study the great scholars of European philosophy and literature who thoroughly thought through and wrote a lot about power and ascension to power <...>. Among them are Aristotle, Dante, Machiavelli and William Shakespeare. Maybe this would have helped them understand that it is possible to ascend to power, but sooner or later the question would arise: What shall we do with it now?”¹¹

It is really difficult to imagine Gintaras Šurkus studying the works of Aristotle or Antanas Bosas paying tribute to the Shakespearean genius. Equally unlikely would be imagining Paksas and Uspaskich studying *Nicomachean Ethics* and Dante’s *Divine Comedy*. However, the role of Machiavelli in this situation seems to be exceptional. Of course, not because these politicians ever read or understood him but merely because it is extremely obvious that certain Machiavellian insights and suggestions to the leader of how to maintain power are surprisingly visible in the posture of Paksas, who ignored the Constitution, and Uspaskich, who promises to change it. The Machiavellianism of the impeached President is primarily reflected in the fact that his answer to the question

by Donskis “what to do next with power?” is: keep it. Machiavellian understanding of politics, which replaced classic understanding of politics as the pursuit of justice, basically implies that power is the ultimate goal of politics and that political science is teaching about measures to maintain power. When deliberating these measures, the suggestion is to follow the circumstance and not normative projects as practiced by the representatives of classic political science¹².

It is worth noting that the Italian dictator Mussolini acknowledged Machiavelli as the inspiration for his views¹³, and Yosif Stalin thoroughly studied *The Prince*, marking the most impressive parts of this work. Obviously, Lithuania is not under threat of Duce-like or Stalin-like dictatorship. However, the Machiavellian understanding of executive power (*esecuzione*) was at the rise of both totalitarian political ideas of the 20th century and contemporary democratic politics. From the establishment of absolutism in Europe to the era of liberal democracy, Machiavellianism influenced the prerogatives and plans of the executive power as well as the actions of its representatives. The presidency of Paksas was probably the most convincing fact that Lithuania is no exception.

The basic idea of Machiavellianism is that the head of state is the pursuer of the will of the nation not bound by the supremacy of law and who is not responsible for his own or public morality. He rules on behalf of the nation just as the Church, despised by Machiavelli, was able to rule on behalf of God. In other words, the projection of the authority of the Church as the legitimate pursuer of the will of God is skilfully applied to the prince, the pursuer of the will of the nation. Machiavelli was the first to “deify” the nation in this manner and to transfer the divine credentials of ruling from an ecclesiastical sphere to politics.

Some signs speak volumes that this scheme was efficiently used by Paksas in Lithuania. His supporters exhibited a rare susceptibility to encouragement to protect and defend the President elected by the nation; respect him not for special virtues or achievements but because he was a true pursuer of their will. In order to show off this aureole of the “chosen” by the nation, Paksas started travelling around Lithuania during the scandal and mobilising the followers who supported him. In effect, during his short term of office, Paksas, instead of ruling the state, tried to pocket almost all the achievements of the executive power and special services and act as a single (*uno solo*) pursuer of the will of the people — “the prince”.

Machiavelli taught that the prince should rely on the large masses of the nation and not on the relatively small aristocracy, the educated minority. He explained it rather simply: the ordinary men are numerous while the elite minority is weak and easy to manipulate, and unloyal representatives of the aristocracy can be replaced by loyal ones. This position is an obvious leitmotif of the public relations and actions of Paksas. It was the tribunes of his entourage who divided

Lithuania into the elite and instigated social hatred towards the elite, and into ordinary people whose “simplicity” should have been reflected in loyalty to the one chosen by the nation. It was his entourage who fostered the idea that the existing elite was “decayed” and should be replaced by a new one which understood its duty to respect and glorify the President as a personification of the voice and consciousness of the nation which should never be subject to any criticism or accusation.

The Machiavellianism of the impeached President is also revealed in his contemptuous view of the hierarchy of the Church. Since the source of power of the “chosen” one of the nation is the deified will of the nation, it was decided to divide the Church, as in the case of the public, into “ordinary” priests, i.e. those who are loyal to the President, and the elite of the clergy allegedly cut adrift from “ordinary people”. The principle of divide and conquer was subtly applied in this case at the same time focusing on the religiousness of the President and appealing to the feelings of the congregation. To wind up the latter, allusions to the Holy Writ was a commonly used trick resulting in comparisons of Paksas with Christ, and poetical insights of two hypostases, as an undeservedly persecuted “ordinary man” and as the prince personifying the will of the nation, into the persona of the impeached President.

Machiavelli claims that the prince must appear religious. Paksas did everything to appear this way. Machiavelli adds that, in addition to appearing religious, it is necessary to appear merciful, faithful, upright and humane. Paksas also, as regards this advice, might say: done. However, according to Machiavelli, it is important to remember that appearing honest and actually being honest are two different things. The prince should only appear honest, and not be honest. For the first time in Western history, this statement laid the foundation for the ideology of public relations of executive power. Therefore, the advisors and information managers who advised Paksas did not discover anything new in this area. They simply applied old Machiavellian principles to the susceptible reality of Lithuanian politics¹⁴.

According to Machiavelli, those who break their promises and successfully outwit others are better at achieving great political victories. Fairness and justice are not a suitable guidance for the head of state. Maybe if people were fair it would make sense to demand their prince to be fair as well, but since everyone tends to various villainies, why should he be better than others? The logic of this question was reflected in the pseudo-Christian banners of the supporters of Paksas: “He who is without sin, let him throw the first stone at the President” or “Members of the Seimas, don’t judge and you won’t be judged”. Finally, even the fact that Paksas acted irresponsibly and unfairly became just another advantage in the eyes of his supporters: he was just like they were – a simple man who makes mistakes, not a “saint”.

Once, the impeached head of state tried to say, unsuccessfully, that “the problem is in us”. There would be some truth in these words, had they been pronounced in right place and time: Paksas was *our* President and Uspaskich may become *our* Prime Minister. The popularity of Machiavellian-like personalities relies on stereotypes of political thought deeply rooted in *our* society. Nowadays, the will of the electorate is being raised above and separated from the understanding and wisdom; no respect is shown to the authorities able to bind it morally and act in a rational way. Instead of perceiving justice as a virtue of a politician, it is understood as a promise or vision of social and economic, but not of political, well-being and order. Actions of politicians are measured by each passing day and the images they create rather than by political virtues and standards enabling their understanding. If the latter are not considered, there is no basis to require due responsibility and justice from the representatives elected by the nation. All this prepares the soil for Machiavellianism which, between the elections, is hoed and fertilised by both our politicians and the electorate. The enforcement of “order” promised by the populists would doom the public to continue “orderly” electing the yield of fruits ripening in this soil. If we seek political justice and not merely social and procedural justice, we should revise the principles grounding our understanding of politics as well as criteria enabling its evaluation which are applied today, and to find intellectual counterbalance for Machiavellianism. “The second majority”, whose egalitarian and authoritarian expectations are being successfully exploited by political pragmatists, is not the only source of power of Machiavellianism. There is an intellectual source of it, which lies in what Walter Lipmann calls “public philosophy”. In Lithuania the prevailing “public philosophy” still apparently lacks essential normative standards of political thought and activity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ See: Kendall W. The Two Majorities // *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. No. 4, November 1960, pp. 317–345; Kendall W. & Carey W. Liberalism versus Conservatism: The Continuing Debate in American Government. Princeton: 1968, pp. 213–225.

² Burnham J. The Attack on Investigations // Kendall W. & Carey G., *Liberalism versus Conservatism*. Pp. 194–204.

³ Riencourt A. Coming Ceasars in America? // *Ibid*, pp. 242–246.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 247.

⁵ On eventual connections between pragmatism and extreme forms of Caesarism see: Elliott W. Y. *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics*. – NY: 1928; Hallowell J. H. *Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*. – London: 1946.

⁶ Paksas and his advisors stated on numerous occasions their pragmatic and “non-theoretical” approach towards the role of the authority in politics. See: Laučius V. *Authority and its Appearance in Lithuanian Political Life* // *Sketches of Politics II*. Ed. by Sirutavičius V. The Institute of Democratic Politics: 2003, pp. 5–12. Labour Party leader Viktoras

Uspaskichas has also emphasized on many occasions that politics should be non-ideological and pragmatic.

⁷ In Lithuania, there are no continuous political traditions because the period of independence was too short and the political forces usually either have no political ideas and traditions (parties established for the election) and ignore and do not understand them (parties with titles of western ideologies).

⁸ On similar tendencies in the West see: Arendt H. *The Human Condition*. – The University of Chicago Press, 1958. – P. 33–45; Manent P. *The City of Man*. – Princeton University Press: 1998. – P. 102.

⁹ “The complex task of constitution-making and of ruling, in the classical republican understanding, is then the weaving together of the necessarily impure simulacra of the twin roots of political authority — wisdom and consent”. Pangle T. L. *The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Age*. The John Hopkins University Press: 1992, p. 127. On the classic concept of political justice, see also: Strauss L. *Natural Right and History*. The University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 127–152.

¹⁰ “Pre-election state of Lithuania can be briefly described as rather deep and thorough crisis in relations of politics and society, citizens and the state. The case of Rolandas Paksas could have become the Lithuanian Dreyfus case which would have cleared and cleaned political morality. Unfortunately, it did not happen. Even the contrary: as the result, politicians, political sphere and even the entire state were demoralised.” Adomėnas M. *Programmes of the Parties 2004. Relations with the Public and Declared Values*. Conference “A Choice of People 2004”, 4 October 2004,

http://www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?s_id=198&exp=1&cn_id=14968.

¹¹ Donskis L. *Will the Society be Born in Lithuania?*

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¹² “And as I know that many have written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation...” Machiavelli N. *The Prince*. Ch. XV.

¹³ Elliott W. Y. *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics*. – P. 316.

¹⁴ The relation between Machiavelli’s teaching and what is called machiavellianism here is not regarded as if there were deviation towards “immoralism” of the latter from “classical republicanism” of the former. See: Strauss L. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. – The Free Press: 1958; Strauss L. *Machiavelli // History of Political Philosophy*. – Ed.: Strauss L., Cropsey J. – The University of Chicago Press: 1987. – P. 296–317; Mansfield H. C. *The Prince: Introduction*. – The University of Chicago Press: 1985. – P. vii - xxvii; Mansfield H. C. *Strauss’ Machiavelli // Political Theory*. – Vol. 3 No. 4. – November 1975. – P. 372–383; Mansfield H. C. *Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power*. – The Free Press: 1989; Hallowell J. H., Porter J. M. *Political Philosophy: The Search for Humanity and Order*. – Prentice-Hall Canada Inc.: 1997. – P. 225–272; Hallowell J. H., *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*. – N. Y.: 1950. – P. 52–60.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY

AESTHETIC ELEMENTS OF POLITICS

Alvydas Jokubaitis

There is a continuous battle between three major modes of experience in approaching politics, i.e. practice, theory and art. Both the practitioners and their opponents from the theoretical and artistic camp profess the uniqueness of their approach. Members of each camp try to prove the supremacy of their position. Sometimes these camps enter into alliances: the practitioners and the theoreticians unite against the poets or the latter join forces with the theoreticians against the practitioners. However, these are usually only nondurable alliances easily disrupted by the egoism of clans. At the earliest opportunity, the practitioners start making fun of the theoreticians' and artists' escapism, while in return these are quick to criticise the lack of sophistication and stronger analytical capacities as well as the primitivism of the politicians.

We live in a civilisation which honours science and, therefore, politics is also not in the position to ignore the authority of theory. Politicians often treat their counterpart theoreticians instrumentally — as servants and assistants. Scientists are required to produce sociological surveys, analyses of empirical data and future forecasts. However, these same theoreticians have their own major political ambitions. Their view of the practitioners is often based on the famous belief of Plato that “until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, [...] cities will never have rest from their evils.”¹

After World War II, the threats of political rationalism were discussed at great length. The negative impact of scientific thinking on the management of political affairs drew heavy criticism. A number of critics of political rationalism claimed that the transfer of methods of natural science to politics gave birth to numerous dangerous phenomena such as belief in steadfast laws of history, disregard for moral pluralism, overestimation of the role of ideology, and nostalgia for perfect political judgements. It seems as if Newton or several Newtons was everything that social science needed. However, this expectation of a Newton of social science resulted in dramatic political shocks of modern societies.

Today we are confronted with a new phenomenon, namely, aesthetisation of politics. Political life is increasingly compared to a performance, a show and a fight for cementing certain images in people's mind. Aesthetic issues are currently dealt with not only by artists but also by professionals representing political sciences. Considerations of representations ceased to be an exclusive object of philosophical discussion a long time ago. It is a component of political life. Mass consciousness is usually orientated towards the characteristics of an image rather than the contents of politics. Today an ancient dispute between poets and philosophers has acquired a new meaning: poets are trying to gain revenge on theoreticians who have been belittling them for a long time.

There are two aspects of aesthetisation of politics. The first aspect defines the processes in modern societies while the second is related to philosophical interpretation of these changes. The first aspect usually deals with virtual reality, new visual culture and the role of information technologies and public relations. The second one reflects significant changes in philosophical thinking. Today an increasing number of authors talk about aesthetical interpretation of political phenomena.²

The Dispute between the Enlighteners and Romantics

"These two big and many-sided cultural transformations, the Enlightenment and Romanticism with its accompanying expressive conception of man, have made us what we are,"³ says Charles Taylor. A similar view is shared by Isaiah Berlin who states that Romanticism constituted a major turning-point in Western political thought.⁴ The fight between the naturalism of Enlightenment and expressionism of Romanticism has been going on for two centuries. The Enlightenmenters view politics through the eyes of natural science, i.e. coldly and systematically, without any major references to emotions and moral values. Romantics follow a different approach. They emphasise the importance of the ability of an individual to discover new forms of self-expression, creativity, authenticity and originality of personality.

Followers of Enlightenment usually appear under the flag of some positivism, scientism or behaviourism, while the work of Romantics is usually continued by the proponents of hermeneutics, phenomenology or discourse theory. The Enlightenmenters support science of politics which is neutral in terms of values and try to prove that political issues can be explained as neutrally as mechanical movement of natural bodies or genetic structure of a cell. The Romantics, on the other hand, stress the importance of understanding, empathy and interpretation. They think that the most important thing in politics is the ability to understand normative expectations, practices, traditions and symbols of citizens.

It is necessary to distinguish between two things: recognition of aesthetic elements of politics and aesthetisation of political phenomena. All activities of humans have certain aesthetic elements. Politics is no exception. However, the proponents of its aesthetisation have always strived for more as they try to explain the whole political life using aesthetic categories. Not only do they love beauty but they try to convert the entire culture into the phenomena akin to literature, fine arts or theatre.

There is no doubt that art has a certain impact on politics. Sometimes even in most unexpected ways: lines, colours, forms, sounds and styles. It is difficult to say *a priori* which aspects of artwork may gain a political edge. The relationship between art and politics depends on specific circumstances, as clearly shown by the Soviet experience. At that time, political power tried to protect people from numerous forms of artistic creation widely accepted in the West. Vytautas Kavolis thinks that “by shaping new kinds of fantasy preoccupations, innovations in art style may indirectly contribute to the emergence of new kinds of political orientations, even though art not be the original impetus to this development.”⁵

The first tendencies of aesthetisation of politics can be found in the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education Of Man* by Friedrich Schiller. He tried to prove that an “aesthetic state” can overcome the alienation of the society, develop sociable characters and create harmony of social life. Such considerations were a major challenge not only to the Enlightenment philosophers but to the entire tradition of Western political thought. According to Plato, art is “thrice removed from the truth”.⁶ He demanded that poets were not given access to management of political affairs as the poet implants an evil constitution into the soul of every man, “indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another small; he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the truth.”⁷ Aristotle upheld a similar view: “the standard of correctness is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than in poetry and any other art.”⁸

Friedrich Nietzsche transformed ethics and politics into components of aesthetic thinking: “We should be *able* also to stand *above* morality – and not only to stand with the anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling at any moment, but also to float above it and play! How then could we possibly dispense with art, and with the fool?”⁹ Nietzsche thought that the will, instincts and the ability of great people to impose a certain vision of the world were the driving force of politics. “The aesthetic justification of the world is thus not its contemplation as if it were a work of art, but its transmutation *into an artwork*”¹⁰ That was a major challenge to the political tradition of Enlightenment defending the position of science. Proponents of

Enlightenment expected to learn the reality of political importance through their mind rather than poetic imagination. They were extremely cautious of any major outbursts of artistic imagination in politics.

The Romantics pretty soon evolved into an influential political power. They created a powerful movement of political romanticism in Germany (Johann Goeze, Ernst Brandes, Justus Möser, August Rehberg, Friedrich Karl Savigny, Georg Friedrich Puchta), became counter-revolutionaries criticising the ideas of Enlightenment in France (Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald), joined the Conservative Party in Great Britain (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Benjamin Disraeli, Robert Salisbury) and formulated the ideas of national culture and national state in Eastern and Central Europe. The poets were especially respected in Russia. Since the times of Alexander Pushkin, this country perceived them as something more than just artists. The society demands them to take on a political mission, i.e. to control the human mind, resist governments and set the milestones for the development of the society.

Romantics thought of theory as a tool too weak to change political life. They believed that a truly great politician has to be similar to an inspired poet. With the help of his genius, will and intuition he must discover new and prospective possibilities for the development of the society. The Romantics reprehended politicians for their poor creativity, sticking to stale concepts of trivial life and lack of a bolder vision of the world. They suggested that politicians should rely more on imagination, be eccentric and treat political reality the way a sculptor treats his source materials.

Recent decades saw an increase in philosophers who prefer an aesthetic way of talking about politics. This is especially characteristic of the so-called postmodernists. Because of them today politics is more and more often treated as a performance, show and dramatic narrative. This approach is taking over the minds of politicians-practicians. Today the preoccupation of the latter with image-making issues often surpasses their ability to have any major impact on the development of modern societies.

Current aesthetisation of politics has been under the influence of certain significant changes in the approach towards science. Since ancient times, the predominant belief was that science was the sphere of objectivism, while art was the domain of subjectivism – fictions, artifices, fantasies and wilful impressions. This approach has been losing ground. According to Willard van Orman Quine, in terms of epistemological footing, physical objects and Homeric gods differ only slightly as *both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits*.¹¹

Current dispute over the nature of politics is held at the coffin of the modern epistemological tradition. The removal of epistemology from the centre

of philosophical discussions will inevitably change the understanding of both science and politics. Currently, the opponents of remnants of epistemological tradition are divided into two main groups. Some authors such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michael Oakeshott, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens and Michel de Certeau emphasise the importance of practice, while others lean towards aesthetisation of cultural phenomena. The latter group includes such authors as Richard Rorty, Frank Ankersmit, Jean Baudrillard and Murray Edelman. All of them can be defined as the proponents of the so-called “aesthetic politics”.

Similarities of Political and Aesthetic Judgement

Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman suggests that social space should be divided into three parts: cognitive space, moral space and aesthetic space.¹² The first one informs us about the conditions of practical activity, the second helps create relationships between people, and the third enables us to play freely with well-established meanings of social life. According to this author, increase in the influence of the aesthetic aspect of social space is one of the main characteristics of post-modern society. Citizens of post-modern society perceive each other as objects of entertainment and pleasure. They avoid any bigger moral responsibility and treat the environment as a source of new sensations and experiences.

Bauman describes citizens of post-modern society as “sensation-seekers”. He says that “late modern or post-modern consumers are sensation-seekers and collectors of experiences; their relationship to the world is primarily *aesthetic*; they perceive the world as a food for sensibility – a matrix of possible experiences.”¹³ If fiction previously was associated with the world of art, now it is moving into the very centre of social space. Politics, in its turn, increasingly becomes an aesthetically pleasing performance, show and play of representations.

Postmodernism is a paradoxical phenomenon. Regularly talking about the meaning of differences and diversity, postmodernists often refuse to see the main difference – the one between different modes of human experience: practice, science and art. They are trying to convince that politics must be interpreted according to the canons of aesthetic thinking. They do not believe in the ability of theoreticians to say anything significant about the phenomena of political life. Nietzsche-like aesthetisation of politics, which meets the main principles of Romantic thinking, prevails.

Since Aristotle, the predominant belief was that understanding of practical issues is essentially different from scientific cognition. “The object of scientific knowledge is of necessity” Aristotle said, and “practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not art because action and making are different kinds of thing.”¹⁴ There are three possible translations of the Latin word “*ars*”:

science, art and craft. Today it is extremely difficult to say what was the meaning of the famous *artes liberales*? According to our current understanding, two of them, rhetoric and music, can be classified as art while the remaining five – grammar, dialectics, arithmetic, geometry and astrology – as science.

It is only at first sight that there are not any similarities between political and aesthetic judgments. An in-depth study shows that political judgments are often very close to artists' reasoning, that is, their judgments are based on common sense, insight and intuition rather than on strict requirements of scientific methods. Two authors, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt, stand out among many authors who discussed the similarities between political and aesthetic judgements. Despite differences in their beliefs, both authors addressed certain important aesthetic elements of political judgement.

Berlin tried to prove that political judgement is completely different from theoretical judgement. Political outlook is inseparable from a certain aesthetic (quasi-aesthetic, to be more precise) element. When talking about politics "We speak of, say, exceptional sensitiveness to certain kinds of fact, we resort to metaphors. We speak of some people as possessing antennae, as it were, that communicate to them the specific contours and texture of a particular political or social situation. We speak of the possession of a good political eye, or nose, or ear, of a political sense which love or ambition or hate may bring into play, of sense that crisis and danger sharpen (or alternatively blunt), to which experience is crucial, a particular gift, possibly not altogether unlike that of artists or creative writers"¹⁵

Berlin maintains that in politics the aesthetic faculty often surpasses the theoretical one. It is important for politicians to understand the uniqueness of a particular situation, the trends of existing circumstances and combinations of various factors. This relationship to reality has more sensual than reasoned basis. A truly great politician is more akin to an artist rather than to a theoretician. "Bismarck understood something which, let us say, Darwin or James Clerk Maxwell did not need to understand, something about the public medium in which he acted; and he understood it as a sculptors understand stone or clay."¹⁶

Political practice requires different abilities than those characteristic to theoreticians. If politicians relied only on theoretical truths, they would not be able to respond quickly to changing circumstances of social life. They need the talent of artists which allows feeling or guessing the course of events, the mood of people and the symbols they are likely to appreciate. Berlin thinks that overrating science is a politically dangerous thing. "Those who are scientifically trained often seem to hold Utopian political views precisely because of a belief that methods or models which work well in their particular fields will play to the entire sphere of human action."¹⁷

The method of scientific thinking is not such a huge advantage of the political mindset. A truly great politician often makes judgements as poets do: instead of analysing various phenomena with the help of a certain method, he is able to encompass them with a synthesising view which can be defined as “insight”, “intuition” or “common sense”. His judgements rely on qualities usually associated with artists such as imagination, good taste and the ability to get the grasp of unexpected links and associations rather than on methodical and analytical thinking.

Berlin does not claim that politics is a domain of aesthetic judgement. He is more modest in his assertion – certain elements of politics bring it closer to artistic creation. Political insight is similar to the ability of poets to live through the events. In both cases the feeling of circumstances and the ability to respond to a situation with certain words and actions supersede erudition. Politicians-practicians raise different requirements for themselves than theoreticians. Similarly to gardeners and bakers, they go along with their business without the knowledge of theoretical truths.

The aim of Berlin is to emphasise certain aesthetic elements of politics. Arendt chooses another, more complex way of the explanation of relations between art and politics. She tries to prove that the *Critique of Judgement* by Kant is the work of political philosophy rather than, as usually believed, an aesthetic work. “Since Kant did not write his political philosophy, the best way to find out what he thought about this matter is to turn to his “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement”; where, in discussion of art works in their relation to taste, which judges and decides about them, he confronts an analogous problem.”¹⁸

In the *Critique of Judgement* Kant talks about the paradox of the judgement of taste. It is both subjective and objective judgement at the same time: “the judgement of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of everyone (for it is only competent for a logically universal judgement to do this, in that it is able to bring forward reasons); it only imputes this agreement to everyone, as an instance of the rule in respect of which it looks for confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of others.”¹⁹ This means that the judgement of art is not only subjective but has a certain aspect of objectivity – people agree on certain feelings which give aesthetic satisfaction.

This paradox of taste is also incidental to politics. Political judgement is both subjective and objective at the same time. On one hand, it is subjective because different people judge the same things differently. On the other hand, it is objective because this judgement strides over the contingency of personal choices and creates certain common rules and norms of behaviour. Artists agree on beauty as the politicians agree on certain norms of social life.

Arendt wants to prove that political and artistic judgements have the same basis – *sensus communis*. According to Kant “taste may be designated a *sensus communis aestheticus*, common human understanding a *sensus communis logicus*.”²⁰ Arendt is interested in the sociality of judgement of taste as it involves not only a single individual but also other members of the society. This means that artistic and political judgements are inconceivable without partners. With the help of judgement of taste, people can learn certain ways of communicating with objects of the world. Beauty teaches how to appreciate objects of the world simply because they create the state of mind in free play of imagination. Something similar happens in politics: citizens recognise certain neutral rules of communication which are above individual needs for benefit. Vincent van Gogh did not paint his paintings only for financial gain. The authors of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America acted in a similar manner declaring that all people were endowed by their Creator with equal rights.

Both politics and art are forms of protection and nurturing of the world. Artists protect the standards of beauty and politicians protect the standards of justice. In both cases imagination plays an important role. Citizens of a free society understand that they cannot depend solely on their own personal desires. They must empathise with the situation of other people and suppress their personal desires. Art is an important tool for development of this political faculty. Citizens not only have common laws but also common sense about certain things.

Arendt thinks that imagination enables not only aesthetic but also political representation. Reconstructive and creative imagination “transforms the objects of the objective senses into ‘sensed’ objects, as though they were objects of an inner sense. This happens by reflecting not on an object but on its representation.”²¹ This ability is important for representative government which is also based on representation of citizens will rather than on their direct involvement. Arendt thinks similarly to John Rawls: “The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion.”²²

Arendt believes that “the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly the sense denoted by Kant, namely, the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present.”²³ This means that taste can be treated as an important element of political life. Judgements of taste are not merely an arbitrary play of imagination. They require the approval of other people, and this quality makes them similar

to political judgements. According to Arendt, “culture and politics, then, belong together, because it is not knowledge or truth which is at stake, but rather judgment and decision, the judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world and the decision of what manner of action is to be taken in it, as well as how it is to look henceforth, what kinds of things are to appear in it.”²⁴

Arendt has no doubts that politics is the domain of practical judgement. However, she gives an unusual sounding to this Aristotelian attitude: political matters can be judged relying on taste. Such an approach contradicts the intentions of Kant she tries to interpret. This author was sure that aesthetic satisfaction was purely a contemplative matter and, therefore, as such could not be transferred into the sphere of management of practical matters. Any practical interest, in his opinion, destroys the uniqueness of aesthetic judgement: “Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste. One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste.”²⁵ Kant clearly differentiated between aesthetic judgement and moral judgement. He refused to talk about “moral taste”: “For where the moral law dictates, there is, objectively, no room left for free choice as to what one has to do; and to show taste in the way one carries out these dictates, or in estimating the way others do so, is a totally different matter from displaying the moral frame of one’s mind.”²⁶

Theoreticians of politics have been lurching from one extreme to the other: they either refuse to recognise the significance of an aesthetic element or, on the contrary, dive into exaggerated aesthetisation of political phenomena. Berlin’s approach can be described as midway between these two extremes. This author tries to show an aesthetic element of political judgement worth appreciation of even the sternest of scientists. The Romantic aesthetisation of politics relies on an incorrect conclusion. Reasonable assumption about the importance of an aesthetic element results in an incorrect conclusion about the artistic nature of political activity. Postmodernists want to prove that politicians and theoreticians can be treated according to the same standards of artistic activity. This is a clear feature of Romantic expressionism justly opposed by advocates of a scientific approach to politics.

One of the main objectives of contemporary political philosophy is to define the limits of aesthetisation of politics. Arendt’s considerations on *sensus communis* display a typical mistake made by the proponents of aesthetisation of politics, the essence of which is the desire to escape the union between morality and politics. Arendt distorts the real meaning of the Kantian *sensus communis*.

The political philosophy of Kant relies on priority given to ethics, not aesthetics. "A true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without first paying tribute to morality," he said. "And although politics in itself is a difficult art, no art is required to combine it with morality. Far as soon as the two come into conflict, morality can cut the knot which politics cannot untie."²⁷

Arendt and her contemporary followers try to return politics to the orbit of aesthetic thinking. It is a truly interesting idea. However, its realisation undermines the differences between morality and art. Since Greek times, politics has been a component of ethics and not of poetics. "The best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue,"²⁸ Aristotle said. In their quest of common denominators of aesthetic and political judgement, Arendt and her followers fall out with the classical tradition of political thinking.

Advocates of Enlightenment were mistaken in their belief that politics could be made subordinate to science. This sphere of human activity cannot be enclosed in the narrow framework of scientific thinking. Proponents of Romanticism clung to the other extreme by trying to poeticise politics, this also being an incorrect strategy. Thus, the only way out is to acknowledge the independence of the worlds of practice, theory and art, preventing any further claims for expansion by representatives of these worlds. What applies to practice might not necessarily apply to science and art; on the other hand, what applies to the latter worlds might be disastrous for practical life. There is no politics in general. We simply constantly encounter three different modes in understanding and interpreting politics. Each of them has its own particular principals of arrangement and ideas.

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THE PROBLEM OF CAUSAL INFERENCE IN THE COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND COMPARATIVE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Zenonas Norkus

The article discusses recent innovations in the methodology of the comparative social research that are known under the name of “comparative qualitative analysis” (QCA) and were developed by U.S. sociologist Charles Ragin. This discussion includes the description of the main strategies for the causal inference (section 1), exposition of the shortcomings of the Mill’s canons of the eliminative induction as rules of causal inference in the non-experimental setting (section 2), the outline of the comparative qualitative analysis (QCA) as the solution for the difficulties of the Mill’s methods (section 3), and the analysis of the difficulties in the practical application of QCA (in the concluding section 4). These difficulties include (a) limited diversity of evidence; (b) contradictory cases – conjunctures of antecedent conditions with both positive and negative outcomes; (c) problems deriving from deterministic assumptions; (d) from binary character of the data that compels to dichotomise continuous aspects of reality and allows to do this in arbitrary way. Although some of these difficulties are mitigated if not solved in the recent elaborations of the QCA in the fuzzy sets framework and incorporation of the statistical elements, these improvements are left behind the scope of the article.

This analysis provides the contribution to the assessment of the prospects of the QCA in the substantive fields where the comparison of the “big cases” plays most prominent role. These fields are comparative sociology and comparative politics. They remain in the embryonic state in the social research in the post-Communist countries, where both sociologists and political scientists are preoccupied almost exclusively with their own countries. The better knowledge both of the promises and of the liabilities of the comparative method as a tool for testing causal hypotheses can be useful for the restructuring of the research agenda of the local communities of the political scientists and sociologists. This article tries to provide a problem-oriented survey of the relevant parts of the recent work in the methodology of social research. In

terms of the local (Lithuanian) context, the article is perhaps the first foray by Lithuanian author in the field known as “political methodology”.

1. Comparison and causal inference

The references to the “comparative method” abound in the social scientific literature. However, there is no generally accepted answer to the question “what is comparative method”? Among the methodologists of the social research, the view of American political scientist Arend Lijphart is perhaps most influential which defines “comparative method” as one of the four possible methods of causal inference.¹ The complete list of these methods includes experimental, statistical, comparative, and case study methods.

The experimental method is the most reliable among them. When the researcher tries to infer from her data whether her causal hypothesis is true by the means of perfect experiment, she controls all the conditions that can influence the values of the variable of interest (dependent variable), and manipulates one of the conditions. The protocol of the perfect experiment consists of the observations of the dependent variable’s changes which accompany the changes in the manipulated variable. In the not so perfect (real) experiments, the researcher samples the cases from her research population, divides her sample into two parts – experimental group and control group, and manipulates independent variable in the experimental group. The protocol of the experiment consists of the observations of the values of the dependent variable before and after the treatment. If there are statistically significant differences between the values of the dependent variable in the experimental and control group after the treatment, the conclusion is valid that independent and dependent variables are connected by causal relation. The crucial precondition for such conclusion is random assignment of the cases to both groups. This kind of the design of the experiment is grounded in the reasoning that if there are many different factors influencing the value of the dependent variable, and causing the measurement errors both in the dependent and independent variable, then they will neutralize each other by working of the great numbers – provided the number of cases in both groups is sufficiently large, and the cases are assigned to both groups at random. This is how e.g. the experiments to test the hypotheses about the efficacy of the new drugs are designed.

In the social sciences, the experimental method is applied by psychologists and social psychologists, whose subject is human behavior in the so-called “small groups”. However, these applications of the experimental method are restricted by the strict requirements of the research ethics. There is no realistic possibility to use experimental method for those social researchers whose units of analysis or observation are large organizations, social groups, whole societies

and other “big” cases. They have no possibility to secure that the condition of the control of “all other conditions” is satisfied, that cases are assigned to control and treatment groups in random way, or to treat large numbers of human agents which are involved in her “big cases” as she pleases.² Even if some radical reforms following revolutions or coups are called “social experiments” (e.g. Bolshevik revolution in Russia after 1917), they violated too many conditions of the valid scientific experiment to be considered as the unambiguous tests for a range of social theories. As a matter of principle, the experimental method is inapplicable in the historical studies because they are concerned with the past. The past is gone, and so there is no possibility to change some conditions or events in the past to observe how these changes would have changed the outcomes.

However, where the researcher has no possibility of the intervention and/or manipulation, two further (even if not so reliable) methods of causal inference still can be used. One of them is applicable if the researcher has a sufficient number of cases (observations), and certain other conditions are satisfied. This is statistical method. The number of cases required for its application is dependent on the number of variables that the researcher considers as the potential members of the causal structure which determines the values of her dependent variable. On the one hand, to explain as much variance in her dependent variable as possible, the researcher is advised to take into consideration as many as possible sources of this variance (independent variables). However, each additional variable complicates the task of causal inference, because it multiplies the number of possible causal explanations.

In the statistical inference, the statistical association between the variables serves as the evidence of the causal relation. The number of observations (cases) should be sufficiently large to provide the statement of the statistical association with the statistical significance. However, the same set of statistically significant associations can be explained by the broad range of alternative causal hypotheses (or alternative causal structures which are statistically indistinguishable). If we have only two statistically associated variables X and Y, we have to decide between three hypotheses: (1) X causes Y; (2) Y causes X; (3) X and Y are caused by some third variable Z. So for the data involving even a modest number of variables, there exist many logically possible causal explanations. The background assumptions (rationale of causal inference) are necessary to reduce them to a tractable set. The data about the relations of statistical association, time order in their change, and controls for non-spuriousness help to do remaining elimination work. However, for all these procedures to work, the number of cases (observations) should exceed the number of variables, and the statistical significance of causal conclusions is dependent on the number of observations.

Both experimental and statistical methods involve comparison as logical operation, so formally they can be considered as a species of comparative method. However, according to the well-entrenched terminological tradition, the name “comparative method” is reserved for the causal inference from the observations of the small population of cases (“small N”). These observations are about the values of the variables that are measurable at the level of the nominal or dichotomous scale, so the data are of the qualitative type. In terms of the reliability, comparative method is weaker than experimental and statistical methods. However, the choice of this method can be justified by pragmatic considerations: “often, given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases”.³ This choice can also be determined by the brute fact that there are only few cases of the phenomenon of interest. Such situation is typical when the cases under analysis are macro-social objects like “social revolutions”, “modern European states”, “Lithuanian cities”, and so on. Theda Skocpol, who has established her researcher’s reputation with the analysis of the second kind, emphasizes the second reason in favor of comparative method: “Comparative historical analysis is distinctively appropriate for developing explanations of macrohistorical phenomena of which there are inherently only a few cases. This is an contrast to more plentiful and manipulable kinds of phenomena suitable for experimental investigations, and in contrast to other phenomena where there are the large numbers of cases required for statistical analyses. Comparative historical analysis is, in fact, the mode of multivariate analysis to which one resorts when there are too many variables and not enough cases”.⁴

The decrease of the number of cases leads to the limit case of only one case, or “case study” case. The available and still to be written historical monographs (e.g., about the emergence of Lithuanian state, Jewish Holocaust, or Anti-Soviet Resistance war 1944–1953 in Lithuania) are best examples of the case studies. However, cases studies are no rarity in the social sciences too, where the researchers committed to “qualitative research” have the natural preference for them.⁵ Qualitative case studies are distinguished by the use of data that are not amenable to statistical analysis. These data are collected by participant observation, “deep” interviews, questionnaires with open questions, analysis of documents, memoirs, letters and diaries. Quantitative data are used in the case studies too, but only as the descriptive statistics, with no attempt to subject them to analysis by means of the advanced statistical techniques.

The status of case studies is bone of contention in the methodological and meta-methodological discussions between the “positivists” (or “naturalists”), and “antipositivists” (or “antinaturalists”) in the philosophy of social research.

From the positivist viewpoint, case study is the weakest from all methods of causal inference. If a single case corresponds to causal hypothesis, it has only illustrative value. If it contradicts the causal hypothesis, it can be safely ignored if this hypothesis is probabilistic one. If the case contradicts the deterministic hypothesis, there is no sufficient reason to reject it. Instead, this contradiction may prompt the researcher to revise the hypothesis or to reconsider her data, suspecting the measurement error in them. So case study has zero power for detection of causes. The positivists recommend using case study as the means of exploratory research only. Case study can be useful at the “discovery” phase of scientific research. During this phase, the researcher is still struggling to formulate her hypothesis, works to define more precisely her population of cases, and to estimate the validity and reliability of her measurement instruments.

The sympathies of the antinaturalists for case study method are grounded in the different understanding of the goals of the social research. They consider as this goal not the discovery of the empirical generalizations and prediction, but the interpretation (and criticism) of the significant (because of their relation to the practical interests of the people) features of the social reality, and their culturally powerful representation by the means of the verbal and non-verbal communication.

The comparative method in Lijphart’s sense is most frequently applied in the sub-disciplines of the political and sociological science which include the word “comparative” in their names – comparative sociology and comparative politics. This terminological peculiarity does not imply, of course, that comparative method is the only method used in these sub-disciplines, or that comparative method has no applications behind their confines. However, the comparative analysis of “small-N” populations is prominent in these sub-disciplines because of their interest in the large-scale social phenomena (wars, revolutions, economic crises), inspired by the hope to discover limited causal generalizations.

This preoccupation of the comparative politics and comparative sociology with the big cases and limited generalizations is reflected also by the somewhat different characteristics of the comparative method that can be found in the methodological writings of Charles Ragin, who has made perhaps most significant contributions to the methodology of comparative research during the last two or three decades.⁶ He draws the distinction between three strategies of the application of the comparative method itself: case-oriented, variable-oriented, and “synthetic” or diversity-oriented. These strategies differ by the numbers of cases compared, and how these cases are interpreted. In the case-oriented strategy, the researcher works with small number of cases (2-10) which are understood in the spirit of the case-study method – as holistic configurations of the qualitative

features. Applying the variable-oriented comparative method, the researcher compares the number of cases that is sufficient for the application of the multivariate statistical analysis (50 and more), and treats the cases as mechanic aggregates of variables. Ragin himself makes plea for a diversity-oriented strategy of comparative method that allegedly combines the advantages of both strategies. In this strategy, cases are examined as exemplifications of the types of configurations which are constituted by the multiple memberships of the cases involved in the sets.

Like the case-oriented (qualitative) strategy, it works with nominal (more exactly, dichotomous or binary) data. However, differently from the qualitative strategy, diversity-oriented strategy emphasizes not the complexity, but the diversity of the cases. This diversity means their differentiation into types which are located in the “property space” analytically represented by the tables very similar to the truth tables in the propositional logic (see section 3 below). The researcher aims to bring this diversity to the light and to formulate certain limited generalizations (in this respect, the goals of the researcher are similar to those of the variable-oriented or quantitative researcher). The “synthetic” strategy works best in the “middle” zone between the small (up to 10) and large (more than 50) number of cases. Most intriguing feature of the “synthetic” strategy is its ability to cope with the phenomena of the multiple and conjunctural causation that present great difficulties for the case-oriented researcher, and are partly ignored, partly treated inadequately in the statistical research.

2. Mill's Canons and the Problem of the Multiple and Conjunctural Causation

British philosopher John Stuart Mill was the first who provided the systematic analysis of the logic of causal inference in the experimental inquiry. He described this logic by five rules of the eliminative induction. These are “methods” or “canons” of (1) agreement, (2) difference, (3) joint method of agreement and difference, (4) residues, and (5) concomitant variation.⁷ The rule of difference (or, more precisely, that of the only difference, because it validates the conclusion only if there is only one difference between two otherwise completely similar cases) helps to identify the temporally antecedent condition that can be described as the cause in the sense of sufficient condition.

If Mill's rule of difference is translated into the language of the contemporary social research, it can be formulated as involving two cases that are characterized by a number of dichotomous variables A, B, C and so on. For each of the cases, the value of the variable is “yes” (1) or “no” (0). If these two cases are so matched that all independent variables have the value 1 for both cases; the only

one independent variable (A in the example below) has different values (1 versus 0) for both cases; and the differences in the values of dependent variable Y correspond to those in the values of independent variable (Y has value 1 when A has value 1, and Y has value 0 when A has 0), then the researcher is entitled to conclude that A is a cause of Y. It may be useful to repeat that this conclusion is valid only as far as the values of all other variables (conditions) remain constant, and that this condition can be satisfied only in the experimental setting. Certain other substantive assumptions are necessary to identify the direction of causation: temporal precedence of changes in A, or the possibility to produce changes in Y by manipulating A, but not *vice versa*. Without such assumptions, the only valid conclusion from the observation of difference is that “the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon”.⁸

Table 1. The method of the (only one) difference

Cases	Variables				
	A	B	C	D	Y
Nr.1	1	1	1	1	1
Nr.2	0	1	1	1	0

Conclusion: B, C, D are eliminated. If the list of variables which can influence Y is exhaustive (there are no more causally relevant differences between the cases 1 and 2), then the temporal antecedent A causes Y.

The rule of the (only one) agreement helps to identify antecedent conditions that are causes in the sense of necessary conditions. This rule entitles the researcher to identify the variable as a cause when she observes that all “positive” cases (those with 1 as the value of dependent variable), agree by only this one independent variable having value 1 in all “positive” cases (see Table 2).

From the remaining 3 canons of the eliminative induction, the rule of residues and that of concomitant variation are of no interest as the guidelines

Table 2. The method of (only one) agreement

Cases	Variables				
	A	B	C	D	Y
Nr.1	1	0	1	0	1
Nr.2	1	1	0	1	1

Conclusion: B, C, D are eliminated. If the list of variables that can influence Y is exhaustive (there are no more causally relevant differences between the cases 1 and 2), then temporal antecedent A is a cause of Y.

for the comparative analysis of the small-N in the non-experimental setting. According to Mill, the rule of residues is a modification of the method of difference: “of the two instances, therefore, which the method of Difference requires, – the one positive, the other negative, – the negative one, or that in which a given phenomenon is absent, is not the direct result of observation and experiment, but has been arrived at by deduction”⁹. However, there usually are no practical possibilities to substitute deduction for observation of the negative cases in the comparative analysis of the small-N in the non-experimental settings. As for “method” of concomitant variations, it presupposes the measurement of the variables at the higher than nominal level, and is irrelevant for qualitative comparison using dichotomous and nominal data.

The situation is different for the joint rule of the agreement and difference which was called by Mill also “indirect method of agreement”¹⁰. This is the rule that was designated by Skocpol as the logical foundation of the case-oriented comparative analysis, proceeding by means of the pairwise comparison of the small N of the cases. This rule can be described as involving the “double employment of the Method of Agreement.”¹¹ Firstly, the cases are compared that agree in having 1 as the value of the dependent variable Y, and the variables are eliminated which have value 0 when Y has value 1. This comparison eliminates antecedent conditions which cannot be qualified as necessary conditions of Y. Then the cases with the value of dependent variable 0 are compared, and those variables are eliminated which have value 1 when Y has value 0. The variable that remains after this double elimination can be described as the cause of Y in the sense of its necessary and sufficient condition (see Table 3). Like the application of other

Table 3. Indirect rule of difference (joint rule of agreement and difference)

Cases	Variables				
	A	B	C	D	Y
Nr.1	1	1	1	0	1
Nr.2	0	1	1	0	1
Nr.3	1	1	1	0	1
Nr.4	0	1	1	0	1
Nr.5	0	0	1	0	0
Nr.6	0	0	1	1	0
Nr.7	0	0	1	1	0
Nr.8	0	0	1	0	0

Conclusion: B, C, D are eliminated. If the list of variables that can influence Y is exhaustive (there are no more causally relevant differences between the cases 1 and 2), then temporal antecedent B is the cause of Y.

rules, the standard conditions of the temporal antecedence and that of completeness of the list of potential variables should be satisfied for this conclusion to be valid.

Skocpol's famous macro-structural explanation of social revolutions¹² can serve as the example of the application of the joint rule of the agreement and difference for the test of the causal argument.¹³ According to Skocpol's definition, social revolutions are "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structure, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below".¹⁴ Before presenting her own explanation proposal for this phenomenon, Skocpol criticizes several explanations of social revolution that are available in the social scientific literature. These explanations include classical Marxist explanation of social revolution; social psychological theory of social revolutions that explains them by relative deprivation – the mismatch between what people get and what they believe they are entitled to get; the resource mobilization theory that attributes the decisive role to the dynamics of the resources controlled by the groups struggling for the power (according to this theory, the revolutions are made by the groups with sufficient resources, first of all, the organizational ones); the theory of systems/value-consensus that explains social revolutions by the mismatch between the social values of the system and changed environment of their existence.

In Skocpol's own explanation of social revolution, the status of causes is attributed to the breakdown of state and to the peasant revolt. The state breakdown itself is caused by the state's failures in its foreign policy (first of all, by the lost wars), and by the resistance of the landlords to fiscal reforms which are necessary for the modernization of the state's military power. The landlords resist reforms because these reform require the redistribution of the part of the rent that is extracted from the peasants in favor of the state. On the other hand, when the state machinery breaks down, the never ceasing peasant unrest expands into mass uprisings that wipeout the landlords. Testing her causal hypothesis, Skocpol analyzes three "positive" instances (cases where revolutions occurred), and five "negative" instances where revolutions failed. These are represented by the societies and situations which are in many respects similar to "positive" instances, but had no revolutionary outcomes. Skocpol's "positive" instances are France in the late 18th century, Russia in 1917, China in 1911-1949. Skocpol's first negative instance is England in the 17th century with its religious and political upheavals that are frequently described as "revolution" (or "bourgeois revolution") in the history textbooks. However, in Skocpol's opinion, they were not deep and fundamental enough to be classified as "social revolution". The remaining three instances are Russia in 1905, Prussia in the early 19th century (1806-1813), Germany in 1848, and Japan in 1868. James Mahoney summarizes Skocpol's analysis by the following table.¹⁵

Table 4. Joint rule of agreement and difference
in Skocpol's causal explanation of social revolution

	Skocpol's causal factors (variables)		Examples of causal factors eliminated		Outcome
Cases	State breakdown	Peasant revolt	Relative deprivation	Urban worker revolt	Social revolution
France	1	1	1	1	1
Russia 1917	1	1	1	1	1
China	1	1	1	0	1
England	1	0	1	...	0
Russia 1905	0	1	1	...	0
Germany	0	0	1	...	0
Prussia 1806–1813	0	0	1	...	0
Japan	0	0	1	...	0

Conclusion: social revolutions happen when state breaks down and the peasants revolt. The combination of these factors is necessary and sufficient condition for social revolution. The table includes only two variables from alternative explanations, and Skocpol discusses the values of one of them (urban worker revolt) only for some cases. In her analysis, Skocpol considers the conjunction of the state breakdown and of the peasant revolt as one condition (in the opposite case, she should eliminate them both: the first because of England's case, and the second one because of the case represented by Russia in 1905).

The comparative researcher who applies the joint rule of the difference and agreement for small N in the non-experimental setting has to cope with at least two difficulties. The first of them is called “too many variables, too few cases” difficulty, and involves the reproach (by the adherents of the statistical and experimental methods) that the eliminative power of this rule is too weak to validate causal conclusions, when this rule is applied in the non-experimental context. The diversity and variance in the researcher's evidence is insufficient to eliminate all alternative hypothesis except one, and there can be no realistic expectation that her population of cases will include the cases that satisfy the condition of only one difference and that of only one agreement (similarity).

This difficulty can be alleviated in several ways. (1) The number of cases compared can be enlarged. One possible way of such enlargement is to treat the states of the same case at the different times as different cases. In the example exposed above, Skocpol applies this strategy by considering Russia in 1905 and Russia in 1917 as two different cases. (2) By selecting for comparison the cases that are most similar. In this way, the conditions for the application of the rule

of the (only one) difference are approximated. In the example above, the treatment of Russia in 1905 and Russia in 1917 can be considered as the application of this rule, because Russia in 1917 is more similar to Russia in 1905 than, say, to France in 1789. (3) By comparing the cases that are most different. In this way, the conditions for the application of the rule of the (only one) similarity are approximated.¹⁶ (4) By reducing the number of variables. This can be done (a) by combining the variables. This strategy is applied by Skocpol when she considers the breakdown of the state and peasant revolt as one joint (conjunctive) variable. The number of variables can be reduced also (b) using the background knowledge to eliminate part of the variables as relevant causal factors. In this way, the number of the causal hypotheses which the researcher has to test as the alternative explanations can be reduced. These strategies how to increase the eliminative power of the comparative method can be applied in various combinations.

However, in other respects the joint rule of the agreement and difference can be considered as too strong. If Skocpol had applied this rule not to the conjunction of the state breakdown and peasant revolt, but for these two variables considered separately, then she should eliminate not only relative deprivation and urban worker revolt, but also state breakdown and peasant revolt too (see explanation accompanying Table 4). Generally speaking, when the joint rule of the agreement and difference is applied, only the true hypotheses about the causes as necessary and sufficient conditions have survival chances (to remain uneliminated). However, if Y can be caused in two or more alternative ways (has alternative sufficient causes), then they both will be eliminated by the application of the rule of agreement or the joint rule of the difference and agreement. So Mill's rules cannot cope with the phenomenon of the multiple causation which is represented by the situations when the same outcomes are caused by the alternative sufficient causes.

Besides that, there are situations, when Y has causes that are neither its sufficient nor necessary conditions, and can play their causal role only in combination or interaction with other causal conditions: as a insufficient but non-redundant parts of the unnecessary, but sufficient conditions. Such causal conditions are causes in the sense of the so-called INUS-conditions.¹⁷ If, for example, Y in one case is caused by the complex of conditions ABC, and in another – by CDE, then the elements that occur only in some of these conjunctures (A, B, D, E) can be considered as causes in this sense, exemplifying the phenomenon of the conjunctural causation. The alternative combinations of causal conditions that are sufficient to produce Y are causes of Y in the sense of sufficient conditions (ABC and CDE in my example), and the antecedent conditions which occur as components in all complex sufficient causes can be

described as causes of Y in the sense of necessary conditions (this is C in my example, provided that ABC and CDE are only sufficient conditions of Y). The full range of the varieties of causation is displayed by the Table 5.

Table 5. Varieties of causation

		X is necessary condition of Y	
		Yes	No
X is sufficient condition of Y	Yes	(1) X is necessary and sufficient condition of Y	(2) X is sufficient, but not necessary condition of Y
	No	(3) X is necessary, but insufficient condition of Y	(4) X is INUS condition of Y

So Mill’s rules eliminate hypotheses about the conjunctural causes.¹⁸ Generally speaking, they are most adequate to deal with the cases of the type (1) as displayed in the Table 5. These are causes as they are understood in the natural science and described by the the causal nomological generalizations. However, when causal statements occur in the social scientific, and most importantly, in historical texts, they typically are about causes in the sense of INUS-conditions.¹⁹ For example, if a historian asserts that the armed guerilla warfare was a cause why Algeria has won independence in 1962, she does not mean that armed guerilla warfare is sufficient condition to win or to defend independence, because there are a lot of cases of guerilla warfare without such outcome (cf. Resistance war in Lithuania in 1944-1953). She also does not assert that guerilla warfare is necessary condition for the establishment of the independent state, because there are many cases where independence is won by peaceful means (cf. Lithuania in 1989–1991).

The best interpretation of this statement is its construction as the description of the cause in the sense of the INUS condition: an insufficient but non-redundant part of the unnecessary but sufficient condition. It is insufficient, because the armed struggle enabled the Algerians to win the independence only because this causal factor interacted with others (the support by Arab countries, the political situation in France, and others). It is non-redundant, because without guerilla Algeria most probably would not be independent in the 1962. However, the combination of the causal conditions that has produced Algeria’s independence in this year most probably was not necessary for the establishment of the independent Algerian state. We can reasonably speculate that Algeria would become independent at some later date by workings of some different

sufficient complex of causal conditions which does not include guerilla as its non-redundant part. This speculation can proceed in the following way: Algeria was incorporated into France as its overseas department (or as “African part” of the France), so there was no restrictions for immigration from Algeria to “European part” of France. By 1980–1990 or even much more earlier there would already be such significant the Arab and Berber immigration into “European France”, that even most savage French nationalists (like Le Pen) who ferociously resisted Algeria’s independence in 1954–1962, would be its most ardent supporters by 1990–2000 or even much more earlier.

3. Multiple conjunctural causation and Boolean methods

Perhaps the most important advantage of the Ragin’s diversity-oriented strategy in the application of the comparative method is its ability to cope with the phenomena of the multiple and conjunctural causation which presented the formidable difficulty for the case-oriented comparison governed by Mill’s canons. Ragin’s strategy owes this advantage to the invention of the technique of the data analysis that is called by Ragin “qualitative comparative analysis” (QCA), “originally designed as a formalization of the logic of the comparative case-oriented approach”.²⁰ This technique is available also as a PC program (QCA 3.0) that can be downloaded for free from Internet.²¹

To apply the QCA, the researcher should build the table that lists in its rows all possible combinations of the values of the independent variables (measured in the dichotomy scale). This table is similar to the truth tables that are used in the logic of propositions to define logical functors (truth-functional operators) and to analyze logical formulas. These similarities are not accidental – both tables are applications of the same mathematical structure known as Boolean algebra. However, there are two differences between two kinds of tables. First difference: in the truth table, the truth value for some specific row (combination of values of the variables) that is inscribed in the output column, depends on the logical functors that are used to conjoin the variables. In the QCA tables, the output column contains the values of the dependent variable for the given rows that were observed as a matter of fact. Second difference: the QCA tables contain an additional column where the numbers of the cases observed are listed. If we have, for example, the population consisting out of 38 cases, three independent variables A, B, C, and dependent variable S, then the QCA has the outlook as displayed by Table 6.²²

The presentation of the data by the tables of such format allows to apply for the analysis of these data the formal procedures of transformation and analysis from the Boolean algebra. They include, firstly, Boolean addition (with

Table 6. Hypothetical example of the QCA table

Independent variables (causal conditions)			Dependent variable	Number of cases
A	B	C	S	
1	0	1	1	6
0	1	0	1	5
1	1	0	1	2
1	1	1	1	3
1	0	0	0	9
0	0	1	0	6
0	1	1	0	3
0	0	0	0	4

weak disjunction as its logical equivalent), and Boolean multiplication (with conjunction as its logical equivalent). The very first thing that we can do using Boolean algebra, is to summarize the table by the formula (in this and other formulas, the capital letter is used if the variable has the value “yes”, and the minuscule letter is used if the variable has the value “no”):

(1) $S = AbC + aBc + ABc + ABC.$

The components of this sum are Boolean products. Each of them refers to some specific combination of the antecedent conditions which is followed by S. This formula can be simplified by the application to it of the procedure called “Boolean minimization”. This procedure allows to replace two Boolean expressions that differ only by the values of one of the input variables (one of them has value 1, and another has the value 0), and have the same output value 1, by one (more simple) expression. This expression is derived from the two “parent” expression by the elimination of the capital and minuscule letters from them. This formal manipulation is guided by the following substantive consideration: if two combinations of conditions produce identical outcomes, then the element that differentiates these combinations is irrelevant. For example, we have two Boolean expressions ABC ir ABc, and for each of them the outcome (dependent) variable has the value 1 (S). They differ only by the the third symbol (C and c), so C can be eliminated, leaving only AB. Substantively, both C and c can be dropped, because the value of this variable does not matter for the value of outcome variable. By the application of this procedure to (1), we transform it into

(2) $S = AC + AB + Bc.$

AC is derived from ABC ir AbC; AB is derived from ABC ir ABc; Bc is derived ABc ir aBc. Differently from (1), the formula (2) contains only the elements that are called “prime implicants”.²³ The Boolean formula that consists only out of primary implicants can be subjected to further minimization by transforming it into the formula that consists only out of the logically essential prime implicants. Such formula contains only logically minimal number of prime implicants. They are identified by means of the chart (see Table 7) in which primary implicants (in the rows) are combined with the primitive (unreduced) Boolean products (in the columns).

Table 7. Prime implicant chart

		Primitive Boolean expressions			
Prime implicants	AC	ABC	AbC	ABc	aBc
	AB	X	X		
	Bc	X		X	
				X	X

If the primary implicant implies the pair of primary expressions (can be derived from this pair by means of the Boolean minimization), then the cells at the intersection of the prime implicants and primitive expressions are marked by the cross. The final Boolean formula includes only those primary implicants that have no identical implications. In the example under consideration, the primitive products ABC and ABc are implied not only by AB, but also by other prime implicants: ABC is implied by AC, and ABc is implied by Bc. So AC and Bc are the smallest set of primary implicants needed to cover all original expressions. So the formula (2) can be simplified to (3), which contains only logically essential prime implicants:

(3) $S = AC + Bc$

What about the substantive point of these formal transformations?

Firstly, the minimized Boolean equation simply expresses in a more economical and lucid way initial data. Besides that, the minimized Boolean expression allows to discover some sufficiently important things about the data. Firstly, the Boolean equation that includes only logically essential prime implicants allows to say what kind of causes produce the outcome S. Namely, the expression (3) shows that none of the four causal conditions A, C, B, c is necessary or sufficient or both for the outcome. Considered for themselves, they can be classified only as the causes in the sense of INUS conditions. As such, they play their causal roles only as parts of causal conjunctures AC and Bc. These

conjunctures themselves are sufficient but not necessary as causal conditions of S. Perhaps most intriguingly, the minimization shows that in the presence of A the presence of C helps to produce S, whereas in the presence of B the absence of C is necessary to produce the same outcome (in the presence of B, C works as the inhibitor of S). To enhance the sense of these useful services of the Boolean minimization, let's compare (3) with several other hypothetical results of the Boolean minimization: (4) $S=AC+BC$; (5) $S=AC$; (6) $S=A+Bc$; (7) $S=B$. The formula (4) would allow to conclude that C is necessary but insufficient condition of S (necessary condition should be present in all primary implicants); the formula (5) would show that A and C are necessary but insufficient conditions of S; and the formula (7) would say that B is necessary and sufficient condition for S (the only cause of S).

Secondly, when we have at our disposition sufficiently simple Boolean expression, we can do with it to some further transformations and extract some additional information from the available data. So, for example, the so-called De Morgan's laws can be applied to the expression (3) to find out the causes of s (i.e., those of the absence of S, be it the absence of the military coups, social revolutions, strikes and so on). There are two laws of De Morgan: $\neg(p \& q) \equiv \neg p \vee \neg q$ and $\neg(p \vee q) \equiv \neg p \& \neg q$ (or, in algebraic symbols: $\neg(A \times B) = a + b$ and $\neg(A + B) = a \times b$). The application of the second law to the right side of the formula $S=AC+Bc$ and of the first law to the Boolean products AC and Bc produces the expression $s=(a+b) \times (b+C)=ab+aC+bc$. This is description of the conditions of the absence of the phenomenon S.

To prevent the impression that all these transformations boil down to the empty play with symbols, I will present also a substantive example used by Ragin to demonstrate the fecundity of the Boolean algorithms of QCA.²⁴ This is the empirical test of the theoretical explanations of the political mobilization of the territorially-based ethnic minorities in the Western Europe. These are minorities concentrated in some circumscribed region of the country. The characteristic manifestations of the political mobilization of such minorities are formation of the ethnic political parties and other ethnic organizations, representation in the national or regional legislative bodies, ethnic political demonstrations and political violence and so on. Why some ethnic territorial minorities mobilize, while others do not? Under what conditions can we expect that some specific minority will mobilize?

The survey of the social scientific literature concerning this problem enabled Ragin to find four variables that are most frequently identified by researchers as the causal conditions which influence ethnic mobilization (M). Firstly, this is the size of ethnic minority (S). In addition, the exploratory analysis of the demographic statistics about Western European populations enables to detect

very convenient coincidence: the minorities group into two clusters, one of them including the minorities less than 100 000 members, and another one with the populations over 100 000. For the minorities from the first cluster *S* has the value 1, and for those from the second cluster it has the value 0. Thereafter, we will use the uppercase letter if variable has the value 1, and the lower-case letter if the value of variable is 0. For size of minority, this gives *S* when the minority is large, and *s* when minority is small. Second causal condition is linguistic base (*L*): some territorially-bases minorities have forgotten their languages, while in others the vast majority of the members know its language in both oral and written form. So if the vast majority of the minority's members speaks and writes in its language, *L* has value 1, and if this it is not the case, this variable is coded as 0. Third condition is relative wealth of the minority (*W*): if the minority's gross domestic product per capita is equal or greater than that of the rest of nation, this variable is coded as 1, and if it is less, relative wealth is coded 0. The fourth causal factor is the economic condition of the minority's region: whether it is growing or declining (*E*). Best indicator of this condition is migration saldo: if immigration exceeds emigration from the region, then the region is growing (1); and if the emigration equals or exceeds the immigration, then the variable is coded (0).

Next, the analysis of the literature permits to identify three main explanations of the political ethnic mobilization: developmental theory, theory of ethnic reactivity, and theory of ethnic competition. According to the developmental theory, political ethnic mobilization is caused by the territorially- and linguistically based minority's economic regional inequality with the rest of nation:

(8) $D = Le$.²⁵

The theory of reactive ethnicity emphasizes so-called "cultural division of the labour" that means the coincidence of the ethnic division and class cleavages. According to this theory, the political mobilization should be expected from the minority which is poor because its members are employed in the low-paid non-prestigious jobs (*w*), and has no linguistic base (*l*). In the eyes of the majority, such minority looks "uncultivated" because it has no literature or developed higher culture in its vernacular language:

(9) $R = wl$.

The ethnic competition theory considers the ethnic political mobilization as the reaction of the large (*S*) and wealthy (*W*) minority to the increased competition with the majority of nation. This increase in competition is usually caused by "structural challenges", which bring destabilization of the cultural division of labor that in earlier times provided the minority with the advantaged position. The symbolic expression for this explanation follows:

(10) $C = SW$.

Ragin summarizes available empirical data that can be used to test these explanations by the following table (see Table 8) that presents the data about 36 Western European territorial minorities (cases).²⁶:

Table 8. Data about Western European territorially-based minorities

Rows	Minority	S	L	W	E	M
1	Lapps, Finland	0	0	0	0	0
2	Finns, Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
3	Lapps, Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
4	Lapps, Norway	0	0	0	0	0
5	Albanians, Italy	0	0	0	0	0
6	Greeks, Italy	0	0	0	0	0
7	North Frisians, Germany	0	0	0	1	0
8	Danes, Germany	0	0	0	1	0
9	Basques, France	0	0	0	1	0
10	Ladins, Italy	0	0	1	0	0
11	Magyars, Austria	0	1	0	0	0
12	Croats, Austria	0	1	0	0	0
13	Slovenes, Austria	0	1	0	0	0
14	Greenlanders, Denmark	0	1	0	0	0
15	Aalanders, Finland	0	1	1	0	1
16	Slovenes, Italy	0	1	1	1	1
17	Valdotians, Italy	0	1	1	1	1
18	Sards, Italy	1	0	0	0	0
19	Galicians, Spain	1	0	0	0	0
20	Western Frisians, Netherlands	1	0	0	1	1
21	Catalans, France	1	0	0	1	1
22	Occitans, France	1	0	0	1	1
23	Welsh, Great Britain	1	0	0	1	1
24	Bretons, France	1	0	0	1	1
25	Corsicans, France	1	0	0	1	1
26	Friulians, Italy	1	0	1	1	1
27	Occitans, Italy	1	0	1	1	1
28	Basques, Spain	1	0	1	1	1
29	Catalans, Spain	1	0	1	1	1
30	Flemings, France	1	1	0	0	0
31	Walloons, Belgium	1	1	0	1	1
32	Swedes, Finland	1	1	1	0	1
33	South Tyroleans, Italy	1	1	1	0	1
34	Alsations, France	1	1	1	1	1
35	Germans, Belgium	1	1	1	1	1
36	Flemings, Belgium	1	1	1	1	1

The same data can be presented in the more compact form by QCA table (analogous to Table 6). Differently from the Table 8 that includes only the observable cases, Table 9 presents all logically possible distributions of values of S, L, W, E. There are 16 (2^4) such distributions.

Table 9. QCA table for the data
about Western European territorially-based ethnic minorities

Row	D	K	T	A	M	Number of the cases (N)
1	0	0	0	0	0	6
2	0	0	0	1	0	3
3	0	0	1	0	0	1
4	0	0	1	1	? (0)	0
5	0	1	0	0	0	4
6	0	1	0	1	? (0)	0
7	0	1	1	0	1	1
8	0	1	1	1	1	2
9	1	0	0	0	0	2
10	1	0	0	1	1	6
11	1	0	1	0	? (0)	0
12	1	0	1	1	1	4
13	1	1	0	0	0	1
14	1	1	0	1	1	1
15	1	1	1	0	1	2
16	1	1	1	1	1	3

The table shows immediately that ethnic political mobilization can be produced by 7 conjunctures of causal factors:

(11) $M = sLWe + sLWE + SlwE + SIWE + SLwE + SLWe + SLWE$

The equation (11) is simply the transcription of the data from Tables 8 and 9 in the different form. This equation simply describes the data in all their complexity. After the application to (11) of the Boolean minimization procedures (in our case, the application of the only first procedure is sufficient because primary implicants are also logically essential implicants), we get

(12) $M = SE + LW$.

Inspecting (12), we can state, firstly, that ethnic political mobilization can be produced by two minimal causal conjunctures (SE or LW) that can be described as its two alternative sufficient conditions. M has no necessary conditions. None of the causal conditions S, W, L, E are sufficient or necessary, because they can produce M only in interaction with other causal conditions. So they are INUS-conditions of ethnic mobilization.

Secondly, in the variety of causal conjunctures or configurations we can distinguish two main types or “paths” of ethnic political mobilization: $M' = SE$ and $M'' = LW$.

Thirdly, we can evaluate available theories of ethnic political mobilization by estimating their scope, comparing these scopes, and detecting their possible improvements. To identify their scopes, we find out the intersections between (8)-(10) and (12). Namely, the intersection between development theory (8) $M = Ka$ and (12) $M = DA + KT$ is

$$(13) D(M) = Lwe.$$

The intersection of (9) and (12) is

$$(14) R(M) = SwlE.$$

The intersection of (10) and (12) is

$$(15) C(M) = SWE + SLW.$$

These formulas indicate imperfections and possible improvements of all three theories. Namely, all three theories provide only incomplete lists of the variables that causally influence ethnic political mobilization. The factors that are emphasized by the development theory – linguistic base and the economic decline of the minority’s region – can cause ethnic political mobilization only provided that the minority was, in addition, more wealthy than the remaining part of the state’s population. The theory of the ethnic reactivity can and should be improved by supplementing it by two further conditions – minority should be large, and its region should grow economically. Without these additional conditions, poverty (w) and the absence of the linguistic base (l) do not add up to the combination of the causal conditions that is sufficient to produce ethnic political mobilization. Lastly, the theory of the ethnic competition should be supplemented by the provisions that large size and wealth of the minority causes its political mobilization only in combination with high linguistic base or the habitation in the economically growing territory.

The application of the De Morgan’s laws to (12) provides the list of the conjunctures that preclude ethnic political mobilization: $m = (s+e) \times (l+w) = sl+sw+el+ew$. This formula says that small territorially-based ethnic minorities with no linguistic basis, small and poor minorities, minorities without linguistic

basis living in declining regions, and poor minorities in declining regions are not expected to form political parties, engage in the political demonstrations and other activities that are characteristic forms of politic mobilization.

Next, the formulas (13)-(15) permit to assess the scope of the theories under evaluation. For this goal, it is sufficient to find in the Table 9 the rows that correspond to these formulas, and to look at the extreme right cell for the number of the cases of this kind. Such inspection shows that the theory of ethnic competition C has broadest scope – it covers three rows (11 and 15-16), and explains 9 cases (Germans and Flemings in Belgium, Swedes in Finland, Alsatians in France, Friulians and Occitans in Italy, Basques and Catalans in Spain). R explains 6 cases (row 10), and D is successful only in explanation of the Aaland Swedes, because the political behavior of the Swedes in continental Finland and that of the Austrians in the Southern Tirol (row 15) can also be explained by C.

4. Concluding remarks: merits and weaknesses of the QCA

It is worth to take repeated notice of the advantages of the Ragin's version of the comparative method, deriving from its backing in the Boolean techniques of the QCA. Most important is the possibility to apply it to the complex causal conjunctures by paying due attention for the complexity of the "real" social and historical causality (more precisely, for the complexity of the available evidence). The construction of the QCA tables provides the description of this complexity, and then the formal transformation of the data helps to simplify or to reduce this complexity by distinguishing some essential features of the great number of the different causal conjunctures. The upshot of this reduction is a limited causal generalization. In this sense, QCA manages to steer the middle course between the preference for complexity characteristic for the case studies, and preference for generality, characteristic for statistical method and the variable-oriented (quantitative) strategy of the comparative research.

The algorithmic backing by the Boolean techniques provides the diversity-oriented version of the comparative method with the power to compare many different configurations all at the same time, while classical case-oriented strategy of the comparative research was bound to proceed by pairwise comparisons.²⁷ However, when the configurations compared are very complex (are described by many variables), the QCA tables are difficult to grasp. In these cases, the QCA is increasingly difficult to apply without the assistance of PC: it makes sense to remind that the number of the combinations compared equals 2^n , where n is the number of variables. The next advantage of QCA is its applicability for the comparison and evaluation of several competing theories (in this respect,

it is clearly superior with respect to case study method that lacks the testing power).

However, it is important to realize that QCA cannot serve as a substitute for the substantive theory. This point is important to emphasize because the first impression from the acquaintance with QCA is that it is a set of procedures that can be applied in a mechanical way to every set of data presentable in the QCA tables format to extract from them the restricted generalizations. The theory or the analysis of the available theoretical explanations is necessary to specify the variables, i.e. the respects in which the cases from some specific population should be compared. "To construct a useful truth table, it is necessary to gain familiarity with the relevant research literature, and, most important of all, the relevant cases. Thus, a truth table presupposes an enormous amount of background research".²⁸

This advice is useful also for coping with two difficulties of application of QCA that almost always happen in the practice. Firstly, this is the problem of limited diversity. This problem arises when not all logically possible cases exist or can be observed. This problem is exemplified by the cases from Table 7 that have question marks (in brackets) attached to the hypothetical values of the dependent variable. Two ways to solve this problem are possible: (a) to assume that dependent variable has the value 0 for missing or non-observable instances (as Ragin does in his example), or to assume that its value is 1. In both cases we are bound to make assumptions what would be observed in certain purely hypothetical, contrary-to-fact cases. If we choose the assumption (b), we have greater number of the primitive Boolean expressions (products), and after subjecting them to Boolean minimizations we get lesser number of primary implicants. Therefore, we receive as the output more "economic" or "elegant" (including lesser number of variables) generalizations. In this sense, the assumption (b) involves greater simplification or reduction of the complexity in the data. If we assume (a), the output generalizations are more cumbersome. However, because this assumption preserves more complexity in the data, it can be described as more conservative.

The assumption (a) can appear also as more realistic, because in this case we are minimizing only such Boolean products that include only the "positive" cases that were observed as a matter of fact. However, this is a false impression because (a) also involves contrary-to-fact assumption: if the "missing cases" would exist, then they would be "negative instances". At this place, it is important to observe that if the diversity of the reality is limited (not all possible cases are actual – and it seems to be usual situation), then such contrary-to-fact assumptions are unavoidable. Their substance is determined by the theoretical expectations and value assumptions. This is the problem situation

where we confront the objective limits of the eliminative power of the comparative method, if in applying this method we are bound by the restriction to use only the observations of the “naturally occurring” cases (if we can drop or overcome this restriction, then the comparative method becomes experimental method).

Where the diversity of the reality is insufficient, the comparative method (in Lijphart’s sense) cannot match experimental method where the researcher can produce the cases that do not naturally occur in artificial way, and to compare consecutively all combinations of the causal conditions that differ among themselves by only one element. In comparison with the case-oriented strategy of the application of the comparative method that tries to take the guidance from Mill’s rules, QCA has the advantage of compelling the researcher to formulate in the explicit way her assumptions about the nonexistent cases. Besides that, it provides her with scaffolding to carry out mental (imaginary) experiments by reasoning from different contrary-to-fact assumptions, and changing them in the systematic and controlled way.

The second difficulty in the application of the QCA is represented by the contradictory rows in the QCA tables. This difficulty arises when some of the cases in the given row are “positive” instances (with the output or dependent variable having value 1), and other cases are “negative” instances (with value 0 for output variable). This difficulty would emerge in the Ragin’s example, if e.g. some of the linguistically-based, rich minorities that inhabit economically growing regions (see row 16 in the Table 9) would engage in the ethnic political mobilization, while some others would remain politically passive. If such contradictory cases would exist, they would serve as the evidence that the list of the causal conditions that influence political mobilization is incomplete.

Best (although very painful) solution of this problem is to return to the data and to re-analyze them, even to supplement them with newly collected data. Such re-analysis should result in the revision of the QCA table by supplementing it with additional variables (columns) or by providing new (more precise) definitions of the variables that would entitle the researcher to revise their codings for the observed cases. If there is only one or two contradictory rows, and the “positive” or “negative” instances are dominating in them (say, there are 9 positive and only one negative instance), satisfactory solution of the problem can be discovered by the intensive (“deep”) analysis of the “deviant” cases. This analysis can help to discover the causes of their abnormality or exceptionality. All other solutions of this problem – to code the dependent variable for all cases with 1 or with 0 or to assume that the contradictory case does not exist – are questionable or “cosmetic” or “formal” (in the bad sense of this word).

The problem of the contradictory cases usually becomes increasingly more pressing with the growing number of cases: for a large-N population, there is greater probability that there will be contradictory cases, than for the small-N population. The attempt to solve this problem by introduction of the additional variables has the price: the increasing number of variables complicates the problem of the “limited diversity”: as the number of the possible combinations of the values of the variables increases, the number of the cases also usually increases that are possible but do not exist as matter of fact. If N is sufficiently large, this problem can be solved by supplementing Boolean techniques with the statistical method. Namely, the researcher can decide to code the output of some specific row (conjunction of causal conditions) by 1 only if the frequency of the “positive” instances exceeds some threshold which is postulated for the population of the given size taking the guidance from the mathematical probability theory.

This last solution for the problem of the contradictory cases Ragin recommends in his recent work.²⁹ In this work, QCA is modified by supplementing it with the probabilistic elements. This modification can be considered as the answer to the first of the two further criticisms which are addressed to the QCA by the skeptics and opponents. These criticisms target both QCA and the traditional version of the case-oriented comparative method guided by the Mill’s rules.³⁰

The first criticism emphasizes that both the application of Mill’s rules and that of QCA is grounded in the deterministic assumptions about causation. The causal hypotheses, tested by these rules and techniques, can only be statements about the strict unexceptional relation of covariance between the variables. However, many advocates of the quantitative (statistical) methodology in the social research assume that probabilistic conception of the causation is more convenient for social research.³¹ This conception maintains that the statement “A causes B” means that A influences (increases or decreases) the probability of B: $P(B/A) > P(B)$ or $P(B/A) < P(B)$. Probabilistic understanding of causation implies, among other things, that single “deviant” case cannot falsify the hypothesis formulated in the statistical language: only “deviant” distributions of many cases count. The situation is completely different for the comparative method applied to small-N population: from the purely logical point of view, even only one “deviant” case is sufficient to falsify causal hypothesis. However, such deviant case can be the artifact created by the measurement error. So in the research that is grounded in the deterministic assumptions true hypothesis can be rejected just because of the only one measurement error. We see that because of these assumptions both QCA and classical case-oriented comparative method are extremely sensitive for the

measurement errors. Even if the incorporation of the probabilistic elements into QCA does not provide incontrovertible solution for this problem, it helps to mitigate it.

The second criticism highlights the shortcomings of QCA which cannot be alleviated in this way. They derive from the dependence of the QCA on the binary data. This means that researcher is compelled to dichotomize the reality – even if it consists of the cases that are marked not by the differences in kind, but by those of degree. So, for example, the conclusions about the causes of the ethnic mobilization provided by QCA depend in a crucial way from the operationalization (choice of the indicators) of this variable and that of the variables that refer to the causal conditions which influence it. In the reality, there can be significant differences in the degree of the political mobilization or linguistic competence among the minorities. The researcher can choose more or less demanding criteria for the partition of the ethnic minorities into “mobilized” and “non-mobilized” ones. However, there hardly can be the choice made that is safe against the allegations of being arbitrary or motivated by the desire to get the “required” result. Even a slight change in the criteria of “political dependence”, “linguistic competence” or the doubts concerning the measurement of particular cases would entail different causal conclusions.

In his most recent work, Ragin tries to cope with this problem, advancing the new version of QCA which works not with the “crisp” variables or sets (such that the membership is the “no” or “yes” answer matter), but with the “fuzzy” sets which include cases with the different degrees of membership. This idea takes into consideration the intuition that a state can be more or less democratic, that a Lithuanian of the Roman Catholic faith can be lesser or smaller Catholic, and so on.³² Ragin’s methodical innovations provide the proof of the methodological vitality of contemporary comparative social research. However, it is doubtful whether the “fuzzy set” version of the diversity-oriented strategy how to apply the comparative method can succeed in rectifying its weaknesses that originate from its dependence on the binary data without engendering new, and even greater difficulties. “No free lunch” principle holds also for increasing methodological sophistication in the comparative social research. But the examination of the revised version of QCA from this standpoint lies behind the intended scope of the present contribution.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ See: Lijphart A. "Comparative Politics and Comparative Method", *American Political Science Review*, 1971, 65: 682-693.

² See e.g.: Popper K.R. *The Poverty of Historicism*. London: Routledge, 8-9, 83-97.

³ Lijphart A., op. cit., p.685.

⁴ Skocpol T. *States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, China, and Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979, p. 36.

⁵ I will name some case studies, which are famous as "classics" in their disciplines. They include the book of an American political scientist Graham T. Allison *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. N.Y.: Harper-Collins, 1971, where the processes of decision making by the governments of USSR and USA during the Caribbean crisis in 1962 are analyzed in detail; the book by sociologists Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd *Middletown. A Study in American Culture*. N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1929, which presents the account of the way of life in the provincial town of the American Middle West in the 1920s (work and the sources of subsistence; leisure and family life; the education of the younger generation; religious life); William Foote's *Street Corner Society. The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955 (first edition – 1943), that presents the picture of the internal life in the Italian immigrant colony (1936-40 in the slums of one of the greater American cities); the books of Clifford Shaw *The Jack Roller. A Delinquent Boy's Own Story*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931 and that of Jon Snodgrass *The Jack-Roller at Seventy*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1982, providing the story about the "criminal career" of the juvenile delinquent and his subsequent life.

⁶ See: Ragin Ch. C. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987; Ragin Ch. C. *Alternatives in Comparative Social Research*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991; Ragin Ch. C.: *Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity of Method*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press, 1994; Ragin Ch.C. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000; Ragin Ch. C.: "The Logic of Qualitative Comparative Analysis", in Griffin L.J., van der Linden M. (Eds) *New Methods for Social History*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999 (*International Review of Social History*, Suppl. 6), p.105-124. See also: Becker H. S., Ragin Ch. (Eds) *What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

⁷ See: Mill J. S. *System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*. London: Longmans, 1949, p. 253-266 (Book 4, ch. 4. First edition: 1843).

⁸ *Ibidem*, p.256.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p.260.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.259.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p.259.

¹² In Skocpol Th. *States and Social Revolutions*.

¹³ See also: Skocpol Th. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, p. 72-95.

¹⁴ Skocpol T. *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 33.

¹⁵ In this reconstruction of Skocpol's argument, I am drawing on: Mahoney J. "Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis", *American Journal of Sociology*, 1999, Vol. 104: 1154-96, especially p. 1159.

¹⁶ About (2) and (3) ways see: Przeworski A., Teune H. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. Reprint ed. Malabar, Florida: Krieger, 1982. P. 31-46.

¹⁷ See: Mackie J. L. *The Cement of the Universe. A Study of Causation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, p.29-87.

¹⁸ See Ragin Ch. *The Comparative Method*, p. 39-42. The difference between Mill's methods and Ragin's Boolean methods (as described in the next section) should not be exaggerated. Instead, Ragin's methods can be considered as development or improvement of Mill's canons.

¹⁹ See for example: Lorenz Ch. *Konstruktion der Vergangenheit. Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie*. Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1997, S. 193-206.

²⁰ Ragin, Ch C. "The Logic of Qualitative Comparative Analysis", p.107.

²¹ See <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsqca.htm>.

²² See Ragin Ch. *The Comparative Method*, p. 96.

²³ Boolean expression X implies Y, if the reference class of Y is the subset of the reference class of X. The expression which implies (X in our case) is called "implicant".

²⁴ See: Ragin Ch. *The Comparative Method*, p. 133-149.

²⁵ The uppercase letter in the equations (8)-(10) refer to the theories of ethnic mobilization: D – developmental, R – reactive ethnicity, C – ethnic competition.

²⁶ See Ragin Ch. *The Comparative Method*, p. 141. I present Ragin's table in somewhat simplified form by coding political mobilization "yes" or "no". Ragin himself draws the distinction between two levels of political mobilization – "high" (2 as value of M) and "low" (1 as value of M). Then he recodes M for all cases in the row as 1, if at least half of the cases in the same row (conjuncture) display high levels of mobilization (2). Otherwise, the outcome variable M is coded as 0 – even if some cases display manifestations of political mobilization. So because Magyars and Croats in Austria are politically passive (0 as value of M before recoding), the M is coded by 0 for given row, although some cases from the same configuration (Greenlanders in Denmark and Slovenes in Austria) are characterized by political mobilization (with 1 as value of M before recoding).

²⁷ See Ragin Ch. *The Comparative Method*, p. 38-41.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p.121.

²⁹ See first of all his *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*.

³⁰ See, for example: Goldthorpe J.H. *On Sociology. Numbers, Narratives, and the Integration of Research and Theory*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000, p. 45-64; Lieberman S. "Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases", *Social Forces*, 1991, Vol. 70, Nr. 2, p. 307-320; the same author: "More on the Uneasy Case for Using Mill-Type Methods in Small-N Comparative Studies", *Social Forces*, 1994, Vol.72, Nr. 4, p. 1225-1237; the same author: "Causal Analysis and Comparative Research: What Can We Learn from Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases?" In: Blossfeld H.-P., Prein G. (Eds) *Rational Choice Theory and Large-Scale Data Analysis*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998. P. 129-145.

³¹ See, e.g. King G., Keohane R.O., Verba S. *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1994, p. 75-82.

³² Software of this modification of the QCA is also available in the Internet. See <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/software.htm>. See also <http://www.compass.org/>. This is the site of the Comparative methods for the advancement of systematic cross-case analysis and small_N studies (COMPASSS) research group, directed by Gisèle De Meur and Benoît Rihoux.

**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS**

**THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES
IN THE ELITE RECRUITMENT AND CONSOLIDATION
IN NEW DEMOCRACIES**

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In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, mass movements served as the most common vehicle for elite mobilisation and elite recruitment during the transition. The first free and competitive elections in the region go a long way towards accounting for the initial salience of these mass movements. These democratic elections are frequently referred to as founding or constituent elections, which makes good sense considering that ‘without elections the full array of institutions that constitute a new democratic political society – such as legislatures, constituent assemblies, and competitive political parties – simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legality, and legitimacy’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, 71). The elections were marked by a minimum of violence, they allowed the citizens to express their political views freely, they encouraged political participation, and, after years of political repression, they served to provide the emerging democratic governments with the seal of legitimacy (Garber and Bjornlund 1992). Free elections meant that the major political players accepted political competition as the only meaningful way of establishing a sustainable democratic order, and it also meant that these actors made ‘the convocation of elections an increasingly attractive means for conflict resolution’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 40).

The composition of elites tends to be volatile and subject to many changes during the process of political change. Polish elitologist Jacek Wasilewski identifies as many as three stages of elite change during the entire period of democratisation (Table 1).

Table 1. Regime Change and Three Types of Elites

	<i>Elite of transition</i>	<i>Elite of transformation</i>	<i>Elite of consolidation</i>
<i>Elite characteristics</i>	Mission and vision	Engineering the new order	Integration and habituation
<i>Major tasks</i>	Institutional choices	Crafting democracy and market economy	Consolidating democracy and inducing growth
<i>Mass-Elite relations</i>	Symbolic politics	Reform politics	Distributive politics

Source: Jacek Wasilewski (2001, 137).

Different periods of transition to democracy promote different types of emerging elites, in the sense that different times call for different political skills, approaches and behaviour. During phase of transition, when strategic choices about new political order are made, the transitional elites might be portrayed as elites with a mission and a vision (Wasilewski, 2001). The breakdown of communist regimes in Central East Europe was, in many cases, the result of interaction between the reform-flank of the old elites and the emerging elites of mass democratic movements. Intellectuals played an especially important role within the transitional elites by articulating democratic values and opinions for society at large, thus turning into prophets and symbols of the democratic movements. But, when the transition was over, most of the intellectuals withdrew from politics, which reduced the overall quality of the emerging political class.

The period of transformation, which includes the introduction of democracy and the opening of society to market economy, paves the way for emerging elites mainly 'composed of engineers and technologists of a new polity and new economy (Wasilewski 2001, 135). The consolidation of democracy as 'the process of habituation of new rules and patterns' (Wasilewski 2001, 134) produces new elites of 'moderators, integrators, [and] growth-inducers' (Wasilewski 2001, 135).

The political organisation of the emerging elites once again makes it imperative to distinguish between different periods of elite development in the process of democratisation (Table 2).

Table 2. Political Organisation of Emerging Elites in the Process of Democratisation

	<i>Elites of transition</i>	<i>Elites of transformation</i>	<i>Elites of consolidation</i>
Political organisations and dominant groups of elites	<p>1. <i>Communist party</i> Elites divided into hard-liners and soft-liners</p> <p>2. <i>Mass movements</i> Elites divided into moderates and radicals</p>	<p>1. <i>Mass movements</i> Elites divided into moderates and radicals</p> <p>2. <i>Emerging party elites</i> Elite pluralism along party lines</p>	<p>1. <i>Party elites</i> Elite pluralism along party lines</p>

In this chapter, we will discuss the evolution of party organisation and party system in Lithuania and the linkage between parties and citizens, particularly the prevailing electoral volatility in Lithuania and the other Baltic countries. An underlying theme of the chapter is parties as vehicles of elite recruitment during the consolidation of democracy.

The Evolution of Parties in a Consolidating Democracy

The founding elections differed very much from subsequent elections, primarily by virtue of the importance of the broad, amorphous, umbrella organisations, which tended to break up and recombine into smaller groups or factions once they had been elected into office. The emerging party system was actually more dependent upon coalescence within the initial democratic reform movement than upon splits within the surviving communist parties (Olson 1998, 11). As David M. Olson points out, flux, splits and coalitions of would-be party formations in and outside of parliament, which tended to be more frequent as elections approached, were common characteristics in the early developmental stages of democratic party systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Olson 1998, 12). The general fluidity of the initial party systems notwithstanding, the political stage of the new democracies was reconfigured along multiparty lines well before the second round of democratic elections.

If consolidation of democracy 'is conceived as a process, and not merely as the result of a process, the main protagonists in that process – parties, party leaders, and other politically relevant elites, including the leading political movements – must be placed at the very centre of our analysis (Morlino 1995, 315). The same author perceives the political parties as the key component of democratisation in the sense that they are the political actors 'most capable of forming, maintaining, expressing and deepening attitudes related to regime legitimacy and illegitimacy' (Morlino 1995, 315).

A stable party system dominated by pro-systemic political parties is a prerequisite of successful democratisation. In countries with party systems in flux, voters tend to align with populist political leaders, instead of developing more or less stable loyalties with pro-systemic parties. Established and institutionalised parties tend to preserve the democratic rules of political game and to promote efficient party government. The legitimacy of pro-system parties is an essential part of the process of democratic consolidation in all new democracies. It is a product of a drawn-out and complicated process involving a variety of factors, including legal regulations, changes of public opinion, performance in government, historical political subcultures, and the style of leader. In the case of political parties as non-institutional political players, at least four levels and phases of legitimacy may be identified.

- Parties are defined as legitimate participants in the political process. The rights of individual citizens to form political associations are secured, and the rights of these associations to run for elections and to organise political campaigns are recognised. In the case of Lithuania, 35 political parties were officially registered – and recognised – by the

Ministry of Justice in September 2002. In Central and Eastern Europe, this process had been completed before or, in some cases, immediately after the founding elections.

- Parties are recognised as legitimate vehicles for representation. Party representatives take part in the decision-making processes of a variety of public institutions, including local government but excluding parliament. In this context, the number of relevant and legitimate parties is usually smaller than the total number of registered parties.
- Parties – competing for the electoral support of the voters – are recognised as legitimate actors in the parliamentary arena. On this level of legitimacy, the number of relevant parties tends to decrease compared to the number of parties represented in local self-government.
- Parties are recognised as legitimate bearers of coalitions or one-party governments. Since the 1992 elections to the *Seimas*, only six parties – the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) (HU[LC]), the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LChDP), the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU), the New Union (Social Liberals) (NU[SL]), and the Lithuanian Centre Union (LCU) – might be described as able to rule the country in a coalition, or on one-party basis.

In democratic political systems, the evolutionary logic of party legitimacy reduces the chances of minor opposition and non-parliamentary parties to create a new party image overnight and to jump into a group of governmental parties from the outskirts of the political arena, ignoring the step-by-step character of legitimacy. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified four historical thresholds that all political organisations must overcome in order to turn into legitimate actors of national importance (see Table 3). These thresholds not only help legitimise some of the political parties; they also prevent other parties from entering the political arena. The effect is two-folded. On the one hand, it stabilises the existing party system by giving priority to evolutionary change. On the other hand, the long-term rejection of newly emerging cleavages and political organisations catering to these new cleavages may cause a lack of congruence between social and political structures in society.

Central and Eastern Europe still remains far removed from the evolutionary path described by Lipset and Rokkan. According to them, the party system is a by-product of underlying social structures. In contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, however, political changes initiated the development of a completely new economic and social order in the early 1990s. Here social divisions of the standard West European variety emerged only gradually, and as a result of political decisions and the dynamics of transitional economies. In organisational

Table 3. Four Thresholds of Party Legitimacy

<i>Threshold of Legitimation</i>	Is there a right of petition, criticism, and opposition? Can the differences among groups be openly expressed and articulated?
<i>Threshold of Incorporation</i>	Are all members of a social group allowed to participate?
<i>Threshold of Representation</i>	Must the new movement join larger and older movements to ensure access to representative organs, or can it gain representation on its own?
<i>Threshold of Majority Power</i>	Are there built-in checks and counter-forces against numerical majority rule in the system, or will a victory at the polls give a party or an alliance power to bring about major structural changes in the national system?

Source: Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 27).

terms, the very elite group that engineered and masterminded the transition to democracy had to create would-be parties as institutional expressions of interests and collective identities, which had to be articulated and constructed before the political elite could aggregate them. At this stage of development, the political elites were reminiscent of a horse, standing not before but behind the cart trying to push the transitional carriage forward.

It is readily apparent that parties carry different connotations and play different roles in new democracies than they do in advanced democratic countries. We must evidently clarify and elaborate upon these differences in order to identify the aspects of political parties of particular relevance for elite recruitment. Not so long ago, Maurizio Cotta stated that ‘the simplest view of a party is one that pictures it as a unitary actor with a well-defined set of political goals and policy preferences’ (Cotta 1999, 4). But, as Cotta points out, ‘things are normally not as simple. Parties are internally articulated and complex dynamics take place within them. The single actor image is perhaps more the conclusion of the process than its starting point, an exception rather than the norm’ (Cotta 1999, 5).

A few elements of the political party as a phenomenon of modern political life must be highlighted in this context. First, from Edmund Burke and onwards, parties have been perceived as ideology-linked and value-consensus sets of individuals. It was only in the late 19th century that *pluralistic consensus* and/or *pluralistic dissent* was acknowledged as beneficial for democratic politics in general and party politics in particular (Sartori 1987, 92). Second, a party ‘is an organization which transcends these individuals. [...] The organization

constitutes a resource for all those who belong to it: because and as long as it exists these can achieve results, which they could not achieve otherwise' (Cotta 1999, 5). Third, according to Panebianco and Cotta 'the party has also a collective identity: it evokes a tradition, an ethos, a "we-feeling" which comes to be valued in itself and must be preserved' (Cotta 1999, 5).

From a functional point of view, we are well advised to differentiate between the various arenas of political parties. Using Cotta's terminology we should distinguish between the membership party, the parliamentary party, the party in government, and the party in the electorate (Cotta 1999, 5). The components of party organisations listed above provide the basis for our analysis of party-elite linkages in this chapter.

The Legal Setting of Political Parties

As organisations, political parties are embedded not only in the transitional context; with the ongoing process of democratic consolidation the parties have become more and more constrained by the constitutional and institutional framework. The latter has important consequences for the ability of the parties to consolidate or, for that matter, encourage fragmentation of the new political elite.

The framework might be described on the basis of two major parameters, i.e. formal or legal versus institutional regulations of party development, including the legal basis of party formation, and the electoral system. The legal regulation of party activities will have to be an essential part in the analysis of party structure and performance. Moreover, these laws are initiated and formulated by political groups and organisations. The implication is that all laws reflect the interests of certain groups. The question is only to what extent these interests make themselves felt on the decision-making process?

Political parties are mentioned only few times in the Lithuanian Constitution of 1992. Article 35 states that 'citizens have the right to freely form and join communities, political parties and associations, provided that their goals do not run counter to the spirit of the Constitution and the laws' (*Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija* 1993, 22). The article draws attention to the fact that other laws regulate the formation and activities of political parties. Article 83 of the Constitution thus refers to political parties rather negatively: 'a person, who is elected President of Republic, must cancel his activities in political parties and political organisations until the following electoral campaign for President of the Republic' (*Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija* 1993, 51).

Despite the few and brief direct references to political parties, the Constitution established very definite guarantees for collective and individual political self-expression. It includes the freedom of thought, right to privacy,

the principle of equal treatment before the law, the rights to vote and to representation, the right to criticize the government and governmental officials, in other words the very guarantees that constitute the basis of group and individual autonomy *from* and influence *on* political institutions.

The Constitution is the only general legal document that allows and regulates party activities. But the road leading up this document was long and rough. Founded in June 1988, Sąjūdis, the first mass opposition movement was in fact an illegal organisation according to the Soviet legal code. The only way to legalise Sąjūdis was for it to be registered as a social movement. Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of Soviet Lithuania stated that the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) was 'an integral part' of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and that the latter was the only legal political party, playing 'the leading and guiding role' in society. These articles of the Constitution were removed entirely in December 1989.

The reconstruction of multi-partyism was not only the work of the Sąjūdis, however. In late 1988 and early 1989 historical organisations such as the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic parties, as well as the Nationalists Union and 'Young Lithuania' reappeared, claiming title to their inter-war heritage. At the same time, a few new parties, such as the Humanitarians and the Greens, were established. In April 1989, Sąjūdis passed a motion calling for the LCP to be transformed into an autonomous political party, and for all other parties to be legalised and receive equal treatment under the law (*Lietuvos Kelias* 1990, 31).

The actual rebirth and formation of political parties was much quicker than legal reform. The 1989 legal changes served to codify changes that had already taken place and practices that had become more or less customary. In September 1990 the Constituent Parliament passed the *Law on Political Parties and Political Organisations*. The law may be seen as a major effort to introduce formal, legal regulations for political parties, and defines rules and procedures for party formation and activities. The so-called *party law* gives all Lithuanian citizens the right to form parties and to participate in activities of these parties. Excluded from this right are only military and police servicemen, staff of national security agencies, and judicial officials during the period of their service or employment. Party formation and registration is not possible unless the following five criteria are fulfilled, i.e. the party must have at least 400 founding members, a party statute and a basic programme, a set of elected leaders, party institutions formed by the party conference or party congress, and file an application for registration with the Ministry of Justice.

Lithuania's rules of party registration might be characterised as strict, since each new party is required to present a list of founders with names and

signatures, data about their citizenship, addresses, personal identification codes, professions, confirmation that she or he is not a member of another party, a protocol of the founding conference, party statute, and even designs of party symbols.

The electoral system shapes the party system to a significant degree. In a narrow sense, the electoral rules have a twofold effect on political parties: on the stability of party government and, secondly, on the structure of the party system. The Constituent Parliament passed the first post-communist election law in July 1992. The 1990 founding election in Lithuania was based on the Soviet-style majority system of representation. The debate on electoral reform was rather heated and displayed several controversies. The rightwing faction of Sąjūdis argued for a two-round formula, while the moderates of Sąjūdis and the parties of the left expected to get dividends from a proportional list system. Both camps believed that the electoral system advocated by them would make it possible for them to defend their parliamentary seats and to curtail parliamentary fragmentation by barring minor parties from entering the Seimas.

After a prolonged political crisis from April to July of 1992, a mixed member proportional electoral system was introduced. This decision was the outcome of political compromise. As it turned out, the mixed system was in fact one of the best options available for those interested in striking a balance between representation and fragmentation after the first multi-party elections of 1992.

The *Law on Elections to the Seimas* fixed the number of MPs to be elected in single member constituencies at 71, and the number of MPs to be elected on proportional party lists at 70. With the exception of political organisations representing ethnic minorities, a four per cent threshold was imposed on all parties running for the *Seimas*. The law was amended in June 1996. The threshold for individual parties was raised to five per cent, and that for inter-party coalitions to seven per cent of the total vote. The special threshold of two per cent for minority ethnic parties was abolished. The amendments were initiated and enacted by the largest parties – the Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), the Homeland Union (HU(LC)), the Christian Democratic Party (LChDP) – and reflected their desire to reduce the number of serious contenders. The 7 per cent threshold imposed on inter-party coalitions could in fact be seen as a violation of the principle of equal treatment of parties in representative democracies. By increasing the costs of pre-election inter-party coalitions, the law seriously reduced the chances of minor parties of ever being thrust into a pivotal parliamentary position.

The election results of 1992 and 1996 did not live up to the expectations about the electoral dynamics cherished by the two opposing camps. The two rounds held in the single member constituencies failed to reduce the number of

parties in the *Seimas* as foreseen by the Sąjūdis rightwing. On the contrary, they paved the way for 13 parties in 1992 and for 14 in 1996. With the exception of the LSDP, the proportional formula did nothing for the moderate and leftwing parties as of 1992. The proportional formula actually brought five parties into the *Seimas* between 1992 and 1996. The Lithuanian case would thus seem to run counter to the well known assumption that majority elections in single member constituencies (whether run in one or two rounds) reduce political fragmentation, whereas proportional elections go towards increasing the level of fragmentation.

Upon the initiative of the HU(LC) and with the tacit support of the LDLP, the two-round format in single member constituencies was abandoned in favour of the simplest form of plurality system, the British-style First Past the Post prior to the *Seimas* elections of 2000. This change turned out to have no major impact on the distribution of parliamentary seats.

The *Law on Local Elections* passed by the *Seimas* in 1994 established proportional representation with a four per cent threshold as the electoral formula, and defined parties as the only actors allowed to nominate candidates. The different electoral systems on the national and local levels made it possible for the vast majority of the political parties to gain representation on either level, to work out a *modus vivendi* with several other parties, and to represent different layers of voter identities. On the other hand, the large number of parties competing for the attention of the voters would seem to suggest that they were all playing significant roles with respect to interest articulation; but perhaps without being capable of aggregating interests the way they should have been. It may be noted that the two parties that came out on top in the national elections of 1996 – the Homeland Union and the Christian Democratic Party – were backed by only 15.8 and 5.2 per cent respectively of the eligible voters (Lukošaitis 1997, 19-20).

To the extent that the present mixed system will be maintained, we would expect voting behaviour to undergo drastic changes along with the stabilisation of the party system as a result of learning and adaptation. Proportional representation with a five per cent threshold, presumably favouring major parties, ignored the preferences of almost 36 per cent of the voters in 1996, and of 23.4 per cent of the voters in 2000. This was the proportion of votes cast for parties failing to pass the threshold. The present electoral rules will eventually lead a significant portion of voters to change their behaviour and turn to split- ticket voting, that is, to vote for different parties according to what electoral formula is to be applied.

The picture of the parties' legal bases would be incomplete if we were not to mention their status and influence in the *Seimas*, particularly considering

that all new parliaments carry a double burden of responsibility. They act as agents of political socialisation for the parliamentary elite, while performing standard legislative functions (Olson 1996). The party faction is, of course, the basic unit in the *Seimas*. The first parliamentary factions actually date back to the Supreme Council in the early 1990s. On the eve of the elections of 1992, there were already nine parliamentary factions. Seven of them were by-products of Sąjūdis, the other two being the Polish Union and the LDLP. The majority of these factions could hardly be characterised as parliamentary parties in the Western sense of that word because of the lack of connections to extra-parliamentary organisations, low internal discipline, and ideological differences among members of same faction. The standing order of the Supreme Council was to take little notice of the parliamentary factions in the legislative process. During the founding elections, some of the candidates made a point of mentioning their ties to emerging political parties, but in the final analysis it was the Sąjūdis label that counted.

The position of the parliamentary factions changed dramatically after the first multi-party elections in 1992. From then on, the *Seimas* has been organised along party lines. The rapidly shrinking proportion of non-partisan MPs – from 22.1 per cent in 1990 to 4.9 per cent in 1992 and to nil in 1996 and 2000 – is as good an indicator as any of the increasing salience of the parliamentary parties. In 1996, MPs, who had run on an independent ticket, nevertheless decided to join a parliamentary faction, presumably because the parliamentary factions were developing into influential centres in the legislative process almost on a par with the parliamentary committees. The fact that it only takes three MPs to establish a parliamentary faction¹ made it possible for all MPs as of 1996 and 2000 to find a suitable niche.

All in all, the constitutional and institutional conditions in Lithuania were relatively stable and favourable for political parties and the consolidation of political elites. But a few critical comments are nevertheless in order. The generous membership requirements (400 members) for new parties paved the way for splits within existing parties and for entirely new parties. It is well known that new political actors lack basic knowledge about the consequences of different electoral rules. They tend to opt for electoral designs that serve their short-term partisan interests, but without realising the full consequences of the electoral rules that are being introduced. The Lithuanian case is a modest illustration of an electoral system that failed to meet the expectations of the principal actors involved. In terms of elite consolidation, the electoral system was actually working against stability and the consolidation of new elites.

Linking Citizens and Parties

The rank and file members have played a crucial role for all kinds of political parties in their efforts to link up with various segments of the electorate ever since the late 19th Century. These party-citizen linkages tend to take on different organisational forms and to carry different connotations over time and space. In 1999 Herbert Kitschelt identified the four most common types of party-citizen linkages developing in Central and Eastern Europe. The first type of linkages, which he labels *charismatic citizen-elite linkages*, makes for democracy by delegation to the political leaders, who make their appeal to the electorate on the basis of their exceptional personal qualities while consciously avoiding policy commitments in order to refrain from alienating any part of their respective constituencies. The second form of party-citizen linkage represents the *legislative faction or proto-party* with individual politicians forming coalitions around a variety of policies in the legislative arena but without having an organisational infrastructure. The third kind of linkage, featuring *clientelist and patronage parties*, relies heavily on leaders ready to invest in administrative-technical infrastructure in order to promote their campaigns, and attract voters and contributors by offering direct selective material and symbolic incentives² to those individuals or groups of individuals who come out strongly and decisively in favour of the party's candidates, rather than to invest in intra-party procedures or policy-based consensus building. In the *programmatic party*, the fourth type of party identified by Kitschelt, politicians do invest in administrative and technical infrastructure but even more so in procedures of consensus building. In clientelistic parties accountability and responsiveness are a function of *quid pro quo* relationships between politicians and their clients; programmatic parties rely on indirect, programme and policy-mediated exchanges with their supporters (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 46–48).

Only programmatic and tightly knit mass parties provide a pool of human resources broad enough for recruitment of party elite through competition and according to democratic procedures. The programmatic parties made up a substantial minority among emerging parties of Central and Eastern Europe, especially during the initial phase of democratisation. In the vast majority of the parties at hand, a small group of leaders was firmly in charge of all strategic decisions. Juan Linz made a similar observation when concluding that 'the new political parties are not likely to be mass membership parties, parties anchored in homogeneous and socially distinct electorates. They will be 'catch-all parties', parties less committed to integrate their supporters into a variety of mass organisations, and even less into an encapsulated subculture, as some socialist and Christian democratic parties did in the past. There will be fewer voters

with a strong party identification, and more of them will be ‘floating voters’ (Linz 1997, 416). It is probably fair to conclude that:

the freedom from socially structured constraining political climate will allow people to respond more readily to changing conditions and issues, to make politicians more accountable and to moderate the antagonism between social groups and their political representatives. In a sense, voters might be freer to choose, to reward and punish politicians, have more “exits” and “voices” and weaker “loyalties” (to use Albert Hirschman’s terms), and that is far from less democratic. The question is the degree of “loyalty” needed so that parties can have sufficient continuity to go on competing, to assure some permanency to elites with experience in politics and governing (Linz 1997, 421).

In Lithuania traditional programmatic parties such as the Social Democrats (which includes the former Democratic Labour Party), the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats tend to have many more individual members than other political parties (Table 4).

Table 4. Individual Party Membership (selected years)

Year	LDLP	HU(LC)	LSDP	LChDP	LCU	LLU	NU(SL)
1992	13600	0	500	5251	0	550	0
1996	9200	16164	1500	10500	1500	1000	0
2000	8300	19487	4000	10500	3000	2000	3500
2001	–	13470	15000	10000	2800	2000	3500
2003	–	12269	12506	10000	3640*	–	4926

* In 2003 LCU means Liberal and Centre Union

It is far from clear whether the size of the party organisation really matters in a setting with all but emerging parties. The charisma or personality of individual party leaders obviously plays a crucial role for party identification in such a context, but even outside observers of Lithuanian party development conclude that there ‘is apparently some correlation between membership numbers and the parties’ success in the elections’ (Smith-Sivertsen 1997, 27).

Table 5. Number of Party Votes for Parliamentary Elections, 1992–2000

Year	LDLP	HU(LC)	LSDP	LChDP	LCU	LLU	NU(SL)
1992	817.331	393.500	112.410	234.368	46.908	28.091	–
1996	130.837	409.585	90.756	136.259	113.333	25.279	–
2000	457.294*	126.850	–	45.227	42.030	253.823	288.895

Source: Table compiled by Alvidas Lukošaitis, except for the 2000 election

* Votes for the LDLP and LSDP electoral alliance

The three parties scoring the highest electoral averages since 1992 – the LDLP, the HU(LC) and the LChDP – were among the parties attracting most members. But, change is an implicit feature of democracy, and stability is always a relative phenomenon. Traditional parliamentary parties – like the HU(LC), the LChDP, the LDLP, the LSDP, and the LCU – have been fighting an uphill battle over time; at the very best, they defended their share of the electorate in the local and parliamentary elections in 2000. Among the main challengers to the mainstream parties were the New Union (Social Liberals), the Lithuanian Peasants' Party and the Liberal Union, which had medium-size organisations in terms of membership. These three political organisations were able to win as many as 529.000 votes or 37.5 per cent of the total number of valid votes in the 2000 municipal elections. In the subsequent parliamentary elections, the share of these parties increased to 602.000 or almost 41 per cent of the valid votes cast.

Yet, the average electoral share of new parties was lower in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia during the 1990s. Initially, this was due to the successful transformation of the Independent Communist Party into the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. Later on, the relative organisational strength and political competitiveness of the established parties effectively prevented new parties from entering the political stage. In retrospect, the New Union stands out as the only successful challenger to the mainstream parties on the basis of its parliamentary breakthrough in 2000, two years after it had been founded (Table 6).

Table 6. Share of New Parties in the Baltic Parliaments, 1989– 2000

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Average
Founding elections	67%	50%	50%	55.67%
First multi-party elections	100%	100%	54%	84.67%
Second multi-party elections	43%	44%	21%	36.00%
Third multi-party elections	0%	50%	21%	23.66%
Mean	53%	61%	37%	

Source: Rose, Munro and Mackie (1998).

See also PARLINE Database, Interparliamentary Union, available at <http://www.ipu.org>.

In Lithuania as of 1999, 5 per cent of the eligible voters were party members, in Estonia as of 1999, 3.5 per cent, and in Latvia as of 2001, 1.5 per cent. The share of party members seems to be related to rather general organisational patterns. In Lithuania, at least some parties, such as the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives), and the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties managed to develop into something reminiscent of mass parties. In

Estonia and Latvia, the prevailing model was elitist from the very outset. These organisational differences make themselves felt in the day-to-day politics of the Baltic countries. The salience of personal leadership and the high incidence of conflicts on the party leadership level in Latvia and Estonia are hardly coincidental. In a recent publication, Hans Petter Svege and Christer Daatland note that Estonian parties 'seem more like vehicles for political ambition and power-seeking than advocates of specific social groups and ideologies' (Svege and Daatland 2000, 66). Similar comments apply to Latvia, where 'parties are top-down establishments' (Bottolfs 2000, 90). Both countries feature parties with weak extra-parliamentary organisations. Parties founded within the respective parliaments dominate the political landscape in Latvia as well as Estonia.

This is not to say that the personality factor is insignificant in Lithuanian politics. It is not. Ever since 1993, the Homeland Union has been associated with Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuania's first leader after the restoration of independence. The LDLP, and later the LSDP, remain strongly linked with Algirdas Brazauskas, the pro-independence communist leader who paved the way for a smooth transition from authoritarian rule; and the success story of the New Union in the local and national elections of 2000 was to no small extent to be attributed to the personal appeal of Artūras Paulauskas, one of the serious contenders for the presidency in 1997. Continuity of personalities is a strong factor of stability of individual parties.

Leaders and Party Organisation

Party leaders³ play a more and more important role in achieving electoral success due to the impact of television and modern election campaigning (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991, 59). It is therefore no wonder that Davis concludes that 'leadership recruitment and selection are key functions of a modern political party. Consequently, parties in the Western democracies focus more of their resources on leadership selection and retention than any other activity, except electioneering and fund-raising' (Davis 1998, 1). The scholarly community has responded in kind by allocating a great deal of attention to the selection of party leaders.⁴

Ideology obviously affects parties as organisations, but its impact on leadership selection and on the leadership stability of the major political parties remains an open question. In this context, party statutes⁵ provide important cues. Four items would seem to be of particular importance: (i) the selection of the party leader, particularly the extent to which it is inclusive or exclusive⁶; (ii) the extent to which there is a clearly defined term of tenure for the party leader⁷; (iii) how and the extent to which party leaders are accountable to the

party organisation, and (iv) the extent to which party leaders may be subjected to recall proceedings, and by whom.⁸

Table 7. Rules of Party Leaders Selection (2001)

	Selection	Term of tenure	Accountability	Recall
LSDP	Congress	Two years	Congress, National Council	No rules
HU(LC)	Congress	Two years	No rules	Congress
LChDP	Congress	No rules	Congress, National Council	Congress, National Council
LCU	Congress	Two years	No rules	Congress
LLU	Congress	Two years	Congress	Congress
NU(SL)	Congress	Four years	No rules	Congress

The leaders of the two leftwing parties (the Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) and the Social Democratic Party (LSDP) - merged under the name LSDP in early 2001) have been elected by their respective party congresses, and the process of leadership selection in these parties may thus be seen as inclusive (Table 6.7). The statutes of the LSDP do not spell out how long the party leader may serve. But the data on the LSDP indicates that the elections of the chairman were held regularly every second year according to the “unwritten rule”. As far as regards the LDLP, the term of office of the chairman was 4 years. As for accountability and recall, the LSDP leader would find himself (or herself) in a more vulnerable position than his (or her) counterpart in the LDLP, considering that the LSDP National Council may remove the party leader from office by a two-thirds majority vote. However, after the merger of the LSDP with the LDLP, the newly elected chairman of the party could not be removed from office.

From the very beginning, the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) had a clearly defined set of rules pertaining to the party leader. All the officials elected by the party congress, including the party leader, could be subjected to recall or premature removal from office by a simple majority of the delegates to the congress. In addition, the selection of the leader may be seen as inclusive. He/she has been elected by the Congress for two years. However, the leader of the Homeland Union is not accountable to any party institution. In the Christian Democratic Party (LChDP), the office of party leader was not introduced until 1995. The leader was to be elected by the party *notables* in the National Council. This testifies to a far less inclusive selection process than that practised by other Lithuanian parties. However, after 1997 the leader of the LChDP was

also elected by the Congress. As if this were not enough, the leader is also politically vulnerable in the sense that he/she is made accountable to the National Council as well as to the party congress. The former body is even vested with the authority to suspend him/her from his/her duties by a two-thirds majority, subject to subsequent confirmation by the party congress.

Among the centrist political parties, the Liberal Union (LLU) has formally had a party leader since 1992, who has been elected for 2 years in the Congress. The leader was made accountable to the party congress, which in 1999 was given the right to recall the party leader by a qualified majority of two out of three. Similar comments apply to the Centre Union (LCU) and the New Union (Social Liberals) as far as regards inclusive selection and recall. But the leaders of these two parties are not accountable to any party institution. In addition, the term of office of the LCU leader is two years and of the NU(SL) four year.

All major Lithuanian parties may thus be seen to have opted for an inclusive strategy of leadership selection. The final decision is always left to the party congress. It is also readily apparent that the parties break down into two distinct groups neatly coinciding with the left/right cleavage. The parties of the left – the LDLP and the LSDP – have both introduced clear and relatively strict rules that pave the way for rather broad involvement by the rank and file in the selection process. They have made the party leader accountable to different party institutions, and they have introduced rules that make it possible to change party leaders during the incumbent's term in office. This approach towards leadership recruitment and maintenance by the left-wing parties might be characterised as collectivist. With the exception of the Christian Democratic party, the parties of the right and of the middle adopted a set of internal regulations that gave much more leeway to the party leader.

Do the two distinct organisational patterns have an impact on re-election rates of party leaders and their longevity in office? As of late 2002, only two parties – the Homeland Union and the New Union (Social Liberals) – were run by their founding fathers, by Landsbergis and Paulauskas respectively. Founded in 1998, the New Union was a relative newcomer in Lithuanian politics, and Paulauskas was re-elected to lead this party for a second term at the beginning of 2002. Landsbergis, on the other hand, had been chairman of the Homeland Union for almost a decade.

In terms of absolute numbers, the differences between the two groups of parties are obvious. The parties of the left have had much more turnover at the very top of the party organisation than the parties of the right or, for that matter, the parties of the centre. The Liberal Union – so far the only major party to have recalled one of its numerous party leaders – stands out as the only

exception from this rule. But even in this case procedures of recall were not used as far as Paksas, the former leader of the LLU, decided to resign on the eve of the forthcoming recall at the party congress in 2002.

Other indicators, such as the year the party was founded, the number of members it has, its relative success in the electoral arena, and the leadership model (collectivist versus individualistic) it represents, have limited or no impact at all on the patterns of leadership change. It would seem reasonable to expect an expanding grass-root organisation, the introduction of clear and transparent rules of recruitment, and the emergence of stable electoral following, to be conducive to the consolidation of the new political elite. Thus far, however, the impact of these indicators has been rather erratic.

We are therefore well advised to focus on what can be documented at this stage. We know that the seven major Lithuanian parties have had a total of 18 leaders since 1989. We also know that one third of them were out of politics by the beginning of 2002. These numbers reflect rather high rates of party leadership change. A few observations about the rules pertaining to party leadership recruitment are also in order. First, the party statutes now regulate the process of leadership recruitment in a rather detailed fashion. Second, the term of party leader has generally been shortened from four or even five years to two. Third, the party leaders have become more and more accountable to the party congresses or other internal party institutions.

Table 8. Share of Votes for the Major Parliamentary Parties*
in the Seimas Elections, 1992–2000 (per cent)

	1992	1996	2000
The votes cast for the largest parliamentary parties as a proportion of the electorate	65.1	35.8	31.1
The votes cast for the parliamentary parties as a proportion of the electorate	61.1	33.9	42.9

* HU(LC), LDLP, LSDP, LCU, LLU, LChDP, NU(SL).

The successful recruitment drive by most Lithuanian parties during the last few years does not seem to have paid off in the electoral arena. The major parties now have more rank and file members than before, but they are yet to carve out stable electoral niches for themselves. Since 1992 till 2000 their share of the electorate has decreased by almost one third (Table 8). The data strongly suggest that the major Lithuanian parties are still struggling to become stable political entities with sufficient electoral support to help stabilise the new political elite.

Parties in Power

Maurizio Cotta makes the point that ‘the “party in government” is temporary since no party is sure to govern forever’ (Cotta 1999, 14). The members of the party in government are usually card-carrying party members. But the party in government is also dependent on the discipline and cohesion of the parliamentary party, without which it would not be in a position to promote the consolidation of the emerging political elite.

Parties in power may be analysed from a number of different angles, for instance, by looking at institutional factors such as electoral rules and the structure of parliament, internal party regulations, especially with respect to the selection of party candidates and the relationship between the party organisation and parliamentary faction, or by focusing on the discipline within parliamentary parties, and patterns of recruitment for government ministers.

The relationship between the parliamentary party group and the extra-parliamentary party organisation attracted the attention of early scholars of political sociology, such as Roberto Michels and Maurice Duverger.⁹ Along with many others, they highlight the importance of identifying the centre of power within the party organisation. During the formative years of party democracy, liberals and socialists actually had very different opinions about where to place the legitimate centre of party power (Heidar and Koole 2000, 257). The liberal parties gave priority to the parliamentary party while the socialists emphasised the importance of the extra-parliamentary party. And even today, one might find these differences reflected in the structure of leftwing and rightwing political parties.¹⁰

Party statutes¹¹ normally contain four indicators that might measure ‘the extent to which the parliamentary group personnel and their actions may be controlled by the extra-parliamentary party (Harmel and Gibson 1998, 638)¹²: (i) *participation* – or the extent to which MPs have the right to take part in the meetings of leading institutions of the extra-parliamentary organisation between national congress when important policy decisions are being taken¹³; (ii) *policy conformity* – or the extent to which the parliamentary party has to comply with the policy positions taken by the extra-parliamentary organisation, (iii) *accountability* – whether the parliamentary party group is accountable to the extra-parliamentary organisation¹⁴; iv) *discipline* – or the extent to which the extra-parliamentary party organisation can impose sanctions on those MPs, who deviate from the party line.¹⁵

The short organisational history of the Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) testifies to several changes over time. In 1990–1992 the extra-parliamentary party was in a dominant position. Since 1993 until 1996, the LDLP achieved

a relative balance of power between the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary segments of the party organisation. In 1996 the party organisation responded to widespread dissatisfaction with the parliamentary record of the MPs by explicitly excluding them from the decision-making process of the extra-parliamentary party. As early as 1993, internal party regulations had made it mandatory for the LDLP parliamentary faction to comply with the policy position of the extra-parliamentary party; and the National Council had been given the right to expel from the party any MP who would deviate from the party line. As for accountability, this principle had been established from the very outset in 1990, and the extra-parliamentary organisation gradually created a number of institutions for the purpose of controlling the parliamentary faction. The overall impression, conveyed by the four above indicators, is thus that of a political party with its centre of power within the extra-parliamentary organisation from the very beginning. These findings are at least partially corroborated by data on the representation of MPs within the National Executive, the highest permanent LDLP institution (Table 6.9). But there is also a general trend for the number of MPs on the National Executive to increase over time, particularly when the party finds itself in government.

Table 9. Representation of MPs in the National Executive of the LDLP and HU(LC), absolute numbers and percentages

	LDLP*		HU(LC)**	
	1992–1996	2001	1993–1996	2000–2001
Non-MPs	48.7% (111)	27.6% (8)	38.6% (17)	28.6% (4)
MPs	51.3% (117)	72.4% (21)	61.4% (27)	71.4% (10)
Total	100% (228)	100% (29)	100% (44)	100% (14)

* After the LDLP merger with the LSDP, since 2001 data on the LSDP.

** Number of those members of the National Executive, who were elected in the Congress.

The Social Democratic Party (LSDP) obeyed a completely different organisational logic. Prior to the merger with the LDLP in 2001, the LSDP MPs were not accountable to the extra-parliamentary party organisation and could deviate from the party line with impunity. Also it was no requirement to comply with the policy position to any party institution. However, after 2001 the LSDP applies all devices to control parliamentary faction, which were used in the LDLP. Two more general observations about the parties of the left are in order.

First of all, the size of the party and the parliamentary faction matters. If the parliamentary party remains smallish, it is not necessary to regulate the relationship between the parliamentary faction and the extra-parliamentary party

organisation in detail. Small parliamentary parties usually have high scores on cohesion from the very beginning. Such parties are also better suited than others to co-opt MPs without current party affiliation. Second, government responsibilities also matter. Somewhat counter-intuitively, party cohesion tends to be on the high side as long as the party remains in opposition, while centrifugal tendencies make themselves felt once the party has secured a governmental position. While in power in 1992-1996, the LDLP survived only several minor splits, but the size of the parliamentary faction nevertheless decreased by almost 20 per cent due to widespread dissent among the MPs. After winning the 1996 *Seimas* elections, the Homeland Union had a parliamentary faction counting as many as 70 MPs, but by the end of the term this number had decreased to 49, or by 30 per cent. The LSDP is the only opposition party to have suffered greater losses, and then only under the special circumstances of 1999 when the party lost 42 per cent of its MPs as a result of the appearance of a social democratic splinter party.

The Christian Democratic Party (the LChDP) is the only rightwing party to impose strict scrutiny by the extra-parliamentary party on its MPs. The LChDP parliamentary faction has been accountable to the National Council ever since 1993. In 2001, the party passed a resolution that reduced its MPs to sheer instruments of the National Council on every issue to be decided upon by the *Seimas*. The adoption of this provision coincided with another resolution effectively barring the Members of Parliament from taking part in the decision-making process of the extra-parliamentary party organisation. Until the merger with the Christian Democratic Union in 2001, the LChDP MPs were *ex officio* members of the National Council. The only instrument that the extra-parliamentary organisation did not have at its disposal was the right to impose sanctions on MPs who were stepping out of line. The control imposed on the MPs was nevertheless strict enough to make for long-term stability of the LChDP parliamentary faction.

Between 1993 and 1999, the HU(LC) parliamentary faction established itself as a centre of decision-making to the detriment of the institutions of the extra-parliamentary party; and the MPs occupied more than 75 per cent of seats on the National Executive of the HU(LC), from 1993 and onwards the most influential permanent party institution (Table 6.9).

At the outset, the HU(LC) statutes had nothing to say about accountability; neither for that matter about the subordination of the parliamentary faction to the extra-parliamentary organisation, nor on policy conformity of parliamentary group to extra-parliamentary party. But the new by-laws, which were introduced in the wake of the disintegration of the dual leadership by Vytautas Landsbergis and Gediminas Vagnorius in 1999, made the parliamentary faction accountable

to the party conference and congress. All things considered, however, the extra-parliamentary party did not have the instruments necessary to control the parliamentary faction.

The Lithuanian Centre Union (LCU) stands out as the only party of the middle specifying the relationship between the parliamentary party and the extra-parliamentary party organisation. Since 1995 the MPs of the Centre Union have been formally obliged to implement the party line by voting accordingly in parliament; and the party organisation may expel from the party any MP who does not toe the line. But the LCU statutes of 2000 make all the MPs of the party *ex officio* members of the National Council. Among the centrist political parties the statute of LLU does not regulate principles of accountability, policy conformity and discipline. The extra-parliamentary party could not control activities of the parliamentary group. Similar comments apply to the NU(SL). As far as regards the relationship between parliamentary faction and extra-parliamentary party, the parliamentary group is only accountable to the extra-parliamentary organization.

The linkages between the extra-parliamentary organisation and the parliamentary faction in Lithuania vary, not only from one party to another but also over time. We have seen that the parties of the middle were rather relaxed about formalising the relationship between the extra-parliamentary organisation and the parliamentary faction. But we have also identified what we believe is a general trend for parties to set out for stricter and stricter regulation and to promote the extra-parliamentary organisation to the disadvantage of the parliamentary faction as time goes by. All in all, three distinct organisational models may be distinguished (Cotta 1999, 16-18). The LDLP and more recently the LSDP stand out as pronounced membership parties. The HU(LC), on the other hand, emphasises the parliamentary arena, and plays the role of a party in government also when not in government. The Christian Democrats (LChDP), finally, represent somewhat of an organisational middle ground in the Lithuanian context.

The decreasing inter-faction mobility in the *Seimas* since 1992 testifies to the gradual stabilisation of the parliamentary parties. A word of caution is nevertheless in order. A comparison over time reveals a high rate of inter-group mobility, occasionally surpassing that of the formative years, also after 1996. Stability is thus more than just a function of time.

Ideology must also be brought into the picture. In Lithuania, the rightwing parties have been more accident prone than the parties of the left with respect to internal fragmentation, dissent and formal splits. This applied to Sajūdis in 1990-1992, and to the HU(LC) and the LChDP in 1996-2000. All parties had their share of conflicts and disagreements, but nationally successful parties

with charismatic leaders somehow seemed to be in a better position to maintain party cohesion. The LDLP under the leadership of Algirdas Brazauskas, between 1990 and 1996, is a good case in point.¹⁶ But the emphasis on personality must not be too strong as evidenced by the splits within the HU(LC). As a matter of fact, the Homeland People's Party and the Union of Moderate Conservatives were established in 1999-2000 as a direct consequence of personal disagreements within the HU(LC) leadership. During the 1990s, the parties of the left actually gave rise to only one splinter party – Social Democracy 2000 – that broke out of the LSDP, while the parties of the right, including the Christian Democrats, counted one major split after the other. The parties of the left also consistently scored higher than the parties of the right on co-operation with like-minded parties. As early as 1992, the LDLP managed to form a pre-election coalition with a number of small leftist organisations, in spite of the resistance of its major competitor, the LSDP, which opted out of the coalition. But by the parliamentary elections of 2000, the two major social democratic parties, the LSDP and the LDLP, had formed their first pre-election coalition based on an equal partnership between the parties, which, finally, led to the unification of these two parties and the establishment of the united Lithuanian Social Democratic Party at the beginning of 2001.

The overall parliamentary setting is also of relevance for the stability of parliamentary parties. The more experienced the parties are in parliamentary representation, the more likely they are to have developed routines to handle and curb internal dissent. In such a setting, dissent has high costs attached to it. In a party system marked by a low level of parliamentary institutionalisation, crossing party lines is much more likely to pay off for those at odds with the party that brought them into office in the first place. In the Lithuanian parliamentary setting, party switching in the form of 'political tourism'¹⁷ has decreased considerably since 1992.

*

In the West European context, ministerial appointments serve as the traditional reward for successful party leaders. A government position is generally thought of as the very height of a political career. In emerging democracies, however, this logic does not work. The political parties are simply too weak to fill all the vacant political and administrative positions. Lithuanian data from 1990-1992, the period of building institutional democracy, show that non-party members of different Cabinets made up some 30–45 per cent of all ministers. Moreover, the number of non-party ministers tended to increase in short-lived governments. Sąjūdis, which was in a majority position in the constituent parliament, was engaged in an uphill battle to form a government

in its own right, but failed due to the rapid erosion of party cohesion in the constituent assembly.

In 1992, the LDLP formed an interim government (the Lubys government) with a record high number of non-partisan ministers (76 per cent). The following years saw a gradual decline of non-partisan ministers, and in the Stankevičius government their share of the portfolios had been reduced to 50 per cent. Partisan ministers dominated the Conservative and Christian Democratic party coalition that took over in 1996. But, after the resignation of Vagnorius from the position as Prime Minister in May 1999, the new Prime Minister, Rolandas Paksas, invited more non-party members into the government. The Liberal-Centre coalition that was formed in late 2000 signalled a further decrease of the number of partisan ministers.

Aggregate data about the partisan composition of Lithuanian cabinets for the entire period, from independence until 2002, provide few new insights. Most of the governments were short-lived, which made ministerial positions 'into a kind of accident rather than the normal outcome of political activity' (Cotta 1999, 14). The fact that no party has won two consecutive elections has also reduced the attractiveness of ministerial positions among the presumptive candidates; and the parties have had little choice but to recruit a substantial number of ministers from the ranks of qualified non-partisan. This is a practice that is likely to reduce the value of a ministerial portfolio even further among its possible partisan contenders.

Mass parties such as the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats are obviously in a better position than others to recruit ministers from within their own ranks. There is a clear-cut correlation between the size of the party and its ability to fill its Cabinet posts with dues-paying members. But this should not be taken as an indication that the mass membership parties have adopted similar recruitment strategies. They have not. The parties of the right – the HU(LC) and the LChDP – have tended to rely on party members, while the parties of the left – the LDLP and more recently the LSDP – have set out to strike a balance between professionals and politicians.

Non-partisan candidates for ministerial appointments also need the explicit support of a political party or a group of parties. A quick glance at the data on party support for Cabinet ministers first of all suggests that the pool of human resources with experience in political-administrative jobs differ from one party to the other. The LDLP-LSDP and the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives), as a successor to the Sąjūdis, stand out as the parties with the largest pool of human resources at their disposal for top-level appointments. But the data also imply that even major Lithuanian parties provide fragile

Table 10. Political Affiliation and Party Support of Cabinet Ministers, 1990–2002

	Political affiliation (per cent)	Party support (per cent)
Sąjūdis	7.0	34.6
The Lithuanian Communist Party	7.4	–
LDLP	8.2	26.8
LSDP	2.7	2.7
NU(SL)	1.9	5.4
LCU	2.3	1.6
LLU	2.3	3.5
LChDP	7.0	3.5
HU(LC)	13.6	21.8
Other parties	2.0	–
Non-party members	45.5	–
Total:	100	100

platforms in parliament as well as in government. As if this were not enough, we have seen that most of the parties found themselves constantly threatened by erosion through internal conflicts and changing party preferences. We are therefore well advised to dwell on the dynamics of the party system as a general determinant of elite stability.

Volatility and Stability of the Lithuanian Party System

What are then the determinants of party system stability? And how do we go about measuring party system stability? The literature at hand provides a number of alternative answers to our queries. Fortunately, however, there seems to be an implicit agreement that some indicators have more to say about party system stability than others. Among them are electoral behaviour, particularly voter turnout and volatility, patterns of party competition, including number of effective parties, ideological space within the party system, particularly the ratio and influence of pro- versus anti-system parties, some features of the electoral system, including its stability, and last, but not least, the general quality of the political class.

As for voter turnout, it may be noted that interest in the electoral process dropped drastically between the first and second multi-party elections in 1992 and 1996 respectively. This was the case not only in Lithuania, but also in Estonia and Latvia. After the third multi-party elections, voter turnout is now

hovering around 60 per cent in Estonia and Lithuania, and around 70 per cent in Latvia (Table 11).

Table 11. Voter Turnout in the Baltic Countries, 1989–2000, percentages

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	St.deviation	Median	Average
Founding elections	1990 78	1990 81.3	1990 71.7	4.9	78.0	77.0
First multi-party elections	1992 66.8	1993 89.9	1992 75.3	11.7	75.3	77.3
Second multi-party elections	1995 68.9	1995 71.9	1996 52.9	10.2	68.9	64.6
Third multi-party elections	1999 57.4	1998 71.8	2000 58.6	8.0	58.6	62.6
Average	67.8	78.7	66.6	6.7	67.8	71.0

Sources: Rose, Munro, and Mackie (1998); PARLINE Database, Inter-Parliamentary Union, <http://www.ipu.org>

Even more troublesome for the political parties is the widespread scepticism towards democratic institutions, including political parties that land at the very bottom of the trust ranking in all three Baltic countries. This might be dismissed as a logical outcome in a context where people have not yet become accustomed to democratic institutions. But it seems more plausible to attribute the high level of distrust in institutions to the discrepancy between the high expectations attached to the transformation process and the limited – some would say poor – social and macro-economic performance of the democratic institutions. Recent studies of Central and Eastern Europe show that popular trust in institutions correlates strongly with measures tapping quality of life such as consumer prices and inflation in, income equality and social security (Yonhyonk 2001, 12). To the extent that voter turnout was stabilising, it was an indication that voters were accepting and getting used to political parties as political actors that formulate and present policy alternatives to society. The paradox is that parties are evaluated negatively on the attitudinal level, but condoned, perhaps as a necessary evil of democracy, on the behavioural level.

Electoral volatility scores provide an excellent indicator of the potential for short- and long-term party system change. Total volatility taps the electoral instability of the party system, and most new democracies have high scores on this measure. The above calculations according to a formula, initially developed by Adam Przeworski (1975, 47-67), give the leading Lithuanian parties a volatility score of 25.6 for the 1992 and 1996 elections. This is slightly higher

Table 12. Electoral Volatility in Lithuania, 1992–2000, percentages

	% of the vote in 1992	% of the vote in 1996	% of the vote in 2000	Score of volatility, 1996	Score of volatility, 2000
LDLP*	42.5	9.5	31.1	16.5	7.5
HU(LC)	20.5	29.7	8.6	4.6	10.5
LChDP	12.2	9.9	3.1	1.15	3.4
LSDP	5.8	6.6	0	0.4	–
LLU	1.5	1.9	17.3	0.2	7.7
NU (SL)	0	0	19.6	0	9.8
LCU	2.4	8.1	2.9	2.8	2.6
Total	83.4	63.8	82.5	25.6	41.5

* The volatility score for the LSDP and LDLP coalition in the 2000 elections were obtained by summing up shares of the two parties in the 1996 parliamentary elections, divided by two

than in Poland and Slovakia for 1991–1993 (22.8) and for 1992–1994 (24.7) respectively, but slightly less than in Hungary where the volatility scores for the elections of 1990 and 1994 hovered around 28 (Janda 1994, 13–16). In the following parliamentary elections 2000, the volatility scores for the major parties almost doubled and reached the level of 41.5 (Table 12). If calculated for all parties that took part in the proportional elections to the *Seimas*, the score was even higher and landed at 46.2 (Novagrockienė 2000, 55), well beyond the level of volatility in Western Europe.

Bloc volatility is of relevance for the parties' policy-related space of manoeuvre (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 1999, 232). Due to the dominance of the LDLP and the LSDP, the volatility of the leftwing bloc has been very low in Lithuania. The flow of votes between the blocs has been more of a problem for the parties of the right. In 1996 these parties were hurt by an electoral wind favouring the parties of the middle and the right. In 1996, however, volatility scores did not really reflect actual voting behaviour. Voter turnout dropped by more than 20% compared to 1992, and most of the potential left-wing voters simply did not take part in the elections. Of those who had voted LDLP or LSDP in 1996, 24.9% opted for the NU(SL) and 19.1% for the Liberal Union in 2000 (Degutis 2000, 17). The parties of the right have much more by way of inter-bloc mobility. The seven rightwing parties running in 2000 thus had an inter-bloc volatility score of no less than 30.3 points.

In this context, it is well worth keeping in mind that there are two distinct patterns of party competition in the Baltic states – the bipolar pattern of

Table 13. Number of Effective Parties, 1989–2000

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Average
Founding elections	3	1.9	1.98	2.3
First multi-party elections	5.9	5.1	3.0	4.7
Second multi-party elections	4.2	6.1	3.3	4.5
Third multi-party elections	5.2	5.5	4.2	5.1
St. deviation*	0.91	0.5	1.0	1.3
Mean	4.6	4.7	3.1	4.1

* Note: Standard deviation calculated only after the first multi-party elections.

competition prevalent in Lithuania and the uni-polar model in Estonia and Latvia, which remain dominated by the parties of the middle and the right. In fact, until the *Seimas* elections of 2000, most students of Lithuanian party politics would have described the party system as Darius Žėruolis did in an article, published two years prior to the election:

[The] Lithuanian party system is not characterized by the kind of fragmentation typical of Latvia and Estonia; the underlying structure of the Lithuanian party system was rather reminiscent of that of Poland. Party labels, at least those of mainstream parties, sound familiar to students of West European politics. In fact, Lithuanian political parties have a tendency to imitate West European, particularly Scandinavian, parties. This may result in programmatic and social profiles not conducive to converting existing divisions into lasting cleavages. Yet the simple structure of the Lithuanian party system has proven a major source of political stability. In the Lithuanian context of low-density civil society, political parties may even serve as vehicles of political modernization (Žėruolis 1998, 139).

The wave of fragmentation in 2000, when two newcomers – the Liberals and the New Union (Social Liberals) – suddenly entered the Lithuanian parliamentary arena, changed the neat picture of Lithuanian party politics as of the late 1990s. But the bipolar structure is still there, and the relatively stable position of what we have referred to as the major parties even lends itself to tentative conclusions about a pending freezing of the party system.

The Lithuanian party system is now closer to that of Estonia and Latvia than was previously the case. They are all multi-party systems without the presence of a single dominant party, but – due to the fluid state of affairs in all three countries – we are probably well advised not to draw any far-reaching conclusions about future developments.

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
In new democracies, ideology has an impact on the timing (when), and the ways (how), political parties appear on the political arena, and it thereby also affects the consolidation of party elites. After the first multi-party elections in 1992,¹⁸ new protest, populist and single-issue parties appeared on the eve of every new election, but many of them literally vanished the following day. Mainstream liberal, social democratic, Christian Democratic and conservative parties had been established in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Newcomers within these party families, if they appeared at all, came into being later and in most cases as a result of internal conflicts and splits within their respective mother-parties. There are a few exceptions to this rule, most notably the formation of the New Union (Social Liberals). From an ideological point of view, this party was based on an ideological mix of social democracy and liberalism.

A few more tentative observations might be appropriate here. After the first phase of party consolidation, traditional ideologies served as a strong barrier against the multiplication of parties within the within the same ideological space. To the extent that a party had successfully claimed a certain ideological niche, potential external challengers within the same ideological space found themselves exposed to dual pressure – from the ‘senior’ party of the same party family (an intra-family ideological competition) and from all the other parties in the race (an inter-family competition). This logic goes a long way towards accounting for the modest number of newcomers in Lithuanian party politics, and the exceptional appearance of genuine external challengers such as the NU(SL).

This is not to say that the established Lithuanian parties have carved out permanent ideological niches for themselves. Data from party manifestoes testify to significant ideological variations over time.¹⁹ With its organisational roots in Sąjūdis, the HU(LC) stands out as the most ideologically consistent party. It has always adopted a rightwing position on the left/right scale. The two parties of the left, the LDLP and the LSDP, gradually moved from a centre/right position back in 1992 to a clear-cut centre/left position in 2000. The Lithuanian Christian Democrats and the Centre Union have slowly moved closer to the political centre; and the Liberal Union made a bold jump from the right in 1996 to a centrist position in 2000. The New Union (Social Liberals), the most successful newcomer in the 2000 parliamentary elections occupied a position slightly to right of the centre in 2000. All things considered, the Lithuanian party system has been dominated by ideological consensus rather than by conflict. In 1992 and again in 1996, the major parties gravitated towards the centre/right; in 2000 they had moved closer to the left.

A decade after Lithuania’s transition to democracy, the traditional ideologies not only served as a constraint on newcomers; they had also developed into a

Change of programmatic positions of Lithuanian parties between 1992 and 2000.



force of unification among ideologically adjacent parties. The merger of the LDLP and the LSDP in January 2001 initiated other party mergers. In May 2001, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union signed an agreement to join forces – an agreement that was subsequently approved by the constituent party conference of the Lithuanian Christian Democrats (LChD). Kazys Bobelis, a Lithuanian-American, who had returned to Lithuania in the early 1990s, was elected chairman of the united Christian Democrats. But unification meant different things in the Social and Christian Democratic contexts. Once the merger had been decided, the two parties of the left set out to form a united party organisation from top down. The two Christian democratic parties moved much more slowly towards unification, and the LChD did not have a unified grass-root organisation until long after the constituent party conference in May 2001.

In October 2001, five minor rightwing parties – the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, the Lithuanian Freedom League, the Independence Party, the Lithuanian Democratic Party and the Homeland People's Party – made an attempt to increase their visibility by forming the Lithuanian Rightwing Union. It was cast as an electoral alliance, and ideological differences within the Lithuanian Rightwing Union are likely to prevent it from developing into anything beyond a loose alliance. By way of example, it may be noted that the five members of the electoral alliance have rather different visions of Lithuania's role in Europe. Some of them are strongly for membership of the European Union (the Lithuanian Democratic Party and the Homeland People's Party), and others more or less strongly against. Finally, in December 2001, the Lithuanian Peasants Party merged with the New Democracy. This new political alliance was named the Union of the Peasants Party and the New Democracy.

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Three generalisations can help us summarise the impact of the parties and party system on the development of the new political class. First, a highly fragmented party system reduces the chances of elite consolidation and downgrades the role of parties. Second, blurred party identities and the marginalisation of traditional ideological parties tend to increase the flux within the new political class. Third, intense ideological conflicts among mainstream parties tend to decrease chances of political elite consolidation.

Conclusions

Unstable party leadership, numerous political scandals, closed party recruitment procedures, low rates of re-election, factional splits, and unsatisfactory performance of party government make for low quality of the political class and serve as an impediment against elite stability and consolidation.

Lithuania – and the two other Baltic states, for that matter – performs well according to some of the above criteria, and poorly according to others. Along each listed indicator it is possible to find out negative and positive examples in Lithuania and the other Baltic states. All in all, however, in Lithuania the odds seem tilted in favour of increasing stability and professionalism.

In the early stages of democratisation, the new social movements and the reform-oriented communist parties served as a source of elite recruitment systems in Central and Eastern Europe. This role was subsequently taken over by the political parties within the emerging competitive multi-party system. These party systems are still in a state of flux in many parts of the region, including Lithuania. But there is no doubt that parties now serve as the most important source of elite recruitment in all consolidating democracies in the region.

Abbreviations

- CPSU** – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- HU (LC)** – Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives)
- LChDP** – Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party
- LCP** – Lithuanian Communist Party
- LCU** – Lithuanian Centre Union
- LDLP** – Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party
- LDP** – Lithuanian Democratic Party
- LFP** – Lithuanian Farmers' Party
- LLU** – Lithuanian Liberal Union
- LPP** – Lithuanian Peasants Party
- LSDP** – Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
- NP 'Y.L'** – National Party 'Young Lithuania'
- NU(SL)** – New Union (Social Liberals)

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ This requirement was in force from 1992 to 2000. The required number was subsequently increased to seven MPs.

² These rewards typically take the form of monetary transfers or gifts, jobs in the public sector, preferential treatment in the allocation of social subsidies (housing, welfare payments, etc.), regulatory favours, government contracts, and honorary memberships and titles (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 48).

³ Schlesinger warns that 'in parties more than in any other type of formal organization, the official lines of authority are suspect' (Schlesinger 1965, 777). On the implicit the question of who the 'real' leader is, most parties would treat the chairman of the party organisation as the party leader.

⁴ See for instance Davis (1998), Punnet (1992), LeDuc (2001), Carty and Blake (1999), Special issue of the *European Journal of Political Research*, (1993) 24, 229-360.

⁵ According to Punnet, 'the view that selection process is not especially important because outstanding figures will always rise to the top, regardless of rules and procedures, is difficult to sustain. The intensity of competition for high office- in most parties, in most countries, at most times – is such that the rules of selection (and often the small print of the rules) can be crucial in determining who emerges from the pack of leadership contenders' (Punnet 1992, 2).

⁶ De Winter says that 'on the inclusiveness dimension we could envisage at the least inclusive end those selection methods in which one person designates himself or his successor, or where a small group of party leaders nominates the leader, in practice, the parties considered usually include a wider body of formal selectors, ranging from the party bureau to the council, the congress, and the membership' (de Winter 1993, 246). Consequently, LeDuc points out that '[d]ifferent electorates might reasonably be expected to choose different types of leadership' (LeDuc 2001, 326).

⁷ Marsh emphasises that in some parties, leadership contests are held in regular intervals, whilst in others leaders are appointed when 'either they or the party decide it is time for change' (Marsh 1993, 230).

Panebianco draws attention to the problem in an oblique fashion: 'the rules constitute a zone of uncertainty. Few rules have a self-evident meaning; a rule almost always necessitates an interpretation. He who interprets the rule strengthens his position with respect to the other organizational actors' (Panebianco 1988, 35). If there is no rule at all, it may be seen as an asset in the internal party scrambling for power. In such a setting, the struggle for the party leadership may be unleashed whenever there is a challenge to the incumbent. On the other hand, if the statutes of the party do provide for the re-election of the party leader at regular intervals, it is at least theoretically possible to contest the election.

⁸ Strøm notes that '[a]ccountability refers to the ease with which activists and members can replace party officers on the ground of the latter's performance in office. [...]. To the extent that party members are authorised to replace their superiors, party leaders are rendered vulnerable, and their expected long-term surplus jeopardised' (Strøm 1994, 112).

⁹ Harmel and Gibson (1998, 633-637) provide an excellent overview of Michels' and Duverger's accounts of this relationship. Nowadays, analyses of the relationship between the parliamentary faction and the extra-parliamentary party organisation are rather scarce (see, for example Heidar and Koole 2000, and Harmel and Gibson 1998). Party cohesion and roll-call behaviour attract much more attention from the part of the scholarly community with an interest in parliamentary politics (see for instance Jenkins 1999, Cowley and Stuart 1997, Skjæveland 1999, and Neto and Santos 2001).

¹⁰ The results of analyses by Harmel and Gibson (1998, 649) of 19 parties in Denmark (9), Germany (4), the United Kingdom (4) and the United States (2) indicate that socialist parties are inclined to place more party power outside parliamentary party group than do parties of the centre and the right.

¹¹ The value of statutes and by-laws as indicators of the balance of power within parties is not uncontested. Panebianco makes the point that '[a] party's statutes do not describe its organization any more than a political system's written constitution does. It is only a pallid trace, fleeting and imprecise, little more than a point of departure for the organizational analysis of a political party' (Panebianco 1988, 35). Katz and Mair, on the other hand, argue that party rules are very important characteristics of a given political party 'affording an insight into its internal conceptions of organizational power, authority and legitimacy' (Katz and Mair 1992).

¹² Harmel and Gibson actually propose seven indicators: candidate selection, parliamentary leadership selection, member rotation, discipline, policy conformity, extraparlimentary policy influence, and primary leadership (see Harmel and Gibson 1998, 638-639). Only two of these indicators

- policy conformity and discipline
- are carried over into the subsequent analysis.

¹³ The crucial question would seem to be whether or not MPs are ex officio members of the National Council with the right to vote. Participation of MPs without the right to vote will be discarded as insignificant. In such a setting, the MPs would be cut off from the deliberations of the extra-parliamentary organisation.

¹⁴ It may be noted that there are no constitutional provisions about the relationship between the MP and the extra-parliamentary party organisation. The constitution pledges allegiance to the free mandate and party statutes and by-laws pay lip service to it by keeping quiet about the formal subordination of MPs to their respective parties, which would be in violation of the constitution. We therefore have to settle for soft indicators of accountability such as requirements to the effect that MPs should provide the party with information about their activities in parliament.

¹⁵ The free mandate makes it impossible for the party to remove recalcitrant or rebellious MPs from their parliamentary mandates. But, with this exception, the party organisation has a variety of sanctions at its disposal, including the suspension of party membership or formal expulsion from the party.

¹⁶ After his election as President of the Republic in 1993, Brazauskas put his membership in the LDLP on hold, but the party nevertheless remained identified with his name.

¹⁷ Bowler, Shawn, Farrell and Katz 1999, 16.

¹⁸ On the changing character of democratic elections see: Krupavičius (2001, 137-139).

¹⁹ The party manifestoes were analysed according to a scheme developed by Laver and Garry (1997).

WOMEN AND MEN PARLIAMENTARIANS: POSITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS

Irmina Matonytė, Aurelija Novelskaitė

Introduction

Parliamentarians are often viewed as a special social (socio-occupational) group or social layer with a lot of commonalties and shared characteristics. Differences in behavior and attitudes among its members are interpreted as random and not structurally rooted, or are understood as based on rational political strategic choice. This is an elitist approach, which claims that the modern democratic politicians (members of parliament) have similar (if not identical) understanding of their political roles, methods and forms of action, value orientations, etc. This elite principle is underlined in formal political science and political philosophy. Since James Meisel the idea of the elite homogeneity (closeness, consciousness, cohesion and coordination) is very widely used in assessing the parliamentarians' social status and action (Higley, Pakulski, 2000: 41).

However, feminist approach claims that in the social context women's situation is rather different from men's (Lengermann, Niebrugge-Brantley, 1992), and these differences are translated into the field of politics. Gender orientated and focused research demonstrates that politician's gender might be relatively salient factor which importance depends on, firstly, politicians' (her or his) belonging to the specific cultural (ethnic) group (Prindeville, 2003), secondly, politician's age, and, last but not least, on politician's country (political culture and traditions) (Raaum, 1999). However, the general tendency noticed on all these three dimensions (politician's ethnic identity, age, and political culture) is that gender differences in contemporary politics are decreasing and becoming less visible than they used to be in the past (Raaum, 1999:63).

Concerning research of gender issues, some sort of a paradox is worthwhile mentioning: the most intensive and comprehensive research on the subject is undertaken in countries with long historic traditions of democratic representation and modern social conditions where consequently gender differences in the realm of power and policy formation are the most attenuated (i.e. in the

USA and the Western Europe, the Nordic countries in particular). In such a context, the nascent research on gender factor in the post-communist countries (new democracies) is rather distinctive and might yield interesting insights. However, on the one hand, results and generalizations of existing “Western” studies of the gender phenomena in politics can only cautiously be applied to interpret the post-communist (here, the Lithuanian) situation. On the other hand, the gender centered research might only poorly be framed by “local” (post-communist) feminist research record and tested hypotheses since these later simply are very scarce in the post-communist academia. Such a situation prompts to carry out the in-depth (qualitative) country studies. The following is a report of one of such researches, conducted in the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas) in 2004, which attempts to highlight gendered political roles of the current Lithuanian MPs and to draw initial lines of their plausible interpretation.

Proportion of women MPs sitting in the Seimas was not stable during all 15 years of the Lithuanian independence restored after the Soviet regime in 1990 (Table 1.). In spite of remarkable fluctuations in numbers, women never constituted more than one fifth of the Lithuanian parliamentarians. From the organizational theory we know that in order any specific group were able to exert influence on the organization, it should constitute not less than one fourth (or even one third) of the members of the organization in question. With this consideration in mind, we may qualify the women’s situation in the Seimas as marginal since there is no structural basis for actual female political representation and manifestation in the post-communist political life in Lithuania.

Table 1. Women and Men elected for Lithuanian Parliament
in 1992, 1996 and 2000

	Number			Percent	
	Total	Women	Men	Women	Men
1990	141	13	129	9	91
1992	141	10	131	7	93
1996	139	25	114	18	82
2000	141*	15**	126	11	89

* a real number of parliamentarians was 139 in spring 2004

** a real number of female parliamentarians was 14 in spring 2004

As Cohen notes, historically in all modern countries there were times, when women’s combined understandings of their feminine identity and role in the society and its governance formed a body of experience that seized the momentum, claimed for the special space, and changed the political direction

into women inclusive and respective track (Cohen, 2000:36). Taking into account peculiar socio-political conditions in the Soviet Lithuania till 1990 (Krupavičius, Matonytė, 2003:82) and low representation of women in the actual Seimas, the challenging question is that *maybe actually Lithuania is in the phase of its historical and decisive introduction and recognition of the gender factor in politics?* In addition, following Cohen's idea and observing actual political discourse and action concerning the gender issues in society at large and the electoral politics in particular, another question arises – *if actual female politicians are powerful enough to influence current political choices and tendencies in any meaningful way?* This question gets in particular firm grounds when, on the one hand, we know that the Lithuanian political parties and the Seimas after intensive but rather short discussion decided not to follow the European Union advised principle of nomination to the electoral positions, which stipulates allocation of equal number of candidacies to both genders, women and men, in the electoral lists to the European parliament (out of 255 candidates, included into the party lists, presented for the EP elections to be held on June 13, 2004 in Lithuania, only 44 are women). On the other hand, for the Presidential elections which will take place in Lithuania on the very same day, June 13, 2004 among 5 candidates registered are 2 women, in the opinion pools one of them is given rather good chances to get into the second round of elections. Based on insights from our research materials, we are going to give at least partial answers to these two questions.

1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: INITIAL GENERALISATIONS

1.1 Sample peculiarities and survey method

Officially there are 141 MPs in the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas). Actually, in late 2003 – early 2004 their number was 139, and among them 14 were women (one MP, Rolandas Paksas, has left the Seimas when in 2002 he was elected the President of the country, another, woman Dalia Kutraitė-Giedraitienė, has left the Seimas to be advisor of the elected President).

Fatefully, the actual number of women MPs in the Lithuanian parliament is too small to make statistically significant conclusions and predictions about the gender factor in the Seimas. However, even if women constituted one third of the Lithuanian MPs (then their number would be 47), the quantitative research would not be much more incisive. The only research solution, which “remedies” the actually existing and established by the Lithuanian constitution situation, is to conduct qualitative in depth surveys.

Qualitative research is renowned and widely used in gender studies. From great diversity of approaches, methods, and epistemologies employed in the

feminist research (Olesen, 1998:300-332) we opted for the interview method. The method was chosen, firstly, because of its “sensitivity [...] and its closeness to the subject’s lived world” (Kvale, 1996:11), which can enhance knowledge of the particular human condition and way of thinking and acting. Our second reason to choose the interview method was willingness to collect free-floating, not necessarily easily outspoken information concerning gender identity of the politicians and the gender factor, perceptible in formation of the national policy.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted in the Seimas with all 14 actual female parliamentarians and 14 randomly selected male parliamentarians (control group, the random selection was carried out by the SPSS).

1.2. Notes on the survey process

The survey started in fall 2003 by conducting four exploratory (pilot) interviews with female parliamentarians. All other interviews (n=24) were done in February-March 2004. The respondents were asked either to meet the interviewer for the estimated 45 minutes conversation or to fill the questionnaire by themselves (closed and open ended questions) via e-mail. The first option was given priority, and the second was used only if it was really hard for the parliamentarian to find out the required one hour for an interview. On the whole men MPs were more easily accessible for the one-to-one interviews than women. 7 women were interviewed directly, and 7 sent their filled questionnaires by e-mail or regular mail. Correspondingly, only two men filled the questionnaire by themselves, and other 12 were interviewed. One explanation for this differentiation is in the fact that women respondents have had higher leadership positions in the Seimas and consequently were more occupied with their parliamentary duties (see Table 2). Another line of explanation is that women respondents wanted to give extensive and deeply thought answers in written, while men followed the strategy of “lip-service” when one easily says – but not writes – whatever one sees appropriate on the issues he/she does not count as important. As a rule, interviews with women took less time (a half of an hour on average) than the interviews with men (an hour on average). Interpretation of this gendered difference might lay in the fact that women respondents were more conscious of and familiar with the issues raised in the questionnaire, while for many men respondents the questions were rather “original” or “unexpected” and demanding time to formulate answers.

Another problem noticed during interviews concerns the gender of the interviewer and the interviewee and the socio-psychological aspects of their contact. The interviewer was a woman. In all 7 cases of interviews with the female politicians the established contact was very close and rather intimate. In these cases there is no ground to discuss problematic power relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee (Tang, 2002)

Table 2. Representation of women in Seimas
and in leading parliamentary structures (2004)

	In total (n)	Women (n)	Women (%)	Men (interviewed) (n)
Members of Seimas	139	14	10	15
Members of the Board of the Seimas	5	—	—	1
Members of the Assembly of Elders (Elders of the Fractions)	19	2	11	0
Deputy Elders	15	1	7	1
Chairpersons of Committees	14	1	7	1
Deputy Chairpersons of Committees	14	2	14	1
Chairpersons of Commissions	14	3	29	0
Deputy Chairpersons of Commissions	14	2	14	3

In contrast, the interviews with male politicians brought rather different experience. First, some men respondent during the interview used to emphasize the interviewer's gender. For instance, when the question touched upon feminine vs. masculine features of individual's behavior, a man respondent presented apologies to the sympathetic woman-interviewer for his rather skeptical account of the female capacities to act as a politician: "I am talking in general ... please, forgive me, I do not mean anything personal." Second, man politicians were inclined to reduce significance and interest of the research itself. Regardless information about the international scope of the current research and self-introduction of the interviewer as a researcher holding her Ph.D. in sociology and employed by the research institute, presented before the interview starts, several men respondents tried to "clarify" for themselves if "This research for your master thesis?" or "Do you have long practice of journalism?"

Third, in the very beginning of the interview only one female and most of male parliamentarians demonstrated somewhat negative attitude towards the research theme and gender issues in general. As he formulated overtly: "to speak frankly, the theme is not interesting for me at all." However, in course of the interview the skeptical attitude changed and became less cynical about the subject itself. For example, a man parliamentarian said that he appreciated the interview and is interested to receive the report of research. However, in May 2004, the same young man parliamentarian gave one of the mostly fierce

interviews to the national TV on the topic of equal shares of women and men candidates to the EP. Thus in some cases the feminist “rescue” of the respondents was rather temporal, not to say Machiavellian.

Some respondents from the very beginning till the end of the interview used to play the “lip-service”. Majority of men used rather intensively emphasized egalitarian attitude towards gender issues saying, for instance, that men and women as politicians are equal, and both genders have to participate in politics on equal basis. However, none of male respondents supported the idea of gender quotas, and one respondent “in particular respectful of women” lost his self-control and in the end of the interview expressively declared: “had there been 50 percent of women MPs in the Seimas, it would be disastrous and would turn politics into mishmash of molycoddles.”

Last but not least, with the exception of one man respondent described above, women interviewees were distinctively much more interested in the research and dissemination of its results as well as in research hypothesis and expected conclusions. It may be explained either by the ordinary respondents’ logic, which sets expectation to know more “about me/us” and “about my/our situation”, or by strategic political willingness to have fresh and first-hand material to act on public opinion and to expose in the electoral campaign. The fact that men were not interested (in neither way) indicates that either they regard the eventual material as unfavorable for them in the political game or toothless and meaningless in the actual political culture (strong patriarchal tradition and discourse) of the country.

2. GENDERISATION OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN THE SEIMAS

2.1. Gender representation in leading positions in the actual Seimas is not even (see Table 2.). Two women are leaders of the Seimas’ fractions (out of 19) and they belong to the assembly of elders; one woman is a deputy elder. One woman is a chairperson of the standing committees (total is 14) and two women are deputy chairs of the committees. Female parliamentarians head 4 (out of 14) Seimas’ commissions and two women are their deputy chairs. None woman belongs to the board of Seimas.

On one hand, the representation of women in leading positions in Seimas roughly follows the trends of representation of women in Seimas in general. That is, women constitute 10 percent of all members of Seimas and 11 percent of members of assembly of elders; 7 and 14 percents of chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of standing committees are women; 29 and 14 percent of chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of the Seimas commissions are female politicians.

These data reflect traditional tendency of women's participation in public activities: the number of women grows simultaneously declining relative prestige and power of the institution. Specifically, there are no women in the board of Seimas, but women constitute one tenth of chairpersons of the standing committees and one third of chairpersons of the parliamentary commissions.

10 out of all 14 female parliamentarians belong to the actually ruling parties (social democrats and social liberals, see Table 3.) and thus have better chances to get any leading positions. Currently 9 of them have leading positions in Seimas. One is leader of the fraction and one is its deputy, one is chairperson and one is deputy chairperson of the standing committees, three are Chairpersons of commissions. Another one is leader of the Seimas' delegation to the European Parliament and another one is Minister (Minister of culture). Only one woman who belongs to ruling parties has no leadership position in current Seimas.

However, women from the parliamentary opposition also have important leading positions, although their political weight and voice might reasonably be expected to be weaker. One woman who does not belong to either of the

Table 3. Women in the Fractions of Seimas (2004)

	Fraction members	Women				Men
	Total (n)	Inter- viewed (n)	(%)	In govern- ment (n)	Not in govern- ment (n)	Inter- viewed (n)
Liberal and Centre Parliamentary Group	21	1	5	–	1	2
Parliamentary Group of the New Union (Social liberals)	22	2	9	2	–	2
Parliamentary Group of Liberal Democrats	16	–	–	–	–	1
Parliamentary Group of the Social Democratic Coalition (LDDP-LSDP-LRS)	52	8	15	8	–	7
Parliamentary Group of the Homeland Union - Conservatives	10	2	20	–	2	1
Parliamentary Group of the Farmers' and the New Democracy Parties	7	1	14	–	1	–
Mixed Parliamentary Group	8	–	–	–	–	2

ruling parties is leader of the Seimas' fraction, and she also heads one parliamentary commission; another one is deputy chair of one standing committee and remaining two are deputy chairs of the parliamentary commissions.

This distribution of leading parliamentary positions reveals that woman's belonging to the ruling party is not the crucial factor, which predetermines her chances to reach leading position. Women's involvement in leadership of Seimas is close to 100 percent. This situation requires additional research in order to be explained in depth (hypothesis to be tested: better women's political experience and competence, women's willingness and appropriateness to take the positions of responsibility and not just to sit as rank and file members, women's numerical shortage among MPs, etc.)

2.2. Gender segregation by the field of political activity in the Seimas follows rather traditional patterns of gender segregation in the fields of social life. First, women hold leading positions in the standing committees, which deal with traditionally female attributed issues (Table 4.): that is the committee on health affairs, social affairs and labor, and education, science and culture.

Table 4. MPs in standing committees: distribution by gender and position (2004)

	Chair-person	Deputy Chairperson	Members (n)	Women (%)
Committee on Social Affairs and Labor	Man	<i>Woman</i>	8	38
Committee on Education, Science and Culture	Man	<i>Woman</i>	12	25
Committee on National Security and Defense	Man	Man	13	23
Committee on Health Affairs	<i>Woman</i>	Man	6	17
Committee on Economics	Man	Man	14	14
Committee of the Development of Information Society	Man	Man	7	14
Committee on European Affairs	Man	Man	24	13
Committee on Environment Protection	Man	Man	7	0
Committee on Budget and Finance	Man	Man	15	0
Committee on Rural Affairs	Man	Man	12	0
Committee on Legal Affairs	Man	Man	13	0
Committee on Foreign Affairs	Man	Man	10	0
Committee on State Administration and Local Authorities	Man	Man	10	0
Committee on Human Rights	Man	Man	8	0

This rather traditional picture is altered by gendered distribution of leading positions in the parliamentary commissions. On the level of commissions, women – along with their traditional leadership in family and child affairs domain, also lead commissions on anti-corruption, environment protection and NATO affairs (Table 5.).

Table 5. MPs on the parliamentary commissions: distribution by gender and position (2004)

	Chair-person	Deputy Chairperson	Members (n)	Women (%)
Commission on Family and Child Affairs	<i>Woman</i>	Man	9	56
Commission for Business and Employment	Man	Man	10	18
Commission on Ethics and Procedures	Man	<i>Woman</i>	7	14
Commission on the Preparing of the Amendments of the Constitution	Man	Man	18	11
Commission on the Rights and Affairs of Participants of Resistance to Occupation Regimes and Victims of Occupation	Man	Man	10	10
Commission on Anticorruption	<i>Woman</i>	Man	12	8
Commission on the Problems of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant	<i>Woman</i>	Man	12	8
Commission for Sustainable Development and Protection of Immovable Cultural Properties	<i>Woman</i>	Man	12	8
Commission on NATO Affairs	Man	<i>Woman</i>	15	7
Commission on Youth and Sport Affairs	Man	Man	9	0
Commission for Maritime and Fishery Affairs	Man	Man	8	0
Commission for Monitoring the Enforcement of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of Article 47 Paragraph 3 of the Constitution	Man	Man	9	0
Commission for Parliamentary Scrutiny of Intelligence Operations	Man	Man	7	0
The Petitions Commission	Man	Man	10	0

Tables 4 and 5 show obvious gendered patterns of role segregation by the field of action in the Seimas, and almost completely mirror design of labor division in traditional societies. Women are concentrated in such fields as family and childcare, education and culture, or labor policy. Very few (if any) women are in the fields of budget and finances, economics, legal affairs and governance, rural and human rights sphere.

In the interviews both men and women parliamentarians say that they are not directed to the leading positions and spheres of activity according to the traditional gendered division of labor (feminine and masculine fields of responsibility). A man says: "It is not right to say that women care about children, and men about war. I did not serve in the army. I know about war from cinema (as women know too). I would like to take care of children (with whom I do not – yet – have personal experience either). The choice of the committee or commission depends on availability of time you can sacrifice to these tasks". A woman elaborates: "I was not directed to the feminine sphere of activity [family and child affairs, I.M./A.N.], I proposed myself. However, usually happens that my initiatives in the "feminine" spheres are accepted and supported, but initiatives and proposals in other fields are usually not".

2.3. Fraction's judgment is the key factor in attribution of positions in standing committees and parliamentary commissions. Majority – two out of three female leaders of standing committees and five out of six female leaders of parliamentary commissions – reports that they took these responsibilities entirely following the fractions' request (combined with positive personal will). As one of them put this out: "If you belong to a fraction, no work is possible in a particular committee, neither it is possible to take any position without fraction's approval." Belonging to and evaluation by the particular political fraction is crucial for women as well as for men to reach leading position in the Seimas. Fractions (indeed, dominated by men and usually led by a man) are essential establishments, which determine actual gender composition of the Seimas leadership.

Nevertheless, one woman and none man reports, that "the only thing imposed on me is participation in the particular commission. My party and fraction told that they think, I ought to be there." Because "it is fraction without any doubts [that decides in which committees and commissions one has to work, I.M./A.N.]. Of course, there is also some personal aspect, because if it is possible to match [personal inclination and fraction's decision, I.M./A.N.], they are matched. The choice is the same everywhere: it is personal, if it corresponds with the party opinion; and if it does not corresponds – then decision of the party fraction prevails."

Personal evaluation of actual self-obedience to party or fraction decisions (concerning voting in the plenary sessions) is practically same among men and

women parliamentarians. Every second man and women maintains that he or she is less obedient than the others; remaining men and women either say that they are as much obedient as other members are or that they are more obedient. Qualitative research permits us to say that after all, men parliamentarians are slightly more obedient to the fraction decisions than women MPs are. Firstly, men somewhat outnumber those who told that they are relatively more obedient than their peer members of the fraction, and secondly, women – if they told that they sometimes tend to disobey – used to give extensive emotional comments on the cases of their disobedience (for instance, they voted against sending the Lithuanian troops to Afghanistan or Iraq), thus demonstrating their strong feeling about the “unjust” decision and deliberate action to oppose, while men who told that they use to disobey appeared much less engaged into the issue which provoked their disobedience. Thus, from subjective evaluation of one’s actual behavior, women appear to be less loyal to the party discipline and more driven by their personal analysis of the situation than are their peer men MPs (who constitute majority of the party leadership).

Concerning politicians’ opinion about abstracted, not based neither on personal self-account, nor on observation of actual behavior of other MPs, level of men’s and women’s MPs obedience to party or fraction decisions the dominating view is that there are no gendered differences in this respect. The largest part of interviewed parliamentarians (very second men and women) claims, that both male and female parliamentarians are identical, i.e. autonomous personalities, in terms of party obedience. “I think, at least in this Parliament, all members are similar [in terms of their obedience to party’s/fraction’s decisions, I.M./A.N.]. It is difficult to talk about other fractions, but nobody could impose anything on women or men of our fraction.”

However, there were parliamentarians (over-represented among men) who thought that the level of obedience to party or fraction decisions depends on gender. That is, four men and two women reported, that in general, women are more obedient than men because “... a large fraction of male parliamentarians has or has had leading positions and we know are not so frightful to oppose. Perhaps women avoid being disloyal sometimes because they are respectful of leadership.” Or because women “fight for their position until the last drop of blood when the question is still on agenda in the fraction, but after the decision is taken, they behave honestly. Interest groups seek to contact with men more often. That has influence on their voting behavior and mobilization practices. In addition, men think, that if voting according to fraction will damage their image, they can vote in different way ... women are more trustworthy.” This point may also be illustrated by “strange things”, which took place in the vote for the President Rolandas Paksas impeachment:

apparently, several men MPs intentionally spoiled the voting bulletins thus pursuing the strategy of saving their attractive political face vis-à-vis voters and still keeping their place in the party (social democratic) because they have not overtly opposed its decision (to vote “for” the impeachment). The only woman who voted “against” the impeachment was Kazimiera Prunskienė and she told her decision and gave arguments unambiguously (in the case of the President impeachment, her fraction did not have the “voting line” set in advance).

Alternatively, almost the same share of parliamentarians (one fifth of men and women) claimed the contrary idea: i.e. men are more obedient to party or fraction decisions and women are less obedient. The argumentation was either ethical “women feel they are right and confident” or based on organizational permissiveness “women have more arguments... in the case then women are disobedient ... men think: let she hop – we are majority and we will leave by this train anyway...” or centered on psychological observations (“women have personal caprices”). From this account we see that women’s disobedience tends to be “downplayed” by masculine (rational and self-defensive) judgment that the structural weight of women is too small to bring any change in the party lines (and policy style) or by attitude towards women as different in a negative stereotyped sense, as being capricious, impulsive or hysterical. It is noteworthy that being disobedient to the party or fraction decision among the Lithuanian parliamentarians in general is valued rather positively. Such attitudes of MPs (along with high “party tourism” observed in the Seimas) show that the party system and party as an organizational principle of the legislative work are only in their maturation. Acknowledged fairly visible level of women’s disobedience to the party or fraction decisions indicates that willingly or not the actual parliamentary elite recognizes constitutive role of women in the design of the parliamentary policy style and patterns.

2.4. Personal will of a parliamentarian and his or her personal ambition

is another factor, which influences choice of the field of parliamentary activity and position taking in the parliamentary structures. What concerns specific area of responsibility (to belong to one or another committee, commission, etc.) both women and men say that the choice was their personal, individual, made according to their competence, experience, and concrete interests. However, men seem to be “more equal” and “more free” to choose. If it happens that a man does not work in the parliamentary committee where he would have liked to work, it is because “it is impossible to work in several committees” (according to the Seimas statutes, it is forbidden to cumulate membership in several standing committees, except one – the committee on European affairs), or “I had to choose, but I would also be interested in...” And thus a man leaves the work in the intended committee for ... another term.

While a woman who could not get a place in the committee where she wanted to work tries to stay still “engaged in this sphere without belonging to the parliamentary committee”, she tries voluntarily to participate in national activities, analyses the situation, provides suggestions and tries to solve the problems on the local level. This symptomatic woman does not post-pone her interest to act in certain field towards the “next time”, but tries to be involved despite formal barriers.

Another woman MP complains: “The chairman of the sub-committee is absent for a half of a year already. I could be given this responsibility. But the issue remains unsolved by men. They do not work very responsibly and carefully. I want... You can not become whatever you want...” In other words, a woman accuses men to behave as “dogs on the hay” (if it is not for them, then it is not for anybody else either) thus preserving masculine domination in the parliamentary life.

Every second woman MP reports that she is completely satisfied and would not like to work in any other committee or commission. However, one third of women expresses willingness to work in another committee or commission than she works now (these “wanted” committees are on foreign affairs, social affairs and labor, human rights and commission on youth and sport affairs) and two women declared that they “were forced” to take a position in a particular committee or commission but now are rather satisfied.

In contrast, more than a half of men MPs expressed interest to work in another committee or commission than they are working now. However, this willingness (distinctively from women’s) is more often based not on dissatisfaction or feeling of lack of competence or interest in the domain under the question, but rather on willingness to go to more prestigious committees or to “collect” experience points in various spheres of legislation. Eventual men’s inclinations to change their field of parliamentary responsibility as a rule are based on willingness to express himself and to realize himself, while if women MPs aspire to change their field of parliamentary activity, they do it because of more instrumental reasons – they feel that they are better qualified and experienced in the intended fields.

Following parliamentarians’ aspirations, intended gender distribution in the fields of policy in the parliament would look like it is presented in Table 6.

The data presented make evident that, if women MPs’ personal interest to participate in the particular fields of policy would be taken into better account, women’s share in different fields would rather drastically change. For instance, women are not represented, but want to be in the committees on foreign affairs and human rights, in the commission on youth and sport affairs. Smaller but still remarkable changes in increase of female presence would appear in

Table 6. Actual and intended distribution of MPs
in the fields of policy by gender

	Actual		Intended (change)		
	Members (n)	Women (%)	Members (n)*	Change (women, %)	Women (%)
Committee on Social Affairs and Labor	8	38	+1w	+6	44
Committee on National Security and Defense	13	23	+2m	−3	20
Committee on Economics	14	14	+4m	−3	11
Committee of the Development of Information Society	7	14	+1w	+11	25
			+2m	−4	10
Committee on Environment Protection	7	0	+1m		0
Committee on Budget and Finance	15	0	+1m		0
Committee on Rural Affairs	12	0	+1m		0
Committee on Legal Affairs	13	0	+1m		0
Committee on Foreign Affairs	10	0	+2w +3m	+17 +13	1713
Committee on Human Rights	8	0	+1w	+11	11
Commission on Youth and Sport Affairs	9	0	+1w	+10	10

* w – women; m – men

other fields such as social affairs and labor, national security, economics, and development of information society. In contrast, several fields (environment protection, budget and finances, rural and legal affairs) would remain totally masculine (as they are now). Is it because women MPs personally do not want (do not feel competent or interested) to work there or because they know the unwritten rule that these are men's "hunting land", where women are not welcome? Symptomatically, there was none woman MP represented in the parliamentary commissions, which were working on highly important and unprecedented President's impeachment matter in late 2003 – early 2004.

Comparing **women and men MPs' satisfaction with a position** that they actually hold within the party and in terms of their future plans related to political career, there are significant differences among men and women. Almost all women and men say that they are satisfied with their position in the party;

and affirm that they will stand for next elections. Only one woman and man still doubted and one male respondent was already resolved to stop his parliamentary career. This account shows that the Lithuanian parliamentarians are quite resolute political professionals, whose career success depends on electoral results.

On more abstract level, in the attitudes expressed by the Lithuanian parliamentarians, there are three options for evaluating who, men or women, have more ambition in politics.

Every second woman maintained that men have more ambitions in the politics. As one woman put it: "Any man, even a last vagabond, may see himself in the post of the President of the country." In general, women mostly attribute masculine ambitions in politics to the lack of self-criticism, to some sort of megalomania. While men who think that their gender is more appropriate in terms of ambition to political activities, see the source of these ambitions in the same high psychological self-evaluation (but contrary to women they present it in the positive asset). For instance, a man MP says: "Almost all men – their party affiliation does not matter – are self-confident and they feel that they are important."

The psychological interpretation of the differences in political male (high) and female (low) ambitions is given, for example, in the statement that high men's ambitions "are in their nature" stemming from their "natural wish to lead, to rule, to dominate, to be significant, and they might not to care much about outcomes of their ambitions." The same psychological account gives rather modest perspectives for women's representation in politics, since "women usually are more critical and demanding towards themselves".

Another explanation of superior man's ambitions in politics is socio-structural, it denies different gender nature and is based on analysis of social life. One MP told that men are more ambitious "not because of their nature nor because of the fact that they are somehow programmed by genes. It is rather because of the cultural environment, which induces women to have lower ambitions ... women are taught not to be self-confident enough, social support for their achievements in society is scarce."

However, a big share of parliamentarians are rather modern and emancipated in terms to think that female and male politicians are nearly equally ambitious. Such respondents were over-represented among women (every second women spoke this way, while only every third man MP supported this point of view). These statements about gender equality in terms of political ambition are based on thought about social leadership (composed of strong personalities) and states: "There are careerists both among men and women." Symptomatically, one man MP told that women are more ambitious in politics than men. He explained such a phenomenon (unnatural) by the actual political-social situation where women have to have more ambitions in order to get into politics because they should be angry and dissatisfied with the male dominance. Again, this account

is rather negative towards women who – in contrast to man – are portrayed as driven into politics by anger, frustration or exasperation, and not by “normal” constructive willingness to act and to express oneself.

2.5. Another way to explain the gendered distribution of decision-making positions in Seimas is to analyze and compare *women’s and men’s political priorities*. Our data indicate that male and female parliamentarians differently list political priorities (assign different importance to particular fields of political action) (see Figure 1. and Figure 2.). For example, more women than men recognize/ perceive that in actual politics, the priority is placed on national economy while more men than women say that the actual Seimas acts giving the priority to international relations and defense issues. In parallel, larger number of women MPs (compared to men) is inclined to think that the Seimas in future has to give more attention and to prioritize national security, legal issues and prevention of crime, while men MPs emphasize the need to improve employment policy, social security, and health care system.




Figure 1. The actual policy priorities in Lithuanian parliament today

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE (to Figure 1 and Figure 2): each politician was given a list of the fields of policy (listed on the left of the graph) and was asked to indicate among them three which are prioritized in Lithuanian parliament today and which should have to have more attention of the Lithuanian parliamentarians.

Number – a real number of female and male politicians who indicated corresponding fields; the numbers do not make up to the total number of the sample since not all respondents conformed to instructions.

The **grade** from 1 (most prioritized out of three marked) to 3 (least prioritized out of three marked) had to be attributed to each of the fields marked; the mean of the grades assigned is presented in the graph.




Figure 2. The required policy priorities in Lithuanian parliament

3. GENDERED ATTITUDES OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS

3.1. Perception MP's role at the Parliament

The most generalized observation is that women and men MPs understand their role in professional, democratic and Western way. They say that their main task is to create (prepare) laws and in parallel to run a highly acknowledged task to implement program of the specific political party (theirs). The democratic imperatives (vocation to look for alternatives, to discuss options in search of the best suited solution, to represent voters) are in the second place for men as well as for women MPs. The least pronounced is the parliamentarians' task to promote Western values, to foster a civilized society as one respondent (a man) put it. Generalized data show that such concentric understanding of the daily parliamentary tasks is common for both, men and women politicians. However, more detailed analysis generates some gendered insights related to understanding of the role of a MP (Figure 3.).

First, women MPs are more inclined to emphasize development of political alternatives than men do. Second, women are relatively less oriented towards realization of their party political program. Third, women are less than men focused on fulfillment of the constituency's expectations. As one of them says: "party political program must meet expectations of the voters... However, there are different electorate interests in the same country. So willingly or not,




Figure 3. Parliamentarian's role

but you cannot fully satisfy neither your voters, nor your party. It is fair to acknowledge existence of this “squared circle”.

Men more emphasize realization of their party political line and present, for instance, the following thoughts: “After all, we still pay too little attention to party political ideology in Lithuania. There are labels of various parties, but we forget that each party should have its own distinctive ideology. There exists very strong amalgamation among ideological considerations among seemingly different parties. And party people unduly tend to serve the government and not the ideology.”

These differences among men and women in their understanding of representative functions of a legislator encourage to further compare men and women MPs. On the one hand it is interesting to see if they differently perceive accessibility and appropriateness of the very profession of a politician in gender terms. In other words, if men and women think of the job of the legislator as fully equal gender opportunity driven, or they see one gender (masculine) as more suitable for this profession than is the other (feminine). On the other hand, it is worthwhile to study if there are gender differences in men's and women's self-identification with political activities.

3.2. Talking of the issue *public versus private sphere*, we see that men politicians do not have such a clear division of the private / public space of action as women politicians have. In a sense, women function in clear-cut modern-rational style and unambiguously distinguish “what is for the God, and what is for the emperor”, i.e. where and when they act as legislators, and

where and when – as private people. While men MPs employ more post-modern fuzzy techniques, and more easily and willingly merge their public and private roles.

Women MPs are mostly interested in the issues directly related to the legislation, while men in the process of legislation find, create and develop new aspects of some sort of the “club communication”. In other words, they find place, occasions and meaning for much broader informal communication than their colleague women do. In that respect, introducing miscellaneous elements into their parliamentary action men somewhat “de-sacrosanct” the Seimas environment, but at the same time make the Seimas space more democratic (profane).

Men put more attention to the informal communication among members of Seimas in both, abstract (understanding, awareness) and empirical (practical) level. On the one hand, an absolute majority of women MPs think that work in committees and commissions and discussions in the fractions are of vital (exclusive) importance. Only one woman in Seimas told, that informal communication is “important because it allows to know backstage”, while men say that “thoughts come in the restaurant, problems are most often solved in the informal way after all”.

On the other hand, women MPs underline pompousness and emptiness of the plenary meetings and say that they are void of any analysis of the problem, because there “we gather to vote, when everything is already decided”. To put it otherwise, women reject both extremes of the symbolic space. They devalue the most formalized and sacrosanct Seimas plenary sessions and they refuse (fail) to recognize importance of the informal muddling-through communication. Women MPs get together into the medium, middle, functional, professional space where they perform their duties, exercise their job (profession).

Men perform the same activities (legislate) and work in fractions, committees, commissions and plenary sessions and at the same time unanimously affirm: “informal communication is on the first place”. Men MPs have quite different views towards the most sacrosanct activity – plenary sessions and voting. Men regard it as some sort of the theatrical performance, which involves them themselves. While women look at it as at pompous manifestation or demonstration which remains exterior and odd to them themselves. A woman says: “Evidently, if there is a party decision, then you do not think any more, just push a button [of a voting machine – I.M./A.N.]” While man tells: “But if the question is brought to the hall where you do not have any preconceived your party position – even if it is a very good one – but you vote against. You cannot grab everyone by the button. I am not at all interested in your project and you are not interested in my projects. That job to get support for your intended projects and amendments has to be started weeks and months before. That’s a very crude thing, but that’s how it is. And to hope that your ideas will

be interested for someone without such a preparatory work is naïve... Maybe, for some five or six, let's say, ten... But you need 100 to get it voted!" That is why the work for voting should start earlier, much before the plenary meeting, and as a man MP puts it: "informal communication is the most important channel of this mobilization work – in order your project gets votes, gets support, gets interest". Men less than women MPs trust / hope for interest and support "in principle" or "on the basis of the idea itself" without any preliminary "social lining". From their subjective account (a separate documentary analysis should be carried out in order to get the objective information) men MPs feel that their legislative projects are more successful than their peer women's. One of the reasons of this higher success may lay not the quality or social need of the project in question, but better masculine understanding of the inner kitchen of the legislative process.

Men MPs emphasize that informal communication is not only a part of the power game (mobilization of support), but it is also a part of the analytical-legislative job required by the law projects. Informal communication is not only an organizational condition to implement the ideas, but also a necessary means to get deeper into the content and various aspects of the proposed law. One MP formulates: "Only informally you can discuss the question in depth, when you communicate informally, you get really interested and informed".

The Seimas women also perform this job (necessary because of both, organization and content, related reasons), but they avoid calling "informal" any form of communication in the Seimas environment. For women MPs everything what goes on in the Seimas is formal, official, public – to begin with the plenary sessions and to finish with the coffee breaks or lunch at the same table in Seimas restaurant. They consider these contacts as a part of their job and treat them as formal communication. Informal communication according to women is strictly outside Seimas and around issues other than legislation. A woman says: "I have in mind informal communication when I talk of dancing, singing, or celebrating birthdays together".

In general, women MPs understand their job in Seimas in more "puritan" way and more responsibly than men who are more "relaxed" (cool) and communicate in the informal way "everyday with whomever the need is", or say that "very often I try to talk informally even with the colleagues parliamentarians", or generalizes that "after all, majority of questions is resolved informally".

Women in the parliament communicate with more narrowly defined targets than men. Women MPs say that they primarily and mostly communicate with their parliamentary fraction peers, while men MPs say that they mostly communicate with the members of their party (inside and outside the parliament), with leaders of the party groups and other people who are not MPs (friends, family, etc.). Why are such differences? One explanation has the

psychological background: women MPs might lack self-confidence in politics (and in society at large) and that is why they tend to function in a more narrow way and more purposefully keep close to the “theirs”. They are trying to constantly check their thoughts and ideas; they are looking for (and finding) their peers’ support. On the other hand (as we have already described it), women work in a more “professional” and “formal” way – they tune up their ideas, initiatives and projects first of all and mostly inside their party group (fraction).

Another explanation of women MPs having more thin networks of their communication partners than men MPs have is socio-demographic. Many women MPs are divorced, have their children are grown up and living independently, while majority of men MPs are married, live with spouses and have dependent young children at home. Thus simply men MPs have whom with to talk in their families, while many of women MPs simply do not have a family partner to communicate with about their legislative worries.

Finally, the third explanation is socio-cultural one. Men might try to demonstrate and underline their professional status not only in their close social environment, but also in the society in general. It is highly probable that this reason – willingness and interest to show “who they are” – is the most important incentive for men politicians to communicate broadly in their parliamentary capacity with anybody in broad society.

3.3. Analyzing *professional discourses and conversations inside Seimas*, we get a rather paradoxical picture of “gender oriented” themes and lines of communication. Evidently, most of women and men MPs say that personally they more often discuss their parliamentary activity with their peers men because of a simple reason – men are much more numerous in the parliament. Majority of MPs says that they do not distinguish their discussion partners into men and women or they do not see any difference between men and women as professional MPs.

However, some tendencies are to be observed. On average women MP is considered to be a better discussion partner (target) by peer men and women MPs. A man says: “It might be surprising but more often I talk of my parliamentary activities with peers women: they are more receptive, more sensible to changes, more just emotionally. In a sense, they have less diplomatic passing over in silence; they are more open and prompt to say what they think. You get more emotional comfort and justice while communicating with women. Women have less hidden thoughts”. A woman notices: “It is more pleasant to discuss with a woman in the parliament, although it is more difficult. Tension is lower. When you discuss with a man, you are looking for words, for a form, you are not so open”. This image of a woman respectable and good willing conversation partner is supported by male MP’s observation that “women are

more conscientious". The gender oriented answers testify to the benefit of women being better conversation partners when they are compared to men MPs' engagement into the political dialogue: "The most difficult is to argue with men from other parties and fractions, because they are swindlers, hard as flint stones, and women are more easy to deal with, with them representing other parties it is more easy to negotiate".

Often the conversation partner in Seimas is said to be chosen not according to some essential his or her features (personality) but because of the constructed "artificial" design. A man says: "A particular woman is my "desk mate", in the committee she sits in front of me, that is why I communicate with her very often, she is a chair of the committee and the work is organized through her, that is why I communicate with her more often than with the others". However, we have already described that structurally women are in minority in Seimas (it is fairly easy to realize legislative projects without them) and it is fair to say that legislative work is mainly organized through men (after all, they are chairs of the majority of the parliamentary committees and commissions). Even without any presumed socio-political or cultural male solidarity, there are not many structural opportunities to involve women into the political discussions and parliamentary process in such a way as to make women's words count as much as man's words might count. In other words, women MPs are organizationally (due to their meager number) reduced from intensive political debates.

However, majority of statements about men and women as conversation and discussion partners in Seimas are gender neutral and correct. For instance, with whom it is difficult, with whom it is easy to discuss to legislative issues, the dominant answer is: "It depends on the personality. If a man or a woman hears and listens to the arguments."

In spite of what is already said, there was quite a few Seimas men and women who declare (think) that there is no difference between men and women politicians. For instance, a woman MP says: "It depends on a person. Physical carriage is determined by nature: men are masculine and women are feminine. That is a biological difference. I do not see any other". In parallel, there is an individualistic approach that claims: "Everyone who is in the parliament is different. It does not pertain to gender. It is because everyone is a personality".

However, some women MPs notice gendered differences in parliamentary behavior: "Women are more tolerant and more easy to communicate even when they are in different parties. They find compromises more easily than men from different parties". A man MP also supports this insight: "A woman can much more than a man, because a woman can present the problem in a softer way and to find an answer or to persuade the opponent. She is more cautious. A man goes as a tank and does not see what is going around. A dialogue is much more gentle with women than with men". Another man

underlines: “Women have intuition. Masculine nature is warrior. Sometimes they act without thinking on the grounds of some sort of mathematical counting and not of wise consideration. Women are more dedicated and sincere”. Still another man recognizes: “Women are carrying. You can discuss, they have more patience to listen. Even though they might have a different view, they are not so sharp”. But *femininity* in the parliamentary life according to the MPs has not only advantages, but disadvantages too. A man observes: “Women are more impulsive and ask the questions more emotionally than men. Men are more sustained and they use arguments in order to persuade you. Women sometimes talk from their personal bell tower”. Evidently that these evaluations and statements contain much of stereotyped thinking, repetition of clichés, which is not necessarily based on real experience from contacts with the colleague parliamentarians (in order to get more realistic picture additional research, for instance, the participant observation, is needed).

It is important that the Seimas member says: “I could not say that Seimas women and men are different, but I feel that they are differently accepted and differently evaluated”. In this case, expression “differently evaluated” means that woman’s results of political activities, their mistakes in politics are judged more severely than those of a man. Most of women and men MPs agree with this statement because “there is no pity/ mercy in this affair – it is a fight for power”.

A woman MP states: “Men try to dominate, they do not evaluate their capabilities thoroughly, in scrupulous way. If they are not in a particular position, that is because they do not want to bear the additional burden (workload), maybe they do not like people who are involved, but not because that they ‘per se’ cannot. Women more often think if they personally are able to fulfill the task properly, if they have sufficient qualifications. Women do not over-estimate themselves.” A man parliamentarian notices: “Women are more transparent in their action, they practice decent politics, the elements of civility and politeness in politics is more expressed among them.”

However, there exist visible differences among women politicians in respect to their self-evaluation and to their strategies of political behavior. A man MP observes: “If a woman employs her femininity, she achieves much better results than the woman who does not. If they want a law to be passed – then they have to smile, to flatter, and to speak to everybody. Such feminine women are more successful than those who come and present their truth – very often very right one – but do not have support which they can get as sympathetic women, their success is much more difficult”. Here again we come back to the theme of informal communication where women’s smile, flattering and gentle speaking are understood as ingredients of the non-verbal communication which via its non-verbal character conveys the *femininity* of the actor.

As N. Henley (2002:235) affirms: “Everything what we do – even though it may look individual and personal – reflects our participation in the system of power, where there are only two choices: to dominate or to obey”. Even in the case of women MPs we meet this rather simplistic pattern: these women MPs who obey to the “laws” of gender roles seemingly have better chances to win in the power game; while those who do not obey to the established gendered system of distribution of social influence and prestige if are “not pushed out of the power system, then at least their disobedience and embodiment of this disobedience create an opposite effect: the woman’s path in politics becomes more difficult and cumbersome” (Milett, 2002: 234).

CONCLUSIONS

The study allows to formulate rather conventional conclusions typical for reports on women’s representation in politics, i.e. women are too few in the parliament, women MPs increase representative scope of the legislative body and in professional way contribute to the parliamentary decision making process. First, the gender segregation in policy areas under parliamentary responsibility is mostly shaped by the labor division traditions in society at large. The parliamentary peers and the party leadership more frequently entrust women to take positions in such spheres as social security, health, children and family affairs. If women happen to get positions in several non-feminine fields such as foreign affairs, anti-corruption or parliamentary ethics, etc., those achievements are rather to be attributed to their personal success and determination which hardly create any precedent in the gendered labor division in the parliament.

Second, even though women are present and visible in the leading positions in the parliament, in reality not all the highest decision-making positions are accessible to women. There is a sort of invisible ceiling effect (established by the party organizations, which seldom and only as an exception to the rule puts women in the party leadership) that makes women absent in the most important positions of the parliament. Third, women MPs are less free, in comparison with their peer men, to choose their sphere of parliamentary activities in the Seimas and to navigate their parliamentary career.

These structural differences and gendered opportunity structures establish specific patterns of the perception of politics by women and men MPs and respectively shape their policy style. Women appear to be less cunning parliamentarians than their peer men are. Consequently, women in politics are treated and evaluated differently than men are. These findings encourage discussion about different, complementary and each other renewing women’s and men’s potential in politics, which in actual circumstances (integration into the EU, development of information society, globalization, growth of the two-track society, etc.) requires variety and flexibility of decisions and attitudes.

Finally, what could be our tentative answers to the Big questions formulated in the beginning of this paper? *Is actually Lithuania in the phase of its historical and decisive recognition of the gender factor in politics?* The answer is *yes*: even though majority of observation point to rather traditional way of political labor division, the gender challenge is acknowledged by both, women and men politicians and “renegotiation” of the gender roles and potential among both, women and men politicians is under way. The second question was: *Are actual female politicians powerful enough to influence current political choices and tendencies in any meaningful way?* The answer is rather *no*: women are structurally too few to make their voice heard and their understanding of politics and parliamentary duties and responsibilities expressed in the “authentically feminine” way without adjusting it to traditional, men dominated policy style and principles.

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**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION PROCESS**

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF EU ENLARGEMENT

Ramūnas Vilpišauskas¹

Introduction: moving targets, shifting interests?

Recent years have seen an increase in political and scholarly attention to the relations between the members of the transatlantic community, in particular the US and the EU. Debates about the changing nature of transatlantic relations could be traced back to the end of the Cold War, changing nature of the international threats and the role of NATO, although they have particularly intensified since the election of the current US administration and events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the military operations in Iraq. The disagreements on the degree of threats to the security of transatlantic community and the most appropriate responses to them together with the continuing disputes on transatlantic trade relations caused many scholars to turn their attention to the changing nature of transatlantic relations and their future. Not all of them view this “transatlantic drift” as a recent phenomena linked only to the policies of US administration and the recent threats. Some scholars argue that it is a sign of the widening power gap between the US and the EU as well as the differences in strategic culture among the two sides of Atlantic which manifest themselves in the treatment of international institutions and other foreign policy issues². This diagnosis leads to the predictions of further growth of divergences among the transatlantic partners, unless serious disruptions of the current international system take place which would lead to relative redistribution of power and change the attitudes towards cooperative institutions.

At the same time, it should be noted that the disagreements on trade relations and related restrictive measures have characterized US and EU relations for several decades and therefore are not new. Moreover, as some scholars point out, at the background of discussions about the political disagreements between the US and the EU, the transatlantic partners not only remain the most important each other’s commercial partners but the trade and investment relations have been growing in recent years. It is argued that “the economic relationship

between the United States and Europe is by a wide margin the deepest and broadest between any two continents in history – and those ties are accelerating”³. This leads to the different conclusion about what is next in the transatlantic relations since the growing level of interdependence, at least according to one of the approaches to international relations, leads to a more intense use of cooperative measures to manage it. Although the economic ideology and beliefs of policy elites can slow down the convergence of interests and complicate the efforts to cooperate, the growing economic interdependence surely acts as an incentive to negotiate cooperative measures⁴.

Another important development has been taking place amidst these changes in transatlantic relations which has also been one of the factors of this change. It is the enlargement of the transatlantic community by accepting Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) which reestablished their independence with the end of the Cold War. The informal enlargement has already been taking place with an adoption of democratic institutions in these countries, strong growth of trade relations, and increasing socialization of political elites. The formal enlargement started with the accession of three CEECs into NATO in 1997, will continue in Spring 2004 with the most numerous enlargement of both EU and NATO in their history, and most probably in 2007 and later in the future. For CEECs accession into the EU (and NATO) have been the two most important policy priorities which not only directed their foreign policy towards strengthening relations with the democratic countries of transatlantic community but also played important role in structuring and sustaining domestic transition reform efforts.

In the face of disagreements between the members of transatlantic community CEECs’ policy makers will often confront difficult choices as the case of intervention into Iraq demonstrated. To some extent these dilemmas were present before the war in Iraq, for example, during the process of accession into the World Trade Organization when negotiators of some CEECs found themselves between conflicting demands of USA and EU representatives, or the dispute concerning the International Criminal Court. The accession into the EU itself not only implies very concrete changes in economic policy such as harmonization of import duties which have direct effect on American producers. It also locks in broader integration patterns which will increasingly bind the CEECs with other EU members in some cases distancing them from the strategic partner on the other side of the Atlantic. CEECs’ accession into the EU and NATO formalizes the asymmetric interdependence of these countries with Europe and America: high and increasing importance of trade and investment relations with the EU and high reliance (dependence) on the provision of security from NATO dominated by the USA.

Different questions could be raised regarding the causal relationships between accession of the CEECs into the most important organizations of transatlantic community and the nature of US and EU's relations. One way to analyze them is to look into the potential effects of transatlantic disputes on foreign policies of CEECs and their roles in the EU and NATO. This paper analyses a different causal relationship treating the transatlantic relations as a dependent variable and asks several political economy questions. First, what are the immediate and longer term effects of EU enlargement on commercial relations between the EU and the US? Second, what could be the likely future developments of US and EU economic relations after the enlargement if judged on the basis of CEECs trade policy preferences which have found their expression in their trade regimes since early 1990s? Third, could preferences of CEECs in the fields of foreign economic and security policies become interconnected in such a way as to alter their preferences towards transatlantic relationship?

***The effects of EU accession on US economy:
generally positive but it depends***

Every enlargement of the EU posed questions regarding the effects of adopting common norms on economic relations of new members with outsiders. The EU is a customs union with a common external tariff and other harmonized trade policy instruments. Moreover, common product standards and other non-tariff barriers play increasingly important role for exporters and investors from the third countries and according some analysts it is the importance of these "behind the border" barriers that cause most disputes between US and the EU⁵. Interestingly, as some scholars note, despite the unprecedented nature of this enlargement this time differently from the previous rounds of EU/EC enlargements when the third countries watched closely for possible trade diversion effects of enlargement, the accession of new members attracts much less attention from international organizations and third countries, most probably due to the general perception of win-win nature of the process and the costs of non-enlargement⁶.

It should be acknowledged, however, that there have been debates between the US and the EU regarding the external effects of integrating CEECs into the EU. Usually such issues are settled by using the instruments of the GATT/WTO (see article XXIV paragraphs 4-6 on the conditions for the creation and expansion of regional customs unions). But the perspective of EU enlargement has had spill-over effects on international economic diplomacy in the WTO some years before the formal accession. For example, during the process of the Baltic states' accession into the WTO, which took up to 6 years and was quite closely coordinated with the European Commission, negotiators from these

countries had to deal with the issues which caused disagreements between the EU and the USA. As the Deputy Director General for Trade from the European Commission noted speaking about the Baltic states accession into the WTO, “the US delayed the completion of these negotiations by many months, insisting (a) on obligations that were known to go beyond those of the EU (thus creating a potential ‘debit’ situation, to be compensated in the future); and (b) attempting, in the specific case of the audio-visual sector, to extract concessions which would result in different obligations from those of the EU, with the same result.”⁷ Thus, in some cases only because they had a perspective of future membership in the EU, Baltic states became the hostages of trade conflicts between the EU and US while negotiating the accession into the WTO.

The accession into the EU requires new members to align their foreign trade policy with the one of the EU. According to the estimates of the European Commission, the accession of eight CEECs will generally mean the reduction of import duties on imports from the third countries, including the US. The general level of import duties should decrease from 9 percent to 4 percent⁸. This overall reduction of barriers to imports will benefit the US exporters and provide more opportunities to them thus providing another stimulus to economic relations between US and the EU. This conclusion is confirmed by other studies which argue that “external tariff reductions will generally boil down to a pure improvement of market access for the US...” explaining this by general lowering of external import protection and relatively advanced liberalization of trade between the EU and CEECs before their accession⁹. It should be noted, though, that statistically the openness of EU will slightly decrease (see table 1.), but this is due to the CEECs trade with the EU being accounted as internal trade rather than import and export operations.

The country and product specific effects of extending EU's common external trade policy to new members is another important feature of harmonizing external trade policy measures of new members with the EU's. Poland, Hungary and other Visegrad members have been more protectionist than the Baltic countries. In the case of the latter, joining the EU implies an increase in conventional (MFN) import duties from 0 percent for Estonia and 2-3 percent for Latvia and Lithuania up to EU's level for imports of industrial products from the US. As a result of this increase there is going to be some trade diversion in Baltic states' trade with the US which will affect US exporters which sell their products to the Baltics. Also, the EU has a record of higher protection of certain “sensitive” sectors such as agriculture, steel, automobile production and some others which compete with imported products and have lobbying power in the EU. Protection level for some of these products in some of new members, mostly Baltic states, will increase. Trade in agriculture, in particular if the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is slow,

Table 1. Changes of some key economic indicators
after the EU enlargement (2002)

	EU 15	EU 25
Population – million (% of world)	379 (6.1%)	455 (7.3%)
GDP – billion € (% of world)	8,827 (26.7%)	9,576 (28%)
GDP per capita, €	24.100	21.100
Total trade with the world – billion €	1.977	1.799
Of which with the 10 new MS – billion €	232	
Share in world trade in goods	19.4%	17.7%
Share in world trade in services	24.7%	
Share in world FDI:		
Inflows	20.5%	na
Outflows	45.2%	na
Share of world trade (goods + services)	20.1%	19.8%
Degree of opening to international trade (total trade/GDP)	28.6%	26.9%

Source: European Commission (2004)

might also experience some diversion although there are different opinions on this issue and its effects will also be country and product specific ¹⁰.

In general, even when the trade diversion takes place its impact on US exports will be insignificant not only because the tariff increases will be moderate, but also because CEECs are relatively insignificant trade partners for the US. Most of CEECs have half or more of their trade turnover taking place with the EU. The increase of EU-25 trade with the US and other trade partners is illustrated in Table 2. Besides, joining EU should provide an additional stimulus

Table 2. Changes in EU's trade with its main partners (2002)

	EU 15		EU 25	
	Mio €	% of total EU-15 trade	Mio €	% of total EU-25 trade
1. USA	416,132	21.0%	429,944	23.3%
2. Switzerland	129,515	6.5%	136,378	7.4%
3. China	116,067	5.8%	119,154	6.5%
4. Japan	110,951	5.6%	119,055	6.4%
5. Russia	78,170	3.9%	97,126	5.3%

Source: European Commission (2004)

to economic growth in new members which should affect positively US companies.

Although the impact of the non-tariff barriers is more difficult to estimate, different product standards (such as the safety and other technical standards for automobiles, veterinary norms and others) are also likely to make imports from the US to new members more expensive. In the long term, this can create incentives for replacing products imported from the US by products produced in the EU or the countries which have preferential trade agreements with the Union. Similar forecasts can be made in the area of agricultural trade. Two factors might slow down or even reverse this trend – further liberalization of trade in the WTO negotiations or conclusion of a long debated Trans-Atlantic free trade agreement. The prospects of the latter agreement will to a large extent depend on the interplay of domestic lobbies and policy makers and the degree of economic interdependence between the US and Europe.

Finally, there are also disputed issues related to American investors' rights in CEECs after the EU accession as a result of a need to renegotiate or renounce the Bilateral investment treaties between the US and CEECs to make them compatible with the EU internal market rules. These debates focused on several aspects which include national treatment status given to US investors in CEECs, specific status in some sectors and other issues¹¹. Although the measures that CEECs have to undertake carry certain symbolic value, their economic impact of US investors should not be significant. More benefits are expected to accrue to the US investors from CEECs participation in the EU's Single market of 450 million consumers. The CEECs have been the most dynamically developing markets in Europe in recent years and according to most forecasts high rates of growth are going to continue after the accession. Therefore despite the relatively low income levels in new members (of around 40 percent of EU average), their economic dynamism is likely to attract investments from the US and other third countries. This is supported by the surveys of US largest investors in which CEECs are listed among the most favored investment locations ahead of the UK and Germany, mostly due to the benefits of stable economic environment that are associated with EU accession¹².

To sum up, the accession of CEECs into the EU is likely to create in the short term diverse effects on US economic interests, which will depend on particular export markets and products. In general, the economic effects of EU enlargement are likely to be positive for the US companies, in particular if the economies of scale and the benefits of economic growth in new members are exploited by American investors. In the long term, the enlargement of the EU might strengthen the incentives for the liberalization of US and EU trade, although the cooperative projects will depend on the interplay of interests groups and policy makers, and the coalition politics in the enlarged EU.

Coalition politics after the EU enlargement

The arguments about the EU becoming larger and more diverse after the enlargement and the resulting increase in importance of the interest-based coalition politics are becoming a conventional wisdom. It has been argued that the enlargement will reinforce the recent tendency of issue-based coalition building in the Council of Ministers, although there are disagreements regarding the stability and the basis of such coalitions. Some authors foresee fluid intergovernmental coalition politics taking place on the basis of particular issues, uniting different combinations of both old and new members in different coalitions¹³. Others identify relatively stable coalition patterns on the basis of cultural characteristics and particular interests¹⁴.

Although there is a long history of scholarly debates about the intergovernmental politics in the EU and the role of joint institutions and decision making habits in transforming the member states' interests, this paper is limited to the analysis of potential intergovernmental coalitions in the enlarged EU focusing on policies towards the US. To put it simply, the question is to what extent the enlarged EU might shift the EU towards more or less cooperation with the US. What are the likely cleavages and sources of disagreements, which factors might contribute to closer cooperation between the transatlantic partners? Is it likely that although the negotiating power of the EU as a global actor will increase, its capacity for reaching internal agreement and the speed of decision making might decrease?

The answers to these questions depend on the compatibility of intergovernmental preferences inside the enlarged Union and the degree of their divergence. Theories of international relations suggest several approaches explaining national preferences. They could be grouped into at least two groups, one prioritizing international structures, and the other giving priority to domestic actors. The first group of approaches stress the importance of long term international structures and the features of states, in particular power, which determine their position in the international system and their preferences towards international cooperation. Liberal theories of international relations focus on the role of domestic actors – interest groups, political elite, experts and their interaction – in forming national preferences. Most political economy theories aiming to explain European integration acknowledge the importance of domestic actors (and mostly differ on explaining their interaction and the role of supranational institutions in facilitating the agreements among member states and informing their long term preferences).

This paper discusses factors which might determine the national preferences of new members towards transatlantic cooperation and possible composition of intergovernmental coalitions inside the EU after the enlargement. It takes an

actor oriented approach which focuses on the role of interest groups inside the member states with their preferences depending of their competitive positions, and the policy makers which respond to the domestic pressures and the structural characteristics of international system.

Preferences of interest groups and their influence on state policies depend on the nature of their activities and the capacity to organize. To be sure, in the multilevel governance system of the EU interest groups, in particular those represented by the European associations, have other channels of influence which are directed towards EU institutions (in particular, the European Commission). However, usually both national and supranational channels of influence are used and the national governments remain among the most important targets of domestic interest groups. Therefore, it is important to continue assessing interactions between domestic interest groups and the governments, taking into account that in some cases (such as security and defense policy) the impact of interest groups on national preferences might be insignificant because narrow interests groups are difficult to identify and it is usually political elites that take a leading role in these policy areas

Detailed analysis of interest groups preferences is beyond the objectives of this paper. Several remarks would suffice. First, as the discussion of import duty levels shows, many acceding countries are small and relatively open economies. Taking into account the large share of their foreign trade relative to their GDP, it is likely that many companies in these countries will support further lowering of barriers to trade with the third countries (the trade inside the EU will become completely liberalized after the accession). In particular due to the traditional relations with neighboring third countries, companies in new members might support liberalizing trade with neighboring markets which will border the Union. Although trade with the US is relatively insignificant, the general openness of these economies could become an important factor in supporting liberalizing trade either bilaterally with the US or in the framework of the WTO. At the same time, it should be noted that small country preferences are not often reflected in EU's decisions and in this sense large countries, which have more protectionist policies can prevent from adopting more liberal trading policies.

However, the liberalization of international trade within the WTO framework is currently relatively advanced. Most important presently are the non-tariff barriers to trade and tariffs levied on agricultural products (and domestic support to farmers). Regarding the latter issue, several likely coalitions could be expected. They will depend on the importance of agricultural sector in country's economy (and employment) and the traditionally strong lobbying of farmers. It is likely that there will be a coalition of protectionist countries led

by France which will include Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania. These countries will remain opposed to further liberalization of open agricultural trade among the WTO members, the reform of Common Agricultural Policy in the EU and the removal of barriers to trade with the US. It should be noted though, that immediately after the accession the new members might advocate reducing support to farmers in the EU only to reduce the differences in the level of direct payments which will be allocated to farmers of current and new member states. But after the discriminatory features of direct payments are eliminated, this motive will disappear and the new members will most likely respond to the lobbying of their farmers and try to increase the level of support. This issue might prove to continue causing important trade disputes between transatlantic partners, especially if enlarging the EU slows down the reform of the CAP.

In the area of non-tariff barriers to trade, the development of regulatory harmonization will be most important issue. As it will be argued below, differences in the level of economic development will result in harmonization creating most adjustment costs for companies in poorer member states. At the same time, as the application of transition periods on cabotage and movement of labor (and measures taken to protect domestic labor markets) show, interest groups in current member states are going to search for ways to protect themselves from the competition based on cheaper labor in the new member states. In this respect, some richer new member states might join Germany, Nordic countries and other states supporting new regulatory measures, with Greece and some poorer old members might join the coalition of states supporting status quo or even deregulation. The level of support for cooperation on mutual recognition of regulatory norms between the US and the EU is likely to depend on particular policy issues.

When evaluating preferences of governmental elites, two important cleavages could be singled out. First, there will be governments favoring liberalization and those favoring state interventionism. Second, those that favor further deepening of integration and proceeding towards “ever closer union”, and those opposing it.

The attitudes of national (and supranational) elites on the role of state in the economy is a matter of ideology. However, currently governments supporting liberalization include British Labor government and right wing Spanish government, sometimes supported by Italian and Portuguese governments. They are likely to be joined by Estonian and Czech policy makers, which often spoken out on the need of trade liberalization. The record of transition reforms illustrates that the small new member states are likely to favor further liberalization of trade in the WTO and bilaterally with the US.

On the other hand, the opposition to liberalization and deregulation comes from French elites sometimes supported by German (although in both countries governments are gradually trying to implement structural reforms), also Austrian and Nordic governments (though latter often support liberalization of EU's external trade). It is very likely, that they will be joined by Poland, Hungary and some other new member states' elites. In some of them external trade policies have been more open than EU's external trade policy and privatization is more advanced in some areas than in most current EU members. However, these are the results of transitions reforms and international commitments which locked in institutional choices and might be reversed as the process of socialization in the EU proceeds. Overall, the socialization in the institutions of the EU and the implementation of Lisbon strategy, which represents a "third way" will reinforce the culture of compromise in new members rather than policies based on ideology.

The more important cleavage might be the one based on the preferences regarding further deepening of integration where original six might form a coalition opposed by most other member states. This issue also relates to the future of transatlantic relations, if deeper integration turns into more inward looking core group of member states and causes frictions between transatlantic partners. However, it should be stressed that in the policy areas which form part of the common market differentiated (flexible) integration is very unlikely. It is more likely in the areas of intergovernmental cooperation, in particular security and defense policies. The latter issues are most likely to cause disputes and misunderstandings between the EU and the US, and also create most difficult policy dilemmas for policy makers of CEECs. They will be discussed below evaluating the impact of the position of new members in the international system and their characteristics.

On the basis of country characteristics in their relation to the international system, several factors determining national preferences are important. It is the size of a country, its geographical position, historical experience and the level of economic development. What potential intergovernmental coalitions could be formed on their basis in the EU after its enlargement?

Coalitions on the basis of the size of a country are formed in the EU mostly during the times of institutional reforms, because during institutional reforms the questions of country representation and their relative decision making power are raised. In other words, institutional reforms raise the question of the long term relative bargaining power which is locked in by the institutional and procedural rules and can be changed by initiating further reforms. It is mostly because of the long term effects of institutional reforms on the relative bargaining power that they become so important for member states. Because

the bargaining power is directly linked to country's population, member states usually form the coalitions of large and small countries during the institutional reforms. It has been evident during the IGC which ended up in the adoption of the Treaty of Nice and in the most recent IGC of 2003 which discussed the draft EU Constitution.

Geographical position is another factor which can influence preferences of countries. It influences foreign policy priorities in several ways. Member states bordering non members are interested in bringing the initiatives of cooperation with their neighbors to the EU agenda. Members geographically in the center of the EU are more interested in cooperation among themselves. This factor is linked with common historical experience, because often geographically close countries have a long history of mutual relations (with the exception of colonies of some European countries). This applies to geographically close Benelux countries which created customs union before the establishment of the Communities and continue their cooperation inside the EU. Similar group is constituted by Nordic countries. By the way, in Autumn 2000 a group of "wise men" formed by Nordic countries suggested to intensify cooperation among Nordic states, in particular by forging a common position to important issues on the EU agenda such as the membership in eurozone or enlargement of the EU¹⁵.

It is likely, therefore, that, for example, Lithuania and other Baltic states will have a common position with Poland on such issues as infrastructure projects (roads, rail, electricity projects). These countries could also be interested in more intense cooperation of the EU with neighboring non-members such as Ukraine, Russia and (depending on political developments) Belorussia. Such groups of members might in the future compete for the political priorities and resources of the EU to advance projects of cooperation with historically and geographically close third countries: South European EU members are likely to continue advocating closer relations with Latin American or Mediterranean countries, Greece, Italy and some Central European EU members could form a coalition advocating support to reforms in Balkan countries, Poland, Baltic states and Nordic EU members will most likely support closer relations with Russia. Importantly, France and Germany in this respect might join different coalitions the former being more interested in cooperation with the South and the latter with the East.

Geography and history have another aspect to it which is particularly important to the future of transatlantic relations. Partly to those reasons – proximity to Russia and historical memories – (in addition to its size and military resources) acceding member states are more inclined to maintain close relations with the USA and support its presence (and the role of NATO) in

Europe than some of the current EU member states. However, in this respect like on other issues, new and old member states are not going to form two separate coalitions but will rather form coalitions including combinations of new and old members. For example, coalition of EU members supporting closer relations with the USA is likely to include most new members and Great Britain (probably also Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal depending on ruling parties). This split between “transatlanticists” and “continentalists” became quite evident during the operations of US in Iraq in Spring 2003. In particular illustrative has been the reaction of President J. Chirac to the support of acceding countries for the US position which they declared in the letter of Vilnius group. It was also seen as another sign that France has aspirations to create a group of European states that could become a balancing force to the US in the world¹⁶.

This foreign policy goal of France might play important role in further developing a coalition between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in creating a defense union, which has been first discussed publicly in March 2003. Debates about enhanced cooperation on defense policy matters have been initiated earlier, mainly due to the revival of “French-German motor”. After the presidential elections in France which ended the period of “cohabitation” during which the president and the prime minister represented different parties, France and Germany renewed the bilateral axis by presenting joint proposals on institutional reforms of the EU, security and defense, justice and internal affairs, economic policy and financing EU enlargement. They also openly supported the idea of enhanced cooperation in security and defense policy matters.

This contradiction could be solve either by undertaking cooperation outside the EU or by amending the Treaty of the EU. It seems that France and Germany so far followed the second path by supporting the inclusion of provisions on structured cooperation in defense matters, including restrictions to others willing to join later, and attaching the declaration with a list of potential participants in this initiative. Also, during the IGC in the second half of 2003 France and Germany started deliberating the idea of a two country core with a common security and defense policy and some other policies to be created after the enlargement of the EU. This idea, which was publicly advanced after France represented Germany in one of EU summits, is not new and has been first suggested about a decade ago but later rejected by France¹⁷. Its revival during the process of IGC could be a strategic bargaining move aimed at convincing some reluctant countries to give their support to the draft EU Constitution. The circumstances and the timing of this initiative and the public hints of German and French leaders about financial and other sanctions against states opposing some of the provisions in the draft Constitution confirm this

interpretation. However, although the idea of enhanced cooperation (even though among much smaller number of states than provided in the Treaty) is most probably used this time again as a bargaining tool, it also illustrates the possible methods of most integration-minded member states to cope with diversity in enlarged EU.

In addition to willingness to advance enhanced cooperation in defense matters there is another issue involved – the capabilities of initiating countries to advance their objectives. To put it differently, this type of initiatives will not be credible without the support and participation of Great Britain which until recently has been reserved about such initiatives. Although this attitude has been changing it is still unlikely that Britain would support initiatives in defense matters which could reduce the role of the USA and NATO in European security. However, if this idea was actually implemented it would create difficult dilemmas for new members of NATO and EU. The joint initiative of France, Germany and some other countries could have a strong political and symbolic impact on new EU members. Being left outside of such initiatives and losing the right to participate in the decision making structure (which has been among the main motive to join the EU) they would have to reexamine their defense and security policy and membership in security alliances. This threat of exclusion after being excluded from EU/EC decision making for half a century is likely to act as a powerful motive for CEECs leaders in forcing them to reconsider their priorities.

Finally, the level of economic development of a country is another important factor which influences its position on redistributive and regulatory issues in the EU. The average income level of acceding states in 2002 was around 40 percent of EU average. Although some acceding countries (Slovenia) have a per capita GDP above that of some current members (Greece), and some acceding countries (Baltic states) have been growing much faster than any EU member, the differences of economic development and income are likely to remain for 15-20 years. Some differences probably will never disappear, but their relative significance should become smaller with the economic growth of EU and catching-up of new members.

However, until significant catching-up takes place the differences of national preferences are likely to divide member states into groups of rich and poor countries. Two policy issues – redistribution through EU budget and further approximation of regulatory standards – are going to create divergent positions between countries of different levels of economic development. Majority of EU legal norms regulate trade between member states and aim at correcting “market failures”, often by setting detailed minimum quality standards and norms of production process. The same could be said about harmonizing indirect

taxes (VAT and excise taxes) by setting minimum EU wide norms. Strict regulatory standards usually reflect preferences of rich member states which try to extend their own domestic norms to the EU level thereby reducing their own adjustment costs and shifting them on other member states. Although the adjustment costs are often managed by allowing for transition periods, they can become a significant burden on the budgets, companies and consumers of poorer member states reducing their competitiveness. It is exactly for this reason that acceding countries negotiated transition periods for implementing most expensive EU directives during the accession negotiations.

Most of the proposals which are currently on the EU agenda aim at setting stricter norms in a number of areas (protection of environment, norms of chemical products, etc.). The adoption of these norms would have a negative impact on the competitiveness of new members' companies. Therefore, the governments of acceding countries might ally against raising regulatory standards (assuming, of course, that national positions are based on the economic reasoning and are not captured by narrow interest groups, which might use regulatory norms to raise market entry barriers and prevent new competitors from entering the market). Overall, regulatory harmonization should become slower after the enlargement due to the increase in differences of economic development. It is no accident that in recent years European Commission has been advocating the use of more flexible regulatory methods (framework directives, self-regulation, etc.)¹⁸. It is also partly for the similar reasons that one of the main recent projects on the EU agenda – implementation of the Lisbon strategy – is based on the open method of coordination, which is based on comparative guidelines of non-obligatory nature leaving the choice of policy instruments to member states.

Redistribution through the EU budget is another area where cleavages and opposing coalitions between net contributors and net recipients are likely to emerge. In this aspect, a coalition of Germany, Netherlands, possibly Sweden and some other countries, on the one hand, and a coalition of net receivers on the other hand, could emerge. The latter group would include most of new member states. On this issue there would also not emerge a clear division between old and new members, because France, Spain and Italy would probably support increases in budget expenditures or the *status quo*. At the same time, Slovenia and Estonia would probably join another group led by Germany. On this issue the differences of positions between Germany and France are likely to diverge (although the degree of divergence would depend on further fate on the Growth and Stability pact, which is currently breached by both countries). The more evident opposing coalitions on budgetary issues will most probably emerge when the new financial perspective of the EU is being decided.

***Transatlantic cooperation:
external security in exchange for farm subsidies?***

Most of preparatory measures undertaken in acceding countries in order to join the EU were in the area of economic exchange. Only several issues touched upon the “high politics” of foreign and security policy, including the Russian transit to and from the Kaliningrad region. This relative focus on technical matters of regulatory rules while ignoring other areas (with the exception of budgetary matters in so far as they were related to sectorally and regionally concentrated groups of society reflects the nature of the EU with its supranational regime in regulatory matters and intergovernmental cooperation in security and defense issues. Most reforms in military apparatus of CEECs and the security aspirations have been related to preparations for NATO membership. It is through the latter that constant regular contacts with the US administration have been maintained. CEECs’ support for US actions in Iraq should also be seen not so much as an expression of support for the military actions but rather as a sign of solidarity with the country which supported the dissident movements of CEECs communities during the period of Soviet occupation when most West European governments tried to appease the Soviet Union, and, in particular, insisted on accepting CEECs, in particular Baltic states, into NATO¹⁹.

However, changing nature of both EU and NATO might change this balance of cooperative relations with the members of transatlantic community. As it was noted before, the moves towards structured (enhanced) cooperation in the area of defense (and the position of the EU foreign minister) might create difficult dilemmas for new members. First, they might result in a group of large member states, maybe joined by a group of most federalist-minded EU countries, taking the decisions without the due regard to the interests of others. For example, the experience of Lithuania’s negotiations with the EU on the Russian transit regime during the accession negotiations provides some basis for the caution. The statements made by the leaders of some large EU member countries urging to respect Russian interests during the process of enlargement could be interpreted as a pressure on Lithuania to give up to the demands of Russian authorities which formally were not part to the accession negotiations. Eventually, despite the statements to the contrary the European Commission did agree to modify the *acquis communautaire* in order to accommodate the interests of Russian authorities by agreeing on the new type of facilitated transit regime. This experience in the context of memories going back to the times Soviet and Tsarist occupation provides the ground for a cautious attitude towards the structured military cooperation led by France and Germany.

Second, with the current ambivalent attitude of the US towards a stronger

political role of the EU in world affairs, participation of new members in the potential enhanced cooperation projects of the EU might contradict the interests of the US. Although for a long time the US encouraged the EC/EU to strengthen its political role and its capacities, the actual developments are now regarded with suspicion by many in the US administration. Of course, the rhetoric of the EU regarding its military role is still not matched by the required funding. According to some experts, meeting the ESDP headline goals might amount to 60-100 billion euro over next 10-15 years which together with its annual operational costs of 7-33 billion euro or some 2.3-2.8 percent of GDP²⁰. Taking into account the current budgetary difficulties of Germany and France in meeting the requirements of Stability and Growth Pact as well as the overall public skepticism towards increasing expenditures on defense, creating credible capacities of the EU might prove challenging. However, the debates on this issue and the division of tasks between EU and NATO are going to continue and the new members will eventually have to take sides which will be difficult due to different historical experiences of new members during the fifty decades of the Cold War, their security concerns and divergent credibility of EU and US support.

Many analysts predict that after the EU enlargement there will be more pro-American countries such as Poland that will strengthen the Atlanticist coalition²¹. Most other countries which signed the Vilnius group declaration are likely to be among those “instinctive” or “reflexive Atlanticists”²². However, it has been extensively shown that in the EU reluctant countries are convinced by using package deals and side-payments or by the threats of exclusion. The discussion of potential coalitions illustrates that fluid coalitions formed on the basis of domestic preferences are likely to dominate EU politics which creates increasingly more room for using side-payments and issue linkages. Therefore, it remains to be seen if the potential budgetary favors can convince economically less developed new members to support EU initiatives which might not be welcomed by the US or to resist from supporting the US in its operations either unilateral or through the international institutions. To be sure, current budgetary difficulties of the main net payers to the EU budget and the increase in a number of net recipients after the enlargement will limit the potential for traditional side-payments. However, issue linkages can still be used as a negative incentive, in particular during the reform of the common agricultural policy and adoption of a new financial framework of the EU for years 2007-2013. The threat of exclusion can be particularly powerful bargaining tool to be used against CEECs which have been excluded from decision making in international institutions for half a century. In such cases the dilemmas of new members could be phrased as follows – will the demands of domestic lobbies outweigh

foreign policy and security concerns. In other words, will agricultural subsidies be able to buy off the support of new members in “high politics” areas?

The history of American and European relations demonstrate that under the conditions of significant external threat (the Soviet Union), the transatlantic community was able to maintain stable and good relations without letting them being disturbed by the disagreements on agricultural subsidies, import duties and other trade related matters. Also, as the history of the EC/EU illustrates, cooperative efforts do not spill over so easily from the matters of economic regulatory and trade to the issues of security and defense. Relatively short history of transition reforms in acceding countries seems to provide the ground for arguing that security priorities determine economic policy decisions. However, when the “everyday politics” rather than historical decisions are being made short-term domestic interests might prevail. Then the members of a coalition of “instinctive Atlanticists” might join the coalition of “calculating protectionists”. Side-payments and socialization of the elites from new member states into the EU institutions might gradually change their pro-American preferences, in particular if the EU continues to base many of its projects by competitive comparison of itself to the US (“become the most competitive economy in the world”, as the main goal of the Lisbon strategy puts it meaning more competitive than the US, making the euro a global currency, etc.). However, it is still too early to forecast that such a change in preferences might spill-over from the common trade policy area to the security and defense issues which are based on a different mode of decision making.

In a place of conclusions

The simultaneous accession into the EU and NATO and the changing nature of these organizations create new important challenges for CEECs’ policy-makers. Remaining a good ally of both the US and partners in the EU when their preferences diverge will be a difficult task. It is still too early to make predictions regarding the similarities of societal values with the ones prevalent in America and Europe, because CEECs’ societal attitudes and values are still in the process of transition which takes longer than the reform of economic and political institutions. On the one hand, the experience of transition reforms makes some groups of population prone to take risks and make them similar to the Americans. On the other hand, still very strong attachment to the paternalistic state as evidenced by popular surveys might actually be reinforced by socializing with societies from the European countries with extensive welfare state.

With regard to the role of international institutions on which currently the attitudes of US administration and many EU member states diverge, new EU members will have difficulties choosing between unilateralists and

multilateralists. The official policy of CEECs has been in line with the multilateralist approach. This seems to be understandable taking into account the size and power of CEECs and the historic experience of being occupied by European powers. On the other hand, if it was not for the strong push of the US, the prospects of, for example, Baltic states's accession into NATO would be questionable. The unilateral actions of the US might still be supported by at least some new members if they are directed at liberating nations from the oppressive regimes only because of the relatively recent historical experiences of the CEECs.

The search for the solutions between different policy choices most often is going to take place in the everyday politics of coalitions. In the area of economic relations a number of factors ranging from the supranational decision making procedures to the easier possibilities for side-payments and issue-linkages would probably push the new members' policy makers closer to the position of France and other protectionists which often conflict with the US. In the field of security and defense matters the challenges are going to be most complex. Although it is in CEECs' interests to have a well functioning NATO and the US firmly interested in the European affairs and its neighborhood, the emerging EU defense structures create the potential for duplication, especially in the face of disagreements between the members of transatlantic community. Together with the new threats this is likely to facilitate directing the attention of the US to the other regions of the world.

To return to the main questions of this paper, several observations can be made about the impact of EU enlargement on the future of transatlantic relations. The enlargement will not create any significant immediate economic effects of US and EU commercial relations, although minor tensions are possible. In the long term, the enlargement might benefit American investors in the EU and strengthen incentives for cooperative transatlantic projects. The prospects of the latter will to a large extent depend on coalition politics in the EU. Closer economic integration into the EU, symbolic (and economic) significance of EU funding and daily socialization inside the joint institutions are likely to result in gradual convergence of new and old member economic policy preferences. On the other hand, different historical experiences and security concerns will preserve a strong interest of new members in maintaining the influence of the US in Europe and probably supporting its actions outside Europe. In general, the intergovernmental coalition politics will become more complex and the process of decision making slower thus making it a more difficult negotiating partner for the US. Although the international role of the EU will increase after the enlargement, the process of internal consensus building and decision making will become more complex, which in turn might reduce its capacity to act on international arena.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ This paper was prepared for the workshop „Transatlantic Relations ”What’s Next?”, organized by the Maxwell EU center of Syracuse University, University System of Georgia and EUSA in March 14-15, 2004. It presents work in progress, therefore, comments are welcome. I am grateful for the comments from the participants of the workshop and for providing the possibility to present it to its organizers and the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University.

² Probably the most well known example of such an approach is the work of Robert Kagan (see Kagan, R. *Paradise and Power*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

³ Hamilton, D. Foreword, Quinlan, J. P. *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy*, Washington, D. C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003, p. v.

⁴ This would be the line of the argument of the liberal intergovernmental approach (see Moravcsik, A. *The Choice for Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁵ Hamilton, D. Foreword, Quinlan, J. P. *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy*, Washington, D. C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003, p. v.

⁶ See Pelkmans, J., Casey, J. – P. *EU Enlargement: External Economic Implications*, BEEP Briefing No. 4, April 2003, p. 3-4.

⁷ Abbott, R. *EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Economic Relations*, presentation at the conference “Europe’s continuing enlargement: implications for transatlantic partnership”, John Hopkins University, Washington D. C., October 22, 2001.

⁸ Note of the European Commission, *Trade Implications of EU enlargement: Facts and Figures*, Brussels, 4 February 2004.

⁹ Pelkmans, J., Casey, J. – P. *EU Enlargement: External Economic Implications*, BEEP Briefing No. 4, April 2003, p. 6.

¹⁰ Some authors argue that at least in the short to medium run EU enlargement will not lead to agricultural trade diversion, although others seem to come up with an opposite conclusion (see Pelkmans, J., Casey, J. – P. *EU Enlargement: External Economic Implications*, BEEP Briefing No. 4, April 2003; Johnson, M., Rollo, J. *EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy: Enlargement and the Making of Commercial Policy*, Sussex: Sussex European Institute, SEI Working Paper No. 43, March 2001). Most agree, however, that in the long term there will be trade diversion, in particular, in beef, sugar and wheat imports from the US, Cairns group and Mercosur countries.

¹¹ For a brief review of these BITs related issues and the motivations behind them see Pelkmans, J., Casey, J. – P. *EU Enlargement: External Economic Implications*, BEEP Briefing No. 4, April 2003, p. 21-23.

¹² Top US firms prefer Eastern Europe as investment location, EUObserver, Brussels, 2004.02.19.

¹³ Braun, M. *EU Intergovernmental Politics after Enlargement*, Paper presented at the 8th Biennial International Conference of the EUSA, Nashville, March 27-29, 2003; Moravcsik, A., Vachudova, M. A., *National Interests, State Power and EU Enlargement, East European Politics and Society*, 2003, 17(1), p. 42-57.

¹⁴ Elgstrom, O. et al. *Coalitions in European Union Negotiations*, Scandinavian Political Studies, 2001, 24(2), p. 111-128.

¹⁵ Nordic Council to discuss enhanced cooperation // EUObserver, 09.10.2000, www.euobserver.com.

¹⁶ Grabbe, H. *Shaken to the Core*, Prospect, May 2003, p. 12-13.

¹⁷ Core Franco-German Union considered, EUObserver, 13.11.2003, www.euobserver.com.

¹⁸ See Commission of the EC, „European Governance“, A White Paper, Brussels, COM(2001) 428, 25.07.2001.

¹⁹ Similar argument on Poland and other acceding EU members' support for the US actions in Iraq is made in Geremek, B. Some remarks on Trans-Atlantic Convergences and Divergences, Center for Transatlantic Relations, and Sikorski, R. Losing the New Europe, in Washington Post, November 7, 2003.

²⁰ Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System on the European Union, in European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 7, 2002, p. 281.

²¹ See Grabbe, H. Shaken to the Core, in Prospect, May 2003, p. 12-13; Zaborowski, M., Longhurst, K. America's proteze in the East? The emergence of Poland as a regional leader, in International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 5, p. 1009-1028.

²² Menon, A., Lipkin, J. European attitudes towards transatlantic relations 2000-2003: an analytical survey, European Research Institute, 2003, p. 20.

LITHUANIA'S EUROPEAN POLICY AND ITS CO-ORDINATION

Klaudijus Maniokas

Introduction

The past several years were particularly important to Lithuania. Major objectives of Lithuania's foreign and domestic policy, which determined the agenda of the recent decade of the Government of Lithuania in a wider sense, were achieved. Lithuania concluded the negotiations on its membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO and became a member of these organisations. It is within this context that the question arises how the future priorities of Lithuania's domestic and foreign policy will further be defined, and especially what Lithuania's European policy may look like in the European Union.

Membership of the EU, as well as membership of NATO, were just the means for every country to achieve its objectives to be able to guarantee security and wellbeing of the citizens and the state. A broad political agreement, however, existed for a long time that membership of NATO would guarantee Lithuania's security, and membership of the EU would create conditions for promoting its wellbeing. Membership of the EU and NATO was and still is the most significant step towards security and wellbeing. However, it is not sufficient. It should be admitted that we did not join the organisations that we had sought to join. Recently the EU and NATO have changed considerably and keep on changing. The Treaty on the EU Constitution may decrease Lithuania's influence on the EU decision-making. Furthermore, the EU enlargement does not terminate – in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania may become its members, the prospect of the EU membership is promised to the Balkan countries, in 2005 Turkey may start negotiations on its membership¹. The present EU enlargement triggered an essential review of the trends in the EU policy. The agricultural policy and the cohesion policy are being restructured so that the expenses of the EU budget would not increase. Re-nationalisation of the cohesion policy is being discussed ever more often. Finally, there is quite a realistic possibility that in the long run the so-called core will form in the ever-enlarging EU, which will consist of the majority of the present old EU members.

All that encourages one to assess what Lithuania's policy in the EU may be based on. To be able to make the substantiated *ex-ante* assessment, first of all it is necessary to make clear what determines the European policy of the EU members. This is not a simple matter since the academic literature devoted to the EU tends to explain the results of European integration by assuming the positions of the Member States on the EU to be an independent variable, that is, a fixed factor, on the basis of which the development of integration is explained. In the recent decade a feedback, that is, the influence of the EU on the Member States, is considered in the europeanisation studies, which have become really popular. Projecting of national preferences of the EU States towards the EU level is still given insufficient attention.

The first part of this chapter will be devoted to the theoretical problem of the European policy of the Member States and will offer a synthetic model based on the typology of the EU issues being considered, as well as on different logic of formulating national preferences in relevant spheres. On the basis of this synthetic model the *ex-ante* assessment of Lithuania's European policy will be made.

Final conclusions are to be adjusted taking into account specific experience of the relations between Lithuania and other new Member States with the EU, the impact of preparation for the EU membership, as well as the institutional system of co-ordination of the EU affairs. In transposing the EU law, those sectors, whereby it was sought to correct the market failures and which have a particular importance to intergovernmental co-operation, were reorganised. However, the analysis of the EU impact obviously shows another thing as well: the EU hardly affected many of other essential functions of the state, such as social security, health, education, and law enforcement².

Analytical Schemes of the European Policy

The definition of the European policy is related to two difficulties. The first one is the definition of the context of the European policy. The European policy may be understood as the foreign policy of the state oriented towards the geographical area of Europe and the states within it. From this point of view the European policy may cover the relationship of some country with such states as Russia and Switzerland, which do not belong to the EU. The European policy may be also understood as relationship of the state that does not belong to the EU with the EU Member States and the EU as a regional arrangement. The European policy may also be called the whole of the positions of the Member States belonging to the EU on the issues of European integration and the issues considered by the EU³. It is in the latter meaning that the European policy will be considered further.

Another difficulty is of a conceptual nature and it is not so easily resolved. It is related to the qualification of the European policy. On the one hand, the European policy may be considered as a part of the foreign policy of the EU Member State related to common positions on the foreign policy of a relevant state and the factors determining it. On the other hand, the EU is a supranational arrangement having common institutions to which competence of the Member States is delegated in the spheres, which are traditionally regarded as domestic policy of the states. Thus, the definition of the subject of the European policy is related to the problem of the EU competence, its qualification and separation of the foreign and domestic policy⁴.

In respectively considering the European policy the problem of the level of the analysis and the means of investigation arises, which is well known as the problem of the EU conceptualisation in European studies (Risse-Kapen, 1996). On the one hand, the EU is an international arrangement in which the Member States play, if not the decisive then at least the essential role and analytical methods characteristic of studies of international relations are applied to the analysis of this arrangement. On the other hand, the EU is an embryonic political system (Eliassen, Andriesen, 1993; Hix, 1999) to which the means of the analysis of the comparative policy are applied. The school of multi-level governance tries to join both of these levels (Wallace, Wallace, 1996; Heritier, 1999). The definition of the European policy, as well as the level of its analysis, depends on the manner of the EU conceptualisation, and, in turn, the definition of the factors determining the European policy depend on the level of that analysis.

What Determines the European Policy

It is possible to look for the factors that determine the European policy of a Member State in two ways: by establishing those factors, which on the basis of certain theoretical schemes may determine the behaviour of the states within the European Union, and by making clear on what basis coalitions within the EU are formed. In the former case the factors would be deducted from general theoretical schemes, whereas in the latter case they would be induced from empirical studies, what actually supports the formation of an alliance of separate states and, accordingly, what common interests relate them.

The search for the factors determining differences in the European policy of separate states often become a problem of typologising the European policy. Though there is an agreement that it is impossible to identify permanent alliances or international blocks in the process of the formation of the EU policy, and that voting of the Member States depend on the specific issue under investigation (Wallace, Wallace, 1996), it is still quite often that attempts are made to find – at least as ideal types – certain cleavages of the European policy⁵. Cleavages of

North-South, atlanticism – continentalism, free trade and protectionism, a cleavage based on the methods of co-ordination of the European policy and capitalism types may serve as its examples (Middlem, 1995)⁶. These cleavages have an impact on relevant coalitions created by the Member States on their basis and show which factor decides in what way the Member States formulate their European policy.

These cleavages are related to selecting the level of the analysis of the European policy. It is obvious that the former relate to the level of the analysis of a national state, characteristic of the studies of international relations. A third and a fourth cleavage is characteristic of the analysis of the EU as a political system and is based on the specificity of the internal structure of the state.

The significance of cleavages in explaining the European policy of the states may depend not only on the level of the analysis but also on the nature of decisions adopted in the course of European integration. Recently the viewpoint that to explain different EU decisions different analytical schemes are necessary, which rest on different theoretical approaches, have become widespread (Peterson, Bomberg, 1999). In this way the so-called “historical” decisions and the decisions characteristic of an incremental formulation of the policy in the EU are distinguished. The latter are sometimes further divided into the decisions of a systemic level, which determine the policy, and the decisions of a sub-systemic level, which define and adjust the contexts of the policy (Peterson, Bomberg, 1999). Decisions on the direction, speed and nature of European integration, adopted in the intergovernmental negotiations at intergovernmental conferences are usually termed as historical decisions. Most often they acquire the character of decisions on amending founding treaties of the European Community and the EU. Most frequently they are explained on the basis of a liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1999). A multiple-level governance approach, which enables one to explain the role of non-governmental players and underlines a specific nature and logic of decision-making characteristic exceptionally of the EU is used to explain incremental decisions (Heritier, 1999).

The issue of cleavages is actually considered in literature devoted to the formation of coalitions during the EU decision-making process. However, reliable generalisations are lacking here. Knowledge about coalitions is often of an anecdotal nature and is not based on comparative empirical studies (Elgstrom, Johansson, Sannerstedt, 2001). As to the coalitions within the EU the statement that it is sought to achieve common agreement prevails (Peterson, Bomberg, 1999, 58) and that even in those cases where decisions are taken by a majority of votes, formally no voting takes place. It is also noted that following the Single European Act by consistently extending the voting of the qualified majority,

coalitions became more important⁷. Another important statement about coalitions within the EU is their instability. In other words, the conclusion that in forming the EU decisions permanent coalitions do not exist is widespread (Nugent, 1999).

The latest studies deny this conclusion (Elgstrom et al., 2001, 118). They present evidence that there still do exist permanent coalitions in the EU decision-making process, which are best reflected by the South-North cleavage, which is consolidated by the cleavage of the large and small states (Elgstrom et al., 2001, 126).

The Level of the National State: Autonomy and the Integration Dilemma

Considering the European policy within the context of studies of international relations and by means of this discipline, the national state is a natural level of the analysis. By the way, it is at this level that the problem of the definition of the European policy arises: despite the impact on non-governmental players on the European policy formation process, the European policy of the national state is being considered. In other words, the very subject of study is directly related to this level of analysis.

In making the analysis at this level, the European policy is considered as a part of the foreign policy of a state. Its objectives are defined by means of the conceptions of sovereignty and security, which become fundamental with respect to the European policy too. An illustrative example of the analysis of the European policy at this level is the analysis based on the conception of the integration dilemma (Petersen, 1996), which deserves a more thorough discussion.

N. Petersen constructs his theoretical scheme on the basis of the theory of adaptation, which was developed in the sphere of studies of international relation by J. Rosenau (1970) and H. Mouritzen (1988). It is based on the conception of the states as rational players of the international system that seek to achieve a balance between society, that is, the internal environment and its external environment, seeking "to secure an adequate functioning of social structures in a situation of growing interdependence" (Petersen, 1998, 37). By analogy with the security dilemma in alliances discussed in the studies on international security, Petersen calls this problem of balance and its solution within the context of European integration the *integration dilemma*. Its essence lays in that a state with European integration going on – as in the international system, on the whole, – seeks to increase its power. Seeking to increase its power, it has to take an active part in integration, which is based on full or partial transfer of competence of a Member State to the EU institutions and making use of the possibilities raised by a "pulled sovereignty". On the other hand, the objective

of the foreign policy of a state is to protect its sovereignty to which European integration poses a direct threat (Petersen, 1996, 35). Hence, every state, which takes part in European integration, has to resolve a dilemma arising due to two opposing objectives of its foreign policy, in this specific case those of the European policy.

By making use of the same theory of adaptation it is maintained that the foreign policy of a state, consequently, the European policy also, depends on the possibilities of a state to exert influence and on its sensitivity to an external pressure. It is a combination of these two factors that defines the integration strategy of a state accordingly. This may be the strategy of dominance, when the possibilities of influence are great and sensitivity to an external pressure is low, the balance strategy – when both the influence and sensitivity are great, the acquiescence strategy – when both the influence and sensitivity are small, and the quiescence strategy – when the influence is small and sensitivity is great. For each strategy different types of the implementation of that strategy are distinguished and possible (Petersen, 1996, 42).

Typologising of integration strategies based on the integration dilemma, which can be identified with the types of the European policy, has an undoubted value due to its simplicity, clearness and relationship with the metaphor of a two-level game (Putnam, 1988). However, it also has several serious drawbacks, which are partly characteristic of the studies of international relations. First of all, this analysis is based on the structural definition of a state's interests. This means that solution of the integration dilemma depends on the assessment of the static position of a state in the international system. This scheme cannot explain the dynamics of the European policy of separate Member States and, accordingly, the internal factors are not taken into consideration. Therefore it is possible to maintain that the analysis based on the integration dilemma may be applied to analysing general positions of a state with respect to the European integration, especially in explaining the so-called historical (Peterson, Bomberg, 1999; Moravcsik, 1999) decisions of European integration adopted in the negotiations of the large Member States on amending the founding treaties. However, this scheme is difficult to apply to explaining the behaviour of a Member State when incremental changes are taking place, which are characteristic of the EU (Richardson, 1996).

Suitability of this level of the analysis to the analysis of the European policy depends on what the role of the EU is and will be in international relations, and, on the whole, on the extent to which the issues related to security of the states constituting the European Union will be resolved in the EU itself. Specifically this is related to maturity of the EU foreign and security policy, as well as its defence policy.

Another cleavage, which is used to explain the behaviour of the Member States in the EU decision-taking process, is also related to the perspective of international relations. The cleavage of Atlanticism and Continentalism is often defined on the basis of the viewpoint of the role of the US in the international security system. Though this cleavage could not play a decisive role at the time incremental European integration was going on – the Communities had no competence in this issue – it was and still is sufficiently significant in defining and explaining the common positions of the Member States on integration. Due to frequency of package deals in the EU policy making process (Wallace, Wallace, 1996) and the coincidence of this cleavage with other cleavages, such as the one based on the definition of the objectives of European integration, it has a certain impact on establishing the European policy of separate states. On the other hand, this influence is difficult to document and it is difficult to assess what its role in adopting both historical and increment decisions characteristic of the policy formulating process is.

Significance of Differences in Economic and Institutional Development of a State

In explaining the European policy of separate states it is often stated that it depends on the difference in the level of economic development of the states (Middlem, 1995). According to this criterion, when applying the analogy to a relevant line of conflict of the international policy, the conflict between the North and the South in the European Union is meant, where the South is related to the so-called cohesion states, that is, the states, which make use of the assistance from the EU structural funds. Similar from the geographical point of view is the cleavage of the EU budgetary donors and recipients based on the balance of payments to and from the EU budget. This cleavage has been given great attention in recent years because it is related to the EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe due to which differences in the economic development within the EU will increase considerably.

Journalists have addressed this theme quite often. Academic attempts to discuss the influence of the economic development of a state on its European policy are scarce. One of them is relating the economic development of a state to the level of regulatory policy and the development of its institutional infrastructure in a Member State (Borzel, 2002).

The theoretical basis of this attempt is the so-called europeanisation studies rather than traditional theories of European integration seeking to explain the results of European integration. Those studies are concerned with diametrically opposite process – the impact of European integration on a national state and the institutions functioning within it⁸. They are based on institutional theories

and consider under what conditions and how the processes going on at the EU level affect national institutions⁹.

The basic analytical scheme used to explain europeanisation is the so-called degree of goodness of fit¹⁰. It is based on the trivial truth of the common sense that changes take place when there is a certain inadequacy. In this case it is the inadequacy between the policy induced by the decisions adopted at the EU level, as well as institutions, and the internal institutional context of the national state. This inadequacy is related not only to europeanisation but also to the projecting of preferences of the Member States towards to EU level studied by the main theories of European integration, which forms the subject of investigation of the present study too.

To explain projecting of preferences in the studies underlining the importance of institutions the same principle of the degree of goodness of fit or inadequacy formulated as the universal principle of behaviour of a national state in the EU is applied. Its essence is to project towards the EU level such preferences, which would reduce the degree of inadequacy of the EU and the national level as much as possible. In other words, it is stated that the Member States formulate their European policy and are for such decisions at the EU level, which would minimise possible changes at a national level (Heritier, 1996). Furthermore, the Member States do not only avoid changes but also – even to a greater extent – seek to device their national regulatory system or a certain policy at the EU level seeking to gain economic and political benefit¹¹.

Such an explanation of the European policy seems to be suitable to the explanation of the European policy of the Member States in the environmental sphere. Furthermore, it seems to be well founded in the sphere of the regulatory policy.

Towards the Synthetic Definition of the European Policy

The above-presented models of the definition and explanation of the European policy are limited in that they cover only a part of policies of a Member State with respect to European integration and the EU. In other words, they are suitable only to explaining the policy of a certain type. Therefore, to be able to thoroughly list the factors determining the European policy of a Member State a synthetic model of the search for causality of the European policy based on different types of the EU public policy and logic of formulating relative national preferences is necessary. Such a model is presented below.

On the basis of this model insights related to a possible nature of the European policy of Lithuania will be presented. They cannot make claims to being exhaustive and comprehensive. However, they may render a clearer direction to a further discussion about Lithuania's European policy. Since a

Type of policy	Level of analysis	Logic of causality
Constitutional policy/ Institutional issues	National state	Integration dilemma
Regulatory policy	Internal structure	Institutional compatibility and economic development, interest groups
Redistributive policy	State, municipal level	Economic development, interest groups
Stabilisation policy	State level	Economic development and peculiarities of the monetary policy
Justice and home affairs	State level/ internal structure	Economic development/ institutional compatibility, geopolitical situation
Foreign and security policy	State level	Integration dilemma/ geopolitical situation

detailed analysis of Lithuania's current policy in these spheres is necessary to discuss the stabilisation, justice and home, as well as the foreign policy, and the relative spheres are rather specific, only the issues related to the EU constitutional structure, the regulatory and redistribution policy will be discussed below.

The issues of how, according to the type of the public policy, the influence of the policy makers affects the results of the policy change is to be discussed separately, however, it will not be studied in detail because it lies beyond the scope of this book. One can point out only to the fact that the role of the domestic interest groups on the issues of the EU structure and the foreign policy should be rather limited. Their influence should be pronounced in the spheres of regulation and redistribution.

***National Co-ordination and the European Policy:
Ambitiousness, Positivism, Compatibility
and the Dilemma of Foreign/Domestic Policy***

Attempts to link the European policy of the Member States with the mechanisms of national co-ordination of the European policy are related to the institutional viewpoint of the policy making¹². However, the studies on national co-ordination of the policy seek to explain the impact of the national co-ordination mechanism on the effectiveness of the European policy of a state more than on its content. Therefore the question on how and to what extent different national co-ordination mechanisms make it possible to adopt the decision on the EU level, which would as much as possible conform with the national preferences remains largely unaddressed.

The variety of national co-ordination mechanisms is usually contained in the typology of decentralised and centralised systems (Middlem, 1995). The place of the central co-ordinator is important in the centralised systems – he is usually either in the department of foreign affairs or in the institutions directly related to the Prime Minister, and also a formal or informal character of decision-making, which often depends on the traditions of a specific state (Kassim, Peters, Wright, 2002). Moreover, the national systems of co-ordination of the European affairs differ in the degree of involvement of national parliaments or politicisation of the European affairs on the whole.

The variety of co-ordination systems is accounted for by many factors – beginning with the state system, reflected in a number of national veto points, features of the administrative system, political culture, etc. (Wright, 1996). It should be noted that due to the abundance of decisions being adopted by the EU, the increasing competence of the EU and the importance of the issues being resolved at the EU level, the national policy is noticeably forced to create new systems of co-ordination of the EU affairs or to review the already existing ones (Kassim, Peters, Wrights, 2002). The need to adjust to the EU decision-making system, learning and copying of successful co-ordination models reinforce tendencies for convergence of co-ordination models. However, in this sphere, like in many others, the europeanisation studies bring out differences in co-ordination that are still in existence (Kassim, Peters, Wright, 2002,10).

Efficiency of national co-ordination may be assessed both for projecting the national preferences at the EU level and for the implementation of the decisions adopted. Speaking more specifically, the ability of co-ordination systems, firstly, to foresee the new EU law-making initiatives and their possible impact on the national scale, secondly, to exert an impact on the EU political agenda and to allocate the available resources accordingly, thirdly, to rapidly and smoothly transpose the EU law into the national legal acts and, fourthly, to implement the EU law (Wright, 1996) is distinguished. The results of different studies indicate that centralised co-ordination models are usually more efficient (Wright, 1996; Menon, 1995; Varheijein, 1996), especially at the level of transposition and implementation; however, this depends on other factors as well (Kassim, 2002). Also, it is stated that the centre may be inactive and it can only restrict the initiatives of some ministries and departments. Furthermore, the centralised system is usually inflexible, and thus unable to rapidly respond to the situation changing at the EU level and to the style of the EU decision-making (Kassim, 2002). Due to this the centralised system also has many advantages, especially taking into account the systemic results of the European policy of a longer time period. It can be maintained that it is more in line with the fragmental, hardly forecasted, non-transparent nature of formulating the EU policy (Wright, 1996).

The choice of co-ordination models and their efficiency depend to a great extent on the level of the co-ordination ambition: on the fact whether a state carries out or intends to carry out the pro-active European policy on the entire “front” of the issues being considered in the EU, and on the positive nature of the European policy being pursued. In the first case the stimuli to co-ordinate in a centralised way are great, however, they do not always manifest themselves. The best example of the scantiness of this tendency is the decentralised co-ordination system of Germany, the formation of which was strongly influenced by the federal state order and the abundance of institutional veto points (Derlien, 2002). The states, which play the role of an observer of many issues being considered by the EU should have fewer stimuli to create the centralised co-ordination system. However, there are exceptions here too, which are determined by such factors as the nature of the political and administrative system. For example, in Denmark the existence of a centralised model, characterised by a great role of the parliament, may be explained by the peculiarities of the political system, typical of the government of the minority. Moreover, it can be stated that due to human and financial resources the problem of co-ordination becomes much more urgent for small states than for the large EU Member States, even if they deliberately focus attention on a limited number of issues. Seeking to exert influence on the EU decision-making, they are made to seek how to use the limited resources optimally and centralised co-ordination is highly necessary for that. Finland serves as a good example of such understanding of the problem and its centralised solution. Centralisation tendencies have been observed in Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

The positive or a negative nature of the European policy is also an important factor determining the form of the co-ordination system. Especially serious co-ordination tasks are set to the states whose integration agenda is negative (Kassin, Peters, Wright, 2002, 13). This need is on the increase when, in adopting the EU decisions, the tendencies of majoritarianism, which will become stronger after the Treaty on the EU Constitution has come to force, strengthen (Peterson, Bomberg, 1999, 51-52; Emmanouilidis, Fisher, 2003).

Looking for a link between the model of co-ordination of the European affairs and the contents of the European policy, a third important factor is compatibility of the national co-ordination system with the EU decision-making system. A fourth factor, which can explain the influence of the co-ordination system on the contents of the European policy is its definition on the axis of the co-ordinates of the foreign/domestic policy.

Compatibility is a pressing problem of europeanisation (Maniokas, 2003), and the studies on co-ordination is not an exception. The conclusion that is common in the studies of europeanisation of the public policy is drawn there that the efficiency of co-ordination of the European policy depends on whether

the principles of formulating the EU policy are compatible with: 1) the constitutional structure of the Member State; 2) the public policy of the Member State; 3) the “political climate”, which is defined as a whole of political objectives, 4) administrative structures and to what extent (Wright, 1996). The degree of compatibility may change depending on the sector of policy or even on the issues under consideration, therefore generalising conclusions are rather complicated. However, some of them can be drawn nonetheless.

First of all, there are some systemic consequences of adoption of one or another co-ordination models. It is stated that due to centralised co-ordination, decision making in the EU becomes more difficult, whereas due to decentralised co-ordination a further movement in the direction of European integration becomes easier (Kassim, 2002, 257). Some authors underline that European integration progressed so far only because the coordination of European affairs in Germany is decentralised (Wessels, 1997). In other words, one can claim that the centralised co-ordination model determines the nationalistic or more nationalistic European policy, which can render the formation of coalitions in the EU decision-making process much more difficult. On the other hand, decentralised systems, which gives more weight to the very fact of the adoption of a EU decision than to its contents, consequently, to its link with the national interests, may be assessed in different ways. It can be especially undesirable in the case where interests of a Member State differ from the interests of the majority of other states, that is, in the case where the basis for a behaviour of a Member State should be blocking rather than stimulating the decisions.

Those European affairs co-ordination systems in which the main role is played by the foreign affairs departments seem to make a similar systematic impact on national preferences too. Irrespective of the fact whether a system is centralised or not, due to the central role played by the foreign affairs departments more attention is devoted to a positive creation of alliances, the search for partners seeking to adopt one or another decision at the EU level. Dominance of a foreign affairs department in co-ordinating the European affairs may encourage a positive EU agenda and the European policy, which is oriented towards an agreement at the EU level rather than towards the national interest.

The degree of politicisation of the system of the European Affairs also has a certain impact on the European policy. Though it is recognised that the main role in the European affairs is played by the executive power, and at the level of the executive power – by the officials of the medium and high level involved in the administrative transnational networks of the European policy¹³, in some states the political power and national parliaments, in particular, still exert a sufficiently great influence on co-ordination of the European affairs¹⁴. Though to make valid generalisations concerning this issue empirical studies

systematically investigating relationship between involvement of a parliament into the European affairs and the contents of the European policy are lacking, cases studies and the example of the European policy of Denmark (Petersen, 1996) enable one to state, that politicisation of the European affairs also may encourage the European policy, which is more oriented towards national interests rather than towards a search for common solutions at the EU level.

This tendency depends on the public opinion about European integration. It is confirmed by its almost universal scepticism of the recent decade.

The European affairs co-ordination systems of the new members distinguish themselves by several unique features. First, they were created for co-ordinating preparation for the EU membership and the negotiations. Second, they depended on the established co-ordination and administration traditions to a lesser extent than the same co-ordination systems of the Member States. Third, the negotiation process "programmed" them for identification and representation of national interests.

The status and dominance of adjustment of the new members to the EU policy encouraged and keeps on encouraging the new Member States to pay more attention at best to transposition of "the best practice" or, at worst, and it seems to be most often the case, to a simple imitation without going deep into the peculiarities of the adjustment practice. Tendencies of learning, imitating and copying in these states are stronger than in the old Member States where dependence on the established administrative and political practice has a greater importance¹⁵. On the other hand, a weaker dependence on national traditions in the new Member States stimulated innovation and made the interpretations of transposition of the "best practice" easier adapting them to the increase of powers of dominating institutions or the implementation of their own (political or institutional) objectives. Finally the process of preparing for membership and the negotiations oriented the co-ordination models towards transposition and implementation of the EU law rather than towards the impact on the decisions adopted at the EU level.

At present it is too early to draw final conclusions about specificity of the EU affairs co-ordination models in the new Member States only due to the fact that their adaptation to the new membership conditions is still going on¹⁶. However, with the preparation going on the co-ordination models created in the new Member States distinguished themselves by a more pronounced centralisation and a greater role of the Prime Minister (Maniokas, 1998; Nakrošis, 2003). After the negotiations had been concluded the candidate countries reviewed the co-ordination models, however, nearly in all of them it was possible to notice continuity, which testified to an increasing dependence on the administrative traditions being formed. The status of the European Affairs

Ministers may be considered as a unique peculiarity of the adapted co-ordination systems. Though such a peculiarity of co-ordination of the European policy is characteristic of the majority of the old Member States, it was noticed that the European Affairs ministers in all old Member States are “the younger” foreign affairs ministers and actually do not play the role of the main co-ordinator (Kassim, 2002, 238). From the administrative point of view the European Affairs Ministers in three new Member States are related to the Prime Minister rather than to the Foreign Affairs Minister, and are main co-ordinators¹⁷.

Features of Lithuania's European Policy and its Co-ordination

Seeking to assess the peculiarities of Lithuania's European policy according to the above-presented scheme it is necessary to take into consideration Lithuania's experience of preparing for membership, experience of the negotiations, as well as that short time period when Lithuania participated as an observer in the EU decision-making process¹⁸. Special attention should be paid to Lithuania's participation in the work of the Convention related to the EU Constitution, and to subsequent intergovernmental conference. Another important factor in assessing possible peculiarities of Lithuania's European policy is the definition of Lithuania's domestic agenda.

It is not only the EU decisions that Lithuania's EU accession will depend on. Therefore the definition of the domestic agenda of Lithuania should play a decisive role here too. Nonetheless, the EU was and will continue to be a very serious factor to exert influence on the implementation of any domestic agenda¹⁹.

Orientation towards the requirements for the EU membership determined extensive and profound changes in Lithuania. Despite their extensiveness, the EU impact on Lithuania and other states of Central and Eastern Europe in the sphere of politics are mainly related to the changes in the regulatory policy and the formulation and implementation of its infrastructure (Vilpišauskas, 2002; Maniokas, 2003). The social sphere, or the so-called welfare infrastructure, and maintenance of the internal order, as well as law enforcement in Lithuania further remain poorly developed. Thus far it has not been clear whether the creation of such infrastructure would become an important element of Lithuania's domestic policy, however, there is no doubt that – with or without a certain reflection – the EU membership will bring back, first and foremost, Lithuania, as well as other states of Central and Eastern Europe to the “normal” public policy, which finds social affairs much more important than during the period of an intensive preparation for the EU membership, and the issues of the EU policy itself will more seldom become the subject of intense internal political discussions. On the whole it is believed that the time period of preparing for the EU membership, which lasted for nearly a decade, caused certain

“integration *fatigue*”, which may be much stronger than fascination of participating in the EU decision-making process. Paradoxically as it may sound, during the first years of the EU membership attention of the public and the politicians to the European affairs may flag, it may be overshadowed by the attention devoted to the analysis of changes in prices and similar things that are of paramount importance to the citizens. With the administration becoming more and more involved in the EU affairs, a rather paradoxical “dulling” effect might be produced. The need to take part in various EU decision-making institutions is so great, and the possibilities to select the matters that are of the paramount importance to Lithuania are so faint that it may cause disillusionment with the efficiency of an active participation in the EU decision-making process²⁰.

Regulation and Re-distribution: the Status Quo Policy

Both political and institutional *fatigue* and specific interests in the sphere of regulation and re-distribution spheres will encourage Lithuania to choose the *status quo* policy. Lithuania, like other new EU Member States, should oppose changes and seek to maintain its current EU redistributive policy (cohesion, agriculture)²¹, as well as the current regulatory regime in the spheres related to the internal market. Furthermore, our economic entities often find the present regulation of the EU internal market too difficult, too much oriented towards the needs of a safe and wealthy consumer society. This regulation, however, may become even more intense thus seeking to reduce competitive edges of the new Member States. This may entail a negative attitude to a further development the *acquis* of the EU environmental protection, minimal standards of consumer and product safety. The same should be said about the issues of tax harmonisation (taxation of energy products), environmental issues (stricter indicators of package processing, electronic waste, further restrictions on emissions of volatile compounds), as well as issues of mandatory increase in oil and gas reserves dominating the immediate EU regulatory agenda. The coalition of the *status quo* states is likely to be against a more intense regulation in the EU, which is characterised by a poorer economic development and also a partly ideological position to put a stop to further integration. In the event of failure to form such a broad blocking coalition, and this can be precluded either by the new EU decision-making rules provided for in the Treaty on the EU Constitution rendering decision-making easier, or by a threat of the prospect of closer co-operation – in the regulatory policy sphere, by maximising various exemptions and transitional periods, Lithuania may become “a footnote state”.

The extent of institutional compatibility and interests of the Member States to transpose their own regulatory regime to the EU level often define the nature of the European policy in the regulatory policy sphere. Passivity of

Lithuania and other new members in this sphere will be encouraged even more by the fact that since economic regulation is not characteristic of these states, so there will be simply nothing to transpose to the EU level. It was by the increase in the scope and intensity of regulation, which was not based on compatibility of the EU and the internal policy as well as structures, that the EU effect in these states manifested itself (Maniokas, 2003; Vilpišauskas, 2002). Hence, Lithuania may try to “transpose” into the EU only the desire to de-regulate. It is well known that for such “transposition” to take place it must be understood as the national interest based on preserving competitiveness of economic entities of Lithuania.

On the other hand, these national preferences based on material needs, institutional compatibility and, among other things, integration *fatigue*, may be adjusted by two factors related to the bureaucratic policy. One of them is a real and perceived necessity to demonstrate the active and positive “pro-European” policy, thus ensuring the status of a “good European”. The importance of this factor may increase provided that in co-ordinating the European affairs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is given a more significant role. Furthermore, the institutions, which were often created or reformed under pressure from the EU and which are still dependant on the European Commission with respect to information or even resources may encourage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to play an active role in the EU regulatory policy²². Besides, it should be remembered that for at least some time there will be political and institutional inertia, which will encourage the imitative behaviour rather than the behaviour oriented towards aggregation and representation of national interests.

Low level of the economic development, as compared with the EU states, dictates Lithuania’s interests that are obvious in the re-distributive policy. However, even here the final result may not be a positive policy oriented towards a greater re-distribution at the EU level but the aspiration to preserve one’s *status quo*. Can Lithuania’s interests with respect to the EU policy and the European policy formulated on their basis be really defined by the slogans “put a stop to integration” and “receive more money from the EU”? In essence, yes, though this depends on the conditions of applying this money. However, a part of Lithuania’s European policy nonetheless can and must be positive. This is determined by Lithuania’s material interests, and the need for a broad coalition of the *status quo* states, which may be maintained having included weighty elements of the positive agenda.

It is difficult to list all the elements of Lithuania’s positive European policy, however, Lithuania’s geographical position, the level of the economic development and the structure of the institutional state and separate spheres of

the public policy will enable some elements of the positive policy to come into existence.

A peripheral geographical position of Lithuania and its relatively poor economic development will encourage a rather natural aspiration, which may be defined as the reduction of Lithuania's provinciality. For the economic entities of Lithuania to be able to make use of the advantages of the EU internal market better interconnections of infrastructure with the neighbouring EU countries, especially Poland, are necessary. First of all this relates to physical interconnections of transport and energy. However, it is only a strong and solid support from the EU and the European Commission that is able to stir up the famous interconnection projects²³.

The geographical position determines and is likely to determine Lithuania's active participation in formulating and implementing the new policy of the EU neighbours, which has already become a part of Lithuania's positive agenda. In this sphere, on the one hand, Lithuania and other states of this region will have to seek to achieve from the EU a favourable balance between its attention to the new neighbours in the South and in the East. On the other hand, due to its role in this sphere Lithuania will have to compete or co-operate with Poland and other countries of Central Europe and even with the Baltic States²⁴.

The spheres, which are new to the EU itself, and in which the method of open co-ordination rather than the Community method works may be put on the positive agenda of Lithuania. Lithuania's policy in the spheres "covered" by the *acquis*, especially in those related to the internal market, should be conservative or even de-regulation-oriented. Lithuania's position may be much more active in the new EU spheres in which the Union may undertake co-ordination, additional or supporting actions. In these spheres Lithuania's interests are based not only on economic but sooner on institutional interests related to Lithuania's present experience of the EU integration. It is in these spheres in which the EU had devised its own rules and exerted pressure on Lithuania that reforms were carried out most rapidly. The external pressure exerted by the EU in these spheres helped overcome or weaken resistance of the internal groups of interests to changes. Unfortunately, there was no such pressure in the majority of public policy areas and they changed but little. The EU competence in the new spheres, such as justice and home affairs (in these spheres application of the Community method is extended), health care, education, culture, administrative co-operation, may help Lithuania move forward, if the examples of the best practice rather than quantitatively expressed guidelines are actually followed.

Such a definition of institutional interests taking into consideration the factors determining the formulation of the European policy in the EU seems contradictory. The Member States seek to reduce a possible pressure to change

in the regulatory policy and on the institutional issues, and they formulate their European policy on these issues so that institutional compatibility should be as small as possible. However, the opposite strategy is also possible. The aim to initiate internal changes by the decisions of the EU level is not frequent, however, it is observed in the behaviour of the Member States too²⁵. To make the internal restructuring of these spheres easier it is not necessary to seek to extend the EU exceptional or partial competence. It would suffice to develop co-operation based on transposition of the best practice, observation, and co-operation programs. As has already been mentioned, this could make it easier to pursue the main goal of the domestic policy – to create a modern welfare state, modernising for that purpose the law enforcement institutions or the health care system using pressure from the outside and measures of the open co-ordination method provided by the EU. In other words, this would be a conscious continuation of the current practice, which aimed at initiating domestic change via Brussels.

To a great extent reality of such a policy will depend on the definition of the internal policy agenda and learning of political and administrative leaders to “master Brussels” as a means to overcome internal opposition, which resists reforms, as well as on the abilities and the desire to implement it in practice.

Economic interests related to making use of the competitive edges of our economic entities in the EU, may be associated with certain elements of the positive agenda at the EU level. The Lisbon process seems to be of use for that purpose. However, this requires a conscious policy because the so-called Lisbon agenda is rather contradictory and ambiguous with respect to its objectives and measures²⁶.

Constitutional Issues and the Foreign Policy: Integration Dilemma in Lithuania

It is easier to assess Lithuania's position on the constitutional issues than its position on the issues of redistributive and the regulatory policy. Lithuania, like other new Member States, since the very beginning have taken part in the work of the Convention²⁷ leading to the new Treaty on the EU Constitution, and in the intergovernmental conference (IGC) that started following it. In the IGC the new members had the same rights as the EU Member States.

First and foremost, it should be noted that neither at the Convention nor at the intergovernmental conference a separate block of the new Member States was formed. This again confirms the fact that the economic development of the states by which the new members distinguish themselves has no influence whatsoever on the position of the Member States on the institutional issues, which aroused heated discussions at the Convention and at the intergovernmental

conference, or its influence is insignificant and dependent on other factors, which determine the coalition. On the basis of the integration dilemma the size of a state or the “shadow” of the previous agreements had to determine the position of the Member States on the institutional issues on the solution of which division of power in the EU depends.

Seeking to establish to what extent Lithuania's position at the intergovernmental conference was determined by its size and the integration dilemma, it is possible to discuss only one, however, essential issue that was considered at the intergovernmental conference. This issue was the definition of voting of the qualified majority at the Council. Its importance is illustrated by the fact that it caused the greatest disagreements between the present and future EU Member States and due to it no agreement was reached till the very European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003. Its importance becomes clear taking into consideration the fact that the list of the spheres in which decisions are adopted by the qualified majority is being consistently extended in the Treaty on the EU Constitution. The Single European Act started this process, and then the Maastricht Treaty, and later the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties continued it.

It was not by chance that this issue stirred up so many emotions. It is indeed essential to the entire functioning of the new EU. The definition of the qualified majority²⁸ proposed within the context of the new EU Constitution, which has been prepared by the Convention, provides for a radical decision-making reform, which may replace the established character of the EU as a consensual democracy. It is rather complicated to precisely assess the degree of radicalism of these changes, however, decisions in the enlarged EU may be adopted more often by the majority of votes rather than by mutual agreement. To crown it all, the largest EU States will readily constitute the majority. Since all the new EU members, with the exception of Poland, belong to the small and medium states, their influence on the EU decision-making may be really insignificant (Baldwin, Widgren, 2003).

Calculating the power indices accordingly, following the provisions of the Nice Treaty on this issue had to be more beneficial for Lithuania and many other small and medium new EU Member States than the formulation provided by the Convention. Furthermore, Lithuania, due to the above-mentioned differences in the level of economic development had to be interested to maintain as many as possible possibilities to block the decisions adopted by the qualified majority where such a manner of voting most often was applied – in the sphere of the internal market. It was, however, only Poland and Spain that were unambiguously for it and defended it. Both at the Convention and at the intergovernmental conference Lithuania was for a double formula of the qualified

majority, which was favourable to it with respect to the balance of power²⁹. It is true, later Lithuania's position became more rigid, it supported the formula 60 : 60 and even mentioned the Nice Treaty³⁰, however, Lithuania did not join Poland and Spain.

Experience of the institutional issues of the negotiations allows the role of "the logic of appropriatedness", "integration *fatigue*" and bureaucratic policy in formulating Lithuania's European policy to be assessed. When analysing the formation of Lithuania's position at the Convention and the intergovernmental conference it becomes clear that Lithuania based its position on the need to take part in the most important EU processes rather than to present its certain national interests³¹, it tried not to create any difficulties to the EU decision-making process, or, on the whole, sought to form an impression of being a nation of good Europeans³². Socialisation, learning, "adequate" behaviour were more important than formulating national interests and representing them. Conditions for such logic of "appropriatedness" to prevail were formed because attention of the public to the debates about the EU Constitution was limited.

The above-mentioned elements of the bureaucratic policy influenced such a position. The fact that a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented the Government and the parliament was represented by the Chairman of the European Affairs Committee³³, also contributed to the fact that Lithuania's position was determined by the desire to maintain and establish new friendly relations with the representatives of other EU Member States rather than the desire to maintain the blocking power as great as possible.

Conclusions

It is difficult to assess the future European Policy of Lithuania because of insufficient theoretical work that has been done in this sphere. Having summed up literature it is seen that many assessments of the European policy of the present EU Member States are based on random empirical examples, which are non-systematic and have no clear comparative perspective. Assessments based on theories have another drawback as well – they are able to explain the formulation of the European policy of the Member States on different items of the EU agenda. Therefore a synthetic scheme was used to make an *ex-ante* assessment of Lithuania's European policy, which in different spheres was based on different logic of formulating the national European policy.

The assessment made on the basis of such a synthetic scheme shows that Lithuania's European policy and the sphere of the regulatory and redistributive policy should be characterised as the *status quo* policy. However, the possibility of the pro-active European policy of Lithuania is also observed, which is determined by the aim to reduce Lithuania's provinciality as well as the factors encouraging to carry out the internal reforms. The impact of the latter factor is

rather ambiguous: though the position of a state with respect to the regulatory policy is characterised by the goal to reduce institutional incompatibility, in cases where it is difficult to carry out internal reforms in certain spheres due to the power balance between the supporters and opponents of the reform, the formulators of the national European policy in Lithuania may have serious incentives to extend the EU competence³⁴.

This conclusion is based on the supposition that Lithuania's European policy will be formulated rationally, that is, taking into consideration national interests and the capability to implement them properly. However, the factors related to "integration *fatigue*" and the bureaucratic policy can adjust it. The importance of the latter will depend to a great extent on what influence the institutions in charge of the foreign affairs will have on the formulation of Lithuania's European policy. Their greater role will mean that the impact of symbolic factors and legitimisation logic is greater and thus Lithuania's European policy is more active. Lithuania's participation in the intergovernmental conference allows us to maintain that these factors at least in the first year of the EU membership may have a considerable impact. This means that Lithuania will at least at the beginning be neither an active nor towards national interests orientated player. Hence, though being interested in blocking many of the EU decisions, Lithuania is likely to do that during the first year of membership rarely and only in exceptional cases.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ See European Commission, 2003.

² For more information about the EU impact on Lithuania and other CEEC states see Maniakas, 2003.

³ According to the ambiguity of the definition the concept of the European policy may be compared to the term of europeanisation. See Maniakas, 2003, 71; Radaelli, 2000.

⁴ It is appropriate to recall the discussion that was held in Lithuania in the summer of 2003 about what the EU policy is; it started in solving the institutional issues of co-ordination of the EU affairs in Lithuania. This discussion clearly shows the relationship between the EU competence, the contents of the EU policy and the institutional infrastructure of its formation.

⁵ Similarly to the conception of the cleavage used in the comparative policy (Allum, 1995).

⁶ The conception of the cleavage implies sustainability of conflicts defined by cleavages and their real influence on the behaviour of a Member State within the EU. Therefore doubts may arise with respect to that though it is difficult to prove a direct relationship between relevant cleavages and, for example, voting of the Member States in the Council on one or another specific issue.

⁷ Also, it is noted that despite all this, decisions adopted by the qualified majority did not become decisions of "the lowest common denominator" and that the European Commission and groups of active states may have a great influence on the decisions (Wallace, 1996; 60; Borzel, 2002).

⁸ For the Review of Europeanisation Studies, see Maniakas, 2003. The synthesis of their results is presented in Borzel, Risse, 200. One of the best examples of theoretically informed empirical studies is Heritier, 2001. The current situation in the europeanisation investigation was well defined at the ECPR Conference devoted to europeanisation, which was held in

Melbourne on 18-21 September 2003. For the proceedings of the Conference see www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr.

⁹ It is true, one can hardly speak about a common theory of institutions. Historical, rational and sociological institutionalism differs greatly in its preconditions and methods.

¹⁰ See Borzel, Cowles, Risse, 2000.

¹¹ Such motives are presented in the article by Borzel, 2002. She gives an illustrative example of the environmental policy. In formulating the environmental policy the Member States, which pursue a developed environmental regulatory policy, seek to make the competitive conditions even for their undertakings, by extending such regulation at a level of the whole EU and thus raising the production costs for the undertakings of all EU Member States. Moreover, in this way the states seek to make use of the technological advantages of their undertakings acquired after having adapted themselves to certain regulation.

¹² Middlem, 1955; Wright, 1996; Bulmer, 1996; Weesels, Rometsch, 1996; Kassim, Menon, 1996; Hanf, Soetendorp, 1998; Kassim, Peters, Wright, 2002.

¹³ The hypothesis of "merging" of the administrative elite is used to bring out the role of these networks (Wessels, Rometsch, 1996, Moravcsik, 1994).

¹⁴ Denmark is the best and most often given example whose parliament formulates the mandate compulsory to the Government without which the Government cannot assume any obligations at the EU level. Such an involvement of parliament is accounted for by the tradition of the minority government. Similar obligations are characteristic of parliaments of Austria and Sweden. The House of Commons of Great Britain carries out a rather effective and serious scrutiny of the European affairs. Moreover, the abundance of such elements of direct democracy as referenda, politicizes the European affairs even more. See Petersen, 1996, 47 about the impact of referendums on the European policy of Denmark.

¹⁵ More about the role of imitation logic in adaptation of the new Member States to the conditions of the EU membership see Maniokas, 2003.

¹⁶ When writing this text, in the middle of 2004, Poland was not yet finally decided on the EU affairs co-ordination, the details of the model were still being harmonised in Lithuania and other new Member States.

¹⁷ In Slovenia, Poland and Hungary. The first two head the European Affairs departments directly accountable to the Prime Minister, and the third one bases itself on the division of the Government Office.

¹⁸ It started in May 2003 after signing the EU Accession Treaty.

¹⁹ A generalised impact of the EU membership on Lithuania in defining the impact on the growth of economy has been characterised in the study commissioned by the European Commission under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania "Systematisation and Analysis of Financial, Economic and Social Impact of Lithuania's Integration in the EU". This study, like all other studies of the impact of the EU membership on Lithuania, are presented at www.euro.lt.

²⁰ Such sceptical attitude and at the same time spoilage of administrative work is testified by a small number of Lithuania's representation in various working groups of the Council of the European Union. For example, even in such a sphere, which is so sensitive for Lithuania, as agriculture, the representatives of Lithuania took part in about half the meetings. According to the data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the beginning of 2003 to 1 September 2003 Lithuania's representatives failed to participate in 366 out of 816 meetings held by different EU institutions. Especially low activity was registered in the working groups of the Council and the committees on commitology of the European Commission. The representatives of Lithuania did not participate in 326 out of 718 and 40 out of 122 meetings. Reports from approximately one third of the meetings were received.

²¹ It should also be admitted that some economists assess the aspiration to obtain more money from the EU rather sceptically, they maintain that more money from the EU may mean a greater distortion of expectations, may encourage the formation of the subsidy mentality and may impede a long-term growth of economy. A more serious consideration of this issue would go far beyond the scope of this book.

²² Prevalence of such, often non-majoritarian, institutions is related to the EU influence on the new Member States. They were created in transposing the *acquis* and implementing other EU membership conditions. It was the European Commission that encouraged the spread of non-majoritarian institutions, which in the course of the enlargement process was given authorisation to interpret the compliance of membership conditions. By definition non-majoritarian institutions depend but little on political control, they are autonomous and follow the action goals and authorisation specified in legal acts. Upon the EU accession they remain dependent on information provided by the Commission with respect to assistance rendered through PHARE. For more about the EU influence on non-majoritarian institutions in Lithuania see Maniokas, 2003.

²³ In this sphere Lithuania's activity has manifested itself already and bore certain fruit – the Rail Baltica project has been entered on the list of priority Trans-European networks, on 16-17 October it was approved by the Brussels European Council. However, the implementation of the interconnection of infrastructure projects will require plenty of efforts and time. The same is to be said about the interconnection of energy between Lithuania and Poland.

²⁴ On the other hand, due to its geographical position these states may also be natural coalitions, which encourage more active co-operation with the countries-partners of East Europe.

²⁵ The EU decisions have a special effect on the internal reforms of the Member States in those cases where the potential of these reforms is average. This means that the EU may have a great influence on the reforms when the forces of the supporters and opponents of the reforms in a state are more or less equal (Heritier, Knill, 2001, 292-294). Having applied this conclusion to designing national preferences it would be possible to maintain that supporters of the reforms who are unable to overcome opposition in the country are interested in seeking for the support of the reforms at the EU level and to formulate the European policy based on the arguments of institutional incompatibility accordingly.

²⁶ On the one hand, by means of this policy it is sought to encourage economic competitiveness of the EU members by deregulation, and, on the other hand, it is sought to maintain and further develop the so-called European social model. See the study carried out by the Free Market Institute of Lithuania commissioned by the European Committee under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania at www.euro.lt.

²⁷ The Convention was a new form of reviewing the EU Founding Treaties. It was established after the EU States had decided that the Nice Treaty signed at the beginning of 2001 formed an insufficient basis for enlargement. Dissatisfaction with the Nice Treaty was related to a traditional manner of its preparation during the intergovernmental negotiations. Therefore, at the end of 2001 the Laeken European Council decided to prepare a new founding treaty by making use of a new form of its preparation – the Convention. Apart from the representatives of the Government it consisted of two representatives from each national parliament. Heads of the EU States appointed the Chairman of the Convention and Vice-Chairmen whose only task was to prepare the draft of the EU Constitution.

²⁸ 50:60. This formula means that the decision, when the vote is taken by the qualified majority, may be adopted when it is approved by more than half the states whose population accounts for at least 60 per cent of the residents of the EU.

²⁹ This means that to adopt a decision by the qualified majority half the states whose population constitutes half the EU residents would suffice.

³⁰ The Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 25 September 2003 On Position of the Republic of Lithuania on the Issue of the Constitution of Europe at the Intergovernmental Conference; Resolution No. 1187 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 25 September 2003 On Position of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Agreement on the Approval of the Draft of the Constitution of Europe Considered at the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union.

³¹ Neither power indices were counted nor the importance of the economic development was assessed.

³² See numerous speeches by the representative of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania in the Convention and the intergovernmental conference R. Martinkonis and speeches by the representatives of the Parliament of Lithuania in the Convention, especially speeches by Vytenis Andriukaitis, in the mass media.

³³ Other parliamentarians represented Lithuania in the Convention by turns too, however, Vytenis Andriukaitis was most active and made the greatest contribution to the formation of Lithuania's position.

³⁴ It could be possible to thoroughly consider under what conditions executors of reforms would be inclined to make use of the measures provided by the EU and on what the expected results of that use depend.

EUROPEAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CASE OF ETA¹

Asta Maskaliūnaitė

Introduction

The end of 1960s saw the dawn of what Walter Laqueur named the “age of terrorism”². The upsurge of groups, determined to use violence to achieve a great variety of objectives – reestablishment of a state, based on the traditional values, the advent of the world-wide revolution or national liberation – was spectacular and most of the states had to face the challenge they posed to the existing structures of power. Even though such groups appeared in all the parts of the world, it was the challengers of the developed European states that received the greatest share of attention. Prosperity of the fifties and sixties made social scientists believe that democracy and economic welfare will make violence disappear from the old continent. They were thus puzzled by the rise of small but virulent groups that threatened the established political systems. Attention seeking strategies of this new threat prompted many investigators to the field as well as numerous pseudo-scientists, attributing the new terrorist events to the mental problems of the people involved in terrorist organizations or to the manipulations of arch-enemy of the times Soviet Union.

Most of such theories disappeared as well as the groups, which brought about their creation. Nowadays the question that is more puzzling to the researchers is not why the European terrorist groups appeared, but why some of them refuse to disappear. They do not seem to be able to incite much “interest” in the world of September 11 attacks and Madrid bombings. In addition to that, according to one of the leading anti-terrorist specialists, Bruce Hoffman, to the contrary to the other, “deadlier adversaries”, motivated by “religious enmity”, intending to acquire weapons of mass destruction, to produce as high as they can a death toll in one attack, such as the Al Qaeda network, the old terrorist groups remain and will remain largely unchanged. He claims, “we can expect little deviation from established patterns by mainstream terrorists belonging to traditional ethnic-separatist nationalist or ideologically motivated

groups”³. Their tactics is dictated by a certain “operational conservatism”⁴ seeking to go around the new security measures that the governments would implement, but not looking to increasing the lethality of their attacks. How, then, will they compete for the scarce attention, focused on the extreme forms of carnage that the “new” terrorists can produce? How will they survive the increased pressure that these new types of attacks generate in response? What will be the rationale for their continuous activities? These are the questions, which still need to be explored.

One of the most interesting cases in this respect is the case of the Basque ETA, second only to IRA in its longevity, its death toll and influence on the society.⁵ After the ceasefire of IRA, ETA remains as the dinosaur of the European “age of terrorism” while the eyes of the world turn towards the more lethal challengers rising in the Middle East. In this article, I will thus present the attempts of the Basque ETA to survive in such unfavorable conditions. In the first part of the article the specific characteristics of the separatist violent groups will be discussed. Next a short history of the organization will be presented. In the third part, the attempts of ETA to resist the efforts of the state to do away with it in the recent years will be analyzed and the fourth part will deal with the impact of the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004.

General characteristics of different terrorist groups

Willing to understand why it was ETA, out of all the different groups that plagued Europe in the decades of 70s and 80s, that managed to survive until now and still manages to impose itself as a political actor, it is useful to start from the general characteristics of different types of terrorist groups and to seek out the possible strengths the organization might have.

As it is often emphasized, terrorism is a means, which can be employed in order to achieve a great variety of objectives, therefore, for the purposes of convenience and classification as well as the general understanding of the phenomenon there exist quite a few typologies of terrorism. For example, according to the aims for which it is employed, terrorism can be distinguished into:

- Ideological terrorism:
 - Right-wing (neo-fascist groups)
 - Left-wing (Marxist-inspired revolutionary groups)
- Religious terrorism
- Nationalist-separatist terrorism
- Single-issue (anti-abortion, animal rights)⁶

The distinction between these different types of terrorism is not only of a scientific interest. While politically it could be considered that all terrorisms

are the same, there appear to be significant variations in tactics, strategy, choice of targets and means employed in terrorist attacks that these different agendas imply and consequently of the ways of countering them. Thus, for example, it has been noticed that extreme right, neo-fascist agenda implies that indiscriminate bombing will be preferred means of attack, which goes well together with their general contempt for the masses. The leftist groups, on the other hand, tend to be very selective in the choice of their targets and very much concerned by the opinion of their audiences, thus their preferred tactics is assassination, kneecapping and kidnappings of concrete persons. In this respect, the relation between aims of the organization and its preferred tactics and victims can be related as shown in the table 1:

Table 1. Relation of aims of terrorist groups to their tactics and victim selection:

Indiscriminate/bombing	Selective/assassinations
Rightist	Leftist
Religious	Single-issue
← Nationalist-separatist →	

The nationalist-separatist terrorism, as it can be seen here, stands in between these two ways of performing attacks and target selection. It is mainly because most often the idea of national liberation in these separatist groups goes hand in hand with some other objective. Thus, the “old” groups, like IRA, PKK and also ETA, in the sixties or seventies received their inspiration from the Marxist ideology, are thus more concerned about public opinion in their constituencies and use more left-wing tactics to achieve their objectives. For the other group of nationalist terrorists, on the other hand, ideas of national liberation are coupled with the religious agenda and their tactics is thus more indiscriminate.

From this it would seem that there is nothing special about the nationalist-separatist violent groups, however, they are the longest surviving of all the terrorist organizations. While deaths they produce may be fewer compared to the new terrorists of religious motivations, the sustained campaign of terror they are waging has deeper social impact. Therefore, what distinguish nationalist-separatist groups from others are essentially two interrelated factors:

- Home base. While domestic leftist and rightist groups have supporters diffused throughout the whole country and the religious terrorists can go global, groups pursuing nationalist agenda are related to a certain area, a homeland, which they want to liberate, with which they are connecting their projects and from which they gain strength.⁷
- Socialization into nationalism in combination with frustration of nationalist demands. Socialization into nationalism not only provides

the people with the sense of belonging to a nation, but also creates a value system in which the survival of the nation and its prosperity will be put on the highest step. The inability or unwillingness of the dominant state to deal with the nationalist demands to preserve their distinctive national culture will lead to the situation of frustration and consequently the state will be perceived as the arch-enemy.

Considering that ETA belongs to the groups of nationalist-separatist organizations with socialist tendencies, thus we should expect them to use selective assassinations as their means of attack. We should also expect them to have a home base, which provides them with a certain extent of popular support. This factor might already give a hint on how to answer the question on the longevity of the organization. However, to get a clear answer we should first start with the history of the organization.

History of ETA

The history of ETA can hardly be separated from the general history of Basque nationalist movement. Born in the end of the 19th century as a reaction to both the attempts at the creation of the nation state of the Spanish monarchy that attracted Basque oligarchy, depending on the Spanish markets and to the worker movement of Bilbao, then a high-rising industrial town attracting numerous immigrants from other parts of Spain. The founder of the movement, father of Basque Nationalism, Sabino Arana, accentuated purity of Basque blood, the exceptionality of Basque history and language⁸. He created symbols for the future Basque state (such as the flag – *ikurriña*) and a political party which had to work to reach that statehood – the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV⁹, further on – PNV).

His writings, however, were a subject of a certain controversy. At the beginning of his career as a nationalist leader, Arana pressed for the independence and statehood of the Basque Country, which, according to him, consisted of seven provinces¹⁰. However, before his death in 1903, he changed his posture and came to advocate autonomy within existing states. Because this change came during Arana's imprisonment and he did not live long enough to explain it, the Basque nationalism in general and the PNV in particular were constantly fluctuating between these two positions.

From death of Arana to the Spanish Civil War PNV was speedily gathering force, so that at the start of the war the government of the three provinces that now form part of the Basque country was already in its hands. In 1936 insurrection of general Franco started the most bloody civil war in Spain. The leadership of PNV was at first hesitant about which side to support. On the one hand, Franco's ideology with its emphasis on Catholicism and conservative

values was close to the ideas of the party, but his ideas about Spain as “unity of destiny in universe” did not go well with the party’s nationalist stance. Therefore, it decided to remain loyal to the Republic¹¹.

Reluctance of such a conservative party as PNV to join his crusade was considered as an insult by Franco. Consequently, the Basques had to pay the price for being on the wrong side. During the dictatorship any public sign of Basque identity was prohibited, including the language. PNV also went underground. However, by the time it has already developed a vast social network, which allowed it to be present even when absent from the political life. Various clubs and associations helped to foster and maintain the feeling of Basqueness and the party itself preserved its structures almost intact as its quick rise after the death of dictator showed.

Yet for some young people it seemed that passive resistance was not enough, that there was nothing to wait for. If during the first years after the WWII it could be expected that the winning powers will crush also Franco’s regime, which, even if neutral during the war, was still bearing a lot of affinity with the fascist and nazi regimes in Italy and Germany, after 1950 such hopes began to wane. Anti-Communism was a new order of the day and nobody was more anti-communist than the Spanish dictator. Thus, no help could be expected from the outside, everything had to be done with own forces. The beginning to this movement was given when the newly founded youth organization Ekin¹² merged with the youth organization of PNV the EGI. This merger, however, was not to be long-lived and soon Ekin distanced itself from PNV, taking with it a substantial number of the members of the latter and formed Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Land and Freedom, ETA¹³.

Though it was initially formed in 1959, ETA started armed resistance to the regime nearly a decade later. In the meanwhile it worked to define itself and the first definition it came up with was that of the “Revolutionary Basque movement of national liberation created in a patriotic resistance and independent of any other party, organization or organism”¹⁴. During the 1960s ETA was working on its ideological background, gathering influences from Marxism and especially the Third World liberation movements. For them, as for the latter, Basque land presented an occupied space, which had to be freed from a foreign yoke. Furthermore, this national freedom had to be combined with the social justice, so that one of the main battle cries of the organization became “For free and socialist Euskadi”.

In the first years of its existence, both the ideology and methods of ETA had certain appeal for the people within Spain and also gathered a substantial foreign sympathy. The event that best showed the support for the organization and the waning possibilities of the Franco’s regime to maintain its iron grip on

the society and state was the so-called Burgos trial in December 1970. A military tribunal was trying 16 ETA's militants for the assassination of a policeman. For six of them the judges demanded capital punishment. However, the massive demonstrations both within Spain and outside its borders obliged the dictator himself to change the sentence to imprisonment.

In 1973 the organization performed its most spectacular attack killing the prime minister and the designated heir of the dictator admiral Carrero Blanco. The action was praised and was considered as a substantial step towards dismantling of Franco's regime, and one of the reasons why after the death of dictator, the process of transition to democracy was initiated.

ETA, however, survived. It was mainly held that the Basque demands were not satisfied – the Constitution of 1978 included an article on the unity and indivisibility of Spanish nation¹⁵ and was not really met favorably by the Basques. Urged by their parties to stay at home, only 50% of them showed up for the referendum on Constitution and from those 20% gave a "No" leading the nationalist politicians to claim later that referendum failed in Basque country (actually, making a calculation it does appear that only 30% of Basque electorate voted for the Constitution). Though the majority approved the Statute of Basque autonomy the next year, it was claimed that it does not mean anything, for the basic law from which it is derived was rejected.

Furthermore, being in the frontlines of the fight against the dictator, ETA was not really happy about being left out completely of the transition process and even less favorable to the solution of territorial questions of the new state. Autonomy was given to all the regions that asked for it, but Navarre was left out of the Basque autonomy and the territorial setting itself was not even close to what ETA imagined. 1978 Spanish Constitution was not liked even by the moderate PNV, so ETA's stance towards it was even less favorable – right of the Basques to secede was, of course, not recognized, the Constitution preserved the role of the army as a guarantor of territorial unity and even the status of Basques as a nation was put in very ambivalent terms.¹⁶ Democratic Spain, thus, in the eyes of the most intransigent supporters of the Basque independence, continued to lack legitimacy and appeared as oppressive as before¹⁷.

Transition posed the first serious challenge to the survival of the organization and its (self)legitimization. Already in 1974 ETA experienced its most important split between more leftist, more moderate and at the time bigger faction, which adopted a name of the ETA(pm) – ETA politico-militar – political-military wing and ETA(m) – ETA militar, a more radical, more intransigent faction, also more nationalist. The transition with the establishment of the democratic framework for the expression of ideas and interests led the politico-military faction of the organization to gradually renounce the use of violence, establishing

itself as a leftist political party Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE – Basque Left), which eventually joined the local branch of the Socialist party to form PSE-EE. The military faction, on the other hand, continued its activities.

Even though democratization brought significant benefits for the Basques, leading them to enjoy a substantial level of autonomy, it left other demands unsatisfied allowing for the maintenance of the space in which radicalism could thrive. The engagement of the Spanish government in the so-called “dirty war” against ETA¹⁸ consolidated this ambience even more, conforming its assessment of the situation as oppressive and of the Spanish democracy as a continuation of the dictatorship.

It was mentioned that what distinguishes the nationalist-separatist violent organizations from other bodies of the kind is the strong home base. Thus, ETA also had such an environment, which helped it through difficult times and allowed it to thrive in the good ones. Defined as *Izquierda Abertzale* (patriotic left) or Basque National Liberation Movement, this environment was composed of a great number of organizations: Herri Batasuna as its political force, youth organizations Jarrai-Haika-Segi, trade union LAB, prisoner support group Gestoras pro Amnistía, etc. The main referent of all this conglomerate of forces was ETA, considered to be the leader of the movement because of the highest commitment of the *etarras* (members of ETA) to the cause of Basque liberation, seeing them as a vanguard of the struggle¹⁹. On the other hand, for ETA itself the sub-culture of *Izquierda Abertzale* is the environment from which it gets recruits, partially also funds, which legitimizes it and supports it through different actions, such as *kale borroka*, a politicized street fight, used for showing that the Basque Country is in a permanent war.

Self-determination and the recognition of Basques as a nation was and still is the battle cry both of ETA and the whole network that surrounds it. This idea, of course, is appealing for a great part of the nationalist environment of the Basque Country, including the main nationalist political parties,²⁰ however, the number of admirers of the methods of ETA is constantly shrinking.

ETA's fight for survival

For a long time, surrounded by such a network of supporters, enveloped by a significant number of various organizations, ETA could not only survive, but also remain the central piece of the puzzle of *Izquierda Abertzale*. However, the situation has changed significantly over the last four years. The number of victims of ETA has gone down – the year 2000 cost lives to 23 people while now the last victims organization claimed on the 30 of May of last year. The pressure both on the organization and its environment is enormous.

There are a number of factors that account for this. First of all, the Spanish state has exploited very well the global situation created after the attacks of September 11 in its own “war against terrorism”. Thus, one of the explanations of the great support that the government of Aznar was giving for the “war on terrorism” of the United States is the promised help in its fight against ETA²¹. In the general global climate oriented to crush this specific type of violence, the government could implement pretty bold policies to tackle ETA. Secondly, these policies would not have a substantial impact if they were not reinforced by another factor – that there is a general revulsion to political violence both in the whole of Spain and to a very significant extent also in the Basque country.

As a consequence of these policies a fierce attack has been made not only on the ETA itself, but also to its environment. Thus, most of the organizations of the ambience of ETA have been outlawed, including the political party Herri Batasuna with all its derivations. The task of these policies was to deny oxygen to the organization and they seem to have a positive impact in this respect. Because of such policies ETA is now cornered more than it ever was, for its supporting organizations have to fight for their own survival and cannot help it to restructure itself.

However, in the Basque Country these policies do not have such a clear impact. They are considered as an assault against the right of self-expression and participation. While there are still people who support ETA and its struggle and see it as a vanguard of the struggle for the Basque self-determination and the “most Basque” of all the Basques, the majority even of the voters of the outlawed Herri Batasuna are against violence. The way of putting this rejection might differ accordingly to what part of political spectrum (or the so-called nationalist-constitutionalist division) a person belongs, however, the rejection of ETA nowadays is immense, the outright rejection for the organization reaches 60%, the highest ever value (during the years of transition this rejection was only 23%, it was growing all the time throughout the subsequent years, getting smaller only during the year of truce 1998-1999).²² Thus, according to the opponents of these policies, to declare every person, identifying herself with the *Izquierda Abertzale*, a criminal is an insult and only leads more people to consider Spain as a fascist state. Yet, as was mentioned before, this tactics also gives its fruits. And now ETA has to work even harder in order to survive.

Adaptation of tactics

Like all terrorist groups ETA has been skillfully adapting its tactics to the developments of the counter terrorist measures. The first shock for the organization and the first necessity to re-organize came with the change of the stance of French government towards the organization which came at the end of the 1980s, leaving it without its sanctuary of Iparralde, the French Basque

country.²³ ETA was pretty quick to adapt to the new circumstances, though, and it still attracted a lot of militants (the end of 1980s was also marked by the end of the “dirty war”), thus, the losses of the activists were quickly replaced by others and the organization re-structured itself to rise again. One of the interpretations of the ceasefire announced in 1998, which lasted a year was also the need for re-structuring of the organization.

Recently, however, organization is going through its worst crisis. Its most important leaders are getting arrested one after another. The ratio of attacks and detentions of the members of the group are more and more in favor of the state side. Over the last six years none of the leaders of military apparatus managed to stay in their position for more than a year.²⁴ Increasing pressure from both the Spanish and French authorities increases the need for the organization to restructure again, even though this time it does not receive any space for breathing and has to do that under increasingly pressuring circumstances. The attack on its environment is strong as well, thus, the organization cannot rely on the support of its network which itself has to deal with the assault on its integrity.

However, ETA showed already numerous times that it is able to rise unexpectedly when everybody pronounces it dead. Now it is trying to readjust itself again. Remembering the ideas of Bruce Hoffman, it could be said that ETA as well could come up with certain innovations in its structures and tactics, while it is clear that some of the aspects of the organization will most probably remain the same.

First of all, arms and information is not a problem for the organization, it procures itself with large amounts of dynamite stolen in France, some arms apparently coming from Eastern Europe, it also possesses a database about the potential targets – the state security forces, politicians, etc. What is problematic for ETA is the personnel and therefore the structure of organization is changing. According to the main counter-terrorist agencies of Spain, ETA is trying to re-organize to protect itself, thus, the “apparatuses” of ETA²⁵ are doubled in order to avoid the problems that arise in case of the arrest of their leaders.²⁶ Secondly, organization is attracting more and more “amateurs”, whose training is very limited, their connection to ETA’s command as well and the orders they receive are also very imprecise. Thus, most of the *etarras* caught red-handed in the last years were so-called “legals” of the organization, i.e. people, previously unknown to the police, having clean legal documents, etc. It could be claimed, thus, that ETA as well starts using something similar to the “sleeper cell” model of Al Qaeda. According to the counter terrorist forces, it is now working on a much more individualized basis in contrast to the assembly-based structure of the previous times.

Thus, to the confirmation of Hoffman's thesis, ETA definitely tries to adjust itself while keeping its weaponry and targets intact. It is, however, changing its internal structure, coming closer to the one used by the new "terrorist" networks like Al Qaeda.

The organization seems to be making some strategic innovations as well. Its recent "summer campaign" against the Spanish tourism industry has left many experts puzzled. The bombs it collocated in the tourist areas were of low intensity and so far did not produce more than a little irritation for the people resting in the area and the authorities. What is the reason of such tactics is not really known. One of the explanations that is given is that ETA does not have a capacity to produce anything more. However, this can be easily disproved, because, as was mentioned before, ETA possesses enough material to strike the way it wants. This, therefore, has probably more to do with the event, which ETA could hardly have predicted and which influences both the sensibilities of the Spanish population and consequently the ways of acting of the organization itself – the attacks on Madrid trains of 11 March.

Challenge of 11-M

The bloodiest attack in Spain, eventually, was not perpetrated by ETA. This created an enormous challenge both to the organization and to its opponents. Even though they had a stronger immediate impact on the latter (the governmental party soon after lost the elections), for ETA, apparently, the attacks were a surprise as well.

It would seem the organization found it somewhat easier to incorporate them in its previous discourse²⁷, claiming that it is a consequence of the Spanish involvement in the war in Iraq. It was not complicated to show it as another attempt of countering imperialist ambitions of the Western world. In ETA's interpretation, Spanish prime minister Aznar collaborated with American president Bush helping the latter in its "criminal foreign policy" in exchange for his help in "finishing off the 'Basque conflict'". A policy, which had a boomerang effect, for instead of solving the problem of Basque Country, it created more serious ones in the international sphere and within Spain.²⁸ In this communiqué, ETA sees the attacks as the right punishment for the Spanish state and appears to be pretty glad about the failure of its enemy.

Other than that there was no advantage for ETA at all. The organization suddenly had to deal with the fact that it is no longer the hegemonic violent actor in the Iberian Peninsula. Before it also had to compete for attention with other small groups, like the Marxist GRAPO, but none of them could rival her in size, the extent of the attacks or the publicity it created. Now it has to

function in an extremely violence-saturated environment with the huge rejection within the society of any violent methods to achieve the aims and the bloody images of Madrid still painfully present. This might be one of the explanations of the new style of “summer campaign” – designed in a way as to show ETA still present on the stage, but without producing such damage as to create a revulsion for the organization in the society.

Talking about the events themselves, the style of the attacks, the method, the victims, all pointed out in a different direction, led to say that ETA could not have done it. The fact that the speaker of Herri Batasuna Arnaldo Otegi was the first to point out.²⁹ ETA herself was very quick to announce that it had nothing to do with it. It was obvious that even for the hard-core supporters of the organization what happened in Madrid was way too much. Hence, the condemnation of Batasuna, which never condemned any act of ETA, hence, the mobilizations in which participated all the organizations of the Izquierda Abertzale. Therefore, while in its communiqués it appeared somewhat supportive or at least understanding of the actions of the Islamist militants, actually, ETA was neither happy to have them intrude in her territory nor actually appreciative of the methods and selection of victims by the perpetrators of the attacks.

The insistence of the government on the authorship of ETA has definitely created a certain moral hierarchy in comparison of the two groups – ETA and Al Qaeda and the prevailing attitude within the Basque Country and not only there that the “armed organization” could not have done it, created such a favorable image for the organization that it did not have since the year of truce 1998-1999.

However, this “moral superiority” creates significant constraints on the actions of the organization – it is impossible to keep it and keep killing as well. There were numerous voices in the Basque Country after the attacks of 11-M saying that there can be no more assassinations, that Batasuna itself will not be able to justify one more victim after it lamented the ones in Madrid. It is claimed that within ETA herself there was also an important debate on whether or not to announce a ceasefire in order to keep its favorable image, to help Herri Batasuna’s chances for re-legalization and, in general, to have a break because of immensely violence-repulsive environment that was created after the Madrid bombings. Yet, apparently, the proponents of the continuation of the armed struggle have gained the upper hand in the organization. It still, according to its latest writings, feels that violence is useful for bringing about liberation of Basque Country, that their violence has a pedagogic effect.³⁰ Furthermore, it still believes that it can negotiate with the government on a one-to-one basis to solve the conflict. An idea, which does not have any serious grounds.

Conclusions

All violent groups have their ups and downs. The developments of political systems in Europe and successful combat by the governments have made most of the European groups disappear, though some of them remain active. The most notorious of the active nowadays groups is exactly ETA. The organization managed to survive throughout the years without giving up arms and has proven itself capable of striking again. Because of the pressure from the law enforcement agencies and also because of the societal effects of the events of 11 of March in Madrid, ETA now has to change its tactics, as it has proven unwilling to disarm. The change of it is visible in the new “summer campaign”, which is based on the collocation of artifacts of low power, designed more to capture the attention of the medias than to inflict any serious damage. Faced with the pressures from the state and from other violent actors, ETA is still not giving up. Here, probably, the spokesman of Herri Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegi is right – police work is not enough to do away with the organization, which has proven to be able to resist the pressures both in the military and political spheres, and, even being weakened considerably manages to have an influence in the national politics.

As long as there exists an environment in Basque Country which strongly supports the ideas that ETA also holds dear, ETA will not give up, pressure from the state notwithstanding. The effects of 11-M will wane with time, allowing the organization to reestablish itself as the only violent challenger in the Iberian Peninsula. It would probably alter its tactics to fit in the violence-saturated environment by sustaining a small scale but regular campaign as it has shown in the new “summer campaign” of August 2004. It must thus be clear that in addition to successful police work, some stronger political initiatives are needed to solve the conflict and finish up with the violent group.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ This article is a result of the research undertaken in the University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain, under the auspices of the Marie Curie fellowship program of the European Union.

² Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987.

³ Hoffman, Bruce. 1999. “Terrorism trends and prospects” in Lesser et al. eds. *Countering New Terrorism*. RAND. P.36

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 800 deaths in 30 years. In addition to that Spain is the country in Europe with the highest amount of people needing bodyguards.

⁶ Such a typology, of course, is just one of the many possible ones. It deals only with the political terrorism, while many authors distinguish also criminal terrorism (either seeking personal psychological satisfaction – like Unabomber – or profit, for example like a group which was putting bombs on the railways in France in order to blackmail the government

into giving it money) and state terrorism. Others also distinguish between intra-state and international terrorism. However, for the purposes of this article, the above distinction according to the aims of political terrorists is the most useful. For more on typologies of terrorism see Schmid, Alex. *Political Terrorism. A Research Guide to Concepts, Data Bases and Literature*. Amsterdam: SWIDOC, 1983.

⁷ Of course, it should not be mixed up with the actual control of the territory that some guerrilla movements exercise. As Francisco Letamendia emphasizes, the “urban political violence (which is used by all the peripheral violent nationalisms in the West) is characterized by the absolute clandestinity of an armed group, lack of control over rural or urban areas, absence of an active institutionalized support from the population and ... the priority for the symbolic effects over the military ones” (Letamendia, Francisco. *Juego de espejos. Conflictos nacionales centro-periferia*. Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1997, p.232).

⁸ Scientists have proven that the people in Basque provinces have certain genetic traits that are different from the people of the surrounding area (for example, they have the highest frequency of blood group O in the whole Europe). Both the language, which is the only non Indo-European language with the unknown links to other languages of the world and the genetic code, which suggests that the Basques are descendants of the Palaeolithic inhabitants of the Continent are used to prove Basque distinction from other populations of Iberian Peninsula. The historical exception of Basque lands – them never being conquered by the invaders of this area be they Romans, Visigoths or Arabs, extremely wide autonomy of Basque region within the Spanish empire and pact-based nature of its relations with the crown – added to this feeling of exception.

⁹ EAJ-PNV - Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea in Basque and Partido Nacionalista Vasco in Spanish.

¹⁰ The Basque land is divided into two by the border between France and Spain, one of the oldest unchanged border of Europe. The Basque land in the nationalist imaginary thus consists of four provinces on the Spanish side of the border – Bizkaia (Vizcaya), Gipuzkoa (Guipuzkoa) and Araba (Alava), which now form an Autonomous region of Pais Vasco and the separate state and autonomy of Navarre and three on the French side Lapurdi (Labour), Nafarroa Beherea (Basse Navarre) and Zuberoa (Soule). However, being divided for so long, these regions are very different, facing more the capitals of their respective states than each other. Basque nationalism itself was born in the developed South (Spanish side) while the Northern provinces while being more homogenous never had a serious nationalism movement. Navarra, in addition, presents a difficult case. The medieval kingdom of Navarre is considered to be the only state Basques ever had and the rule of Sancho the Wise had all the Basque lands united into one state the only time in history. Thus, it has a special meaning for the Basques, however, it took a different historical trajectory – mountainous and much less developed than the other Spanish Basque provinces, Navarre adopted a strongly conservative ideology, based on the unity of Church and King and hostile to the Basque nationalism. Therefore, the differences between the different Basque provinces are so great that to imagine them forming one political unit is very difficult.

¹¹ Actually, from the four provinces, only Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa remained republican and were fiercely defended. Araba decided to join Franco and Navarra was a strong supporter of the crusade from the beginning of the civil war.

¹² Ekin means “to act” in Basque, while ekintza is “action”. Action instead of the words was one of the mostly emphasized notions in this new organization. However, the group itself was born more as a discussion club to become an armed organization only after a pretty long process of transformation.

¹³ This scission is mostly explained by the reluctance of PNV to allow anything more than a passive resistance. That in itself, though, is also understandable as the leadership of

PNV did not want their youth to take risks in fighting against an apparently omnipotent dictator.

¹⁴ Garmendia, José María. *Historia de ETA*. Donostia-San Sebastian: Haramburu Editor, 1996. P.52.

¹⁵ For an interesting unconventional analysis of Article 2 of Spanish Constitution, see Xacobe Bastida. *La nación española y el nacionalismo constitucional*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1998.

¹⁶ The Article 2 of the constitution mentions “nationalities”, but their status is inferior to that of the Spanish nation which in the same article appears characterized by “indissoluble unity”. This has so far led to huge controversies, some people interpreting this as recognition of the plurality of Spanish state and the understanding of Spanish nation as a plural entity. For the others, though, indissoluble unity appears as a reason to deny space for peripheral nationalists.

¹⁷ One of the reasons for that is also that during the transition process, the police forces, largely inherited from the dictatorship reacted sometimes excessively to the numerous demonstrations demanding amnesty to the ETA prisoners captured during the times of dictatorship. As Pedro Ibarra Güell writes: “The new member of HB [Herri Batasuna], KAS [- Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista] or ETA joined the movement because s/he had taken part in a demonstration against repression. The “genuine” nationalist or left-winger voted for HB because s/he had seen how the radical nationalists fought back in the streets against the Spanish police”. Ibarra Güell. “The Evolution of Radical Basque Nationalism: Changing Discourse Patterns”. In Beramendi, Mjir, Núñez, eds. *Nationalism in Europe. Past and Present*. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 1994. Vol.2, p.423.

¹⁸ Between 1983 and 1987 a number of members of ETA as well as some of the people not related to the organization were kidnapped, killed or tortured by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación), an organization, which, as was suspected and confirmed later was designed by the government officials, so that the Minister of Interior of the time and a lot of other high officials ended up in prison. As Fernando Reinares and Oscar Jaime-Jimenez, two leading experts on terrorism in Spain argue: “the state-sponsored terrorism used to counter insurgent terrorism can be considered a major factor explaining why ETA has persisted beyond the democratic transition” (Reinares, Jaime-Jimenez. “Countering Terrorism in a New Democracy: the Case of Spain” in Reinares et al. eds. *European Democracies Against Terrorism: Government Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation* Dartmouth, UK: Dartmouth Publishing, 2000. p.137).

¹⁹ Ibarra Güell. “The Evolution of Radical Basque Nationalism: Changing Discourse Patterns”. In Beramendi, Mjir, Nsñez, eds. *Nationalism in Europe. Past and Present*. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 1994. Vol.2, p.423.

²⁰ Some of them openly advocate self-determination, like Aralar (the splinter party from HB) or EA (Eusko Alkartasuna), while the main political force, conservative EAJ-PNV, Basque Nationalist Party is constantly fluctuating between independentist and autonomist positions.

²¹ See, for example, Andrés Ortega “La coherencia del giro de Aznar” in *El País*, 15 Febrero 2004.

²² See, for example, GEES. 2003. “The Decline of ETA” in <http://www.gees.org/articulo/337/>

²³ During Franco’s regime and some time into transition the French kept their eyes closed to ETA and thus Northern provinces were used as a logistic base for preparation of the attacks.

²⁴ See, for example, “Principales detenciones de jefes de ETA” in *El País*, 10 Diciembre 2003.

²⁵ According to the experts the structure of ETA is divided into three apparatuses: military, logistics and political.

²⁶ This, however, leads to “greater bureaucratization and also a certain delay in its operational activities” (“ETA posee armas procedentes del Este y 1.000 kilos de la dinamita robada en Francia” in *El País*, 9 Febrero 2004).

²⁷ The governmental party, basing its rhetoric and electoral campaign on the unity and indivisibility of Spain and claiming peripheral nationalism to be a cause of all the wrongs in the country was not able to incorporate this event produced by a new enemy into its discursive frame.

²⁸ See ETA’s communiqué dated 14 March 2004. A part of the text available at <http://uruguay.indymedia.org/news/2004/03/23344.php>

²⁹ See “Otegi asegura que ETA no está detrás de ‘esta masacre’” in *El País*, 12 Marzo 2004.

³⁰ See “ETA se reestructura e intenta rearmarse para volver a atentar, pese a su declive interno” in *El País*, 30 Mayo 2004.

THE CHANGES IN THE RUSSIAN IMPACT ON GLOBAL ARMS TRADE AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

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Introduction

Since the First Hague Conference in 1899, the states of the world have been trying to control arms trade and the use of weapons. At the start of the 21st century, the problem of weapons proliferation has not been solved yet. Weapons proliferation control has been affected by the armaments spiral¹, huge costs, arms trade, and the development of weapons of mass destruction.

This research puts special emphasis on Russian arms trade military and political aspects, and the control of conventional weapons. The reason for this is the fact that the only legally possible arms trade is conventional weapons trade, because the proliferation of Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)² is officially forbidden. “Weapons of mass destruction are nuclear weapons either any other weapons such as chemical or biological weapons the use whereof can cause major mass destructive effect”³

The analysis concentrates on the impact of Russian arms trade on global security and is of crucial importance to Western European countries because of several matters:

1. After the end of the Cold War the rivalry in arms trade markets of the developing world remained very tough. Russia has resumed the USSR arms trade policy and strongly competes with the U.S. and major West European suppliers⁴ in the arms markets of Asia, Africa, Near East and Latin America.
2. Russia is selling dangerous weapons and related materials to unstable states in regions where conflicts are a strong possibility. The main reason for this is that Russia has been driven out of the weapons markets of stable states by the strong positions of the US. and Major West European Suppliers. Russia is looking for markets and finding them in Syria, Eritrea, Libya, Iran and etc. This is a major threat to the security of some regions.

3. Russia inherited a large quantity of WMD and with them related materials from the former USSR Republics. Proliferation of WMD and especially nuclear weapons is still very possible. One of the biggest present dangers is that WMD might fall into the hands of terrorist organizations.
4. There lingers the threat that former Soviet Union scientists might develop WMD for “rogue” states because such high-qualified specialists are presently underpaid in Russia and other countries. There are facts that Belarus could be a channel for Russian conventional weapons sales to “rogue” states and even to terrorist groups.

The issues of illegal arms proliferation and control of WMD haven't been solved yet. Russia has a great arsenal of various lethal weapons at its disposal but it lacks effective control on arms and related dangerous materials. It makes Russia a very problematic state.

According to various data, in the period of 1999-2003, Russia was 3rd largest supplier of arms to the world. The Russian influence and importance to arms trade dynamics and international security is unquestionable.

In this research it is summarized the dynamics of global arms trade. It is analyzed the important changes in levels of arms trade after the Cold War and the gross decrease of quantities and value of Russian arms export and far-reaching changes in global arms trade market. The Russian market share is analyzed too. Interconnections between Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine with regard to arms export to “rogue states” is also considered.

To get a clearer picture of the place Russia occupies in the global arms trade, it is necessary to make a short overview of the global arms trade dynamics.

1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF ARMS TRADE

Arms trade is usually comprehensible as the transfer of conventional arms, including non-nuclear weapons, such as tanks, combat helicopters and similar technology, but excluding chemical and biological weapons, from one country to another.

“The arms can be sold, exchanged or given as an intermediate commodity.”⁵ Most of the arms trade transactions are executed on the governmental level although quite notable amounts of arms are sold by large arms manufacturers; individual persons also play an important role in the arms trade.

Typical motives of the arms trade include:

- Deliveries of arms to the allies;
- Interference in a conflict (e.g. despite the UN embargo Yugoslavia was supplying arms for the Bosnian Serbs, and Muslim countries were supplying the Bosnian Muslims).

- Expectancy to acquire diplomatic influence by creating dependence;
- Commercial goals (e.g. during the Iran-Iraq war the value of arms sold into those countries accounted for USD55.1 billion. The belligerent countries were supplied with arms by 41 state, including 28 states that were supplying both belligerent countries with weapons. With a tough competitive pressure in the current arms market, a great number of previous restrictions have been abandoned. Even up-to-date arms are offered for sale.).
- Internal political pressure: corporations, military technologies and arms producers, trade unions, representatives of constituencies in the Parliaments.

Following the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the USSR, and relieved tension in the Middle East, the value of global arms sales shrank.

The major drives of the present arms trade are considered to be the rearmament that is currently taking place in most of the countries of the Third World as well as the armament market having become more public.

In the post-Cold War years, attempts were made in Russia to rearrange the munitions industry into civil industry. This attempt was largely unsuccessful therefore it was recognized that Russia can gain more benefit from efficient trade in arms.

Russian arms go to untrustworthy countries and it is very difficult to prevent such arms transfers. Belarus and the Ukraine are often considered to be major dealers of Russian arms. Therefore, the increased importance of Russia in the global arms trade can affect the security around the globe, increase tension, and also boost its influence on the global political arena.

This research work aims at ascertaining whether the above assumptions are correct. If they are, the paper will look into the scope of the said developments, the main purchasers of Russian arms, the target markets, and the links to the arms sold by Belarus and the Ukraine, etc. However the new position of Russia in the global arms trade is primarily illustrated by specific data or rather their development in the period from the Cold War through 2002.

1.1 Dynamics of the Global Arms Trade

In 1987, the arms sales accounted for USD84.4 billion, which was the highest mark ever achieved.⁶

After the Cold War, the arms trade totals began falling dramatically. The lowest mark was recorded 1994, when the value of the arms deliveries was almost threefold lower (USD29.5 billion) than in 1987. This decline is attributable to the grave economic and political crisis in Russia, followed by the reorganisation of the global arms market. For instance, during the period

of the Cold War from 1986 through 1990 the USSR surpassed the United States in terms of arms export volumes: in 1997 the value of arms sold thereby was higher than the value of the worldwide arms deliveries in 1994.

The data of 1997 seemed to indicate that the global arms trade was recovering again and approaching the highest level after the Cold War, over USD42 billion.

In 1998 there was another notable decline of the arms transfer agreements related to the Asian financial crisis: USD 37.7 billion. In terms of the arms value, Asia is the second largest purchaser in the developing world, after the Near East. The shrinkage of the trade was also factored by the problems of the exporting countries: the slowdown of U.S. economy growth, and the economic crisis in Russia. The above factors resulted in dramatic decrease of demand. In 1999, the arms trade remains comparable to that one year before: USD 38.7 billion.⁷

In 2000, the actual arms sales volumes fell, however in 2001 they decrease dramatically and come to the lowest mark: barely USD 25.7 billion. Analysts associate the fact with U.S. economic crisis after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. It is important to emphasise that the global economy had not fully recovered after the Asian financial crisis that had effected most of the countries worldwide. The political factor also plays an imperative role: the U.S. finds it much more important to support its own security and the improvement of its armament. This is clearly illustrated by the figures: from 1999 to 2001 the amount of arms sold by the United States fell nearly twofold, to USD8.5 billion.

In 2002, following the terrorist attacks, the United States significantly increased the military expenditure; however it was mainly intended for the exclusive purpose of strengthening the armed forces. Thus the arms sales enjoyed a very moderate growth and came up to USD27.2 billion.⁸

This brings to an important conclusion that the arms trade volumes are highly dependant on the global economic and political situation that predetermines the ability to afford the arms and the necessity to acquire them. The political situation presupposes the striving of the major weapons suppliers either to sell the arms or not. Russia sells arms within the confines of its potential. The United States and the major West European suppliers sell arms as long as the volumes and destinations thereof do not present threats to the security of their countries. Nonetheless, most analytics admit that in the arms trade the supply always exceeds the demand. The major reason of the arms trade shrinkage is the slackened growth of the developing countries' economics as well as economic problems that make the new costly armament unaffordable. Most countries take up a cheaper and more realistic option – upgrading and absorption of the existing weaponry.

Table 1^{9,10}. Global arms trade

Arms trade volumes	Year	billion USD
Latest data	2002	27.2
Lowest in recent years	2001	25.7
After the Asian financial crisis in 1998	1999	38.7
Highest after the Cold War	1997	42.1
Lowest in the 20 th century after the Cold War	1994	29.5
Highest ever	1987	84.4

An increasing number of military conflicts in a region leads to growing military expenditures: in 1999-2001 they went up by 37% in Africa and by 23% in South Asia¹¹; however the amounts of purchased arms do not necessarily increase. As noted before, due to the lack of financial resources, most countries chose upgrading and absorption of the existing weapons systems. It is even more important that many yet cheap weapons are being bought by the regions which are most prone to conflicts. Light arms – submachine guns, munitions, and explosives – cost little money but nevertheless they kill thousand of people. Thus Africa, the countries whereof purchase large quantities of cheap light arms and which is known to be a highly warring region, ranks last in terms of the value of purchased arms since the arms bought by African countries hardly include expensive heavy armament due to the simple reason that African countries cannot afford it.

The end of the Cold War reduced the arms trade volumes; nevertheless the regions of tension keep increasing their military potential in anticipation of becoming more secure. However as a rule this is not the case. A large number of countries that are among the top 30 largest importers of arms worldwide failed to avoid military conflicts: e.g. Rwanda, Somali, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kong, and Sierra Leone in 1999, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, and India in 2000.

2. RUSSIA'S POSITION IN THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE

In order to analyse the changed position of Russia in the international arms trade market it is necessary to have a look at the previous situation.

2.1 Cold War in 1986–1990

The year 1986 was chosen as the datum-point. In the period from 1986 through 1990 the Soviet Union was an obvious leader of the global arms trade. The USSR had longstanding customers — mostly the countries supported by

the USSR. The data for this period are surely impressive: the USSR arms export accounted for USD29.2 billion in 1986, and USD30.4 billion in 1987. However the enormous export volumes did not mean similarly large profits. Currently it is becoming evident that a vast problem encountered by the USSR was the solvency of countries that were buying its weaponry. From several tens of billions US dollars worth arms delivered to the customers the recovered amounts used to be several times smaller. The USSR had to come to terms with this fact in order to maintain the political influence and to be able to compete with the United States. Therefore the huge lead of the USSR reflected by the data may be somewhat different from the real situation as most of the U.S. customers were solvent countries meaning that the delivered arms used to be paid for.

Table 2. Arms export¹² (in billion USD, rounded down to USD100m)

	1986	1987	1988	1989
Russia	29.2	30.4	28.0	23.7
United States	19.0	23.6	22.2	21.0
Worldwide	75.9	84.4	80.6	67.7

Important countries in the arms trade of this period were the USSR allies China and North Korea, the armament volumes whereof also significantly decreased after the Cold War. In 1986, the North Korean arms sales came up to over USD500 million, whereas in 1996 the sales fell tenfold, to only USD50 million. North Korea is an economically declining totalitarian paramilitary state. It is not able to produce arms and therefore purchases armament abroad. The case with China is somewhat different: it is a large state with a huge economic potential; however its arms export fell from USD3.3 billion in 1989 to USD0.8 billion in 2002 even though China is dramatically increasing its expenditure on strengthening its military force and is known to be one the largest recipients of armament in the world. According to the value of the newly made arms purchasing agreements it has even gained the lead globally. Nevertheless China cannot produce marketable armament that would be seriously competitive on the global market.

2.2 Decline during the Disintegration of the USSR in 1990–1995

The period from 1990 through 1995 represents a decline in the arms trade, reorganisation, etc. During the Cold War the arms sales volumes had reached abnormally high mark. They were bound to reduce: such actual

purchasing power or such need for arms did not exist in the world. Dramatic changes take place in the world: the USSR breaks-up, the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, the new independent states suffer economic crisis, huge problems of inherited armament have to be addressed. In 1990, the United States surpass Russia in terms of the value of arms export and keeps increasing the gap.

Table 3. Arms export¹³ (in billion USD, rounded down to USD100m)

	1990	1991	1992
Russia	17.0	7.0	2.7
United States	24.4	28.7	27.0
Worldwide	63.4	52.5	45.5

The expressive data of 1992 reflect the then Russian crash, a crushing victory of the United States during the Cold War, and emerging possibilities to win the former markets of the USSR. A single dominating power – the USA – emerged in the arms market to last.

Table 4. (in billion USD, rounded down to USD100m)¹⁴

	1993	1994
Russia	3.4	1.7
United States	15.1	13.3
United Kingdom	4.6	5.2
Germany	1.7	1.7
France	1.5	1.3
Worldwide	32.1	29.5

Shortly other countries also took advantage of the favourable situation: the UK surpassed Russia, Germany and France caught up with it. The political chaos and economic failure of the Russian government factored in the principal changeover of the global arms market.

2.3 Unsuccessful Attempts of Changeover in 1995–1999

For Russia that was a period of unsuccessful attempts to change over. In 1995 and 1996 there was some temporary improvement, however the Russian economic crisis in 1997, the collapse of banks, and the Asian crisis affected the shaky Russian economy.

*Table 5. Arms sales*¹⁵ (in billion USD, rounded down to USD100m)

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Russia	3.7	3.5	2.6	2.2
United States	16.0	14.9	16.4	16.9
United Kingdom	5.3	6.5	6.8	3.8
France	3.1	3.9	6.7	7.3
Worldwide	36.7	36.7	42.1	37.7

During the second decline Russia is considerably surpassed by France, the British increase the gap. This brings to a new global arms trade type with a single dominating power, the USA, and two weaker leaders, the UK and France, the arms exported whereby amounted to almost 75% of the international arms sales totals in 1998. Whereas Russia accounted for only approximately 6% of the sales.

2.4 Russian Challenge in the Period of 1999–2002

After V. Putin became the President of Russia in 2000, the Russian military expenditure policy changed: the new objective was the strengthening of the armed force. “Due to the increase of export orders and growing internal demand, the production of the weaponry increased by 75% compared to 1998. Yet, after the break-up of the USSR the economy of the Russian Federation encountered a number of crisis therefore everything had to start at a very low mark. Consequently, despite the fast growth, the arms production level in 2000 accounted for barely 1/5 of the 1991 level, and for 1/3 of the 1992 level.”¹⁶

V. Putin’s efforts to reorganise the defence industry bore fruit: Russian arms trade volumes increased. Currently Russia ranks second after U.S. in terms of the annual value of the arms transfer agreements; it has caught up with and in 2002 even narrowly surpassed Great Britain which used to rank second after U.S. in terms of arms deliveries.

This period was successful to Russia, since according to the data for the whole period it placed third globally, due to reduced U.S. arms trade volumes it markedly approached the United States, surpassed France, and noticeably narrowed the gap between Russia and Great Britain. (See Appendices, pp. 33)

To understand the factors that determined the Russian success it is necessary to shed light on a few of them: which market segment Russia has won back, what military hardware is supplied and whereto, and how the arms production industry has been reorganised. The answers to the above questions will enable to present a clearer picture of the changed role of Russia in the global arms trade.

Table 6. Arms sales in constant 2002 u.s. dollars¹⁷
(in billion USD, rounded down to USD100m)

	1999	2000	2001	2002
Russia	3.4	4.0	4.2	4.8 [*]
United States	18.0	12.9	9.5	10.2
United Kingdom	5.0	6.5	4.5	4.7
France	4.2	2.5	1.8	1.8
Worldwide	38.7	33.5	25.7	27.2

* According to official Russian data published by CAST.

3. TYPES OF ARMS MARKETS

Analysts distinguish between regular and occasional arms trade markets.

3.1 Regular Markets

Such markets are characterized by regular arms acquisitions made in line with planned replacement of obsolete and/or aging armaments. It is often maintained that the demand on these markets can be estimated given the previous arms purchase time, the service life, and the financing allocated for arms procurement in the purchasing country. The supplier of arms is chosen on the basis of a number of complex interrelated financial, technical, political, and economic factors combined in many different ways. The ability of the exporter to offer delivery guarantees and flexible payment terms is also very important. For instance, under offset programs, the customer may import technologies and receive other economic benefits.

In general, the regular markets deal with peacetime acquisitions of arms where the countries do not face immediate military threat.

3.2 Occasional Markets

Here arms are mostly acquired in cases when the purchaser is involved in a military conflict or is facing a serious threat of such conflict. The ability of the exporter to deliver arms to a tight deadline, i.e. with exceptional expedition within a short notice, is a predominant factor on such markets. Moreover, occasional markets are dominated by the demand for relatively simple and inexpensive arms systems. Another key factor is ensuring the adequate combat potential of weapons systems and the ability of the armed forces of the recipient country quickly to learn how to use them effectively.

3.3 Types of Importing Country Motives/Behaviour

They are predetermined by both objective factors and a complex system of motivations held by its administrative, military, and financial bureaucracy. They are more easily identified on regular markets while the occasional markets are mainly influenced by subjective factors. Therefore, the five motivation models listed below apply mainly to regular markets although the fourth type of purchaser's motivation is close to occasional markets.

Types of Motivation Inherent with Arms Importers¹⁸

- *The Corruption-related model.* In this case, at the time of purchase, the corporate or personal financial gain of the importer country's leadership prevails over its government or national security interests. This model is primarily typical of the Muslim countries and Latin America. In addition, it is quite strong in India and in South and Southeast Asia. With commission payments to mediators banned by law in the United States, it is primarily this motivation that constrains ultimate U.S. technological, financial and political domination on the arms trade markets. There is a number of reasons to believe that this model of motivation prevails among importers.
- *The Dependent customer model.* Arms and other military hardware that are being traded as an intermediate commodity are designed to conceal the true subject of the trade. Under the guise of arms deliveries the importer is in fact buying guarantees for its national security. This type is primarily typical of countries with excessive capital, which are, however, unable to ensure their own national security due to demographic or cultural reasons. The Persian Gulf oil monarchies represent the best example of such a model. According to experts, traces of dependency model can also be detected in the arms acquisitions of Japan, Israel and to a lesser extent in Taiwan and South Korea. Therefore, in order to operate successfully in these markets, the exporter country needs a relevant political weight behind it. Moreover, the reliability of its military and political guarantees should not be questioned. Having a mutual security treaty as well as the deployment of troops and/or the presence of military advisors of the exporter country in the importing state, the importer's status as an ally, partner or a friendly nation can serve as an example of the dependency pattern.
- *The Political model.* The decision to import one or another type of arms depends largely on the political orientation of the importer country. This pattern is mostly typical of the post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe and countries like Malaysia or United Kingdom.

This model differs from the dependent motivation model in that the importer country is not facing any real threat to its security. Here the arms acquisitions rather demonstrate the country's political and cultural preferences rather than efforts to ensure security guarantees. Preferences can be pro-Western (Central and Eastern Europe), anti-American (China), anti-Islamic (India) or pluralistic (Malaysia). In this case countries mainly rely on one or two exporters. In the case of Malaysia geopolitical and economic pluralism is being demonstrated. Anyhow, the arms acquisition sources are consciously chosen in any given case.

- *The Blockade model.* A large number of countries that are in urgent need of strengthening their armaments or of spare parts for upgrading the existing weaponry live in conditions of either an official or enforced siege. Iraq before Saddam Hussein overthrow can serve an ideal example of this model. Libya, Syria and Iran also have elements of this model in acquisitions of up-to-date conventional weapons. Taiwan represents a special case. Though Taiwan's type of motivation mainly corresponds to the dependent model, it has some distinctive elements of the blockade type as well. The United States as Taiwan's main arms supplier pursues a policy of precaution: it delivers arms in small quantities at a time, in order to prevent tension with China. As a result, Taiwan has a shortage of offensive weapons such as long-range attack aircraft, non-nuclear attack submarines and high-tech tactical missiles. Pakistan is also rather close to this model.
- *The Rationally-pragmatic model.* Here, the decision to import arms is made depending on how the price, effectiveness and adequacy of a weapons system correlates with the requirements of the national armed forces of a particular country. Here, the decision-making process is especially clear, typical to countries with a competent bureaucracy and low corruption levels (Western Europe, China, and to a certain extent, India). Within this type the *industrial-technological motivation* sub-type can be singled out whereby preference is given to the exporter who offers the best-offset arrangement or transfer of technology rather than just the best commodity. Exporters that have a stake in major defence companies of the importer country have the best chance in this sub-type. For instance, such an arrangement exists in the consortium of French companies owning 20 percent in Brazil's Embraer, and U.S. Lockheed Martin having a stake in South Korea's aerospace KAI company. In this market segment the main competition is for the right to get a stake in national defence companies, mainly in the aerospace sector.

Table 7. Types of arms markets¹⁹

Type	Main features	Formal indicator	Pre-dominant markets	Pre-dominant exporters	Key export strategy element
Corruption-related	At the time of purchase, the corporate or personal financial gain of the importer country's leadership prevails over its government or national security interests.	Low CPI* index of the government bureaucracy in the importer country.	Muslim countries, India, Greece, Southeast Asia, South America, Africa	Russia, France, Ukraine	Identification of effective mediator, generous commission offer
Dependent	Arms imports only an element in seeking military security	Mutual security treaty, deployment of troops and/or advisors in the importer country demonstrate the importer's formal status of an ally, partner or friendly nation	Arab Persian Gulf monarchies, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan	USA, UK, France	Formal or informal security guarantees, deployment of troops in the importer country
Political	Geopolitical and/or cultural orientation of the importer		Central and East Europe, China, India, Malaysia	USA, Europe, Russia	Enhancement of the competitiveness and attractiveness of the sociopolitical and cultural model
Blockade	The importer tries to circumvent an embargo and get access to necessary arms systems	Existence of international and/or national arms embargo to a particular country	Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Pakistan	China, North Korea, Ukraine, Belarus	Most exporters ignore the market
Rational pragmatic	Choice on the basis of rational, often formal criteria, primarily cost, effectiveness and the competitiveness of offset and license programs.	High CPI rates	West, Central and East Europe, Chile, Brazil, China	USA, France, in some cases Russia	The reduction of the product price, the improvement of its technical parameters, formation of industrial alliances, attractive offset programs and technology transfers

*CPI (Corruption Perception Index) is annually calculated by Transparency International on the basis of expert polls. It reflects the perception of the degree of corruption in a country by the polled. High figures mean a low level of corruption of the bureaucracy in a particular country, and vice versa.

4. MAJOR IMPORTERS OF RUSSIAN ARMS

4.1 Types of Arms Market Targeted by Russia

The latest CRS report to the United States Congress names Russia as the second most important state in the global arms trade. In terms of the total value of arms transfer agreements made in 2002 Russia firmly ranked second making USD5.7 billion, i.e. nearly six billion US dollars or 19.5% of the world total. Yet Russia is considerably behind the United States. The United States made USD13.3 million worth agreements or 45.5% of all arms trade agreements made worldwide. One of Russia's arms trade partners, the Ukraine, ranked third in the value of arms transfer agreements, making USD1.6 billion.²⁰ According to another data group, the arms deliveries/sales volumes, the Report to the Congress evaluates Russia as ranking third after the United States and Great Britain. The U.S. arms deliveries accounted for USD10.2 billion and Great Britain's delivered arms for USD4.7 billion. According to the U.S. analyst's R. F. Grimmett report to the Congress²¹, in 2002 Russian arms deliveries accounted for USD3.1 billion.²² According to the data submitted by Russia to the UN Arms Register, the value of arms deliveries was as high as USD4.8 billion²³, that would mean that for the first time after the Cold War Russia actually ranked second and surpassed Great Britain by one hundred million. In any case, the comparison of data submitted by Russian analysts, the government, and U.S. analysts brings to a conclusion that the Russian arms trade sector has noticeably recovered and achieved the highest sales level ever since the Cold War. The value of Russian arms deliveries hit record and reached USD5.6 billion in 2003. This fact evidently proves the above-analysed tendencies to be true. The data have never been completely matching, the amounts of sold arms and their types have been at variance, time and again the final sales value was often higher with the Americans. Arms trade is a sensitive area in terms of national security and therefore it is not possible to obtain complete factual data. This research focuses on other important aspects: what changes the Russian role in the global arms trade has undergone over the last few years, what major purchasers of its arms are, what markets are focused on, and what markets are only sought to be overtaken.

4.2 Major Purchasers of Russian Arms and their Regional Structure

Over the whole period from 1993 to 2002 Russia ranked second in terms of the value of arms delivery agreements with the developing nations although it ranked fourth in terms of money amounts received for the actually delivered arms. During the aforesaid period it was surpassed by the United States, Great Britain, and France, the latter being a major rival during the times of financial crisis.

Russia clearly focused on the developing countries: it accounted for 77.2% of all agreements with the developing countries in 1993–1996²⁴, while in 1997–2002 its share was as high as 91%.²⁵ A strong focus on the developing nations demonstrates the fact that Russia does not have access to the markets of NATO countries or other developed nations, with the exception of Greece, Cyprus to some extent, Turkey, Poland, Slovakia, etc. It has to look for purchasers among less wealthy countries that are nevertheless seeking good armament, such as the nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Near East.

The stronger Russian positions in the global arms market can be associated both with V. Putin coming to power and the new reforms and with the focus on the nations that are discontented with the United States dominating position. Arms sales have always been one of the foreign policy implementation tools: one either purchases weapons from prospective allies or does not sell weapons to potential enemies. Moreover, analysts say that the concentration of Russian defence industry in a single Rosoboronexport establishment and a more flexible payment policy also have factored heavily in the positive changes.

Regions²⁶

Asia

Asia has been the second largest region in terms of the value of delivered arms, which accounted for USD67.8 billion in the period from 1995 to 2002.

Russia enjoyed the strongest positions in Asian region: in 1999–2002, nearly 82% of its arms delivered to the developing nations were sold into Asia. Two largest importers of Russian arms taking the lion's share in this sector are China and India. Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma (Myanmar), and Vietnam are also gaining importance. China, India, and Pakistan present a problem since they are the competing nations in this region.

In 1993–1996, agreements with Russia accounted for 35.3% of all arms transfer agreements made by Asian countries; in 1995–1998 this share accounted for 41.4%, while in 1999–2002 agreements with Russia accounted for more than a half (51%) of all Asian arms trade agreements. The data on the arms transfer agreements enable to make assumptions as to which countries are going to keep dominating the region in the nearest future. Russia is likely to become a dominating country in Asia.

In terms of another important index – the value of actually delivered weapons – the United States has been ranking first in Asia: 31.8% of all deliveries in 1995–1998 and 38.6% in 1999–2002. Russian data are less impressive: 16.4% in 1995–1998 and 33.4% in 1999–2002 respectively. In 1995–1998, France accounted for 24% which placed it ahead of Russia however in 1999–2002 it accounted for merely 4.9% and lost its previous positions.

Therefore it can be maintained that the improved Russian position in the field of arms trade is closely related to the successful operation in the Asian sector where in signature of new profitable agreements it is successful in surpassing the United States, which is accounting for hardly 18% of such agreements. Other important factors include some Asian countries deciding on purchasing arms from Russia due to political reasons, disapproval of the United States politics or failure to obtain a consent of the latter for delivery of required weaponry (e.g. Malaysia decided on purchasing Russian SU-30MKM instead of American F-16²⁷) as well as a much better price.

Near East

The Near East is a distinctive leader among the regions in terms of the value of purchased arms: in 1995–2002 the nations of this region with the smallest number of countries purchased armaments for USD111 billion.

Currently, dominance has been achieved by the United States that finds the Near East a strategically important region and therefore seeks to secure the greatest possible influence therein. In 1995–1998 it accounted for 43.2% in agreements and 42.2% in deliveries, compared to 75.8% and 42.5% in 1999–2002 respectively. The only serious rivals of the United States in this region are the major West European suppliers: the UK, France, Germany, and Italy; in 1995–1998 they accounted for 32.5% in agreements and 41% in deliveries; in 1999–2002 the share of agreements accounted for barely 5.3% whereas the deliveries rose to 44.2%. The increased influence of the United States can keep preventing the major West European suppliers from entering into profitable deals in the Near East. Therefore their perspectives in the nearest future are uncertain and it is very likely that the USA is going to become the only leader in the arms trade of the region.

Due to the above reason Great Britain and France that used to steadily rank second and third in this region are likely to be surpassing Russia rather insignificantly or even to draw level with it. The influence of the latter on the Near East market is moderate yet rather stable. It has maintained its previous positions and in terms of the value of agreements it has even drawn level with the West European countries collectively: in 1995–1998 it accounted for 5.8% in agreements and 4.5% in deliveries; in 1999–2002 the share was 6.1% and 3.9% respectively. Russian situation in this region is complicated by the strong positions of the United States that keeps accusing Russia of weapons sold to Iran. Syria is considered to be a new market of Russia that also features tense relations with the United States. The major purchasers of Russian arms are the United Arab Emirates (the UAE), Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait, etc. However the UAE and Egypt purchase most of their armaments from the United States. Other two large arms importers of this region – Saudi Arabia and Israel – also go for the United States.

Russian cooperation with Iran in the military field is an important aspect in the analysis of the Russian arms trade in the Near East. In 2000, Russia once again attracted the attention of the world and particularly the United States in respect of the weapons deliveries to Iran and especially of its assistance in pursuance of the Iran nuclear program. Currently, after the war in Iraq, the United States are escalating the issue of Iran threat again although the latter denies the accusations. Both Iran and Russia claim that the program is aimed at exceptionally civil purposes: the nuclear power is necessary for providing the country with electric power. The data submitted by Iran have been given a positive evaluation by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA) officers.²⁸ However due to the volume of this work this issue will be covered in the Master's Thesis.

Latin America

It is the third region in terms of the volumes of purchased weapons. In 1995-2002 the weapons sold into Latin America accounted for USD8.2 billion.

The United States clearly dominate in this region: in 1995-1998 it accounted for 21.7% in terms of agreements and 37% in terms of deliveries; in 1999-2002 the share was 51% and 61% respectively. The United States has no major rivals in this region: Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain deliver comparable amounts of weapons accounting for 4 to 7 percent.

Russia might increase its influence in the Latin American market, however in 1995-1998 it accounted for 7% in terms of agreements and deliveries; in 1999-2002 it made 5.4% in agreements and only 4% in deliveries. Russian weapons were purchased by Brazil, Columbia, and in 2002 by Mexico.²⁹

Africa

The nations of African region rank last in terms of the volumes of purchased weapons. In 1995–2002 the value of purchased weapons accounted for only USD3.5 billion. In this region of the poorest nations Russian deliveries rank first. Its rival is China. In 1995–1998 Russia accounted for 19.4% in terms of agreements and 18.2% in terms of deliveries; in 1999–2002 the share was 14.7% and 25.5% respectively. In 1995–1998 China accounted for 16.2% in terms of agreements and 14.6% in terms of deliveries; in 1999–2002 the share was 7.8% and 12.7% respectively.

Russian cheap and rather good quality weapons are very competitive in Africa. Russian arms are purchased by African nations that order the largest amounts thereof: Ethiopia, Sudan, etc. New agreements have been made with Guinea.³⁰ The data imply that in the future Russia will outrival China and European countries in a large number of cases. Due to a low strategic value the United States express little interest in this region. The weapons exported to Africa by the USA in 1995–2002 accounted for 5 to 10% of the total sales of the region.

Developed Countries³¹

This arms market sector is financially sound and it is important for Russia however it manages to get into it only in exceptional cases. For instance in the period from 1995 to 1998 the Russian sales volumes in this sector accounted for 10.3% of the total sales of the country, in 1999–2002 they represented 13.4% and barely 6.4% in 2002. The value of deliveries in 1999–2002 exceeded USD1.5 billion. Developed countries sector ranks third in terms of the value of Russian deliveries after Asia and the Near East. Here, the best Russian customer is a NATO member Greece that purchased Russian weaponry for USD1 billion. That represents the largest share of total Russian deliveries to the developed countries (The latest USD64 million worth agreement made at the end of 2002 on the sales of submarine Pomornik³²).

Cyprus is one of the importers of Russian weapons. Important achievements were the agreements made in 2002 with East European countries Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia on upgrading the existing MiG-29 fighters and purchasing spare parts therefore; a comparable agreement was made with Hungary in 2001.³³ The value of the agreements is rather small however they will enable the Russian MiG to continue on the markets of the said countries.

Another still more interesting fact is the Russian agreement made in 2003 with France on military and technical cooperation particularly in the aerospace field in the development of a fifth generation fighter. France also made a purchase agreement for 4-5 newly developed training fighters MiG - AT.³⁴

Russian collaboration with France demonstrates an advanced approach: to seek competition with the United States dominance in the arms trade markets by joint efforts. The USA has already developed F-22 fighter attributed to the fifth generation. Whereas France represents a country that has been the most unsuccessful in the arms trade over the recent years; its sales have fallen several times.

4.3 Links between Russian and Belarusian Arms Sales

In 1995–2002, Belarus, being a small and financially weak country, stood as high as in the eleventh position only in terms of officially known arms deliveries. The total value of arms sales accounted for USD 1.9 billion including USD1.8 billion to the developing countries that represents the tenth position worldwide.³⁵ Naturally, experts question whether such a small country with a tenuous and unvaried defence industry is able to achieve such high results.

It is difficult to identify the exact position of Belarus on the global arms market. A large number of classified arms sales the data whereon are not available to analysis centres make this next to impossible. However, even according to official data, Belarus is one of the major arms suppliers. Western states often accuse this country for selling arms to nations and groups supporting terrorism and countries instigating regional conflicts.

Analysts of German DNA news agency claim that due to the inaccessibility of official data Western observers have to rely on the data provided by intelligence analysts as well as military officers and diplomats of the neighbouring East European countries and political magazines quoting sources close to Belarusian arms traders. More interestingly, during the 56 Session of the UN Assembly in September 2001 the document distributed among the Security Council members presented a clear-cut chronology of arms sold by Belarus. It corroborates the fact of the arms sales to countries supporting terrorism. According to Russian analysts, the data are presented in a way to imply that Russia had knowingly yielded these markets to Belarus. In 2001 Western and Belarusian opposition press published articles expressing supposition that Belarus was delivering weapons to Iraq, Albania, Afghanistan, the Palestinians, and even Chechnyan rebels.³⁶ The Wall Street Journal said that in 2001 Belarus delivered weapons and military hardware for USD500 million to the Palestinian striking forces and other countries considered by the United States to be supporting terrorism.³⁷ There has even been information on the deliveries of S-300 (SA-10) medium-range surface-to-air missiles to Iraq.

The arms trade in Belarus is actually controlled by the President A. Lukashenko, which is a fact speaking for itself. He denied the accusations of arms deliveries to the so-called “rogue (rougue) states”. During his interview to the Wall Street Journal A. Lukoshenko claimed that Belarus does not even produce such weapons as tanks, sub-machine guns, missiles or bombs the export whereof it is being accused.

In fact Belarusian military industry is producing parts of various weaponry, optical equipment, computer hardware and devices for space programs. It can be assumed the Belarus receives the weaponry sold thereby from Russia since, due to political reasons, the latter cannot deliver it to the “rogue states” but is unwilling to abandon this profitable arms market segment.

Interesting data³⁸:

- In 2001 Italian police intercepted a delivery of Belarusian arms for Kosovo liberation army.
- Delivery of light weapons, anti-tank missiles, mines, etc. to Palestinian organisations.
- Further deliveries of tanks to North Korea.
- 48 T-72 tanks delivered to Morocco from Belarusian army stockpiles.
- Deliveries of light weapons and ammunition to Libya which later re-exported them to the Chechenyan rebels.

The above data are not verified by official Belarusian sources however it would never do such things. Therefore it can be assumed that the with the new situation on the arms market after the Central and Eastern European countries

joined the NATO the markets of the said countries became no longer available to Belarus. Over the few most recent years the collaboration with Russia has become more intensive which could have led to sharing out the influence zones. Both Russia and Belarus focus on the markets of Asia, Latin America, and Africa; however the said markets are limited. Moreover, there is another large “rogue states” market mentioned before where Russia cannot take up any activities.

Belarus, the political relations whereof with the global society are complicated anyway has much less to lose.

The fact that a high degree of secrecy in arms trade transactions has been especially apparent since 2000 also adds to the assumptions that Belarus is a dealer of Russian arms. The abundance of implicit evidences of such transactions cannot be accidental. The economic and political relations with rogue states – Iraq (before the United States victory), Iran, Libya, and North Korea – are very intense. After V. Putin came to power, the focus on North Korea was clearly expressed; the leaders of the two countries met twice. North Korea repeatedly requested for Russia to restore the deliveries of weapons in exchange of the given consent to build the Trans-Siberian railway.³⁹ North Korea is mainly equipped with Soviet weaponry therefore it needs spare parts for upgrading it.⁴⁰ Russia could achieve the objectives sought by both parties through Belarus, which even has official proofs of deliveries to North Korea. Russia itself denies the possibility to restore the deliveries to North Korea; but probably Korea would not have given the said consent in return to empty promises.

Therefore there are two explanations of where Belarus gets the weapons from, namely:

1. A. Lukoshenko claims that he personally ordered to halt the dismantlement of tanks as prescribed by the Tashkent Agreement. According to this Agreement, Belarus was to cut down the number of other combat vehicles, armoured cars, artillery systems, fighter aircrafts, and helicopters. The disposal of this military hardware may have been also suspended and it may have been sold instead. Whatever the case may be, according to the official reports Belarus fulfilled the terms of the agreement.
2. One of Belarusian opposition leaders, Stanislav Shushkevich, claims that it is not Belarus that selling weapons. Rather, Russia employs Belarus as a channel for arms deliveries to Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc. For instance, the transfer of MiG–29 to Peru and Algeria. Belarusian air force did not have these fighter aircrafts, not even in their stockpiles; thus it seems likely that the above is an example of Russian weapons re-export.

Both explanations may be correct to some extent. However, while analysing the changed role of Russia in the global arms trade, it would be wrong to

disregard the above entirely. Belarus, which is likely to unite with Russia in the future, is under a strong political and economic influence of Russia.

In the future Belarus should remain an important exporter of arms, while the market segment covered thereby presents the greatest menace: terrorism supporting and unstable countries. As Russian analysts put it, it would be impossible to maintain the existing positions without Russian support. However there are no official proofs thereof.

4.4 Collaboration between Russia and the Ukraine in Arms Trade

The Ukraine ranks second among the former USSR states after Russia in terms of the value of arms deliveries. In the period from 1995 through 2002 the Ukraine ranked eighth in terms of arms transfer agreements, accounting for USD5.3 billion including USD3.3 billion worth agreements with the developing nations, i.e. ranking seventh in the world in this respect. In 2002, in terms of agreements made globally the Ukraine ranked third after the United States and Russia. In terms of the value of arms export in 1995-2002, accounting for USD3.9 billion, the Ukraine ranked ninth globally and in 2002 it was sixth with USD600 million. Deliveries to the developing nations accounted for USD2.8 billion against the total deliveries of USD3.9 billion over the said period.⁴¹

The Russian and Ukrainian market segments often overlap. The Ukraine was more successful in making agreements with the developed countries and Pakistan. Russian and Ukrainian focus on the same markets frequently led to tough competition. For instance, the Ukraine recently supplied China with technologies for the maintenance of Russian AL-31 aero engines for USD20 million, whereas Russia did not earn anything from this deal.⁴² However the situation is likely to change as of the year 2003. The Ukrainian foreign policy has turned to Russia again. In the field of arms trade a representative example thereof is the agreement made in July between Russia and the Ukraine “on joint actions in arms exports to the third countries”. After the signature, Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov claims that Russia and the Ukraine are no longer going to compete or to hinder trade on the third country markets. According to Kasyanov, the two countries will benefit more by uniting efforts in the arms trade and sharing the customers.⁴³ An intergovernmental group is going to be formed that will have to decide which country is going to have a transaction which is interesting to both of them. Rosoboronexport and Ukrspecexport will have to submit all applications for participation in the transactions or arms sales tenders for the consideration of the aforesaid group.

Experts divided in assessment of the agreement. Russia being a larger state with a stronger potential should remain dominating in any case and thus further

strengthen its positions on the global arms trade market. On the other hand, the Ukraine may benefit if due to the agreement it gets the contract for repair of Indian tanks T-72 produced in the Ukraine or any other comparable contracts. The value of the said contract is USD1 billion. The Ukraine is looking for other ways to increase its competitiveness: recently it offered a modernised version of Kalashnikov assault rifles.⁴⁴ However, for all we know, this might also be a case of shared spheres sanctioned by Russia. Worldwide, the value of offensive firearms accounts for barely 4-5% of the total global arms sales. Therefore it can be assumed that Russia will continue getting the most important contracts, whereas the Ukraine will also benefit from this agreement.

Moreover, Russia and the Ukraine have decided to complete a joint project of the development of a military transport plane AN-70 they are currently working on.⁴⁵

5. EVALUATION OF CHANGES IN GLOBAL ARMS TRADE

The amounts of weapons purchased by the developing countries keep shrinking dramatically. This fact is attributed to the lack of financial resources resulting from the economic depression suffered by a large part of the world. This also led to a drastic growth of competition on the arms trade markets. Thus the value of the excellent results achieved by Russia over the recent years is even greater since the said achievements demonstrate the ability to remain competitive even in more demanding conditions. Under the said conditions a great number of developing countries decided to focus on upgrading and absorption of the existing weapons systems. The purchase of older system parts precluded purchases of newer and costlier weapons. Analysts are forecasting a further slight decrease of the arms trade volumes with the developing countries.

The major weapons producing developed countries further seek to protect the vital elements of their military industry which resulted in reduced trade between these countries with the exception of joint weapons development projects.

The changing international arms market dynamics forced Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to restructure and consolidate their defences. Russia has also embarked on modernisation. Due to the increased Russian influence, even the United States decided to cancel a great number of restrictions on American arms export for a period of five years starting in 2002. The official version says that the United States needs this measure in order to secure more allies in its fight against international terrorism.⁴⁶ Another important reason is the need to stimulate the national economy that is facing the crisis with profitable arms transfer transactions. The arms embargo imposed on the United States

enterprises was lifted for Pakistan, India, Indonesia, etc. i.e. the markets where the positions of Russia are very strong.

A new prospective market is the new NATO countries, the former states of the Warsaw Pact. Here, the competition between the United States and West European companies is very tough.

The Near East should remain at the top of the list of the arms trade regions of the developing countries with Asia ranking second. The dramatic decrease of the weapons volumes purchased by Latin America and Africa is attributable to their solvency problems. Therefore in the future they are not going to play an important role even should they reach the previous export levels. On the other hand, the cheaper light weapons purchased thereby are employed at conflicts and the smaller purchases do not solve the problem related to the costly weapons.

6. RUSSIAN PROBLEMS AND MERITS IN GLOBAL ARMS TRADE

The major problem faced by Russia is the lack of customer diversity. Contracts with China and India account for over 80% of total value of agreements made by Russia. That is where the lion's share of the profit comes from. Thus the increased sales of Russia are based on the increasing needs of these countries and the better potential of the Russian defence industry to fulfil the orders within a shorter time.

Very important Russian arms purchasers are Kuwait, Algeria, Vietnam, and Greece. A successful cooperation is anticipated with Malaysia, Indonesia, Guinea, and Pakistan. It is expected to improve the situation with Iran and Syria. However the Russian efforts to expand the list of purchasers confront definite problems. Firstly, the most potentially cash-paying states are the long-standing customers of the United States and major West European suppliers. In the meantime they express an explicit unwillingness to replace their armaments with non-western Russian ones when more recent versions of the existing weaponry are available from the Western suppliers. Russia's difficult transition from the soviet state supported and controlled industrial system has led some prospective purchasers to question its reliability. Specifically, it is doubted whether the Russian defence industry can prove to be a reliable supplier of spare parts for the purchased weaponry and whether it can provide support services necessary for the maintenance. Another problem is related to the fact that Russia has hardly embarked on a wide-range military R&D program aimed at developing modern systems of the major armaments. This places it at great disadvantage that prevents successful competition in the market segments dominated by the United States and West European suppliers which are able to develop new generations of weapons and to enhance the existing ones.

Concrete reform of the Russian defence industry has begun in 2001 but it is too early to evaluate its results. Russian arms industry, which is characterized by an extremely high degree of over-capacity and a low degree of civilian production, and is still very much dependent on arms exports. Russian analysts admit that the national arms industry calls for higher modernization levels whereas V. Putin's reform was so far but restoration of order. He concentrated nearly all major weapons producers in the hands of the state. In 2002, the instituted formation Rosoboronexport accounted for 85% (USD 4.2 billion) of total Russian arms export.⁴⁷ It accounted even for 94% (USD 5.1 billion) of total Russian arms export in 2003.⁴⁸ In the meantime, the variety of exported weapons is not great either. Over three fourths of the profit is derived from the sales of aviation hardware, chiefly fighter aircrafts MiG-29, SU-27, and SU-30. The value of the sold ground forces weaponry accounts for 15% (tanks T-90), naval armaments and equipment come up to 6% (Kilo-class attack submarines), and air defence weapons represent 4% (S-300 PMU - 2 SAM systems).⁴⁹

At any rate, Russia can offer rather diverse weaponry with good value for the money. It also enjoys the advantage of selling the newest weaponry, which even Russian armed forces cannot afford. Western countries almost exceptionally keep the latest generation weapons for their own use until better armaments are developed. That might be one of the main reasons why Russia managed to increase its sales and to take over some of the French and German markets. That can represent a strong influence on the international security environment and reduce the global security. Good quality weapons are delivered to instable nations and this fact presupposed the insecurity of such Russian orientation as the largest number of military conflicts is generated in the segment of the insecure countries.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, the Russian arms export is worth USD 5.941 billion against USD 3.941 billion worth US export, ranking first and second in the world respectively.⁵⁰ SIPRI equalises one type of equivalent weaponry with the same price (the F-15 fighter produced by the US being USD 50 million is equalised with the price of Russian SU-30, the market price whereof is below USD 35 million). SIPRI expert Siemon T. Wezeman explains that the SIPRI calculations based on the number major conventional arms (tanks, planes, artillery) do not reflect real financial indicators.⁵¹ SIPRI does not calculate the price of aviation hardware, electronic and monitoring systems. Nevertheless, the SIPRI data are important: they show that in 2001 and 2002 Russia surpassed the United States in terms of the amounts of delivered major conventional weapons. Of course, this was achieved due to a much lower price of the Russian weapons, whereas the US keeps earning the highest profit and remains the global leader in terms of the actual financial indicators.

The aforesaid data are supplemented by the data from the UN Conventional Arms Register. According to them, Russia was the world leader in terms of individual weapons deliveries, which is due to the fact that here a missile export is equated to a fighter export, i.e. it represents one unit. As a result of 330 missiles delivered to China and 941 missile delivered to Kuwait, Russia took the lead in terms of the number of exported weapons. The United States was only second (1027), however it exported only 425 missiles. Thus, excluding missiles, the United States would have firmly ranked first with the sales of 487 tanks and armoured cars, 60 combat helicopters, etc.⁵² Therefore it is quite reasonable that the value of the US export (approximately USD\$10 billion) is more than twice higher than the value of the Russian arms export (USD4.8 billion). However the UN data do not cover all the supplied weapons.

Still it is important to emphasise that the SIPRI and UN data suggest that Russia is dramatically strengthening its positions on the international arms market. It makes a serious impact on the global security by selling the largest quantities of weaponry. Research shows that military conflicts mainly employ light weapons, large quantities whereof are sold by Russia. The data submitted to the UN Conventional Arms Register reflect Russian arms export to Sudan, Angola, Algeria, Burma (Myanmar), etc.

Russia makes a great impact on the global security; rather fair accusations of the weapons re-export through Belarus add to the threat posed by Russia. The Belarusian arms export leads to the so-called “rogue states”. Consolidation of power with the Ukraine, the agreement on coordination of actions and non-competition in arms trade also represent an important achievement of Russia. The Ukraine firmly ranks second among the former communist countries after Russia. Therefore Russia enjoys much more possibilities to dominate over the Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS

The most recent years have been very successful for Russian defence industry. This brings to a conclusion that Russian influence in the global arms trade should remain of high importance and the gained stronger positions should be maintained in at least the nearest future. Russia can expand its customer base in the Near East and strengthen its positions in Asia by capitalizing on the difficulties faced by the United States on the international arena.



However Russia does not have sufficient capacity for expansion as this requires modernisation of the defence industry and larger financial resources. The lack of these increases the threat that the weapons will be further supplied to the segment of the less stable countries.

The assessment of the Russian role in the global arms trade brings to a conclusion that this role is presupposed by its current position, i.e. the arms market niche covered by Russia is greatly unstable or it is potentially dangerous in the future. The Russian role changed after the Cold War since the potentiality of presenting a serious challenge to the Western states became lesser; however presently the recipients of Russian arms are still mainly the countries which are simply not able to afford purchasing desired weapons from the Western states. Potentially, such trade can increase tension in the inter-state relations to a greater or lesser extent and result in hostility in the international security system. Russia claims that the accusations of irresponsible behaviour in arms transfers are merely the striving of the United States to secure exclusively dominating positions in the arms trade and the attempt to control its self-determination. Despite numerous promises not to deliver arms to one or another country presenting a menace, usually those promises are not kept and the sales continue. Therefore it can be maintained that the arms trade trends have undergone very few changes since the Cold War, the antagonism towards the United States persists, although the potentiality of presenting a serious challenge dramatically reduced.


The Russian arms trade strategy could be defined as striving to make the biggest possible profit by causing as much harm to the potential opponents as possible. The impact of the weapons sold by Russia on the global security environment should remain an important factor reducing the global security.

The analysis in this research leads to a final conclusion that Russian arms trade decreases international security and such tendencies will remain in the near and midterm future. The situation in the distant future depends on Russia's political system evolution. If the tendencies of commercial and antagonistic to the Western countries arms sales remain, Russia will further threaten global stability and security. It would mean the evolution towards military authoritarianism, which is very possible. The optimistic variant is the way towards modern state, though in authoritarian form. It could lead to more secure arms export, based on international law regulations, which usually remain only in theoretical level now.


APPENDICES ⁵³




Arms Transfer Agreements With Asia, 1995-1998
(supplier percentage of value)




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



Arms Deliveries to Africa, 1995-1998
(supplier percentage of value)




Arms Deliveries to Africa, 1999-2002
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








Arms Transfer Agreements With Near East, 1995-1998
(supplier percentage of value)



Arms Transfer Agreements With Near East, 1999-2002
(supplier percentage of value)











Table 8 Regions Identified in Arms Transfer Tables and Charts*

ASIA	NEAR EAST	AFRICA	LATIN AMERICA	EUROPE
Afghanistan	Algeria	Angola	Antigua	Albania
Australia	Bahrain	Benin	Argentina	Armenia
Bangladesh	Egypt	Botswana	Bahamas	Austria
Brunei	Iran	Burkina Faso	Barbados	Azerbaijan
Burma	Iraq	Burundi	Belize	Belarus
(Myanmar)	Israel	Cameroon	Bermuda	Bosnia/Herzegovina
China	Jordan	Cape Verde	Bolivia	Bulgaria
Fiji	Kuwait	Central African	Brazil	Belgium
India	Lebanon	Republic	British Virgin	Canada
Indonesia	Libya	Chad	Islands	Croatia
Japan	Morocco	Congo	Cayman Islands	Czechoslovakia/
Kampuchea	Oman	Côte d'Ivoire	Chile	Czech Republic
(Cambodia)	Qatar	Djibouti	Colombia	Cyprus
Kazakhstan	Saudi Arabia	Equatorial Guinea	Costa Rica	Denmark
Kyrgyzstan	Syria	Ethiopia	Cuba	Estonia
Laos	Tunisia	Gabon	Dominica	Finland
Malaysia	United Arab	Gambia	Dominican	France
Nepal	Emirates	Ghana	Republic	FYR/Macedonia
New Zealand	Yemen	Guinea	Ecuador	Georgia
North Korea		Guinea-Bissau	El Salvador	Germany
Pakistan		Kenya	French Guiana	Greece
Papua New		Lesotho	Grenada	Hungary
Guinea		Liberia	Guadeloupe	Iceland
Philippines		Madagascar	Guatemala	Ireland
Pitcairn		Malawi	Guyana	Italy
Singapore		Mali	Haiti	Latvia
South Korea		Mauritania	Honduras	Liechtenstein
Sri Lanka		Mauritius	Jamaica	Lithuania
Taiwan		Mozambique	Martinique	Luxembourg
Tajikistan		Namibia	Mexico	Malta
Thailand		Niger	Montserrat	Moldova
Turkmenistan		Nigeria	Netherlands Antilles	Netherlands
Uzbekistan		Réunion	Nicaragua	Norway
Vietnam		Rwanda	Panama	Poland
		Senegal	Paraguay	Portugal
		Seychelles	Peru	Romania
		Sierra Leone	St. Kitts & Nevis	Russia
		Somalia	St. Lucia	Serbia & Montenegro
		South Africa	St. Pierre &	Slovak Republic
		Sudan	Miquelon	Slovenia
		Swaziland	St. Vincent	Spain
		Tanzania	Suriname	Sweden
		Togo	Trinidad	Switzerland
		Uganda	Turks & Caicos	Turkey
		Zaire	Venezuela	Ukraine
		Zambia		United Kingdom
		Zimbabwe		

* As used in this research, developed countries include the United States, Russia, European countries, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A listing of countries located in the regions defined for the purpose of data used in this research — Asia, Near East, Latin America, Africa and Europe — is provided in this table.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹ The Armaments Spiral is the interaction between weapons – tension – weapons in the international arms system that often gives rise to conflicts.
- ² Hereinafter the weapons of mass destruction will be referred to as WMD.
- ³ “Glossary.” *SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford University Press, 1999.
- ⁴ The major West European arms suppliers are United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy.
- ⁵ “Arms Trade.” *Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2000*. © 1993-1999 Microsoft Corporation.
- ⁶ Cordesman, A., H. (1999). “The Strategic Impact of Russian Arms Sales and Technology Transfers.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, April 5, 1999, pp. 8.
- ⁷ Grimmett, R., F. (2002). *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1995–2002*. CRS Report to Congress, 2002, September 22, p. 77.
- ⁸ *ibid.* pp. 77.
- ⁹ Arms Trade 1989-1999. www.state.gov/documents/organization/6310.pdf.
- ¹⁰ Grimmett, R., F. (2002). *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1995–2002*. CRS Report to Congress, September 22, 2002, pp. 77.
- ¹¹ *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*.
- ¹² Cordesman, A., H. (1999). “The Strategic Impact of Russian Arms Sales and Technology Transfers.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, April 5, 1999, pp. 8.
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